THE UNION INDIAN BRIGADE IN THE CIVIL WAR

HILL'S ARKANSAS AND TEXAS TROOPS GENERAL STERLING PRICE ELKHORN TAVERN

Last hour of the Battle of Pea Ridge, March 8, 1862. Advance of Union Forces to retake the position at Elkhorn Tavern. First battle in which the Cherokee and Choctaw Indians, under General Pike, participated against white troops.
(From a painting by Hunt P. Wilson in the possession of the Southern Historical Society, St. Louis.)

THE

UNION INDIAN BRIGADE

THE FIVE CIVILIZED INDIAN NATIONS IN THE CIVIL WAR

BY

WILEY BRITTON

Author of "The Civil War on the Border," two volumes; "A Study of the Trades Union System;" "The Aftermath of the Civil War." Life Member of the American Association for the Advancement of Science; Thirty Years Special Service War and Interior Departments, Washington

1922

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Arkansas Volunteer Cavalry.

First, Col. L. M. Harrison; Second, Col. J. E. Phelps; Third, Col. A. H. Ryan; Fourth, Col. . . . . *Infantry*, First, Col. J. M. Johnson; Second, Col. E. J. Searle. *Artillery*, First Battery, Captain D. D. Stark, approximately 7,000 men.

Colorado Volunteer Infantry.

Second, Col. Theo. H. Dodd, say, 1,000 men.

Illinois Volunteer Cavalry.

Third, Col. E. A. Carr; Tenth, Col. Dudly Wickersham; Seventeenth, Col. J. L. Beveridge; 36, two companies.

Illinois Volunteer Infantry.

25th, Col. W. N. Coler; 35th, Col. G. A. Smith; 37th, Col. Julius White; 44th, Col. C. Knobelsdorff; 59th, Col. C. H. Frederick; 94th, Col. Jas. McNulta. *Artillery*, Peoria Battery, Lieut. H. Borris; Captain Davidson's Battery, about 9,000 men.

Indiana Volunteer Infantry.

Eighth, Col. W. P. Benton; Eighteenth, Col. H. D. Washburn; Twenty-second, Col. Jeff C. Davis; Twenty-sixth, Col. J. G. Clark; Forty-third, Col. W. E. McLean. *Artillery*, First, Second and Third, Batteries, approximately 6,000 men.

Iowa Volunteer Cavalry.

First, Col. F. H. Warren; Third, Col. C. Bussey; Fourth, Col. E. F. Winslow. *Infantry*, First, Col. J. F. Bates; Fourth, Col. G. M. Dodge; Ninth, Col. W. Vandever; Eighteenth, Col. J. Edwards; Nineteenth, Col. B. Crabb; Twentieth, Col. W. McE. Dye; Thirty-sixth, Col. F. M. Drake; Fortieth, Col. J. A. Garrett. *Artillery*, First and Third Batteries, approximately 11,000 men, and Generals S. R. Curtis, G. M. Dodge, F. Herron, C. Bussey, W. Vandever.

Kansas Volunteer Cavalry.

Second, Col. W. F. Cloud; Fifth, Col. P. Clayton; Sixth, Col. W R. Judson; Seventh, Col. C. R. Jennison; Ninth, Col. E. Lynde; Fourteenth, Col. C. W. Blair; Fifteenth, Col. G. H. Hoyt; Sixteenth, Col. Samuel Walker. *Infantry*, First, Col. G. W. Deitzler; Second, Col. R. B. Mitchell; Third, Col. James Montgomery; Fourth, Col. W. Weer; Tenth, Col. C. S. Hills; Eleventh, Col. Thomas Ewing, Jr.; Twelfth, Col. C. W. Adams; Thirteenth, Col. Thomas M. Bowen. *Artillery*, First, Second and Third Batteries.

Kansas Colored Volunteer Infantry.

First, Col. J. M. Williams; Second, Col. S. J. Crawford; approximately

Indian Regiments Home Guards, Union.

First, Col. R. W Furnace; Second, Col. John Ritchie; Third, Col. W. A. Phillips; about 3,000 men.

Missouri Volunteer Cavalry.

First, Col. J. F. Ritter; Second, Col. L. Merrill; Third, Col. J. M. Glover; Fourth, Col. G. E. Warring; Fifth, Col. J. Nemett; Sixth, Col. Clark Wright; Seventh, Col. D. Huston; Eighth, Col. W. F Geiger; Tenth, Col. F. M. Cornyn; Eleventh, Col. W. D. Wood; Thirteenth, Col. E. C. Catherwood; Fourteenth, Col. J. J. Gravelly; Fifteenth, Col. J. D. Allen; Sixteenth, Col. J. F. McMahan. *State Militia Cavalry*, First, Col. J. McFerran; Second, Col. J. B. Rogers; Third, Col. Walter King; Fourth, Col. G. H. Hall; Fifth, Col. Sigel; Sixth, Col. S. H. Melcher; Seventh, Col. J. F. Philips; Eighth, Col. J. W. McClurg; Ninth, Col. Odin Guitar; Eleventh, Col. H. S. Lipscomb; Twelfth, Col. B. F. Lazear; Fourteenth, Col. J. M. Richardson. *Artillery*, Two Regiments, Light and Heavy.

Volunteer Infantry.

Phelps Regiment, Col. John S. Phelps; First, Col. F P. Blair, Jr.; Second, Col. F. Schaefer; Third, Col. I. P. Shepard; Third, Col. F. Sigel; Fifth, Col. C. E. Salomon; Sixth, Col. P. E. Bland; Twelfth, Col. P. J. Osterhaus; Fourteenth, Col. R. H. Graham; Seventeenth, Col. F. Hassendeubel; Twenty-fourth, Col. S. H. Boyd; Twenty-fifth, Col. E. Peabody; Twenty-seventh, Col. B. W. Grover; Thirty-ninth Col. E. A. Kutzner; Forty-third, Col. Chester Harding, Jr.; Forty-eighth, Col. Wells H. Blodgett; Fiftieth, Col. David Murphy.

Missouri also had Eighteen regiments of Enrolled Militia, and about 10,000 short term Home Guards, Union, or about 54,000 men exclusive of Enrolled Militia and Home Guards.

Ohio Volunteer Cavalry.

Second, Col. C. Doubleday; and Second and Fourth Batteries, say, 1,500 men.

Wisconsin Volunteer Cavalry.

Second, Col. N. H. Dale; Third, Col. W A. Barstow. *Infantry*, Ninth, Col. F. Salomon; Twelfth, Col. G. E. Bryant; Thirteenth, Col. Maurice Malony; Twentieth, Col. Henry Bertam; Forty-eighth, Col. U. B. Pearshall. *Artillery*, Ninth Battery, Capt. J. H. Dodge; say 5,000 men.

Missouri State Guard, Southern.
Eighth Divisions, about 40,000 men.

Missouri Volunteer Cavalry, Confederate.
First, Col. E. Gates; Second, Col. . . ; Third, Col. C. reen; Fourth, Col. J. Q. Burbridge; Fifth, Col. F. B. Gordon; Sixth, ol. D. Shanks; Seventh, Col. S. G. Kitchen; Eighth, Col. W L. Jeffers; inth, Col. J. D. White; Tenth, Col. R. R. Lawther; Eleventh, Col. W. Smith; Fourteenth, Col. R. C. Wood; Fifteenth, Col. T. Reves; egiments of Col. J. F. Davis; Col. T. R. Freeman; Col. E. T. Fristoe; o.. E. Elliott; Col. A. W. Slayback; Col. S. D. Jackman; Col. D. C. unter; Col. D. A. Williams; Col. J. A. Schnable; Col. C. H. Tyler; ol. C. Perkins; Col. John T. Coffee; Col. J T. Searcy; Col. J. O. nelby; Col. B. Jeans. *Artillery*, Ten Batteries; approximately 65,000 en.

Arkansas Cavalry, C. S. A.
First Mounted Rifles, Col. J. McIntosh; Second Mounted Rifles, Col. J. Churchill; General N. B. Pearce's Division, 1861, about 4,000 men; egiments of Col. J. A. Carroll: Col. J. C. Monroe; Col. A. Gordon; ol. T. J. Morgan: Col. J. F. Hill; Col. W A. Craford; Col. W F emons; Col. T. M. Gunter; Col. J. M. Harrell; Col. C. H. Carlton; ol. J. C. Wright; Col. A. S. Dobbin; Col. J. H. McGhee; Col. A. R. itt; Col. T. H. McCray; 45th, Col. O. P Lyles; 47th, Col. Lee Cranda l; ol. J. W Rogan; Col. E. Ford. *Infantry*, Col. A. T. Hawthorn; 22d, ol. J. P King; 29th, Col. J. C. Pleasants; 34th, Col. W H. Brooks; 'th, Col. D. McRae; 26th, Col. A. S. Morgan; 30th, Col. A. J. McNeill; ol. C. E. Matlock; Col. C. W Adams; 27th, Col. J. R. Shaler; 33d, ol. H. L. Grinstead; 28th, Col. R. G. Shaver; 19th, Col C. L. Dawson 4th, Col. E. E. Portlock; 4th, Col. E. McNair; 14th, Col. Mitchel ol. Rector; 17th, Col. Embry. *Artillery*, Eleven Batteries, approxiately 51,000 men.

Texas Volunteer Cavalry, C. S. A.
Third, Col. E. Greer; Sixth, Col. B. W. Stone; Fourth, Col. W S. ms; Col. J. S. Griffith; Col. O. Young; Col. W. P Lane; Col. T. C. awpe; 22nd, Col. J. C. Stevens; 31st, Col. G. W. Guess; 34th, Col. M. Alexander; Col. Chas. DeMorse; Col. Randolph; 20th, Col. T. C. ass; Fifth Partisan Rangers; Artillery, four Batteries, approximately ,000 men.

Indian Regiments, C. S. A.
First Cherokee, Mounted, Col. S. Watie; Second Cherokee, Mounted, ol. John Drew; First Cherokee, Mounted Rifles, Col. W P. Adair, pecial Service, Choctaw and Chickasaw Mounted Rifles, Col. Tandy alker; First Creek Mounted, Col. D. N. McIntosh; Second Creek ounted, Col. Chilly McIntosh; Col. Deneale's Regiment Choctaw Warors; First Chickasaw Infantry; First Seminole Mounted Volunteers, pproximately 12,000 men.

Louisiana Infantry.
Third, Col. Louis Hebert, 1,000 men.
The military operations in this region employed about 300,000 troops.

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Very truly yours
Wiley Britton.

PREFACE

It has seemed to me that a History, a Monograph, of the operations of the Civilized Indian Tribes of our borders in the great struggle for the preservation of the Union should be left as a monument of their heroism and devotion by some one who participated with them in that struggle and saw their sufferings and trials for the cause they espoused.

Their descendants who have grown up since the war, with all the advantages that have come to them in the unprecedented development of their country, will undoubtedly feel an interest in the achievements of their fathers, and wish to preserve a record of those achievements to hand down to posterity. The operations of both sides have been given and described without prejudice as if the writer was a disinterested spectator taking down and recording everything of historic interest that came within his knowledge.

Larger and distant operations in other parts of the country have been referred to only in connection with their bearing on operations in the Indian country, such as taking the troops from the department in which the Indian Territory was embraced, to reinforce the troops or armies of another department in important campaigns.

The fact is noted that when the Indian soldiers were taken out of their country and co-operating with the white troops in operations in Missouri and Arkansas, that they abstained more scrupulously from depredations upon private property than the white soldiers with whom they were associated.

While there was talk at the time of the shameful manner in which Federal officers and Indian Agents abused their authority in giving permits to dishonest persons to

drive stock, cattle and horses, out of the Indian country, and sell it and appropriate the proceeds to private use, it is worth while to mention that there was a conspicuous exception in Colonel Phillips, the commander of the **Union Indian Brigade** for nearly two years, and who was a consistent friend of the Indians and did all in his power to break up the illegal operations of white men coming into the Indian country and driving off the cattle and horses of the Indians, their most valuable property.

The Indian Territory occupied an extremely important position in the great war; it was the extreme right flank of the Federal operations from the Potomac to the western boundary of the Indian country, and the turning of that flank by the Confederates would have been a severe blow to Southern Kansas; the **Union Indian Brigade** was an important factor in holding it intact.

These Indian allies of the Government were as humane to prisoners taken in action as the white troops with whom they were associated, and they were as gallant in action and as patient in enduring perils and hardships as their white comrades.

This work is only a small chapter of the history of the Great War; but it is an honorable chapter full of interesting achievements that should not be omitted from our general history. The honorable part these Indians took in the war certainly has had the effect of making those associated with them respect and appreciate the splendid bearing they exhibited in all the struggles and trials that fell to their lot during that tempestuous period.

When the Administration of Mr. Lincoln came into power, nearly all the Indian Agents of the Indian Territory south of Kansas were Southern men, appointees of the Buchanan Administration, and such influence as they possessed was used in getting the Indians to denounce their treaty relations with the United States and to form an alliance with the new Confederacy.

The action of the General Government in evacuating the forts and withdrawing its troops from the Indian country made it easy for the Southern emissaries to persuade the leaders of the Indians that it would be to their interest to denounce their treaty relations with the United States and transfer their allegiance to the Southern Confederacy.

Having withdrawn its troops from the Indian Territory and having made many blunders in the campaign in Missouri, the Federal Government did not get back into the Indian Territory until the spring and summer of 1862, and then it was confronted with the situation that the Confederate authorities had organized for the Confederate service nearly all of the available men of the Choctaw, Cherokee and Creek Nations; but the Cherokees and Creeks were divided on the question as to whether they should give their allegiance to the South, or continue their treaty relations with the General Government, and in the attacks made by the Southern forces of Indians and Texans upon the loyal Indians under the leadership of Hopoeithleyohola, the latter were defeated, losing nearly all their movable property and retired to Southern Kansas.

These loyal Indians formed the nucleus, around which were rallied a sufficient number of loyal Cherokees and Creeks to make the three Indian Regiments of the **Union Indian Brigade,** and when the **Indian Expedition** entered and occupied the Indian country north of the Arkansas River in the summer of 1862, for a short time, and then retired, they were the only troops left to hold it. With Western Arkansas firmly held by the Federal forces, and the Arkansas River open to navigation to Fort Smith, the **Union Indian Brigade** under its efficient commander, Colonel Phillips, when properly mounted and supplied, was able to hold the Indian country north of the Arkansas, and give protection to the loyal Indians without assistance of white troops.

The commanding officers of the belligerent forces and

other persons refer to the conduct of the "Pin Indians," always with the assumption that they were devoted to the Union cause; they were mostly deserters from the Union Indian regiments or refused to enlist in them, and operated in parties of fifteen, twenty to fifty men, but always independent of the organized Indian forces; their operations were similar to the operations of the Southern partisan bands and guerrillas in Missouri and Arkansas; they were considered outlaws by the Southern Indian forces, and never taken prisoner.

In my Diaries of daily happenings, I took down a synopsis of the most important events that came under my notice, and if I did not participate in the event, I found some officer or soldier who did, and took down his account of what he saw, and before the close of the war I had accumulated a good deal of material, a large part of which was lost in the hurried preparation for the evacuation of Fort Smith.

In reporting the speeches or addresses of officers or leaders in war councils or on occasions of receptions or celebrations, if I did not hear the address in every case, I saw some officer or soldier who did hear it and took down the principal points as he remembered them.

In these addresses the speaker nearly always gave a summary of the principal features of a campaign just closed, or what was proposed to be accomplished in the campaign which was planned, thus giving a good view of the situation as it then appeared to him from all the information he was able to secure.

I have also used the official reports and correspondence published by the Government to verify as far as practicable all that I have written in the work.

Under instructions of Colonel Phillips I made the first detail of men from the Battalion Sixth Kansas Cavalry to work on the fortification at Fort Gibson in the spring of 1863, on the Federal occupation of the place, and was on duty at the headquarters of the District Commanders at

that post and at Fort Smith, and with the troops in the field, in all our campaigns in that region, and saw much of the correspondence in regard to the operations in which we were engaged, and made notes in my Diaries of anything I considered worth while.

In the examination of a witness we sometimes require him to state his opportunities for knowing the facts about which he testifies, so here I may state that I was in a position to know the facts about which I have written in this work, and was interested at the time in knowing them. I have used the official reports, correspondence and rosters published by the Government in verifying the names of officers and others participating in the operations described, and believe them absolutely correct.

In the investigation of war claims after the war, in that region, I had occasion to cover many of the operations described, in the depositions of hundreds of claimants and witnesses whom I examined in the course of my work.

WILEY BRITTON.

Kansas City, Kansas, March, 1922.

THE UNION INDIAN BRIGADE IN THE CIVIL WAR

CHAPTER I

Southern Propaganda to Win Over Civilized Indian Tribes

During the Presidential Campaign of 1860 the writer was visiting relatives at Greenville, Texas, and teaching a school in the country three or four miles northeast of town, and rode in every Saturday to hear the news and listen to the discussions about the issues involved. The excitement increased with the progress of the campaign, and a month or so before the election the Breckenridge and Lane Democrats were asserting that in the event of the election of Mr. Lincoln the Southern States would certainly secede or withdraw from the Union. After the announcement of the election of Mr. Lincoln was confirmed, the people, the followers of the ultra Democratic faction, became wild with excitement, and the talk of war, war to the knife and knife to the hilt, was persistent in every little group of men that assembled together on the streets or in the public offices.

Feeling certain that the Southern leaders would not be conciliated by any efforts the new Administration might make, short of sanctioning the withdrawal of the Southern States from the Union, and knowing that the Republican Administration would oppose secession to the bitter end, it seemed that the writer's only course was to get out of the country as early as practicable. He saw from the latest dispatches that some of the Southern States had already called State Conventions for the announced purpose of passing ordinances of secession, and he felt that if he delayed his departure for the North much longer, he might find it difficult to get away. He therefore determined to mount his horse and start home to Missouri at once, without wait-

ing to collect the amounts of tuition due from several of his patrons. The route he planned and followed was through Clarksville, Texas, across the southeast corner of the Choctaw Nation, into Arkansas, where he struck the State Line Road to Fort Smith, Fayetteville, and thence to Neosho, Missouri, where he intended to stop with his parents until spring and then go to Kansas. It was raining when he crossed Red River by flatboat ferry at the mouth of Mill Creek and sleeting and snowing when he passed into Arkansas, and the next day turned freezing cold. He had a cold, disagreeable journey over the mountains to Fort Smith and Fayetteville, after which the weather moderated, and when he arrived home a few days after Christmas it was quite pleasant. The journey from Greenville was made in about eleven days. On account of the inclemency of the weather, very long rides were not made each day, probably not more than twenty-five to thirty miles, depending on the accomodations he found at the close of the day for lodging and stabling and feed for his horse; in some instances the houses on the road were eight to ten miles apart. After riding all day against the chilly blasts from the north, and on stopping for the night, his horse stabled and fed, he sat down before a big blazing hard wood fire in the fire place. He keenly enjoyed the comforts it afforded and the fast from morning until night created a sharp appetite for food, for none of the few houses on the road were passed at the dinner hour. After supper, which was generally in a kitchen in a separate building from the main dwelling, the men folks, father and sons and their guest, returned to the comfortable fire and soon fell into discussion about the impending war between the North and the South, as they called it, that all felt certain would commence in the spring. The hosts, however, did nearly all the talking, for the guest considered it a time for prudence and silence. The people living on or near the Line Road were only a few miles from the Indian Territory, and they and the Indians were in constant communication,

trading with each other, and all matters affecting their interests were freely discussed as among white neighbors. As the hosts at every place where the stranger guest stopped were full of war talk, he was not unwilling to hear the views they held in regard to the line of action the Indians, whose Territory lay directly west of Arkansas, would probably adopt if war really should commence in the spring between the North and South, as everyone who talked on the subject seemed to forecast.

Along the State Line Road there were men of intelligence, influence and in easy circumstances, who had for many years taken a lively interest in the political situation that was leading to a near crisis and impending conflict, and they talked freely about the action the Indians west of Arkansas would probably take, and of the strong Union sentiment that existed in the mountainous regions of Arkansas. They stated that as soon as the new Government was organized, it would send prominent men from Western Arkansas and Northern Texas among the Indians and to their Councils and have mass meetings called, and these men would address the Councils and meetings, and point out to them why it would be to their interest to take sides with the South. There were also prominent Indian leaders who would be called upon to assist in the work, and the hosts to the stranger-guest thought there could be no reasonable doubt of the Indians aligning themselves with the South, for many of them were slave owners whose natural interests and sympathies were with the South.

There was decided hesitation among some of the leaders of the Indians, particularly Cherokees and Creeks, in regard to breaking treaty relations with the Federal Government, for to them the Union or the United States had become a symbol of peace and happiness, for which they had an affection almost as strong as many of the citizens of the States, while the new Government of the South, to which they would be required to transfer their allegiance, was untried,

and they did not know what it held in store for them. Early in the secession movement the efforts of the Southern leaders to have these Indians take sides with the South met with such decided opposition among the Cherokees Creeks and Seminoles that it resulted in the development among them of a strong Union sentiment, a sentiment so strong that it commenced to take the form of organization, which required the new Confederate Government to send a force of Confederate Cavalry, under Colonel James McIntosh, to suppress the opposition.

There were a number of Missionaries who lived with these Indians, and among them Reverend John B. Jones, who was later Chaplain of the Second Indian Regiment, Union Home Guards, and who was opposed to slavery. He spoke the Cherokee language fluently and, at councils and religious meetings, addressed them, eloquently advising them to stand firmly by the Union; that while the situation looked dark and gloomy at that early period of the gathering storm, the Government would wake up, was waking up and would exert its might in driving the invaders from their country, who were terrorizing and killing people, driving them from their homes and robbing them and destroying their property. It would be difficult to measure the influence of Mr. Jones among these Indians in keeping them loyal to the Government, and spurning the advice given them in the harangues of Southern leaders; for his life among them had been of that disinterested and sympathetic nature that made them have unbounded confidence in him, a confidence, too, that the Confederate leaders could not shake or undermine.

The new State of Kansas that bounded the northern line of the Cherokee Nation had just passed through the dreadful drought of 1860, which had paralyzed the business of the people, causing thousands to leave it discouraged and with no thought of returning, so that those who remained were in no condition to render assistance to the Indians in

the way of advice and propaganda, for they themselves were receiving aid in food and clothing and farm implements from the North, so desperate had become their situation from the prolonged drought over the Territory. There were only a few inches of rain in the Territory during the entire year, which broke all known records of the annual rain-fall of that region.

There was a strip of land known as the **Neutral Land,** or **Government Strip,** that extended from the Missouri-Kansas line westward along the southern line of Kansas for several counties. It was wedge-shaped and fifty miles wide on the eastern end and terminated at a zero point on the west. It belonged to the Cherokee Indians under treaty relations, but very few Indian families were living on it up to the war. A few white settlers or squatters were living on it, but they could be lawfully removed at any time by the Government. This **Neutral Land** that had very few white settlers living on it was an effective barrier in preventing propagandists from Kansas crossing and going into the Cherokee Nation to work for the Union cause at a time when the flames of secession were sweeping over the slave States, and when agents of the South had already been sent among the Indians of the Five Civilized Tribes to win them over to the Southern cause.

The officials and representatives of the Federal Government among these Indians were generally appointees of the retiring Democratic Administration of Mr. Buchanan, most of whom resigned soon after the Administration of Mr. Lincoln came into power, and accepted appointments under the newly formed Southern Confederacy. They had acquired a degree of prestige under their former appointments in the Government service and used their influence to control the actions of some of the leaders of the Indian factions who were identified with and interested in slavery. While there were not very many Indians, or white men who had Indian wives, who owned slaves, those who did own them,

were generally men of influence and easily won over to align themselves with the cause of the South; but those who doubted the wisdom of the secession movement held aloof from any organization that pledged its members to opposition to the General Government.

The writer lived only fifteen miles from the Indian Territory, and several Indian girls of Cherokee families attended the same school at Neosho, and he was in position to know of the stirring times and what was going on in the Cherokee Nation almost as well as in his own section, particularly of the efforts made by the Southern leaders to have the Cherokees committed to the cause of the South, up to the time he left for Kansas, in April.

On the 7th of February, 1861, the General Council of the Choctaw Nation assembled and passed resolutions expressing the feelings and sentiments of the Choctaw people in regard to the disagreement between the Northern and Southern States of the Union, and in those resolutions declared that in the event of the permanent dissolution of the Union, the relations of the Choctaw Nation with the General Government must cease, and that then being left to follow the natural affections, education, interests and institutions of the Choctaw people, which indissolubly bound them in every way to the destiny of their neighbors and brethren of the Southern States, upon whom they felt they could rely for the preservation of their rights of life, liberty and property, and continuance of acts of friendship, counsel and material support, it was to their interest to share in the fortunes of the South.

This action was taken a little more than a month after the writer passed through the southeast part of the Choctaw Nation, and it shows how rapidly events were pressing towards a crisis involving the entire country; a crisis, too, which would soon bring the conflicting elements together in bloody struggles, which would determine whether the Union should be preserved, or whether negro slavery should

continue to exist and be extended to the Territories which had been dedicated to freedom, and whether the proponents of slavery should continue the dominating power of the country.

By the early part of April nearly all the Southern Slave States except Missouri, Kentucky and Maryland had passed ordinances of secession, withdrawing from the Union, and elected delegates to a convention of the Southern States, and the Delegates of this Convention organized and set up a Provisional Government which they called **The Confederate States of America,** and elected Jeff Davis the first President, with the temporary capital at Montgomery, Alabama.

The first work of the new Government was to order the seizure of the United States Arsenals with their valuable supplies of war material in the seceded States, and to compel the surrender or evacuation of the Federal troops and detachments garrisoning the arsenals, forts and posts within those States, a task that was accomplished without bloodshed in most cases, for military organizations were rapidly developed in the early movement of secession, and any resisting force or detachment could have been quickly overwhelmed by superior forces, or their positions made untenable.

After the supplies were cut off from Fort Smith, a post on the Arkansas River, on the State line between Arkansas and the Indian Territory, it was evacuated by Captain Samuel D. Sturgis,commanding two companies of the First U. S. Cavalry, on April 23rd, and he marched with such supplies as he could take along, to Fort Washita, Chickasaw Nation, 160 miles southwest, where he reported to Colonel W. H. Emory, First Cavalry, who had recently been assigned by the War Department, after a conference with him in Washington, to the command of all the Federal troops in the Indian Territory. He was a Southern born man, and as nearly all the officers of the Regular Army of Southern birth were

resigning from the Army and offering their services to the Confederacy, the Federal Government at Washington was sounding officers of Southern birth as to their views in regard to the crisis at hand, and as to whether they would support the Government before assigning them to important positions. In a short time after his arrival from Washington to assume command at Fort Washita, Colonel Emory found that supplies for that post had been seized by the secessionists, and on April 15th he evacuated it and retired in the direction of Forts Arbuckle and Cobb. It was occupied the next day by a large force of Texans, and in the early part of May he evacuated Forts Arbuckle and Cobb, bringing away all the public property for which he had transportation, and retired through the Indian Territory and Kansas to Fort Leavenworth, and the evacuated forts were at once occupied by Texans and Indians, who were keenly disappointed in allowing the Federal troops to get away with nearly all the arms and supplies they had on hand. On taking possession of the forts the Texans and Indians found very little that would be of value to them in arming and equipping their newly organized forces; but the fact that the Federal commander decided to evacuate the forts and march out of the country gave the secessionists increased prestige among the Indians, and the Choctaws and Chickasaws commenced at once, with the assistance of Southern leaders, the organization of military companies for the purpose of co-operating with the Southern forces operating in the country when the time came for action.

While these movements were taking place in the Indian Territory, the Governors of Missouri and Arkansas refused to furnish their quotas of troops under President Lincoln's call for seventy-five thousand men for the purpose of suppressing the insurrection in the Slave States, and the Federal troops had been withdrawn from all the Government Posts in Arkansas; but the new Administration was determined not to abdicate its authority in Missouri, nor to

withdraw any Federal troops from the State; nor permit the surrender of the St. Louis Arsenal, with its valuable stores of arms, ammunition and equipments, to the State authorities, which had been pledged to support the South, without a struggle that would test the strength of the opposing forces in the State for a majority of the people not only of St. Louis, but of the State, were in favor of the Union, as had been shown by the action of the State Convention, which refused to vote an ordinance of secession, a large majority of the delegates having been elected as Union delegates and as opposed to secession. In the face of this large majority of Union delegates in the Convention, Governor Jackson and his followers were determined to ignore its mandate and pledge the State to the Southern Confederacy, regardless of consequences.

Early in May Major Ben McCulloch, of Texas, was appointed brigadier general by the Confederate Government in the Provisional Army of the Confederate States, and assigned to the command of the Indian Territory west of Arkansas and south of Kansas, and given three regiments, one from Texas, one from Louisiana and one from Arkansas, with headquarters at Fort Smith, for such military operations as might be designed.

As soon as practicable after assuming command of his new district, General McCulloch established a camp, called Camp Walker, in honor of the Confederate Secretary of War, in the northwest corner of Benton County, Arkansas, only a mile or so from the Arkansas-Indian Territory line, and only a few miles from Maysville and Old Fort Wayne, which were on and near the line in the Cherokee Nation, for drilling and disciplining the newly organized regiments assigned to his command. It was a good point from which he could carry on propaganda work among the Indians, and be in close touch with the Missouri secessionists and brace them up at a time when operations were going against them.

In the early part of May the State Convention of Arkansas, which assembled at Little Rock, passed the ordinance of secession and created N. B. Pearce, a prominent citizen of the State, a brigadier general of Arkansas State troops, to command the western frontier, with headquarters in Benton County, where he would have a brigade of three regiments under instructions and discipline, and as a corps of observation to co-operate with General McCulloch's force if the requirements of military operations against the Federal forces should demand it, which seemed probable from the aggressive activity of the Missouri secessionists.

General McCulloch was anxious to have the assistance of Captain Albert Pike, who was then a prominent figure in Arkansas politics, to secure the co-operation of the Cherokee Indians to prevent the emissaries of the Union cause from poisoning the minds of the fullbloods, many of whom he alleged were already abolitionists, while most of the half-breeds and enlightened part of the nation were with the South in their sympathies, some of them being slave owners. Captain Pike was a New England born man; a poet and politician of some distinction, and had lived in the Choctaw and Cherokee Nations many years prior to the war and was well known to many of the leaders of the Five Civilized Tribes of the Indian Territory, and it was believed by the Confederate authorities that he would have great influence among them. At the time, however, he lived at Little Rock.

In the early part of May he wrote a letter to Senator R. W. Johnson, of Arkansas, giving his views at considerable length in regard to affairs in the Indian Territory, and in which he made many suggestions in order, as he conceived, to secure the good will and allegiance of the Indians to the South, and to raise among them three or four regiments of Indian troops for the defense of their country, in co-operation with several regiments of white

troops from Texas and Arkansas. He did not exactly ask for the appointment of general to command the troops which he proposed to raise in Arkansas and the Indian Territory for the defense of the Indian country, but he mentioned several splendid things he would do if given the command. The Confederate Government, however, had other use for him at that time and appointed him a Commissioner among the Indian tribes west of Arkansas and south of Kansas, to supervise the new treaties to be made with them; to explain any features of the new situation that needed explanation, and to guarantee the right of members of the new military organizations of battalions and regiments to elect their own field officers, instead of having such officers appointed by the Secretary of War on the recommendation of political leaders of factions who had been making recommendations for appointments of political friends and supporters without any regard to their fitness for the positions.

He was of a kindly, conciliatory nature and the Confederate Government could not have selected a more efficient man to deal with the Indians under the new conditions. Later that year, however, he was commissioned brigadier general to command the Indian forces organized in the Indian Territory for the Confederate service, a position that seemed to satisfy his ambition to serve the Confederacy. He was afterwards known as General Pike and was a conspicuous figure around Washington for many years after the war, up to his death. He was very venerable and benignant in appearance; his long white hair falling in hyacinthian curls upon his shoulders; he was a thirty-third degree Mason and senior officer of the order in this country, and his great prominence was probably due to his contributions to Masonic literature, and his almost devout interest in the order.

The Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, by the action of their Councils and Legislatures and by proclamations of

their principal Chief and Governor, declared their adherence to the Confederate Government, giving reasons for their action by preamble and resolutions; but in order to get results, it was necessary for the Confederate Government to bring pressure to bear upon the people of the Cherokee Nation to induce them to change their attitude of neutrality and come out openly and declare adherence and allegiance to the Confederacy. It was generally known to the Southern leaders in Arkansas that the Cherokee people were divided upon this issue, and that it might not be an easy task to have the recalcitrants adopt the proposed changes of faith and allegiance in the twinkling of the eye.

As early as January, 1861, Governor Rector, of Arkansas, dispatched an emissary, one of his aids, Colonel Gaines, with a letter to John Ross, Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation, with overtures, laying the foundation for asking the Cherokee people to join their fortunes with the South, in the impending withdrawal or secession of the Slave States from the Union, and in his letter stated that on account of Northern aggressions the people of some of the Southern States had already assumed an attitude of separation, and that the others would probably pursue the same course before the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln; that the people of Arkansas and the Cherokee Nation were natural allies in war and friends in peace; that on account of latitude, contiguity of territory and having similar institutions, slavery, relations of so intimate a character had been developed as to preclude the idea of discordant or separate action by the Cherokee people.

After General McCulloch assumed command of the Department of the Indian Territory, the latter part of May, he had an interview with Chief Ross at which he used substantially the same argument as Governor Rector, to induce him to prepare the way for having the Cherokee Nation declare its adherence and allegiance to the Southern Con-

federacy, at the same time using a veiled threat that if the Chief did not take such action he, McCulloch, might find it necessary, if there should be a threatened invasion of the Cherokee country from Kansas, to occupy it with his troops, then at Camp Walker, touching the eastern border of the Cherokee Nation. At that interview Chief Ross protested that he desired his people to take a neutral attitude during the impending conflict between the United and Confederate States; that he did not apprehend the invasion of his country from the North, and that if an invasion from that quarter should be attempted, he would head his own forces to repel it, and that the General's demand that those people of the nation who were in favor of joining the Confederacy be allowed to organize into military companies or Home Guards in defense of their country in case of invasion from the North, he could not sanction for the reason it would be the means of stirring up domestic strife and of inviting invasion.

In the rapid march of events Chief Ross was obliged to give up his proposed neutrality of the Cherokee people during the war, which was now being fiercely waged by the forces of the Union and Southern armies, and in two great battles, Bull Run, Virginia, July 22, and Wilson Creek, Missouri, August 10, within cannon sound of the Cherokee Nation, the Union armies had been defeated with thousands of killed and wounded men and compelled to retreat to their bases of operations, giving the Confederacy an unlooked-for prestige, and in forecasting the outcome of the war, led nearly all doubting minds to believe that the South would be successful in winning her independence.

These decisive defeats of the Union armies were used for all they were worth by the friends of the South to impress upon the minds of those who were hesitating, undecided, as to which side they would give their support and adherence, now hesitated no longer and declared that henceforward they would support the cause of the Confederacy.

When these defeats of the Union armies became known to the people of the Cherokee Nation, a general mass meeting was called by the Executive Committee of the Nation to be held at Tahlequah, August 21, for the purpose of giving the Cherokee people an opportunity of expressing their opinions and taking such action as the situation seemed to call for. In addressing the meeting Chief Ross told his audience that the Great Government with which his people had been connected was rent by dissensions, and its component parts stood in hostile array, and had already engaged in deadly conflict; that the United States claimed they were contending for the integrity of their Government, and that the South claimed she was contending for her independence and a government of her own. The Chief went on further to say that the Slave States would probably establish a new government, and that in view of the position of the Cherokee Nation with Arkansas on the east, and on the south the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, who had already severed their relations with the United States and joined the Confederacy, the disruption of the United States was probably permanent, and that in his opinion it would be in the interest of the Cherokee people to make an alliance with the Confederate Government.

After Chief Ross's speech an organization was effected for the transaction of business and in the course of the proceedings Joseph Vann was elected assistant principal chief and president of the meeting, and William P. Ross secretary, and then a recess was taken until after dinner, when the people again assembled.

On the meeting being called to order, P. M. Benge prepared and offered a preamble and resolutions covering the situation, for the consideration of the people, ending with the resolution "That reposing full confidence in the constituted authorities of the Cherokee Nation, we submit to their wisdom the management of all questions which affect our interests growing out of the exigencies of the

relations between the United and Confederate States of America, and which may render an alliance on our part with the latter States expedient and desirable."

The resolutions upon the question of their passage were carried by acclamation, and the Executive Committee of the Cherokee Nation, headed by Chief Ross, at once addressed a letter to General McCulloch advising him of the action taken at the meeting, which authorized them to form an alliance with the Confederate States, which they had determined to do as early as practicable, and inclosed him a copy of the proceedings, preamble and resolutions passed by acclamation; and they further stated that they would proceed to organize a regiment of mounted men to be commanded by Colonel John Drew and tender them for service, and if accepted by the Confederate Government, would have to be armed and equipped and prepared for active service in the field. But in spite of the preamble and resolutions of confidence in the Confederacy at this great mass meeting of the Cherokee people and an expression of willingness to make an alliance with it, there was unquestionably a strong undeveloped opposition to such a course, for as General McCulloch had reported to the Confederate Government, nearly all of the fullblood and many half-breed Cherokees, with Chief Ross as their leader, were opposed to slavery and called abolitionists, and it would have been a safe prediction, would show their true colors when they could do so with reasonable safety.

CHAPTER II

SOUTHERN FORCES ATTACK HOPOEITHLEYOHOLA

At the time the Cherokee Nation decided to sever relations with the General Government, the Union cause in Missouri was suffering from serious blunders of Federal commanders in the State, which permitted the defeat of General Lyon's army at Wilson Creek, and which also permitted the secession forces under General Price to march unchecked after the battle via Fort Scott to the Missouri River, lay siege to and capture Lexington, and to threaten Kansas with invasion and desolation from the south by the Confederate forces under General McCulloch. Indeed, the situation must have looked exceedingly gloomy to the loyal part of the Cherokee people whose natural sympathies were with the Union cause and who desired to remain loyal to it.

There was about the same division of sentiment in regard to breaking treaty relations with the United States and joining the Confederacy, among the Creeks and Seminoles as among the Cherokees, but Commissioner Pike for the Confederacy, negotiated a treaty with the faction that wished to join the Confederacy, which enabled the leaders of that faction to commence at once the organization of a regiment whose services were to be tendered to the Confederate Government for co-operation with the Confederate forces in the Indian Territory and on its borders.

The Confederate authorities had now secured the organization of the military forces of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, and with the raising of the contemplated regiments among the Cherokees, Creeks and Seminoles would have Indian forces of between four and five thousand mounted troops to co-operate with the Confederate forces under General McCulloch for the invasion of Kansas, which was contemplated and frequently mentioned in his plan of operations.

As early as February the Southern Slave States commenced seizing the United States Arsenals within their limits for the purpose of securing the valuable ordnance stores and supplies for arming and equipping the new military organizations they were calling into service, and as most of the Cabinet members of the Buchanan Administration were Southern men or in sympathy with the South, they did little or nothing to prevent the State authorities of those States from seizing the arsenals, forts and military posts within their limits with the valuable ordnance, quartermaster and commissary supplies, if indeed they did not encourage such action, for they were intending to resign their positions when the new Administration of Mr. Lincoln came into power.

On the 8th of February, Captain James Totten commanding the Little Rock Arsenal, with one company of the Second U. S. Artillery and an ordnance detachment, received reliable information that some four hundred secessionists of the State of Arkansas had arrived at Little Rock to demand the surrender of the Arsenal, and that if the captain did not surrender it they proposed with superior numbers to attack and capture it, at the same time stating that they would be re-enforced in a few days by five thousand men. Captain Totten failed to receive instructions from the War Department, Washington, as to the course he should pursue and the situation was daily becoming more threatening. He knew he did not have a sufficient force to repel an attack and after some correspondence with the Governor he decided to evacuate the Arsenal and retire beyond the limits of the State. The Governor had become a factor in the situation, such an active factor as to demand the surrender of the Arsenal to the State, to prevent its attack with attendant bloodshed and loss of life, and as to offer and agree to, and did, receipt to Captain Totten for all public property in the Arsenal, to hold the same in the name of the United States until he should be legally absolved from the trust. Under

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this agreement Captain Totten was permitted to retire with his command with their arms and equipments, and was given safe passage out of the State, and on the 12th embarked on the Steamboat Madora, for St. Louis, and arrived there in a few days without further interference.

On April 23d, Captain S. D. Sturgis with two companies of the First U. S. Cavalry, evacuated Fort Smith and marched to Fort Washita, Chickasaw Nation, one hundred and sixty miles southwest, taking along all supplies at the post for which he had transportation. The State authorities had cut off his supplies en route up the river by steamboat, and the post had therefore become untenable. An hour after he left two steamboats arrived from Little Rock with three hundred men and ten pieces of artillery of the State forces, although the Convention had not passed the ordinance of secession. The State authorities had intended to secure the arms, ammunition and supplies at that post.

The leaders of the secessionists of the slave States were anxious to get possession of the arsenals within their limits even before the states had seceded, in order that they might use the ordnance stores to arm and equip the military organizations coming into existence, and it was a matter of common knowledge that the state authorities connived at and encouraged the seizures by irregular organizations in every instance; some enthusiastic supporters of the South even lamented that the United States troops in evacuating military posts had been permitted to get away with their arms, equipments and supplies on hand. From the forts evacuated in the Indian Territory, Colonel W. H. Emory and his subordinates were able to take away with them all the arms, equipments and supplies for which they had transportation, thus depriving the Indians and their Southern allies of the means of immediately arming for the Confederate service. The difficulty of securing arms and equipments at this early period of the war for the new levies of troops was keenly felt by the Confederate authorities, and also by the Federal authorities.



GEN. BEN MCCULLOCH
GEN. WILLIAM STEELE

GEN. STANA WATIE
GEN. S. B. MAXEY

About the first effort of the Confederate Government to organize the five civilized tribes of the Indian Territory who had declared their adherence to the Confederate States, for military service, was in May, when the Confederate Secretary of War wrote Douglas H. Cooper formerly an Indian agent for the Choctaw and Chickasaw tribes, authorizing him to raise a regiment of Choctaw and Chickasaw Indians for the Confederate service to act in co-operation with General McCulloch who had been assigned to the command of the Indian Territory west of Arkansas and south of Kansas, with a brigade of three regiments, one each from Texas, Louisiana and Arkansas. The regiment to be raised was to be armed and equipped by the Confederate Government as soon as practicable after its organization was effected, and to be known as "Mounted Riflemen." It was also announced at the same time that it was the purpose of the Confederate Government to raise two other similar regiments among the Cherokees, Creeks and Seminoles, under the same conditions and with the same object in view. Douglas H. Cooper who had received the appointment as colonel, reported to the Confederate Government July 25th, that the Choctaw and Chickasaw regiment of Mounted Rifles was about complete, but had received no arms; that the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations could furnish ten thousand warriors; that they were unfit for garrison duty, and in the field would be a terror to the Yankees, and that he desired to hold in addition to the position of colonel of the regiment thus raised, also that of Agent of the Choctaws and Chickasaws, which Commissioner Pike thought incompatible.

As already stated, it was determined by the Cherokees at their mass meeting in August at Tahlequah to raise a regiment of mounted men under Colonel John Drew for the Confederate service to co-operate with the white troops under General McCulloch, and now preparations were being made for the organization of a regiment of men among the Creeks and Seminoles who were mostly opposed

to renouncing their treaty relations with the United States, and, in spite of the efforts of Commissioner Pike and a number of the leaders of the Creek and Seminole Nations, it was daily becoming more certain that the leaders of this large faction were determined to fight rather than give their adherence to the Confederacy. In the latter part of August, Hopoeithleyohola, the chief of the Creeks and leader of the faction who were determined to stand by the Nation's treaty relations with the United States, sent a messenger to Mr. E. H. Carruth, the United States Commissioner for the Creek and Seminole Indians, advising him of the situation and asking for assistance to meet the threatened attack from the other faction, aided by several regiments of Texas and Arkansas troops, who were in the Choctaw country south of the Arkansas River, co-operating with the Indians who had entered the Confederate service. Mr. Carruth was with Lane's Brigade near Fort Scott at the time, and in reply to the Chief's message requested him to send a delegation of his best men to meet the United States Commissioner in Kansas; that the President was alive and would not forget him and his people who were loyal to the Government; that he was authorized to say the Federal army would soon move southward and drive out the enemy who had violated their homes and from the land they had treacherously entered, and that when his delegates returned to him they would be able to inform him when and where the moneys would be paid to his people; that those who stole their orphan fund would be punished, and assuring him that the Government which had so long protected them was their friend, and would aid them at the earliest practicable moment. This communication heartened the loyal faction of the Creeks and Seminoles, and the leaders commenced at once to prepare for the struggle which they knew was near at hand. They also knew that they would be obliged to meet the attack of not only their own disaffected people, but also the combined attack of the disaffected Cherokees, re-enforced by

the Choctaw and Chickasaw regiments and three or four white regiments from Texas and Arkansas.

The eastern border counties of Kansas were threatened by invasion by the Missouri secessionists, and not a company of the regiments then being called into service in Kansas under General Lane for the protection of those counties could be spared to re-enforce the Creek chief; neither was the Government in a position to send him re-enforcements from other quarters.

The leaders of the Creeks had therefore determined that, if attacked by overwhelming forces of the enemy, they would retire north to the Kansas Border where they would look for re-enforcements; should the enemy pursue them, they believed that the people of Kansas would be aroused to come to their assistance by an invasion from the south.

The Administration at Washington was exerting all its energies in dealing with the loyal states of the North and the border slave states in regard to furnishing, organizing and equipping their quotas of troops under the second call of the President for six hundred thousand men, and had been unable to give the attention to the conditions developing among the Indians south of Kansas and west of Arkansas that the situation demanded, and was pressing and of immediate importance. It was an immense task imposed upon the Government to make the necessary preparations for an advance southward on the long front from the Potomac through Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri and the Indian Territory to New Mexico, in the face of the many disadvantages which had been interposed by Southern men who were in control of the Government until the Administration of Mr. Lincoln came into power. While there was some impatience manifested by the Unionists and friends of the Government in the border slave states and Indian Territory in regard to the seeming backwardness in getting its military forces in readiness for actively aggressive operations, there was really little cause for im-

patience, when the fact is taken into consideration that there was stupendous work to be done before it could safely undertake aggressive movements on a large scale. After the battle of Wilson Creek, General Price had successfully marched his secession forces from Springfield to a point within sight of Fort Scott and thence to the Missouri River where he laid siege to and captured the Federal force holding Lexington, which gave him great temporary prestige; but, before he had an opportunity of enjoying the fruits of his victory, and take away much loot, General Fremont was urged by the President to advance with his fairly well organized and equipped army of perhaps upwards of forty thousand men and attack the secessionists. The movements of the different divisions threatened to cut off Price's army or force him to give battle to superior forces with superior equipments, and, finding his position untenable at Lexington, he beat a hasty retreat and kept it up until he arrived at Neosho and Pineville, McDonald county, in the southwest corner of the State, bordering on the Cherokee Nation, with greatly diminished prestige, which was noted by both factions of the Cherokee people, cooling the ardor of those who had espoused the cause of the South, and kindling almost to enthusiasm those who had been in favor of remaining loyal to the Federal Government.

This splendid movement of Fremont's army, which advanced as far south and west as the battle field of Wilson Creek, twelve miles southwest of Springfield, and forced Price's army into a humiliating retreat from Lexington into the rough, hilly region of McDonald county, was to come to nothing and count for nothing. At the moment of its full tide of success, General Fremont was removed on his arrival at Springfield, and General David Hunter placed in temporary command and ordered by the War Department to retire the army to Rolla and Sedalia, one hundred and twenty-five miles east and north, thus yielding up to the enemy in a few da

the State south of the Osage River, extending as far east as Lebanon; it was humiliating beyond measure to the Unionists of the State and lost thousands to the Union cause.

The Southern leaders were at once advised of the retirement of the Federal Army, and the Federal rear-guard had barely left Springfield when General McCulloch's cavalry advanced rapidly from Cross Hollow, Arkansas, and occupied the town, and General Price immediately about-faced the Army of Missouri and moved forward, advancing as far north as Osceola on the Osage River, where he proposed to spend the winter recruiting and sending expeditions north to the Missouri River to assist bodies of recruits from the northern part of the State to join him, all of which had a depressing effect not only among the Unionists of Missouri, but also among the Indians of the Indian Territory who were friendly to the Union cause; they could not understand such a vacillating policy of the Government; it impressed them with its weakness and indecision.

General McCulloch's cavalry occupied Springfield only a short time and then retired to northwest Arkansas, and as his command was designed mainly for operations in the Indian Territory, and as the retirement of the Union Army from Springfield and Southwest Missouri was heralded among the Indians as a great Southern victory, he was free to use any part of his force he desired, in co-operation with the Indian regiments raised for Confederate service, to bring to terms any recalcitrant Indians of the factions of the Creeks and Cherokees who were holding out against joining their destinies with the Confederacy.

After a few days at Springfield, General McCulloch reported to the Confederate Secretary of War on November 19th, that the Federal Army had retired from Southwest Missouri, and that he proposed to return to Arkansas, put his troops in winter quarters at Cross Hollow,

Fayetteville and Van Buren, and ask permission to come to Richmond, the new capital of the Confederacy, to give the Administration correct information in regard to conditions in that region before it took further action, leaving the command of his division with Colonel James McIntosh who had been an officer in the Regular Army prior to resigning his commission and transferring his allegiance to the Confederacy; his request to visit Richmond was granted.

Colonel Douglas H. Cooper, who had raised the First Choctaw and Chickasaw Mounted Rifles, had been placed in command of the Indian Department, with the regiments he had been authorized to raise in the Indian tribes of the Territory, reported to the Confederate Secretary of War, that having exhausted every means in his power to secure an interview with Hopoeithleyohola, the disaffected Chief of the Creek Nation, for the purpose of settling the difficulty between his faction and the faction that had espoused the cause of the Confederacy, and finding that his overtures were treated with silence or contempt; and also finding that the Chief had, for some time, been corresponding with the Federal authorities in Kansas, if not in alliance with them, determined to advance upon him with sufficient force to compel submission or drive him from the country. Colonel Cooper therefore collected and concentrated at once for operation against the defiant Creek Chief the available men of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Mounted Rifles, Colonel McIntosh's regiment Creek Mounted Rifles, Colonel Drew's regiment Cherokee Mounted Rifles, and Colonel Quail's regiment Fourth Texas Cavalry, an effective force of fourteen hundred men, and advanced up the Deep Fork of the Canadian River to attack the camp of Hopoeithleyohola's forces, which had been located.

On arrival in the vicinity of the Chief's camp Colonel Cooper found that it had been abandoned, and that the Indians had retired to Red Fork of the Arkansas River,

en route to Kansas, and soon finding their trail, pushed on to overtake them, and in the afternoon of November 19th came in sight of the smoke of their camp, and a few of their scouts, who were driven in.

A charge was made upon their camp by the Texas troops and it was found to have been recently deserted, and that Hopoeithleyohola's forces had retired to a creek skirted with timber some four miles beyond; the Southern forces pursued the scouts to the timber and were fired upon as they came within range by the Indians concealed therein, killing and wounding several men. The Indians then came out upon the prairie in large numbers, estimated at twelve hundred, and threatening by their movements to outflank and surround the Confederates, who hastily retreated in the direction of their main body, pursued by Hopoeithleyohola's warriors in a running fight, in which there were a few casualties on both sides.

Colonel Cooper re-enforced his retreating troops with the Choctaw and Chickasaw regiment, and having formed a new line, opened a hot fire upon Hopoeithleyohola's warriors as they came up within range, and after a short engagement in which rifle firing became quite heavy, darkness fell upon the combatants, making it impossible for either side to follow the movements of the other, besides incurring the danger of either side firing upon its own men. Under these conditions the combatants of both sides withdrew to their respective camps, the Confederates to renew the fight the next morning and Hopoeithleyohola's warriors to retreat in the direction of Kansas. He did not, however, consider he had suffered a decisive defeat, and at once collected the warriors of his nation, and with some Cherokees, to the number estimated at twenty-five hundred men in all, on Bird's Creek, near Tulsa, a strong position, and proposed to attack Colonel Cooper's forces when they approached near enough to do so with advantage.

The position taken up by Hopoeithleyohola was known as Chusto-tahlasah, and was difficult for Colonel Cooper's forces to approach. It was in the bend of the Creek, too deep to be forded except in places known only to the loyal Indians, and the bend was densely covered with timber, undergrowth and thickets, impossible for mounted troops to pass through in battle formation.

The bend of the creek, or toe of the horse shoe, made up to the prairie on the side approached by the Southern forces, and on that side there was a precipitous bluff or bank some thirty feet high. Inside of the bend, within rifle range of the opposite bank or bluff, Hopoeithleyohola's warriors had constructed breastworks of logs, from behind which they kept up a hot fire when the Southern forces came within range.

Making disposition of his forces, Colonel Cooper brought forward to make the attack on the position the effective men of five regiments; the Choctaw and Chickasaw regiment, the Creek regiment, the Cherokee regiment, and the two Texas regiments, and on driving in the scouts of the Union Indians, opened the fight, which lasted about four hours, ending with darkness, when the Confederate forces, having suffered heavy losses in killed and wounded, retreated to their camp to prepare for further operations the next morning.

In his report of the battle of Chusto-tahlasah, Colonel Cooper stated his losses at fifteen killed and thirty-seven wounded; but it is difficult to see how his charging columns and hand to hand conflicts of his dismounted men with a foe estimated at 2,500 men that had all the advantages of position and delivered its fire from impenetrable thickets and from behind breastworks of logs, for four hours, could happen with such insignificant results. There was no report of the losses of Hopoeithleyohola's Indians; but they were probably less than the Confederate losses, from the fact that the losses of the assaulting force is always heavier than the losses of the force that

fights from behind breastworks and from concealed positions like the warriors of Hopoeithleyohola. The next day after the battle Colonel Cooper sent out a regiment to make a reconnoissance of the position of the Union Indians, and it was discovered that they had abandoned it on the creek and retired into the mountains, taking with them their families and live stock, horses and cattle, and other belongings, so that neither side could claim any decisive advantage from the contest.

It was probably evident to Hopoeithleyohola that Colonel Cooper would shortly be re-enforced by other white regiments of Texas and Arkansas troops, who were better armed and equipped and disciplined than his own warriors, and that under such conditions it would be more prudent for him to retire with his people into a more inaccessible region where further offensive operations of his enemy would be made much more difficult, if not indeed impracticable at that season of the year with winter close at hand and far away from their supplies. It does not appear that in all these operations Hopoeithleyohola had the advice and counsel of a representative of the Government with him, or his white friends from Kansas. Depending upon his own resources, therefore, it would certainly appear that he made a remarkably good showing, particularly when it is considered that he had pitted against him the wit and intelligence of the best men the Confederate Government could find in the West who were familiar with the situation, and with large resources of men and supplies at their command.

At the time it was admitted by the Confederate Government that a contingent of white troops among the Indians had a stimulating effect with them in carrying out proposed offensive operations. Without such contingent of white troops it is doubtful whether it could have found enough Cherokees and Creeks to have effective military organizations for operations against the Government that was at perfect peace with them and which had been paying

them regularly their annuities. They knew that if the Government was successful in maintaining its integrity, that their treaty relations with it, which were satisfactory, would continue as in the past, and they could not see how their condition would be improved by breaking treaty relations with it and joining the Confederacy, for it was not threatening them in any manner by sending troops among them against their wishes; nor was it threatening to withhold their annuities on account of the war; very few of them owned slaves; most of them were opposed to slavery, and they could not see their interests were with the South.

General McCulloch had gone to Richmond to correctly inform the Confederate Government in regard to affairs in Western Arkansas and the Indian Territory, leaving Colonel McIntosh in command with headquarters at Van Buren, on account of an outbreak of smallpox at Fort Smith, the regular headquarters. Colonel Cooper having advised him of the situation in the Indian country after the battle of Chusto-tahlasah, Colonel McIntosh determined to win military glory in the absence of the chief, McCulloch, before winter set in, by prosecuting further operations against Hopoeithleyohola, who was still assuming a hostile attitude.

He therefore took from the mounted troops of his division of Arkansas and Texas volunteers 1,600 men and marched hastily to Fort Gibson, where he had an interview with Colonel Cooper and agreed upon a plan of campaign, promising co-operation with each other in their operations against the enemy Indians.

In pursuance of their plan of operations, they left Fort Gibson December 22d, to open a vigorous campaign against the enemy. Colonel Cooper marched up the north side of the Arkansas River to get in the rear of Hopoeithleyohola's forces on one of the tributaries of the Verdigris River, near the Big Bend of the Arkansas, while Colonel

McIntosh marched up the Verdigris River opposite to the position of the hostile Indians.

They then moved forward with four days cooked rations to attack the enemy in the strong position running back among the mountains into the Big Bend of the Arkansas, and, about noon of the 26th of December, after his advance company had crossed Shoal Creek, a heavy and continuous fire was opened upon it by enemy warriors. The company maintained its position, however, until it was re-enforced by Colonel Griffith's Texas regiment moving up to the right, and Colonel Young's Texas regiment moving up to the left, while Colonel Lane's Texas regiment and the Second regiment Arkansas Mounted Rifles and some mounted detachments composed the center. The whole force then moved forward and crossed the stream in the face of the fire of the hostile Indians posted to the right on a high rugged hill, with the sides covered with timber, from which they observed every movement of the attacking forces. Hopoeithleyohola's Indian warriors fought from behind trees and rocks and poured a heavy rifle fire into the ranks of the advancing Confederates the moment they came in range and with such deadly effect that Colonel McIntosh ordered part of his command to dismount and charge on foot up the hill and on that part of the field where the enemy Indians were inaccessible to his mounted troops. After the fighting had lasted until four o'clock, McIntosh's troops succeeded in driving them from their position back into the gorges and deep recesses of the mountains, which compelled them to abandon their camp, with the loss of considerable property, consisting of wagons, oxen, ponies, cattle and sheep, besides one hundred and sixty women and children and twenty negroes, which fell into the hands of the Confederate forces.

The Confederate forces camped on the battle field that night and the next day Colonel McIntosh ordered pursuit of the loyal Indians, and after a hard march of twenty-five miles overtook their rear guard and captured and

burned two wagons. This action closed the campaign against the loyal Indians for the winter. Colonel McIntosh returned to the headquarters of his division at Van Buren in a blaze of glory and as conquering hero. He called the battle with Hopoeithleyohola "Chustenahla," and reported his losses nine killed and forty wounded, and the enemy losses much larger.

Severe winter weather at once set in and the loyal Indians having lost nearly everything in the way of food supplies, clothing and transportation, endured almost indescribable suffering on their march to Southern Kansas, some of them having frozen to death.

CHAPTER III

SOUTHERN INDIANS TAKE PART IN BATTLE OF PEA RIDGE

The battle of Chustenahla, Cherokee Nation, was fought without the participation of the forces under Colonel Cooper that had marched up on the north side of the Arkansas River. Colonel Cooper reported that this was on account of the desertion of the teamsters of his train, in consequence of which he was unable to bring up his command in time to join in the engagement. This was a lucky happening for Colonel McIntosh, which relieved him of the courtesy of dividing the honor and glory of his achievement with the commander of the Indian Department.

There is no doubt, however, but that this campaign against Hopoeithleyohola's followers from the Creek, Cherokee and Seminole Nations, in defense of their homes, from which they were driven in mid winter, brought upon them and their families almost indescribable suffering. After his arrival with his people in Kansas, he dictated a letter to the President in two or three weeks after the battle in which he stated that his people had lost everything they possessed; that many of them had frozen to death in their retreat during the severe cold over the snow-covered ground; that there were then six thousand women and children of his nation in Southern Kansas, scantily clothed and exposed to the cold of a severe winter; that their Agents had done and were doing all they could to relieve them, but that they wished to be restored to their comfortable homes in their own country as soon as practicable.

This large number of refugee Indian families who had sought safety, food, clothing and shelter in Southern Kansas, on account of their devotion to the Government, aroused a deep sympathy in the hearts of the people of the new State when their presence became known, and arrangements were speedily made for feeding, clothing and sheltering them

as comfortably as possible under the circumstances. The counties west of the second tier of counties were thinly settled—in fact, all the counties along the southern border of the State were thinly settled, but the settled part of the state had raised good crops the past year and there was an abundance of food at reasonable prices to be had for feeding the hungry multitude until spring, when it was hoped that the Government would send an expedition of several thousand men into the Indian country to restore the refugees to their homes and afford them adequate protection against the factions who were adhering to the cause of the South.

General Henry W Halleck had relieved General Fremont of the command of the Department of Missouri and commenced immediately to reorganize in a systematic manner the forces of his department for an active, aggressive, mid-winter campaign, and did not propose to wait until spring to commence operations. About the time these Indians were driven from their homes and pursued by the enemy almost to Kansas, the General was preparing a campaign and commenced concentrating his forces at Lebanon, fifty-six miles northeast of Springfield, under the immediate command of Brigadier General Samuel R. Curtis, to drive General Price's forces, then at Springfield, out of Southwest Missouri, a movemen' which, if successful, would clear Missouri of secessionists, and have a very important bearing on operations in the Indian Territory and of heartening those who were in sympathy with the Union cause. A large part of the army that had retired from Springfield to Rolla and Sedalia in November when Fremont was relieved, was being concentrated for this movement under General Curtis. General Price became alarmed at the threatened danger to his position at Osceola, on the Osage, and he hastily withdrew and was at Springfield on the 23d of December, 1861, appealing to Colonel McIntosh, who was left in command of General McCulloch's division in his

absence, for assistance in repelling the threatened attack of the Federal forces. He was thus vividly reminded that his triumphant march to the Osage was associated with as little glory as the temporary occupation of Southwest Missouri by Fremont's army in November; both armies having marched up the hill and then marched down again.

The second call of President Lincoln for six hundred thousand men was being rapidly filled by the governors of the several states furnishing their quotas of troops. The Government at Washington was waking up and becoming fully alive to the blunders that had been made in Missouri, and under the direction of General Halleck was preparing for an aggressive campaign to start in the early part of January, that would force the secessionists under Price then at Springfield out of the state. While General Curtis was concentrating his divisions at Lebanon for operations against Price, General David Hunter had been assigned to the command of the Department of Kansas, including the Indian Territory west of Arkansas, was concentrating the troops of his department, numbering some five or six thousand men, at Fort Scott for operations in the Indian country, to co-operate with the forces of Halleck under Curtis in the advance southward. There was a fair prospect, if no serious blunders were made, that the Union forces would sweep the Southern forces not only out of Missouri and the northern part of the Indian Territory, but far into Arkansas and the Indian country, perhaps beyond the Boston Mountains to the Arkansas River, leaving the country to be occupied by the Federal forces before the close of the campaign.

At Springfield, General Price organized several brigades of troops out of the State Guard forces for the Confederate service, which gave him a Major General's commission in that service. Early in January the Confederate Government assigned Major General Van Dorn to the command of the Trans-Mississippi District, which included all

of Louisiana north of Red River, all of Arkansas except the tract of country east of the St. Francois River bordering on the Mississippi River; the State of Missouri and the Indian Territory west of Arkansas and south of Kansas. President Davis had called on the governors of the states forming the Confederacy to furnish their quotas of troops under a recent call, and Indian Commissioner Albert Pike had been appointed Brigadier General of the Provisional Army to organize and command the Indian troops raised in the Indian Territory for the Confederate service, and everything indicated that General Van Dorn was preparing for an aggessive campaign. He issued orders from his headquarters at Pocahontas and Little Rock for the troops of his command in the western part of Arkansas to concentrate at Fayetteville and Cross Hollow, and for the Indian troops under General Pike to concentrate in the Indian Territory near the State line and to be in readiness to cooperate with the Confederate army in any movement when it was ready to advance northward into Missouri and Kansas.

The forward movement of the Union forces in Missouri under General Halleck commanding the Department, commenced in January, and had for its purpose the driving of the secession forces under General Price at Springfield out of the state and to pursue them until they were completely disorganized or brought to an engagement. While this movement was going on there were concentrated at Fort Scott several thousand troops of the Department of Kansas under General Hunter, designed to operate on the right flank of the Army of the Southwest under General Curtis, but on account of a controversy between General Hunter and General Lane as to who should command the expedition these troops did not move forward in co-operation with Curtis.

Hunter was a graduate of West Point, a Regular Army officer, a Major General in the Volunteer Army and had the confidence of the President. On the admission of the new



BATTLE OF PEA RIDGE
OR
ELKHORN TAVERN
MARCH 7TH 1862
UNION
CONFEDERATE
Troops
Cavalry
SCALE OF ONE MILE
ENGAGEMENT OF
MARCH 8TH
(SECOND DAY)
McCULLOCH
VAN DORN
CURTIS
SIGEL
PRICE
BIG MOUNTAIN
OPEN FIELDS
HIGH GROUND
RUDDICK'S FIELD
FROST HILL
ADVANCE OF GEN. PRICE & GEN. VAN DORN
PIKE 1st position
McINTOSH & HEBERT
OSTERHAUS
Leetown
Pratt's Store
Winton's House
Ford's House
PEACH ORCHARD
GEN. CURTIS HEAD QRS.
GEN. SIGEL'S HEAD QRS.
UNION PICKET CAPT. RUSSELL
UNION CAMP MARCH 6 & MORNING OF 7TH GEN. CURTIS
ASBOTH 2nd Division
OSTERHAUS 1st Division
DAVIS 3rd Division
CARR 4th Division
SCHAEFER
Little Sugar Creek
GREEN
CONFEDERATE RESERVE GUARDING TRAIN
ELBERT'S SECT OF BATT.
BENTON HUSSARS
TELEGRAPH ROAD

state of Kansas to the Union the legislature had elected James H. Lane a United States senator, and as he had been active on the side of the free state men during the Missouri-Kansas troubles, President Lincoln was willing to oblige him and appointed him brigadier general, advising him, however, that he would be subject to the orders of General Hunter in the proposed campaign into the Indian country. But, without resigning as United States senator, he was in a short time after his appointment as brigadier general exercising authority of the department commander without consulting the latter, thus causing confusion and paralyzing the movement which had been widely advertised as "Lane's Expedition into the Indian country south of Kansas," an expedition which he knew he could not control and had no intention of controlling. Indeed, he had told General Hunter, in the course of an interview between them, that he had not accepted his commission as brigadier general, and was only visiting Hunter as a senator and member of the Military Committee of the Senate of the United States.

Early in March, 1862, there was a general re-organization of the Kansas regiments on a more rational basis than had existed up to that time. Some of the regiments had been raised as part cavalry and part infantry, and in some companies of several regiments part of the men claimed that they were enlisted for Home Guard service and refused to go out of the state, while their officers persisted that they had enlisted for three years or during the war in the volunteer army the same as the other men in the companies who were not complaining of being deceived as to the kind of service they would be required to perform. Among the discontented men there were many unfit for military service on account of age or other disabilities. In some companies there were enough discontented men who claimed they were enlisted for Home Guard service to become almost mutinous, and their representations were taken up by

higher authority to the Department Commander and the Secretary of War, and the companies having the discontented men were ordered mustered out and broken up. In the Sixth Kansas Volunteers, three companies of infantry were mustered out, and the remaining companies of cavalry were organized as a cavalry regiment and filled up by transferring to it cavalry companies from the Fourth and Fifth regiments, which had mostly infantry companies that were transferred to the newly organized Tenth Kansas Infantry; the Third and Fourth regiments, Kansas Volunteers, that had mostly infantry companies, were broken up and the men mustered out and transferred to other regiments. The new organizations received new arms and equipments appropriate to the arm of the service into which they were mustered, to take part in the campaign that was being prepared to advance into the Indian country.

There was now concentrated at Fort Scott for the proposed expedition into the Indian country the following regiments: Cavalry—Third Wisconsin, Colonel William A. Barstow; Second Ohio, Colonel Charles Doubleday; Sixth Kansas, Colonel William R. Judson; Ninth Kansas, Colonel Edward Lynde; Infantry—Ninth Wisconsin, Colonel Frederick Salomon; Twelfth Wisconsin, Colonel George E. Bryant; Thirteenth Wisconsin, Colonel Maurice Malony; First Kansas, Colonel George W. Deitzler; Tenth Kansas, Colonel William Weer; Batteries—First Kansas, Captain Norman Allen; Second Indiana, Captain J. W. Rabb, all under the temporary command of acting brigadier general George W Deitzler, who had been severely wounded in the battle of Wilson Creek while gallantly leading his regiment, the First Kansas Infantry. Before the expedition was ready to move south, however, the following regiments were ordered to other points: The First Kansas Infantry and the Twelfth and Thirteenth Wisconsin Infantry to West Tennessee, for operations against the enemy in that region. In the meantime the Army of the Southwest which had concentrated

at Lebanon, Missouri, under General Curtis, moved forward and attacked and drove General Price's Southern forces from Springfield; pursued them vigorously and attacked them at every place where they made a stand; at Crane Creek, Cross Hollow and Fayetteville, Arkansas, until they were driven into the Boston Mountains.

By this time General Van Dorn had arrived and assumed command of the combined Southern forces under Generals Price, McCulloch and Pike, reported at the time to be about 25,000 men, including Indian auxiliaries. After some reorganization and refitting and bringing up General Pike's forces of Indians and Texans, on his left flank, and some speech making at which the speakers told the soldiers what they were going to do to the foe who had thus invaded the soil of Arkansas, General Van Dorn ordered his army to about face and march to meet and attack the Federal forces in their strong position on Sugar Creek, on the Wire Road, twenty-five miles north of Fayetteville.

General Curtis was kept accurately informed of the movements of the Southern forces, by his scouts and spies and by Union citizens coming into his lines from the territory occupied by the enemy. He had thrown forward detachments from different divisions, covering about twenty-five miles of his front, from Huntsville to Osage Mills, and he withdrew them just in time to prevent their capture, some of them being obliged to conduct a retreating fight to safely reach his position on Sugar Creek. This position he strengthened by felling trees over the roads on his flanks, which might otherwise be easily turned, when he found that Van Dorn was advancing to attack him.

When the Confederate plan of battle was communicated at the grand council of war, which consisted principally of Generals Van Dorn, Price, McCulloch, McIntosh and Pike, they felt so certain of success, so certain of capturing the Federal army in its position on Sugar Creek that they determined to push forward their forces by rapid marches on

two roads, the Wire Road from Fayetteville to Springfield, which would bring the column on that road directly in front of the Federal position, and the column on the other road, the Bentonville Road, led by Price's Army, to a position several miles in the rear of the Union Army on the Wire Road, thus cutting off every avenue of its retreat. The retreating fight of General Sigel's Federal division on the 6th of March from Bentonville to Sugar Creek developed the intention of the Confederate commanders, for, having pursued Sigel on that road until he formed a junction with Curtis on his extreme right at dark, Generals Van Dorn and Price halted their troops an hour or so that their men and animals might be refreshed with rest and food, after which the march was resumed on the Bentonville Road with the design of reaching the Wire Road in the rear of the Federal Army before daylight. But the large and small trees felled across the Bentonville Road under General Curtis' instructions had so obstructed it that the Confederate forces were kept at work and marking time nearly all night to remove the obstructions so that the artillery, troops and trains could pass and be in position to open the battle early the next morning.

To keep in touch with the Confederate forces during the night General Curtis sent out mounted detachments on both flanks to observe their movements. The officers of some of these detachments returned to the General's headquarters during the night and reported that they had heard the movement of troops, artillery and trains on the Bentonville Road. Early the next morning the General sent out a mounted force supported by infantry and a section of artillery on the Wire Road to make a reconnoissance on that road as far north as its intersection with the Bentonville Road. Before reaching that point, however, it came in contact with a strong force of Price's army supported by artillery, which compelled it to retire fighting until it received re-enforcements near Elkhorn Tavern, by which name the battle is as well known as that of Pea Ridge.

General Curtis was at once informed of the situation and sent Colonel Carr's division to re-enforce the reconnoissance, and ordered a change of front to the rear of his entire line, and instead of facing south behind the precipitous bluffs of Sugar Creek, he was facing north and east and fought the battle out on the changed front with the enemy who had gained his rear. The battle now joined from right to left on the Federal front and raged furiously during the day, and when darkness intervened the Federal right under Colonel Carr had been forced back several miles with heavy casualties, and he was obliged to yield to the enemy Elkhorn Tavern and the heavily timbered tract of probably one hundred acres southwest of the Tavern and west of the Fayetteville or Wire Road.

General Curtis had thrown in his reserves on his right to check the advancing foe, and the situation would have appeared discouraging and almost hopeless had not his left, under Colonels Jeff C. Davis and P. J. Osterhaus, in a fierce assault smashed and completely demoralized the Confederate right under Generals McCulloch, McIntosh, Pike and Hebert, during which McCulloch and McIntosh were killed, and Hebert captured, and their forces, including Pike's Indians, were driven from the field. This success on his left enabled General Curtis after darkness fell to order most of the troops and artillery from his left, to re-enforce his right and be in readiness to renew the struggle the next morning. General Van Dorn also ordered the senior officer commanding McCulloch's corps and General Pike, commanding the Indians, to gather up their broken and demoralized troops, except a force sufficient to guard and protect the train which had been brought up on the Bentonville Road, and march to his assistance during the night, designating the positions they should take up near the Telegraph Road.

In the morning, after changing front, General Curtis had his trains parked in a large field west and southwest of the heavily timbered tract referred to, with the teams

to each wagon hitched up and ready to move at a moment's notice, so that after darkness came on and quiet reigned over the field, he was able to have most of his troops and animals furnished with food, and bivouacking on their arms in line, his men had refreshing rest during the night, with pickets in front to observe any movement of the enemy whose lines were only a hundred or so yards distant. Having had all arms of his troops furnished with an ample supply of ammunition, General Curtis opened the attack on the enemy early the next morning, and in a few moments a fierce artillery action was on, the roaring of the guns being heard many miles distant from the scene of conflict. Generals Van Dorn and Price had concentrated most of their batteries on Pea Ridge Mountain, about half a mile north of Elkhorn, overlooking the Federal position, and firing between the opposing batteries for some time was very heavy, but finally the Federal guns getting the range of the enemy guns on the mountain, succeeded in driving all the batteries from their positions, killing and wounding many of the battery horses, exploding ammunition chests, knocking to splinters gun carriages, and decapitating Captain Clark, commanding one of the most famous batteries of the enemy and causing general demoralization.

While General Curtis' batteries on the left were engaging the enemy batteries on Pea Ridge Mountain, his batteries on his right and center were employed in shelling the heavy timbered tract in front of Elkhorn in which were massed large forces of Van Dorn's infantry. Having prepared the way for his infantry on his left to ascend Pea Ridge Mountain to drive the enemy from their position thereon, he then advanced his right and center and soon became engaged in a fierce conflict with the enemy who were forced gradually back on both sides of the Springfield and Fayetteville Road to Elkhorn Tavern and beyond, when the whole Confederate line gave way, precipitating the ut-

most excitement and confusion in all parts of General Van Dorn's Army, which became disorganized and disintegrated into detachments fleeing in every direction.

In the last hour of the battle the report got out among the Confederate troops and spread rapidly that Generals Van Dorn and Price had been captured, which increased the consternation and confusion, and General Pike, commanding the contingent of Indian troops, became separated from them, and, with an aid and three or four men, wandered two or three days in the woods and on by-roads in the rough, hilly region between Elkhorn and Bentonville, and finally received information from stragglers, who had fled from the battlefield on the Bentonville Road, that a part of his command was marching to Cincinnati on the Cherokee line, and he joined them at that place and they moved into the Cherokee Nation and then south and crossed the Arkansas River, many of the Indians having thrown down their arms and returned home. When the general break-up came, Generals Van Dorn and Price with such forces as they were able to rally, retired several miles northeast on the Telegraph Road in the direction of Cassville, until they came to the Huntsville Road and then turning sharply to the right marched ten to fifteen miles and bivouacked for the night, after which, taking the nearest and most practicable route through the Boston Mountains, arrived at Van Buren in less than a week, where the Confederate forces were reorganized and further operations planned. The main parts of the troops and trains of McCulloch's and Pike's divisions retreated from the field on the Bentonville Road until their officers received instructions to march to concentration points; but the overthrow of the Confederate forces was so complete that aggressive operations by them was out of the question for that campaign in that region.

General Curtis took into the battle about 10,500 men of all arms, and he reported his losses at 203 killed, 980

wounded and 201 missing; but there should be added to these losses two officers and seven men killed and four officers and fifty-seven men wounded of Colonel John S. Phelps' regiment, Missouri Volunteers, that took a conspicuous part in the battle.

General Van Dorn reported his effective strength at 16,000 just prior to going into battle and his casualties at 800 to 1,000 killed and wounded and 200 prisoners, but submitted no tabulated statement of his losses. These were probably as large or larger than the Federal casualties, judging from the number of general officers killed, wounded and captured.

Had the Kansas forces of five or six thousand men concentrated at Fort Scott for operations in the Indian country been ordered forward on the right of General Curtis and in co-operation with him after he passed Springfield in the pursuit of General Price in his retreat to the Boston Mountains, the Confederate army under General Van Dorn might have been practically destroyed and ended further efforts of the Southern leaders to control Missouri. The bitter fight between Senator Lane and Governor Robinson was, no doubt, responsible for keeping this large force of well-equipped troops, except part of the Kansas regiments, in idleness at and in the vicinity of Fort Scott, when they were much needed on the right and in co-operation with General Curtis during his advance into and operations in Southwest Missouri and Northwest Arkansas. Clearly there was too much politics injected into the proposed campaign and into the reorganization and equipment of the Kansas regiments and into the movement of the well equipped troops from other states concentrated at Fort Scott to get the best results out of the resources the Government had staked for a definite purpose. This mixing of politics with military operations was distasteful to General Hunter, and on March 24th he was assigned to the command of the Southern Department, which included operations about Savannah, Georgia.

While General Van Dorn was at Van Buren he ordered Colonel Churchill with his brigade of cavalry to march from near Clarksville to Forsyth, on White River, Missouri, and thence to Springfield to destroy General Curtis' supplies at that place and any supply trains en route to the Federal army operating in Northern Arkansas or Southern Missouri. General Curtis had anticipated such a movement of the enemy, however, and, in a short time after the battle of Pea Ridge had his cavalry advance east along the southern line of Missouri, soon to be followed by his infantry and artillery, covering not only Forsyth, but all that section of country southeast of Springfield as far east as West Plains, and Colonel Churchill's raiding force was unable to pass into Missouri.

During his brief stay at Van Buren General Van Dorn had planned a campaign for Southeast Missouri, and ordered his reorganized forces, encamped in the vicinity, called the First Division Army of the West, of about twenty thousand strong, under General Price, who had recently been appointed and confirmed a Major General in the Confederate Army, to Pocahontas, from which place he proposed to march his forces and attack the Federal Army in the rear of New Madrid, and if that movement was found impracticable, to march boldly on St. Louis. When his army under Price was on the march to Pocahontas, he received a dispatch from General Beauregard that his movement then in progress was too late, that the Federal forces were in possession of New Madrid and that it would be best to join their forces against the enemy, and instructions were hurriedly sent him to change his line of march at Springfield, Arkansas, to Des Arc, on White River, where troops and supplies would be concentrated for further operations, which would soon take Generals Van Dorn and Price with their troops to east of the Mississippi River to re-enforce Beauregard, who was besieged at Corinth by the Union forces under General Halleck.

CHAPTER IV

THE INDIAN EXPEDITION

With the Confederate forces of Van Dorn and Price removed from western Arkansas and the Southern Indian forces of Pike south of the Arkansas River; with the Federal Army of Curtis moving east and southeast from the battlefield of Pea Ridge, and there being no enemy in sight and no threatened invasion of Kansas, there was no further need of so large a force as had been concentrated at Fort Scott for operations in the Indian country. Moreover, as already stated, three infantry regiments had been ordered out of the Department of Kansas to participate in operations designed to open the Mississippi River.

When Price took with him east of the Mississippi River all the men he could get to enlist into the Confederate service from the Missouri State Guard, or Army of Missouri, as he called it, there was a large part of this force that continued in the old organization, and soon commenced to drift back into the state in small detachments of companies and battalions. With some regiments of secessionists in process of organization in North Missouri at the time Price was driven out of the State, these made a troublesome element for General Schofield, then commanding the Department of Missouri, to deal with. At the same time there was developing in different counties, particularly in the western counties of the State, lawless bands of secessionists known as "bushwhackers," who co-operated with the returning members of the State Guard and the secession organizations that had been cut off from joining Price before the battle of Pea Ridge. Price took with him east of the Mississippi probably less than ten thousand Missourians, and the members of the State Guard who did not enter the Confederate service, and his followers who had left the State with him

and were in Arkansas and Texas were perhaps more than twice that number, most of whom were anxious to get back home, even if they were obliged to hide out in the brush. It should be stated, however, that there were hundreds of the State Guards whose terms of service expired about the time of the battle of Pea Ridge, who were at heart Union men and had been persuaded to enter that service in the early part of the war under the representations that it was strictly for the defense of the State and had nothing to do with the cause of secession, and on the expiration of their terms of service many of these returned home and joined the Union Army.

As nearly all the volunteer regiments from Missouri on the Union side were with the armies operating beyond the limits of the state, the returning secessionists of the State Guard and the other organized elements referred to were disturbing the tranquillity of the state to such an extent that the state government was obliged to organize a force of fourteen regiments, called the "Missouri State Militia," mostly mounted, for service in the state during the war, but armed, equipped and paid by the General Government; and later they were called for emergency service what was known as the "Missouri Enrolled Militia," in which there were companies and regiments from nearly every county in the state, who were useful in holding small posts, escorting trains, and in co-operating with the state militia and volunteer forces in times of raids of Southern forces into the state. They were under the orders of Militia Generals commanding different districts; but some of the Enrolled Militia organizations had more than a year's service during the war; part of the fourteen State Militia regiments were recruited from them.

After the first of April there was no immediate danger of invasion of Kansas on her eastern or southern borders, and except for the conditions in the Indian Territory, nearly

all the troops concentrated at Fort Scott and vicinity could have been sent away without detriment to the service, to strengthen the Union Army at other points.

Colonel Charles Doubleday, Second Ohio Cavalry, made a reconnoissance with his regiment from Fort Scott into southwest Missouri to break up secession organizations that were committing depredations upon and terrorizing Union families. These had been unable to leave their homes and seek safety at Springfield or in Kansas on account of the means of moving their household goods and clothing having been taken by the secessionists, many of them outlaws, who had no restraint imposed upon them after the Southern Army was driven out of the State. There had been several Federal scouts through Newton and McDonald counties and several skirmishes at Neosho; but no Federal commander had made any effort to hold the place for more than a day or so at a time; it was only a night's march from Cowskin Prairie, Cherokee Nation, a rendezvous for Southern forces, and for a month or so after the battle of Pea Ridge was visited oftener by Confederate detachments, Indian and white, than by Union troops. Colonel J. J. Clarkson, of Missouri, had been authorized by General Van Dorn just before his activities were transferred east of the Mississippi, to raise a mounted regiment of white troops and, with the co-operation of the Indian forces already organized, to march through the Indian country into southwest Kansas and capture or destroy the supply trains from Fort Leavenworth en route to the Union forces operating in Colorado and New Mexico, and under his instructions was displaying a good deal of activity and zeal in the northeast part of the Cherokee Nation in organizing and preparing for the work laid out for him.

In his reconnoissance through several counties in Southwest Missouri and through the northeastern part of the Cherokee Nation, Colonel Doubleday did not break up the enemy forces, Indians and whites that had been

operating from Cowskin Prairie. Instead he simply compelled them to retire a few miles southward, where they continued to receive accessions from fugitive secessionists from Missouri, and from the Missouri State Guard, which was disbanding since most of its members had entered Confederate service and were with Price east of the Mississippi River.

The Federal authorities determined to restore to their homes in the Indian country, on the opening of spring, the refugee Indian families in Southern Kansas and, by sending a military force of four or five thousand men, with an adequate complement of artillery, to the vicinity of Fort Gibson and Tahlequah, to impress the Indians, particularly the Creeks, Seminoles and Cherokees, with the power of the Government and give them an opportunity of raising several regiments for the protection of their own country, homes and families. Early in the spring, when they were in Southern Kansas, and it was reasonably certain that an expedition would be sent into their country to restore them to their homes, it was believed that it would be practicable to raise several regiments among them for their own protection, for service in their own country and on its borders only, and recruiting officers were sent among them and nearly two full regiments were organized and prepared for the field except as to arms and equipments. Most of them, however, were soon armed with a long barrel rifle known as Indian Rifle, that used a round bullet that was quite effective at close range. The Government had on hand at Fort Leavenworth enough of these rifles to arm part of the organized Indians and issued them to the new regiments. Indeed, the Indians generally preferred them to the army musket then in use, and when fighting in the timber where they could get a rest for their rifles, they were not to be despised on account of being antiquated; they used a percussion cap instead of flint and powder pan, which was passing out of use.

In the early part of June the following regiments were concentrated at Baxter Springs, west of Spring River, on the Military Road from Fort Scott to Fort Gibson, near the State line, for the Indian Expedition: Tenth Kansas Infantry, Colonel William Weer; Ninth Wisconsin Infantry, Colonel Frederick Salomon; Second Ohio Cavalry, Colonel Charles Doubleday; Sixth Kansas Cavalry, Colonel William R. Judson; Ninth Kansas Cavalry, Colonel Edward Lynde; Captain Rabb's Second Indiana Battery; Captain Allen's First Kansas Battery; there were also two Indian regiments, consisting of Cherokees, Creeks and Seminoles, that had nearly completed their organization, that made up the troops of the expedition.

The refugee Indian families that had been in Southern Kansas west of Baxter Springs since mid-winter came over and followed in the rear of the army after it entered the Indian Territory, and when it was encamped at Hudson's Crossing of the Neosho River, the white soldiers saw hundreds of families, women and children, bathing nude in the warm, shallow water of the stream, apparently unconscious of what we call shame. They were mostly Creeks and Seminoles.

In the political deals that were made, Lieutenant-Colonel James G. Blunt, of the Third Kansas Infantry, which had been broken up, was appointed Brigadier General of Volunteers and assigned to the command of the Department of Kansas, including the Indian Territory, with headquarters at Fort Leavenworth, the base of supplies for the department, and, as his presence was required at headquarters to make arrangements for furnishing his troops in the field with the needed supplies, which would have to be transported by wagon trains for a distance of over two hundred miles and over streams that had not been bridged, he was unable to accompany the expedition. In the absence of General Blunt, the command fell upon Colonel Weer, the senior colonel, who had been up to entering the army, a lawyer of some ability in Wy-



CHIEF JOHN ROSS

andotte, and had a good military bearing, and would have been an efficient officer except for the fact that he was addicted to the liquor habit, which was frequently so pronounced as to unfit him for having command of troops in the field.

The regimental commissary sergeants made out requisitions on the division commissary for rations to issue to the regiments to which they belonged, and the requisitions had to be approved by the division commander, and it so happened that one time when the command was to make a night march so as to strike the enemy at daylight the next morning, that one commissary sergeant was directed to have the rations issued to the companies of his regiment by dark. He took the requisition to Colonel Weer's headquarters to have him approve it; but was unable to see him, that officer being drunk in his tent; the errand was repeated three or four times, and finally just before midnight his approval was secured; his drunken condition caused a delay of several hours in the movement of the troops whose requisition for commissary supplies was to be filled.

Before the expedition left Baxter Springs, Colonel Weer had information through his scouts of a Confederate force of Indians and Whites encamped at Round Grove, on the east side of Grand River, about twenty miles distant, and having everything in readiness his troops struck tents and crossing the State line, passed into the Indian Territory and took up the march south on the Old Military Road to Fort Gibson. On crossing the Neosho River at Hudson's Ford, the command turned east and crossed Grand River, marching in the direction of Cowskin Prairie until it came to a beautiful grove where there was an abundance of water and went into camp for the night. The army was now in the enemy country and pickets were posted to prevent a surprise attack.

Detachments of cavalry from the Sixth Kansas and mounted Indians from the First Cherokee regiment were

sent forward under Colonel Jewell as far east as the State line, and south ten to fifteen miles to scout the country thoroughly and gather all the information practicable of the movements and numbers of the enemy in the northern part of the Cherokee Nation, and the officers in command of the detachments reported that they had interviewed a number of Cherokee people who informed them that there had been in that section for several weeks Southern forces of Missourians under Rains, Coffee, Hunter and Clarkson, variously estimated at twelve to fifteen hundred men, and under Colonel Watie three or four hundred Cherokees, and on hearing of the advance of the Union Expedition, had broken up their camps and moved further south; that these Southern forces of Missourians and Indians had recently made a raid into Missouri as far as Neosho and attacked a detachment of about two hundred militia commanded by Colonel John M. Richardson, Fourteenth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, at that place and dispersed them, capturing their wagons and doing some damage; that the Cherokees under Colonel Watie were the only Confederate force in that section displaying much activity since the battle of Pea Ridge; that those under Colonel Drew were at or near Park Hill and Tahlequah and had not lately been active, and were not enthusiastic for the Confederate cause.

With the information thus secured Colonel Weer ordered the greater part of his command, consisting of infantry and artillery, some cavalry and the supply and baggage trains under Colonel Salomon, to recross Grand River to the west side and march down on the Military Road to Cabin Creek, where the two wings of the command would unite, while he took a battalion of his own regiment, the Tenth Kansas, a battalion of the Ninth Kansas Cavalry and a section of Rabb's Second Indiana Battery, and by making a night march down on the east side of Grand River, endeavor to surprise and attack the enemy whom he had located, by daylight the next morning. In co-

operation with this movement he sent Lieutenant-Colonel Jewell, Sixth Kansas Cavalry, with part of his regiment, to make a rapid march south several miles east of the line of march of Colonel Weer's force, to strike the Southern force of Indians under Colonel Watie and capture or disperse them, and then push on and join the column under Colonel Weer early the next morning, if practicable at or near Grand Saline.

The enemy Indians had heard of the Union Expedition crossing to the east side of Grand River and were on the lookout for any mounted detachments moving south, so that Colonel Jewell's day's march was a day of excitement in pursuit of small parties of the enemy in their flight south, and several times came near capturing Colonel Watie, and one time certainly would have done so had he not taken to the brush, so near were his pursuers at his heels, those in advance having emptied their revolvers at him without effect. Having dispersed Watie's force in every direction, at dark Colonel Jewell halted an hour to feed and rest, and then mounting his men, marched all night and arrived at Locust Grove just as the action was over.

It turned out that the enemy camp at Locust Grove under Colonel Clarkson was located as it had been described to Colonel Weer, and having reliable guides, he was able to adjust his march so as to arrive at it just at daybreak, and capturing several of the enemy pickets out some distance from camp and by a rapid movement of his command had the enemy surrounded before they knew of his presence. When awakened by the firing at those who were endeavoring to escape from the camp, many of Colonel Clarkson's men in their night clothes were seen rushing about in the greatest confusion; but the Federal forces had closed up so rapidly that the cordon thrown around the camp was so strengthened that any further escape of the enemy was impossible.

In this affair, known as the action of Locust Grove,

Colonel Clarkson surrendered 110 men, mostly Missourians, and all his baggage and sixty wagons loaded with powder and supplies just arrived from Fort Smith, for his proposed expedition into Southwestern Kansas, to capture or destroy wagon trains hauling supplies to the Federal Posts in Colorado and New Mexico.

Locust Grove was near Grand Saline, the Salt works, and the next day after the action the prisoners and captured train were taken to the west side of Grand River where the army encamped near the mouth of Cabin Creek and where it celebrated the Fourth of July. The Indians who took part in the expedition were allowed to help themselves to the captured loot except as to army supplies; but the Indians got most of it, for the clothing was nearly all citizens' clothing and of no use to the white soldiers; the other supplies that could be used by the army were turned over to the chiefs of the departments that issued such supplies to the troops; the powder was turned over to the Indian officers to be used as ammunition for their Indian rifles.

The loyal Indians were delighted with this important triumph in a few days after the Federal army entered their country, and it caused consternation among those who had espoused the cause of the Confederacy, and they lost as little time as possible in putting the Arkansas River between them and the Federal forces.

After spending a few days in the camp on Cabin Creek to await the arrival of the supply train from Fort Scott, Colonel Weer moved the army forward again down the Military Road on the west side of Grand River to Flat Rock, about twelve miles above Fort Gibson, where it encamped for two weeks and until its commissary supplies commenced running low, and until a fear arose in the minds of some of the officers and troops that our communications had been interrupted between that place and Fort Scott with the possible loss of our supply train. After leaving Cabin Creek the weather had become op-

pressively warm for Northern troops and animals; not a drop of rain had fallen since the expedition entered the Indian country to revive the dying grass, which in some places was dry enough to burn, an unusual phenomenon for that season of the year. The expedition seemingly was unable to move forward or retire; the troops day after day, were sweltering under almost tropical heat and no dispatches having been received in regard to the supply train, some of the officers and soldiers became almost mutinous; in fact became mutinous, and as Colonel Weer would neither order the expedition forward nor retire, Colonel Salomon, the next officer in rank, feeling that the situation was desperate, called a council of war of the principal commanders of regiments, and after its deliberations issued a pronunciamento to the troops, reciting that the army was one hundred and sixty miles from its base with communications interrupted, took upon himself the responsibility of arresting Colonel Weer and assuming command and ordering immediate retirement until the supply train was met or its safety assured, and in reporting the fact to the Department Commander charged Weer with being abusive in intercourse with fellow officers, and of being notoriously intemperate in habits while on duty.

But after all, the expedition accomplished something worth while before leaving Cabin Creek. Colonel Weer sent two companies of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, under Captain H. S. Greeno, to Tahlequah, the capital of the Cherokee Nation, and to Parkhill, three miles beyond the official residence of the Chief, John Ross, to ascertain the condition of affairs there and for information as to whether the Chief was willing to visit the camp of the expedition and talk over with the Federal authorities the line of policy he proposed to pursue, all of which was intended to impress him with the power of the Govern-

ment and give him an opportunity of renouncing the treaty of alliance of his people with the Confederacy.

He declined to visit the Federal camp for the purpose set forth, pleading age and the delicate position in which he was placed by the fortunes of war, and as the matter appeared to Captain Greeno to belong more appropriately to the Indian Department and to diplomacy than to the Military, he decided not to disturb the Chief, but put him upon his parole not to leave his official residence or capital until his position was considered by the proper Federal authorities.

Part of Colonel Drew's regiment of Cherokees and many of the officers were at Parkhill and Tahlequah, and on hearing of the disaster to Colonel Clarkson's command and the close pursuit of Colonel Watie, were almost paralyzed, and after rounding them up, Captain Greeno heard them debating about what they should do, and remarked that he would decide for himself and make them prisoners and take them to camp, and he did so. There were some of the prominent men of the Cherokee Nation among them, Lieutenant Colonel William P. Ross, Major Thomas Pegg, Lieutenant J. Chover, and several other officers of Colonel Drew's regiment.

Lieutenant Colonel William P. Ross had just received orders from Colonel Cooper to report to him at once at Fort Davis, which was on the south bank of the Arkansas River opposite to Fort Gibson, with his available men; but Captain Greeno's action made it impossible to comply with the instructions. Chief Ross had also just received a dispatch from Colonel Cooper, requesting him in the name of the President of the Southern Confederacy, and in accordance with treaty stipulations of October, 1861, to issue a proclamation calling out every man fit for military service in the Cherokee Nation between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five years, to assist in repelling the invasion of the Indian country by the Federal forces.

In view of this situation and in order to make it impossible for the Chief to take any action in opposition to the Federal Government, Captain Greeno decided on further consideration not only to parole him and leave him at home, but to make him a prisoner of war until the matter should be disposed of by higher authority. This action prevented him from issuing the proclamation under pressure of Colonel Cooper. He knew, too, that there was no Confederate force in the Cherokee Nation to defend it against invasion of Federal forces as had been promised.

Captain Greeno was a graduate physician and practitioner up to the time of raising his company, and an intelligent officer, and had the good judgment to use tact and diplomacy in dealing with these Indians. Having heard of the whirlwind movement of the Federal forces down on the east side of Grand River, and the capture of Colonel Clarkson's command at Locust Grove only a few days before the arrival of Greeno, several hundred Cherokees, many of them leading men of the nation, had gathered at Tahlequah and Parkhill, to discuss the situation. While they were debating the matter without seeming to get anywhere, Captain Greeno decided to address them, giving his view of the situation. There was a meeting of the leaders of the Indians at which he was present and invited to speak, and in substance spoke as follows: "Leaders and people of the Cherokee Nation, I am here under orders of the commanding officer of the United States forces encamped at Cabin Creek. It is an expedition of several thousand men, well supplied with cavalry, artillery and infantry, and sent by the Government into the Indian country to restore peace and tranquillity among the Cherokee people, and to protect those who have lived up to treaty relations with the Government. You have heard of the swiftness of our movements and of the first blow we have struck the enemy in the capture of Colonel Clarkson's command at Locust Grove a few days ago, and we mean to keep up these blows until not an enemy organiza-

tion shall find a footing in your country. Last year the Federal Government did not have its forces organized until after the enemy, white and Indian soldiers, had overrun your country, taken your property, and by threats and intimidation forced many of your people to take sides with the South against their will and judgment. But I am able to tell you now that the Federal Government is rapidly getting its forces organized and equipped for an aggressive campaign on all fronts, and I may call your attention to the fact, if you have not already heard, where our arms have been completely successful recently in defeating large Southern armies and driving them from their strong positions with the loss of thousands of prisoners and cannon and millions of dollars' worth of equipment. Commencing his mid-winter campaign, General Grant, after many bloody conflicts, drove the Confederate army out of Kentucky into their strongly fortified positions at Fort Donelson on the Cumberland River and Fort Henry on the Tennessee River, and after a short siege, compelled both places to surrender with more than 21,000 prisoners, including several generals, and with the loss of all their arms, supplies and equipments. This overwhelming success of the Federal arms caused the Confederate generals to retire their remaining armies to Corinth, Mississippi. General Grant advanced in pursuit and took his army up the Tennessee River on transports, convoyed by gunboats armed with guns of heavy calibres, to Pittsburgh Landing, where he disembarked his forces, 33,000 strong, and was soon attacked by the Confederate forces from Corinth, under General Andrew Sidney Johnston, 38,000 strong, and, after a desperate battle of nearly two days, defeated the Southern forces and drove them back to Corinth with a loss of nearly fifteen thousand men killed and wounded on each side, General Johnston being among the slain. General Grant's forces moved forward from the victorious field and laid siege to Corinth, which had been strongly fortified and re-enforced by all the available Confederate forces in the

West, and after more than a month's siege, the Confederate commander slipped out and retired further south, so that the Confederates were holding no position on that front, but were holding strong positions on the Mississippi River, the most northern of which was Island Number Ten. While General Grant's operations were going forward at Forts Donelson and Henry and at Pittsburg Landing and Corinth, the Confederate forces holding Island Number Ten were being fiercely attacked and besieged by the Federal land and naval forces, and on the 7th of April, the last day of the battle of Pittsburg Landing, compelled to abandon the Island, and in endeavoring to escape 5,000 men and three generals were cut off and captured, and all their arms, supplies and equipment, including more than 100 cannon, fell into the hands of the victors. Continuing the Mississippi River campaign, the Federal Gunboat Flotilla attacked and defeated the Confederate Ram Fleet at Fort Pillow, and it retired to Memphis, where, in the early part of June, it was again attacked by Admiral Walke, commanding the Federal Gunboat Flotilla, and every vessel destroyed except one, that escaped by flight down the Mississippi River. And now coming nearer your own homes, within cannon sound of the Cherokee Nation, the great three days battle of Pea Ridge was fought between the Federal forces of General Curtis, 10,000 strong, and the combined Confederate forces of Generals Van Dorn, Price and Pike, 16,000 strong, and you know the result, you know of the overwhelming defeat of the Southern forces who were driven from the field with the loss of three generals killed, McCulloch, McIntosh and Slack, and of thousands of men killed, wounded and missing, and so demoralized that they were practically a disintegrated mass until they arrived at Van Buren for reorganization.

While these operations were going on, Admiral Farragut, commanding the United States naval forces of the Gulf Squadron, passed the Confederate forts on the Lower Mississippi River, advanced up to New Orleans, and having

the city under his guns of the fleet, received its surrender, leaving only two places of importance on the Mississippi River to the Confederates, Vicksburg and Port Hudson.

"These successes of the Federal arms are referred to to show you that part of the Federal forces employed in those operations will be released for operations in Arkansas and the Indian country, and that it is the firm intention of the Government to exercise its lawful authority in all this region, and to meet, engage and destroy all opposition as rapidly as practicable, and it has been pointed out to you the earnestness with which the Government has taken hold of the matter."

In concluding his address, the captain told his audience, which had increased after he commenced speaking, that the Government was firm but conciliatory and not disposed to exercise revenge towards any one, and that if any of the Cherokee people had, under pressure of threats and promises of the Confederate authorities, assumed a hostile attitude towards the General Government, and were now convinced of their error and wished to henceforward cast their fortunes with the Unionists, they could do so without prejudice and without danger and would receive the protection of the army, but that the Government was determined to restore to their homes all loyal Indian families who had been driven off by the enemy, and to give them all the protection within its power, and would look to them for co-operation in this work.

It was the desire of the Federal authorities to treat the leaders of the faction that had renounced their allegiance to the Government with leniency, for it was generally known that the Confederate Government had brought strong pressure to bear upon them to have them change their policy and form an alliance with it. But the alliance with the Confederacy was not popular with the majority of the Cherokee people from the first, and when Captain Greeno started to march back to camp, there were several hundred Cherokees, mostly members of Colonel

Drew's regiment at Tahlequah and Parkhill and vicinity, of whose political status he did not feel certain; but as their attitude was not hostile, he decided to leave them to follow their own inclinations, and they followed him into camp, and most of them immediately joined the Third Indian Regiment then being organized.

Two companies of Colonel Judson's Sixth Kansas Cavalry were also sent out from Cabin Creek down the east side of Grand River on a reconnoissance to ascertain whether any Confederate force was occupying Fort Gibson. The detachment met with no resistance on the march, and on approaching the place found from inquiries that not more than forty to fifty Confederates had been there for a day or so, and these fled when the Federal cavalry came in sight to the thick brush and timber on the north side of the Arkansas River, three miles distant. On marching in and occupying the town and post, the Commanding officer of the Sixth Kansas raised the Stars and Stripes to the top of the flag pole, the first time its graceful folds had waved from that place for a year and a half. On the south side of the Arkansas River, opposite the mouth of Grand River, the Confederates had prepared a fortified position they called Fort Davis, in honor of President Davis, of the Confederacy, and the commanding officer of the Sixth Kansas received information that Colonel Cooper had, at that place and in the vicinity, a force of two or three thousand men, Choctaws, Chickasaws and Texans; but that since the Federal Army had swept the Confederates from the north side of the Arkansas River, he was on the point of retiring to the Canadian River.

During the month that the Federal Army had occupied the Indian country north of the Arkansas River, hundreds of Indian families returned to their homes in the confidence that they could live in peace and have the protection promised them, and were of course deeply disappointed and grieved when they heard the Federal forces were retiring north to Baxter Springs, a movement that

would leave them entirely unprotected, should the Indian troops recently organized and only partly armed and equipped also retire. It was generally felt among the Indians that the moment the Federal forces retired to the northern line of the Cherokee Nation, that Colonel Cooper would gather up his forces, consisting of Choctaws and Chickasaws, Texans, and Colonel Watie's Cherokee regiment and cross the Arkansas River and overrun all that part of the country evacuated by the Federal army and cause a reign of terror among the loyal Indian families who had returned to their homes.

When the army returned to Cabin Creek, a regiment of cavalry under Colonel Cloud arrived from Kansas and was sent over to Tahlequah and Parkhill, to bring out Chief Ross and the archives of the Cherokee Nation. He was considered by the Federal officers in a position to know his feelings and sentiments, to be in favor of the Union cause, and it was not held expedient to leave him at his capital on the evacuation of the country.

His family, friends and entourage occupied about a dozen carriages as they accompanied the army on the march north, part of our troops escorting him from Baxter Springs to Fort Scott, where he made arrangements to go to Philadelphia. He never returned to the Cherokee Nation; he was generally beloved by the Cherokee people whose interests he always held superior to all other considerations. He was not a full blood Cherokee.

In a short time after arresting Colonel Weer and assuming command of the expedition, Colonel Salomon was promoted to Brigadier General, and under instructions from General Blunt, commanding the Department, was to hold the advanced position he occupied on the west side of Grand River, a few miles above Fort Gibson; but it is a well established principle of military science, as well as of common sense, that a military commander operating some distance from his base must see to it that his lines of communication are kept open; his supply lines kept intact,

for any interruption of these by his enemy might force him into the humiliating position of being obliged to surrender without fighting. The army was about one hundred and sixty miles from its base at Fort Scott; the weather was unusually hot and dry for nearly two months in midsummer and had dried up the grass, dried it up so that it would burn in places on the prairie, and as there was no corn in the country for the public animals the troops were handicapped from further aggressive operations. The Indians, under normal conditions, did not raise enough corn for their own use.

But this was not all, the Federal position was tenable only so long as Western Missouri and Western Arkansas were free of Southern forces of sufficient strength to attack the Federal line of communication, its supply line, which was all the way from its position on Grand River to Fort Scott, within a day's march of the western line of Arkansas and Missouri, and the greater part of the distance within a few hours' march.

All of western Arkansas north of the Arkansas River and west of Batesville was unoccupied by any Union troops, leaving this large area open and undisturbed for the Southern leaders to collect and organize their forces from conscripts and large numbers of secessionists from Missouri, who were anxious to return to their homes. General T. C. Hindman had lately been assigned by the Confederate Government to the command of the Trans-Mississippi District, which included the Indian Territory, and as he was an energetic commander and anxious to make a good showing to his government for its confidence reposed in him, set to work at once to organize all the resources of his district and prepare the forces raised for active, aggressive operations at the earliest possible moment, giving his almost undivided attention to Western Arkansas and the Indian Territory.

There were no Federal troops or Missouri Militia stationed at more than one or two points in the western counties of the State south of Nevada, leaving this extensive area to be traversed by returning bands of secessionists without opposition, except accidental opposition of meeting scouting detachments of Union Militia from Springfield and a few other points.

There was some correspondence between General Blunt and General Brown, commanding the District of Southwest Missouri at Springfield, in regard to co-operating with each other to prevent bodies of secessionists from passing through the western counties of Missouri to the Missouri River counties; but these efforts of co-operation were ineffectual, for during the month of July there was an almost constant stream of Missouri secessionists, in small parties of a dozen or so to a hundred or more, emerging from Arkansas and on the march to the Missouri River counties or other counties in the interior of the State.

Many of these parties were headed by prominent men, such men as Colonel John T. Hughes, with a Brigadier General's commission; Colonel J. V. Cockrell, Colonel Upton Hayes, Colonel John T. Coffee, Colonel J. O. Shelby, Colonel Tracy, Colonel Jackman, Colonel Chiles, Colonel Hunter, and in a short time they were able to recruit, rally and concentrate two or three thousand men upon any place they considered it worth while to attack successfully. On the 11th of August, Colonel Hughes, the ranking officer among them, attacked the Federal force of Lieutenant Colonel James T. Buell, Seventh Missouri Cavalry, commanding the Post of Independence, and after a desperate fight that lasted from daylight until nearly noon, captured most of the Federal force; but at a terrible cost of killed and wounded on both sides, Colonel Hughes, Colonel Chiles and other Confederate field officers losing their lives, and a number of others being severely wounded.

The situation became so threatening to his supply line and to the depot of supplies at Fort Scott that General Salomon left the three Indian regiments recently organized

and a force of white troops and some artillery at his camp on the west side of Grand River, a few miles below Baxter Springs, and with the main part of his command made a forced march to Fort Scott and upon arrival there found General Blunt, who had just arrived from Forth Leavenworth, to take command in person of all the troops that could be spared from Fort Scott and vicinity, in an expedition north through the western counties of Missouri, in co-operation with the forces of General Schofield and at his request, the march to continue north until the Southern forces were met and engaged.

The time was pressing; the battle of Independence had been fought and won by the Southern forces, and they were buoyant with hope. General Blunt had little time for preparation for an expedition that meant so much to Eastern Kansas and the Indian country. The cavalry, artillery and transportation animals and the troops just arrived from the Indian expedition were badly worn out, many of the animals being entirely unfit for immediate service; but the General selected his cavalry from the Second, Sixth and Ninth Kansas regiments, mounted on native horses, and put his infantry, consisting of the available men of the Ninth Wisconsin, Tenth Kansas, and several hundred dismounted men of the Second Ohio Cavalry, into four-mule Government wagons, and with Rabb's Second Indiana Battery, Allen's First Kansas Battery and four howitzers, started out on a forced march, day and night, with only three or four hours intervals for feed and rest, to come up with and engage the enemy. In his march through the eastern part of Cass County he came up with and passed Colonel Fitz Henry Warren's regiment, First Iowa Cavalry, that had been stationed at Clinton. Members of this regiment stated that reports had come to it, seemingly reliable, that a desperate battle had been fought the day before, August 16th, at Lone Jack, between the Southern forces commanded by Colonel Cockrell and a Federal force of

Missourians of eight hundred men commanded by Major Emory Foster, and that the Union forces were defeated and obliged to retire on Lexington, leaving Major Foster severely wounded on the field.

But General Blunt pushed on and came up in front of Lone Jack about the middle of the afternoon and threw out skirmishers of mounted men to keep in touch with the enemy until his troops and artillery could come up and form in line of battle. When his dispositions were made and he was ready to open the attack, a terrific thunder and rain storm that had been gathering in the northwest for some time burst upon the hostile forces, and it soon became so dark and with the blinding sheets of rain as to suspend operations until the crest of the storm passed over. It was then too dark to commence a movement until the enemy's position could be better ascertained by advancing the skirmish line.

It was soon found, however, that the enemy, seeing our preparation for commencing the attack, had taken advantage of the darkness of the night, and took a road near the position where they had formed on the south side of the village, that led through the timber around the Federal right, and by daylight the next morning the whole force was in a rapid retreat south. The night was spent by General Blunt's forces in reconnoitering to ascertain the movements of the enemy, and when daylight came it revealed to him that they had passed around his right and were in full retreat. Dispositions were immediately made for a vigorous pursuit; a hard task was imposed upon troops and animals, for it was kept up until the enemy were pushed into Northwest Arkansas, and until the mounts of the Union force had become so worn out by constant marching as to unfit them for further immediate service. The Missouri forces of General Brown from Springfield, Mt. Vernon and Greenfield joined in the pursuit in Southwest Missouri, and assisted in pushing

the enemy out of the State, engaging him in several sharp skirmishes. But this was not the final effort on either side in this section, for the struggle was to be renewed after a short respite given for rest, reorganization and preparation.

General Blunt returned with his troops to Fort Scott to rest, refit and remount a large part of his cavalry, the horses having become unserviceable from hard marching and scouting from Kansas through the Indian country to the Arkansas River and back north almost to the Missouri River and return, and all made during the hottest season of the year. The move south to be made in two or three weeks required preparation, during which General Schofield's Missouri forces would hold Southwest Missouri.

The Indian expedition was justified by the results, even if greater results were promised at one time. It had enabled the Government to organize, arm and equip three full regiments of Indians for the defense and protection of their country, and who would be valuable allies of the white troops in all operations along the eastern border of the Territory, in protecting the right flank of the Federal forces.

CHAPTER V
THE NEWTONIA CAMPAIGN

The withdrawal of the Federal white troops from the Indian country for operations against the enemy in the western border counties of Missouri and Arkansas left the Indian regiments in possession of all that part of their country west of Grand River with the east side debatable ground which they could hold when the regular Federal forces were within supporting distance, and which they would be obliged to evacuate when they could not have such support. It was becoming more and more evident to the Federal military authorities that the Indian country could be best defended by the Federal occupation of western Missouri and western Arkansas, and that the Indians who had espoused the Confederate cause would become aggressive only when supported by white troops, who, up to this time had been thrown into the Indian country from Texas.

In a short time after the retrograde movement of the Indian Expedition commenced at Flat Rock towards the northern part of the Territory, Colonel Cooper commanding the Southern forces at and in the vicinity of Fort Davis, consisting of the Choctaw and Chickasaw regiment, the Creek regiment and Colonel Watie's regiment of Cherokees and a contingent of Texas troops, was ordered by General Hindman to cross to the north side of the Arkansas River and to move north and east until he came in touch with the Missouri Southern forces under Shelby, Rains and Cockrell, who had recently been pursued by the Federal forces from Lone Jack. General Pike, who had been in command of the Indian Department before and after the battle of Pea Ridge up to July, and, in fact, until he resigned in November, had been making his headquarters at Fort Ben McCulloch near Red River in the southern part of the Indian Territory, nearly two hundred miles from the scene of active operations, and the administration of the affairs of his depart-

ment was causing much complaint among his subordinates, and finally General Hindman ordered him arrested and brought to his headquarters if he undertook to do certain things he had proposed in his correspondence.

In compliance with instructions from General Hindman, General Pike turned over to Colonel Cooper the troops and supplies he had requested, and about that time Pike sent in his resignation, but President Davis did not accept it and he returned to the service, to the command of his department, and remained until November, when he resigned again and had nothing further to do with Indian operations. He was accused of treason to the Confederacy and of being connected with a secret society of Unionists of Grayson and Cook counties, Texas, of whom forty-six, after a form of trial, were hung. However, he was never tried on a charge of treason.

When General Salomon assumed command of the Indian Expedition and commenced the retirement of the army no immediate orders or instructions were sent to the commanders of the three Indian regiments for their guidance in future operations, and Colonel R. W Furnas, the senior officer among them, called a council to outline a policy for their immediate future. After some discussion in the council it was decided to consolidate the three regiments into one command and call it the First Indian Brigade, and Colonel Furnas was designated as the commander; the opinion was also expressed in the council that under the conditions then existing the Indian Brigade could hold the country north of the Arkansas River if General Salomon would leave with it a battery of artillery and honor their requisitions for subsistence and ammunition.

Colonel Furnas at once called on General Salomon and laid before him the action of the council, and he agreed to leave with the Indians one section of the First Kansas Battery and to honor their requisitions for supplies as far as practicable, and the General further stated that it was not

the design of the Department Commander, General Blunt, to withdraw all the white troops from the Indian country; that those then being withdrawn were being used in an emergency for operations in the western border counties of Missouri against secessionists who were entering the state in large numbers from the South.

On assuming command of the Indian Brigade Colonel Furnas made disposition of his forces so as to afford protection to the loyal Indians as fully as possible; he sent a force of two or three hundred men to occupy Fort Gibson, which it did for a short time, a day or two, and then evacuated the place, the enemy under Colonel Cooper at Fort Davis, a few miles distant, threatening to cut it off. He also sent out a larger detachment of three or four hundred men under the command of Colonel W. A. Phillips of the Third Indian regiment, to scout the country between Tahlequah, Parkhill and Fort Gibson, which he did, and came into collision with a hostile force of Indians equal to his own, under Lieutenant Colonel Thomas F. Taylor of Colonel Watie's regiment of Cherokees at Bayou Manard near Fort Gibson, and after a sharp engagement, routed the enemy, killing Colonel Taylor, Captain Hicks and two Choctaw captains, and thirty-two found on the field, besides wounding, as he estimated, upwards of fifty men of the hostile force, who were carried away in the retreat.

This vigorous action of Colonel Phillips alarmed Colonel Cooper and he ordered all his detachments scouting on the north side of the Arkansas River to return immediately to the south side; but in the meantime Colonel Furnas had retired with the balance of his brigade to Baxter Springs on the northern line of the Territory, and Colonel Phillips was directed to join him there, which left the greater part of the Indian country north of the Arkansas River to be over-run by the Indian forces of Cooper in a short time. Large numbers of Cherokee and Creek families who had declared themselves in favor of the Union during the brief occupation of

the country by the Federal forces, followed closely in the rear of the retiring troops, for they knew they would soon be the victims of revenge on the return of the Indians who had espoused the cause of the Confederacy, if they attempted to remain at home.

The families of the Indian soldiers who had belonged to Colonel Drew's Cherokee regiment until Captain Greeno visited Tahlequah and Parkhill and then left it and almost immediately en masse joined Colonel Phillips' Third Regiment Indian Home Guards, would be the especial victims of persecution of the re-occupation of the country by the white and Indian Southern forces, which was certain to follow the Federal evacuation.

These loyal Indian families who had commenced preparing to raise patches of corn and garden vegetables would now have to leave everything of that nature to fall into the hands of the enemy, and would be obliged, when they reached the northern line of the Territory to be fed and provided for by the Government until the next year; but they would not be subjected to the sufferings and hardships that fell upon the loyal Indians who were driven from their homes the previous winter under the leadership of Hopoeithleyohola.

When the Indian Expedition entered the Indian country the Federal troops were scarcely ever out of sight of good sized herds of a hundred or so head of cattle grazing on the prairies, and as the spring had been seasonable, they were in good condition and made good beef and if prudence had been exercised by the commander of the expedition and his chief commissary the army meat bill should not have cost the Government one cent, for probably most of the herds the troops saw belonged to the disloyal Cherokees who had espoused the Confederate cause and had shared in the spoils of lost property sustained by the loyal Cherokees in their disastrous retreat to Southern Kansas the past winter.

It was common talk among the soldiers that the beef contractor for the Expedition furnished it every day with full rations of beef without making any new purchases for slaughter and without decreasing the size of his herd; but Colonel Phillips on returning from his expedition to the vicinity of Fort Gibson, brought out a large herd of cattle with his command and estimated that this stock would supply the refugee Indian families and the troops of the Expedition with beef for a long time, and recommended that it be held for that purpose instead of being sold to speculators for a nominal price. The Indian country was fairly well watered and was considered the best grazing region in the west, and the live stock the Indians raised up to the war was their main source of wealth, but they would certainly shortly be deprived of this if the hostile forces of both sides alternately occupied and marched over the country, taking such supplies as they could find.

On the return of the troops of the expedition under General Blunt from Fort Scott to Lone Jack, and the pursuit of the enemy from that place into Southwest Missouri, there was some reorganization at Fort Scott of the Kansas forces before moving south again about the first of September, down through the western counties of Missouri, and the new organization of the Kansas forces was called the **First Divison Army of the Frontier**, and was divided into three brigades, as follows:

First Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General F. Salomon, consisted of the Ninth Wisconsin Infantry; Second Ohio Cavalry; Ninth Kansas Cavalry; Second Indian Regiment Home Guards; Major Blair's Second Kansas Battery; Captain Stockton's Battery, manned by a detachment from the Second Ohio Cavalry.

Second Brigade commanded by Colonel William Weer, Tenth Kansas Volunteers, consisted of the Tenth Kansas Infantry; Sixth Kansas Cavalry; Third Indian Regiment Home Guards; Allen's First Kansas Battery and two twelve pounder howitzers attached to the Sixth Kansas.

Third Brigade, commanded by Colonel William F. Cloud, Second Kansas Volunteers, consisted of the Second Kansas Cavalry; First Indian Regiment Home Guards, and Captain Rabb's Second Indiana Battery.

All the information received through scouts, spies and prisoners by General James Totten, commanding the District of Southwest Missouri, at Springfield, and General Blunt, commanding the Department of Kansas, convinced them that General Hindman, commanding the Southern forces in Arkansas and Indian Territory, was making extensive preparations for an aggressive campaign into Missouri at the earliest practicable moment; that he was then concentrating in Southwest Missouri and Northwest Arkansas and along the line of the Indian Territory large forces, estimated as high as fifty thousand men, from Arkansas, Texas, Missouri and the Indian country; that the Missouri Southern forces were already in Southwest Missouri and the Indian and Texas forces under Cooper on the Missouri and Arkansas line in easy supporting distance of each other, and that as the supplies necessary for supporting an army in the field south of Missouri had become exhausted, these forces had become desperate, ragged and hungry, and that he would certainly make a desperate effort to invade Missouri and march to the Missouri River, where he proposed to winter his army, and where he believed that he would receive large accessions to his army in recruits and abundant supplies to maintain it; that the state was considered the granary for the Southern Army west of the Mississippi and could furnish it lead from the Granby Mines to make small arms ammunition to an unlimited extent.

As the Southern Army had been driven out of the state the latter part of the winter, the people of Southwest Missouri had raised good crops of corn, wheat, oats, and apples in their orchards, all of which made a tempting prize for the Confederate leaders to get possession of in their desperate straits, but which was not to be yielded up by the

Federal forces without a struggle that would tax their resources to the utmost degree.

While General Blunt was reorganizing his forces and remounting his cavalry at Fort Scott, after his return from the Lone Jack Expedition, General Hindman met the retreating Missouri Southern forces of Cockrell, Shelby and Coffee from Lone Jack, in Benton county, Arkansas, and after a conference with these Southern leaders, determined to push these troops, re-enforced by several regiments of Choctaws and Chickasaws, back into Southwest Missouri before the Federal forces under General Blunt could advance south again. In this movement of General Hindman he was able to occupy with Texans, Indians and Missouri Southern forces Neosho, Newtonia and Pineville and to requisition the mills of Newton and McDonald counties and set them in operation making flour and meal for his troops who were employed in hauling in wheat and corn taken from the citizens of that section.

Generals Blunt and Totten were maintaining communication with each other and had arranged for co-operation of their forces to meet and drive back the forces of Hindman before they advanced farther into the state. General Blunt had made such progress in the reorganization and refitting of his troops at Fort Scott that he was able the last of August to order the Second Brigade under Colonel Weer, except the Third Indian Regiment under Colonel Phillips, operating from his camp on the west side of Spring River near the mouth of Shoal Creek, to Carthage, and to keep himself advised of the movements of the enemy in front and on his flanks, particularly if they should attempt to pass around either flank.

The Brigades of General Salomon and Colonel Cloud, except the Indian Regiments near Baxter Springs, were to go forward in a few days and take up positions in co-operation with the troops of General Totten at and near

Mt. Vernon, under General Brown, to prevent Confederate detachments from passing north at any point west of Springfield.

Southwest Missouri was becoming an armed camp of belligerent forces, and as soon as the Confederate forces concentrated in considerable strength, it was the design of Generals Schofield and Blunt to move against them and test their ability to hold the ground they were occupying in southwest Missouri, as it was believed that their strength had been greatly exaggerated according to information derived from prisoners taken and questioned and from other sources.

On the 5th of September, Colonel Phillips was at Neosho with part of his Third Indian Regiment and reported to General Blunt and Colonel Weer that he had been there and in that vicinity several days keeping in touch with the enemy, all Missourians, skirmishing with them and maneuvering to force them, if they designed to attack him, to do so at a disadvantage as to time and position; but that they hesitated, indicating that they were not in readiness, and were preparing to concentrate a larger force against him than that which had been threatening.

Hearing of the critical position of Colonel Phillips at Neosho, Colonel Weer directed Colonel Judson, with the Sixth Kansas Cavalry to re-enforce him, and while en route met him retiring and skirmishing with the enemy who had also been largely re-enforced. A couple rounds of shells from a section of Allen's First Kansas Rifled Battery thrown among them sent them scurrying to the rear, and the command continued its retirement and joined the balance of the brigade near Carthage. At this place the information received by Colonel Weer from General Totten at Springfield and from other sources was puzzling. It was to the effect that a large force of the enemy was on the march to attack Springfield, or to turn his position on the west in a northward movement, and requesting him

to make a forced march in the direction of Greenfield to head them off with co-operating forces of General Brown at Mt. Vernon.

The forced march was made by Colonel Weer's Brigade in a northeast direction to Sach and Turnback Creeks, ten to twelve miles north of Mt. Vernon, when the Colonel received a dispatch from the commanding officer of the Missouri forces that the enemy had not yet advanced; were still at Newtonia and other points in Newton and McDonald counties, gathering up wheat and corn and using the mills in making flour and meal for subsistence. The danger of a turning movement by the enemy having been based on incorrect information, the Kansas Brigade about faced and marched to Mt. Vernon, where it found part of a brigade of Missouri Cavalry, and some other detachments of General Totten's forces, and after a day's rest, continued the march to Sarcoxie, eighteen miles west, and encamped there and west of the place for more than two weeks.

While there the Brigades of General Salomon and Colonel Cloud came up and the Federal forces held a front from Sarcoxie to the Kansas line, with intervals of only a few miles between encampments. The Indian Regiments occupied the extreme right, resting on Spring River, and daily mounted detachments were sent out under competent officers from each brigade to watch and report the movements of the enemy.

After the middle of September, Colonel Cooper, commanding the effective forces of the Confederates of the Indian Trritory, consisting of four or five regiments of Texans, the Choctaws and Chickasaws, and Creeks and Cherokees, of seven or eight thousand men and several batteries of artillery, crossed to the north side of the Arkansas River, and moved north along the Arkansas and Territory line, to Maysville and to Scott's Mills in McDonald County, Missouri, where he came into communica-

tion with the Missouri Southern forces of Rains, Cockrell, Shelby and Coffee, and soon arranged for co-operation of their forces against the common foe. On his arrival at the Elk Mills, Colonel Cooper sent Colonel T. C. Hawpe, of the Thirty-First Texas Cavalry on a reconnoissance north along the Line Road as far as the neighborhood of Baxter Springs, as a protection to his left flank in any further advance north.

In his advance north Colonel Hawpe located the camp of the Second Regiment Indian Home Guards commanded by Colonel John Ritchie, at Shirley's Ford, on Spring River, and on the morning of September 20th, about eight o'clock, fired upon and drove in the Indian pickets, causing a panic among the fifteen hundred women and children; but the Colonel soon rallied his Indian soldiers and after a sharp action of about half an hour routed the enemy, and killed, as he reported, two captains and twenty men and captured their flag. He reported the Union Indians loss at sixteen enlisted men and one officer killed and nine wounded. The officer killed was Captain George Scraper, while leading his men.

Colonel Cloud with three mounted companies and two howitzers, arrived at Colonel Ritchie's camp the day after the action and advanced some distance south of it, but the enemy having accomplished the purpose of his reconnoissance returned to his main command at Elk Mills.

The Confederate forces were now within supporting distance of each other in southwest Missouri, having moved up and occupied Neosho, Granby and Newtonia, and the Federal forces from Fort Scott and Springfield had moved forward and occupied positions southeast, east and north of the enemy, twelve to fifteen miles in his front. While these operations were going forward General Curtis was assigned to the command of the Department of Missouri, relieving General Schofield, who took command of the troops in the field and he hastened to Springfield to or-

ganize his forces for an aggressive campaign against the enemy who were threatening an invasion of the state.

On his arrival at Springfield, he assigned General Totten to the command of the Second Division of the Army, and directed him to move forward on the Neosho road to the vicinity of Big Spring, the head of Spring River, southwest of Mt. Vernon, and from that point communicate with General Blunt's forces under General Salomon and Colonel Weer at and in the vicinity of Sarcoxie; but not to bring on an engagement unless the advantages were decidedly in his favor, with the Kansas forces in perfect co-operation.

General Schofield desired to hold the enemy in southwest Missouri until he could collect other and additional forces and resources at Springfield and then move forward, unite his forces and assume command, and with General Blunt's Division co-operating, push the enemy from Newtonia and from southwest Missouri into Arkansas. The latter part of September Colonel Weer's Second Brigade was encamped a week or more on Jenkins Creek, six or seven miles west of Sarcoxie, but toward the end of the month General Salomon received information that led him to believe that the enemy was preparing to attack him at Sarcoxie, the home of General Rains, and directed Colonel Weer to move up with his brigade and join him and be in position to meet the enemy. General Blunt was detained at Fort Scott a few days collecting and preparing for active service at the front. several new regiments organized in the state, and when in readiness to go forward and take command of his division in person and in co-operation with General Schofield, make a vigorous campaign against the enemy until he was driven out of the state.

On the 29th General Salomon ordered a reconnoissance of a cavalry force, in command of Lieutenant-Colonel Jewell, Sixth Kansas Cavalry, in the direction of Neosho and Granby, for the purpose of securing reliable information of the movements of the enemy. Colonel Jewell re-

ported that when he passed through Granby that a Texas Regiment and a force of Indians were just ahead of him en route to Newtonia, where a large force of Missourians, Texans and Indians were concentrating. On the same day Colonel E. Lynde, Ninth Kansas Cavalry, was directed to take four companies of his regiment and two howitzers under Lieutenant H. H. Opdyke, and make a reconnoissance to Newtonia, tweve miles south, to ascertain the strength and position of the enemy. He advanced about eight miles, crossed Shoal Creek, and passing nearly a mile of timber, came upon the prairie and encountered the enemy picket guard, which fled on the approach of his column and which he pursued almost to the village and until they joined the main body posted about Colonel Ritchey's stone barn and behind the stone fences on each side of the lane that led up to the town.

In pursuit of the pickets Colonel Lynde noticed an outpost of the enemy at a house a quarter of a mile to his left and not wishing to leave them on his flank and rear, directed Lieutenant Opdyke to throw a couple rounds of shells from his howitzers among them, which he did, dispersing them. He then moved forward to the front of the enemy position, but not near enough to give him the advantage of screening his movements behind them, and ordered Lieutenant Opdyke to open upon them with shell from his howitzers. Colonel Lynde did not press the reconnoissance further. He made such observations as were practicable; a prisoner was taken and brought to him from whom he ascertained that there were 2,600 Confederates posted in and about the town with two pieces of artillery, and that other Confederate troops were on the march to that place, and being unable to draw them out, he gave them several rounds of shells from his howitzers and then started back on his return march to make a report on the situation as he found it.

The troops of General Salomon hearing the sound of cannon in the afternoon in the direction of Newtonia, he ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Jacobi, with four companies of the Ninth Wisconsin Infantry, two companies of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry under Captain David Mefford, about fifty men of the Third Indian Regiment, and a section of Captain J. Stockton's Battery to move out on the Newtonia road to re-enforce Colonel Lynde. About three miles out from Sarcoxie, Colonel Jacobi met Colonel Lynde returning from Newtonia with his command, and he marched into camp and reported to General Salomon the result of his reconnoissance, while Colonel Jacobi enterpreted his instructions as authorizing him to continue his advance to the vicinty of Newtonia for the purpose of reconnoitering the enemy position, ascertain his strength and secure information that would give a probably accurate forecast of his intentions. Colonel Jacobi resumed the march after meeting Colonel Lynde and soon struck the timber on Shoal Creek, which extended four or five miles, and crossing the stream encamped on the south side near the edge of the prairie at dark, three or four miles northwest of Newtonia. He was re-enforced by two more companies of his regiment during the night. Colonel Lynde was also directed by General Salomon to return with his command to Newtonia, and leaving Sarcoxie at three o'clock in the morning of September 30th, overtook Colonel Jacobi at six o'clock in front of the village skirmishing with the enemy who were posted behind the stone fences. Captain Mefford, Sixth Kansas Cavalry, was driving in their outposts on his left and had taken several prisoners.

Colonel Lynde, having arrived, assumed command of the Federal forces and made dispositions to develop the forces of the enemy who, up to this time, were mostly concealed behind the stone fences, stone barns and buildings and orchards in the village. He ordered up Lieutenant Masterson with a section of the Second Indiana Battery to

the center to open fire upon the enemy about the stone barn and at other points where they could be seen in considerable numbers, and directed Captain Mefford, re-enforced by Captain Thatcher's company of the Ninth Kansas Cavalry, to press the attack on the left, while Colonel Jacobi with his infantry moved forward from the center to a wooded ravine near the stone fence.

In a moment the enemy replied with two pieces of artillery near the stone barn to Lieutenant Masterson's section, but without doing any damage. On approaching the stone fence Colonel Jacobi's infantry came under a heavy rifle fire from the enemy Indians concealed and posted behind the stone fence, and as his men could not effectively reach the foe with their rifles, ordered them to retire out of range, after having several men wounded by the fusillade.

It was now evident to Colonel Lynde that he could not take the town by assault without making too great a sacrifice of his small force, not exceeding five hundred men, and he ordered a retirement, and before the high ground in the prairie northwest of town was reached, noticed the enemy swarming out in large numbers from their concealed positions to cut off his infantry and capture his guns, while large forces of white and Indian troops, mounted, were coming up on his flanks to cut off his retreat before he could get well into the timber, and it was here that his howitzers and field guns were brought into effective use, dispersing the enemy with shot and shell and grape, when they came in range. The Confederates were so persistent in their efforts to capture the entire force under Colonel Lynde, and were pressing so closely on his flanks and rear that he was obliged to form and reform his cavalry on each side of the road to hold them back and let the infantry and artillery pass on, after firing their volleys.

It was after his troops got into the timber that the fighting became the hardest, and it was here that Colonel Lynde sustained his heaviest losses. His infantry, in endeavoring to hold the enemy and save the guns were entirely surrounded and 149 enlisted men and officers captured, and the remnant and the artillery saved only by Captain Mefford forming and having his men fire volleys from their Sharp's carbines into the enemy ranks formed across the road in his front, each volley causing a dispersal of the enemy and an opening that allowed his troopers to pass through.

The Confederates kept up the pursuit of Colonel Lynde's force almost to Shoal Creek. Here re-enforcements from Sarcoxie came up under Colonel Judson, Sixth Kansas Cavalry, and two howitzers, and drove them back to Newtonia. Early in the morning the troops at Sarcoxie heard cannon firing in the direction of Newtonia, indicating that the forces sent out during the night and the evening before under Colonel Lynde and Lieutenant-Colonel Jacobi were engaged with the enemy. General Salomon at once ordered forward to the support of the troops at the front, the effective men in camp of the First and Second Brigades, except some four hundred Indians and a battery of artillery left to guard the trains. The cannon firing continued at short intervals and the General ordered Colonel Judson and Colonel Phillips with their regiments, the Sixth Kansas and Third Indian, to proceed to the battle field at a trot, while he accompanied and brought up the infantry and artillery. A short distance north of Shoal Creek Colonel Judson met a few men of the Ninth Kansas Cavalry and Ninth Wisconsin Infantry, two howitzers and a section of Stockton's Battery in full retreat, and the officer with them informed him that Colonel Lynde, with part of his regiment and Captain Mefford were surrounded by the enemy.

Pushing on Colonel Judson soon came to the scene of the recent fighting and saw beside the road in the timber the bodies of eight to ten men of the Ninth Wisconsin Infantry who had been killed and stripped of their clothing and exposed in the hot sun, and continuing to advance with caution he came in sight of the enemy drawn up in line near the edge of the prairie. He then ordered Lieutenant Benedict up with his two howitzers, attached to the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, to open on the enemy with shell, which he did, causing them to fall back. They were pursued to Newtonia, and Colonel Judson skirmished with them and held them about three hours and until Colonel Phillips arrived on the field about two o'clock with the Third Indian Regiment and took up a position on the left along a branch that ran north and that had a plum thicket, brush and timber on it.

These positions were maintained until the infantry and artillery under General Salomon and Colonel Weer arrived about three o'clock and took up a position on the heights of a ridge in the prairie overlooking the little town a mile distant, and in which, with the aid of field glasses, the enemy could be seen moving about in considerable numbers. The foliage of the shade trees in town, however, obscured the view so that it was difficult to make out details of movements.

The artillery coming up, the batteries took positions on the crest of the ridge supported by the Tenth Kansas Infantry, and in a short time the rifled guns of Allen's Battery were throwing a stream of percussion shells into and around the stone barn, where one of the Confederate batteries was located, bursting and killing and wounding men and horses. But the battery was not long idle; it was soon exchanging compliments with the Federal batteries, sending shell for shell with them; many, however, bursting in mid-air before reaching the Federal position.

While the Federal batteries were shelling the enemy

position in town and any Confederate mounted forces exposed to view, Colonel Phillips with his Indians in the brush and timber along the branch north of town were sharply engaged with the enemy, who were apparently making an effort to turn General Salomon's left flank, and in this action Captain Webber was killed and two officers and fifteen men wounded. On the Federal right Colonel Judson was sent out with the Sixth Kansas Cavalry as far south as the Neosho road to meet a movement of Colonel Jean's Missouri and Colonel Steven's Texas Cavalry, which threatened to flank General Salomon's position on the right.

The movements of the two Confederate regiments as they marched out of the village on the Neosho road were observed by General Salomon and Colonel Weer from the position occupied by their infantry and artillery on the ridge, and they noticed with satisfaction the steadiness with which Colonel Judson advanced southeast over the prairie in line of battle to meet the hostile forces. When the Confederate regiments marched out of town, passed the stone fences and came out upon the prairie, they wheeled into line and advanced facing the Sixth Kansas, and when the hostile forces were within range, Lieutenant-Colonel Jewell, who was in immediate command of the Kansas regiment, ordered his men to give them a volley from their Sharp's carbines, which had the effect of making the enemy break, and they wheeled and returned precipitately to their position in town, pursued by the Kansans until they come to near the mouth of the lane and within rifle range of the stone fences.

Having spent the afternoon in fighting and maneuvering and failing to draw the enemy out from his strong position behind buildings and stone fences, and having instructions from Generals Schofield and Blunt not to bring on a general engagement unless he felt certain of success, General Salomon at sunset withdrew his forces

from the field and returned to his encampment at Sarcoxie. He was disappointed in not receiving the re-enforcements of Colonel George H. Hall, Fourth Brigade Missouri State Militia Cavalry of General Brown's command encamped on Center Creek six miles southeast of Sarcoxie, but he had not made his dispatch to Colonel Hall for re-enforcements and co-operation very definite, and as a consequence the Colonel did not arrive on the field with his brigade of cavalry and Captain Murphy's Battery, First Missouri Light Artillery, until dusk, just as General Salomon's forces were withdrawing and entering the timber skirting Shoal Creek. Here Colonel Hall formed his cavalry in the timber and masked his battery near the prairie, and allowed General Salomon's forces, part of whom had been engaged all day and were tired and thirsty for water, to pass to the rear through his line, and waited for the enemy, who soon appeared in the deep dusk of the evening on the ridge in the prairie in a long line that covered the visible horizon that touched the prairie, having mounted and followed closely the retiring Federal forces from the field.

The advancing enemy passing over the crest of the ridge could not see Colonel Hall's command formed in the timber for the heavy foliage and the coming on of darkness, while the Federal troops could see with perfect distinctness the masses of the enemy as they passed the sky line on the ridge, and they made excellent target practice for the gunners of Captain Murphy's battery in the edge of the timber, the men standing by their guns loaded with shell in readiness to fire the moment the command was given. When on the crest of the ridge the Confederate batteries fired several rounds of shells into the timber, and then in a moment a flame of fire leaped from the guns of Captain Murphy's Battery F, First Missouri Light Artillery, sending bursting shells into the ranks of the enemy in rapid succession, causing them, before they had

approached within a quarter of a mile of the timber to turn in headlong flight back to Newtonia.

The mounted force of General Salomon's command formed in the rear of Colonel Hall's Brigade, and when the action was over and the enemy in flight to Newtonia, retired on the road to Sarcoxie, and after crossing Shoal Creek, bivouacked in the timber to be drenched by rain that fell during the night.

The troops of General Salomon and Colonel Hall returned to the positions they occupied before making the reconnoissance and commenced preparations for a movement in a few days that would determine whether the enemy would be able to hold his position in Southwest Missouri much longer.

On the 3rd of October, General Schofield arrived from Springfield to take command of all the troops facing the enemy at Newtonia, and brought additional forces and artillery belonging to General Totten's Division. General Blunt arrived from Fort Scott to take command of the First Division, called in the early stages of the campaign, **"The Army of Kansas."**

Generals Schofield and Blunt had a conference and arranged the plan of operations to commence on the morning of October 4th, that would compel General Cooper to fight at Newtonia or evacuate the place.

As provided in the plan, General Schofield advanced with the two divisions of Totten and Brown, who were encamped about the same distance from Newtonia as were Blunt's troops at Sarcoxie, to attack the enemy in their position from the east and southeast, and General Blunt advanced south on the Sarcoxie and Newtonia road, sending part of his mounted troops west of that road via Granby, to attack from the north and northwest, the combined forces to keep in touch from the time of starting out until they came upon the field for the assault.

The movement worked like clockwork. All the Federal troops, cavalry, infantry and artillery and ambulances were in their designated positions on three sides of the enemy by ten o'clock, and on the firing of a signal gun the attack opened with an intense artillery fire of shot and shell upon the enemy in Newtonia from the battery of every brigade of the combined forces, thirty-six field guns and four twelve-pounder howitzers, knocking gun carriages and caissons to splinters and killing and wounding nearly all the horses of some of the enemy batteries. After the artillery had played upon the enemy position for less than half an hour, Generals Schofield and Blunt ordered their troops forward, and with flags flying, from the extreme left to the extreme right they advanced, with the intention of coming to close quarters with the enemy; seeing which, and that his line of retreat was threatened by the rapid advance of the Federal cavalry towards his rear, Colonel Cooper ordered a hasty retreat in a southwest direction until he struck the Neosho and Pineville road on which his trains were moving south.

General Schofield ordered his cavalry in pursuit at once, and during the day overtook the enemy rear guard who appeared to have the fight taken out of them and fled on sight of the Federal advance, and next day the whole Confederate force that had been threatening to advance into central Missouri passed into Arkansas and the Indian Territory in a demoralized condition, and took with it nearly all the guerrilla bands of western Missouri.

In the action on the 30th, the Federal losses were fifteen killed and thirty-two wounded; on the 4th there were no Federal losses. General Cooper reported the Confederate losses at seventy-five killed and wounded.

CHAPTER VI

THE CANE HILL CAMPAIGN

The evacuation of Newtonia by the Confederates left the offensive entirely in the hands of the Federal forces and ended the campaign in Southwest Missouri; but it was the design of General Curtis, the new Department Commander, to push the operations in Northwest Arkansas until the enemy were driven south of the Boston Mountains and into the Arkansas Valley.

General Hindman was not in immediate command of the Confederate forces at Newtonia, being detained at Little Rock in connection with the defense of that place, which was being threatened by the Federal forces of General Steele, operating in Northeastern Arkansas. It was known to the Federal commander that General Hindman was making every possible effort to raise new levies under the conscription act, from Arkansas, Missouri and Texas and bring them to the support of his forces just driven out of Southwest Missouri into Northwestern Arkansas and Indian Territory in a demoralized condition.

While his cavalry were pursuing the broken forces of the enemy into the rough, hilly region of McDonald county, Missouri, and into Arkansas, General Schofield ordered his infantry, artillery, cavalry and baggage and supply trains forward to convenient places for encampment. The divisions of Generals Totten and Brown moved to positions southeast of Newtonia near the Wire Road from Springfield to Fayetteville, and General Blunt's First Division moved to Indian Springs on Indian Creek, southwest of Newtonia, where it remained several days on account of rainy weather, but kept out scouting detachments on his front and right well in the direction of the Indian Territory, to look out for and give notice of any raiding force of the enemy attempting to move north around his right flank.

After General Blunt's forces moved from Fort Scott into Southwest Missouri in the early part of September, it was generally called the **Army of Kansas,** and the Missouri forces under General Schofield from Springfield co-operating with the Kansas forces in that section against the enemy were called the **Army of Southwest Missouri,** and the combined forces had co-operated so effectively in driving the enemy from their strong position at Newtonia into Arkansas that General Curtis issued an order denominating these forces **"The Army of the Frontier,"** with General Schofield in command.

General Curtis as commander of the Department of the Missouri had a wider range of information of the movements of the enemy on all his fronts than his subordinate commanders. For instance if General Hindman was withdrawing troops from one point to re-enforce others at other points, he received information of the fact through his confidential agents and spies, earlier than his subordinates. Any information of this kind likely to affect the operations of a subordinate commander were at once communicated to him, that he might make intelligent disposition of his forces accordingly. The telegraph line from St. Louis to Springfield and Cassville was opened a few days after General Schofield moved south from Newtonia, and he was kept advised of the movements of the enemy southeast of his position in Arkansas. Besides this information, he had frequent reports from his own scouts kept out to watch the movements of the enemy.

It appeared from the information available that the Confederate forces of Rains, Cooper and Shelby were making an effort to concentrate at Elkhorn or Pea Ridge to make a stand, and after scouting thoroughly in front and on both flanks, General Schofield ordered Generals Blunt and Totten with the First and Second Divisions of the Army of the Frontier to advance upon the new position of the enemy. On arrival of the army in the vicinity of Elkhorn,

General Schofield found that the Confederate forces had left, the white troops under Rains going in the direction of Huntsville, twenty-five miles southeast, and the Indian auxiliaries under Cooper marching to Maysville, about thirty miles west on the line of Arkansas and the Indian Territory.

The army encamped on the battle field of Pea Ridge several days in order to secure, by sending out scouting detachments of cavalry, more accurate information of the movements and position of the enemy, which, having been obtained, General Schofield directed General Totten to take the cavalry, artillery and infantry of his division, with five days' rations in haversacks, ambulances and wagons, and advance against the enemy at Huntsville and accompanied the expedition in person.

General Salomon of the First Brigade, First Division, was directed to guard the trains and keep out scouting parties and secure himself against surprise, and General Blunt was instructed to take the balance of his division with its transportation and move against Cooper's Confederate Indians reported to be at Maysville and preparing to make a raid into Southern Kansas. In compliance with his instructions the General marched from Elkhorn to Bentonville and halted four or five hours for his troops and trains to close up and then made a night march and struck Cooper's force the next morning at daylight, October 21, at Old Fort Wayne about three miles southwest of Maysville, and after an action of half an hour routed him, capturing all his artillery, four guns, and most of his camp, with an insignificant Federal loss.

The movement of General Blunt's Kansas troops and Indians was so swift that they took in the Confederate pickets and outposts and chased some of them into camp, so that Cooper was completely surprised and had time to make only feeble resistance. His guns fired scarcely half a dozen rounds before the cannoneers were shot down and

driven from them, the supporting troops of Indians having fled on the near approach of the Federal soldiers, who kept up a hot fire as they advanced.

The Second Kansas Cavalry, Lieutenant Colonel O. A. Bassett, Third Brigade, had the advance; Colonel W. R. Judson, Sixth Kansas Cavalry, Second Brigade, came next, followed by the First and Third Indian Regiments, and the batteries in the order of assignment, the whole force coming on the field in a trot and wheeling into line as they came up and moving forward threatened to surround the enemy. The principal part of the fighting fell to the Second Kansas Cavalry, for two or three companies of that regiment, under Captain Crawford, charged the Confederate Battery while the other troops were coming up and forming line.

Captain Rabb's Second Indiana Battery and Captain Allen's First Kansas Battery came into position quickly and did good work in throwing shot and shell into the ranks of the enemy, where they were found endeavoring to make a stand, or an effort to get away, increasing the demoralization as bursting shells were falling near a group of enemy Indians or screaming over their heads in their flight from the field.

On leaving the main part of the Confederate forces at Elm Springs, twelve miles north of Fayetteville, General Rains instructed General Cooper to march with the Indian Brigade and take up a position at Old Fort Wayne, Cherokee Nation, near Maysville, and from that place make an expedition into Southern Kansas at the earliest practicable moment, as a diversion to weaken the pressure of the Federal forces against General Hindman in Western Arkansas.

General Cooper complained that General Rains had taken from him four Texas regiments, leaving him without white troops; that the actions of Rains had so weakened his command that he looked upon the proposed expedition with some misgivings owing to the lateness of the season, and the taking of his Choctaw and Chickasaw soldiers so far away from their homes; that on his arrival in the Ter-

ritory quite a number of his men had returned to their homes, and he was having some difficulty in getting them back to their regiments again.

After the action of Fort Wayne General Cooper's Indians hardly halted until they crossed to the south side of the Arkansas River, and the remainder of the year were of little use as an organized fighting unit. It was probably a fact, as had often been asserted by men familiar with Indian life, that Indian soldiers needed white troops with them to give them courage and confidence in a contest with white troops.

The removal of this large Indian force of four thousand men from the north side of the Arkansas River, allowed many of the loyal Cherokee families to return to their ruined homes in comparative safety; but the fortunes of war were so uncertain that they could count on remaining only temporarily to gather up any of their stock on the range that had escaped the enemy. While operating in that section this large force of hostile Indians was a constant menace to the people of Southern Kansas.

In reporting to General Hindman the Fort Wayne disaster, General Cooper stated that his command was in no condition to make the expedition to Southern Kansas; that many of his Indian soldiers were barefooted and nearly naked, having had no shoes or clothing issued to them for a long time, and as the weather was getting colder they were much in need of both, and finally that since the white troops had been taken away they felt they had been abandoned by the Confederate authorities.

The night after the action the weather turned cold; half an inch of snow fell during the night and covered the ground, and the next morning the ground was frozen, and as General Cooper had lost a large part of his camp equipage and baggage, his thinly clad soldiers must have suffered from cold before reaching the Arkansas River. General Blunt's cavalry and Indians pursued the demoralized foe south of the Spavina hills, taking a few prisoners and

then returned to camp to prepare for further movements in co-operation with the troops under General Schofield in pushing the enemy in Northwest Arkansas south of the Boston Mountains. On the day that Generals Schofield and Blunt started on their expeditions to Huntsville and Maysville, General Hindman arrived at Fayetteville to inspect and ascertain the condition of his forces in that section, and to make such dispositions of them as he considered advisable after conference with his general officers. He was not long in finding out that the prospect of wintering his army on the Osage or Missouri River, as he had proposed doing, was not very bright, and as information tending to thwart his plans reached him almost daily, he probably considered himself fortunate if he should be able to hold any part of Western Arkansas. He doubtless underestimated the resources of the Federal commander opposing him.

All that section was almost entirely exhausted of forage and food supplies, and as the Confederate army depended mainly upon the country it occupied for such supplies, it would have been a serious problem as to whether General Hindman could have maintained his army there during the winter, and the rich granaries of Missouri, as he called them, were a prize much coveted, and worth fighting for. He was with the forces of Rains, Shelby and other Missouri Confederate leaders when General Schofield arrived near Huntsville with the Second and Third Divisions of the Army of the Frontier and did not deem it advisable to make a stand, and after some skirmishing retired in the direction of Ozark in the Arkansas Valley, where conscripts were being collected and organized into regiments and prepared for the Confederate service.

A large part of the western half of Arkansas was mountainous, and perhaps most of the people living in those regions were loyal and devoted to the Union, and had up to that time resisted all efforts of the Confederate authorities to get the men fit for military service into the Confederate army. Many of them hid out in the mountains and

were fed clandestinely by their families, rarely ever venturing into their homes except sometimes of nights. They were difficult to find even by conscripting officers, and when found and taken to the rendezvous to be prepared for the service they were considered unreliable, many of them deserting the first opportunity, and those taken to the front generally made inefficient soldiers.

General Schofield's expedition to Huntsville, while it did not result in any spectacular glory, had the effect of pushing the enemy out of all that region to the south of the mountains, and to relieve the pressure of Southern domination in Northwestern Arkansas, Southwest Missouri and the Indian Territory north of the Arkansas River. There was still, however, a Confederate force under General M. M. Parsons of Missouri, at Yellville, in Northern Arkansas, directly south of Springfield, of about two thousand men, sometimes reported at two or three times that number, that General Schofield felt obliged to keep his eyes upon, which caused him to dispose his Second and Third Divisions so as to cover Springfield in the event of an attempted raid to attack that place and destroy the large quantities of supplies stored there for the army.

To guard against what seemed to be a threatened attack of the enemy on Springfield from the direction of Yellville, General Schofield directed General Totten, commanding the Second Division at Fayetteville, and General Herron, commanding the Third Division at Osage Springs, to move to Crane Creek and Cassville, where they would be in supporting distance of General Blunt, who was then about ten miles southwest of Bentonville, or in position to march to the aid of the forces at Springfield should the enemy be found advancing in force upon that place.

Later information proved that General Hindman had withdrawn most of his force from the vicinity of Yellville and with the forces that General Schofield had driven from Huntsville in the direction of Ozark was concentrating everything available near Van Buren with the view of ad-

vancing as early as practicable against General Blunt, who was then about fourteen miles south of Maysville. General Hindman assigned General John S. Marmaduke, a Missouri West Pointer, to the command of his cavalry, and as early as the middle of November General Blunt sent out a scout under Lieutenant Colonel Jewell, Sixth Kansas Cavalry, in the direction of Van Buren via Cane Hill and down the Cove Creek road through the mountains to secure as accurate information as practicable of the movements, strength and position of the Confederate forces. Colonel Jewell moved forward without any opposition until he passed Lee's Creek on the road to Van Buren, when he came in contact with General Marmaduke's advance, which at once fell back upon a strong support, and in the skirmish that ensued took several prisoners, from whom it was ascertained that the Confederate cavalry were then on the march with a battery of artillery for Cane Hill and Rhea's Mills, where they were going to operate the mills in making flour and meal from the grain collected in that section for the army at Fort Smith and Van Buren, that would advance in a few days under General Hindman.

Returning at once to camp, Colonel Jewell reported to General Blunt the result of the reconnoissance, and measures were taken by the General to keep in touch with the enemy every day until he was in readiness to move against them. He was determined that if the grain was to be collected and ground into flour and meal for the use of the military forces of the Confederacy, he, too, would have a hand in the matter. The region around Cane Hill and Rhea's Mills was the best agricultural part of Washington county, besides nearly every family had an orchard that produced an abundance of fine apples. The season had been especially favorable for their maturing and ripening, and they were delicious. The people were quite willing to exchange them with the Union soldiers for sugar, coffee and tea, which the citizens had difficulty in getting in that section.

There was a decided Union sentiment in Western Arkansas and a sufficient number of Union men had already refugeed into Southwest Missouri to organize a regiment, the First Arkansas Cavalry commanded by Colonel M. La Rue Harrison, and the soldiers of the regiment, being familiar with the country, made valuable scouts and guides, and through their families frequently advised Federal officers of the movements of secessionists in their neighborhoods. While the First Division was encamped at Camp Bowen, southwest of Bentonville, General Blunt directed Colonel Phillips to take the best mounted men of the First and Third Indian regiments and make an expedition to Fort Gibson, Parkhill and Tahlequah and scout the country thoroughly to ascertain if there were any of Cooper's or Waite's men operating as an organization north of the Arkansas River. The Indians would be in their own country, and if there was a foe in it they were certain to find him. The Colonel was also instructed to make an examination of the Salt Works on the Illinois River, as to whether they were in condition to be operated with slight repairs.

Prior to the war the people of Western Arkansas and Southwest Missouri had depended largely upon the Salt Works at Grand Saline in that section for their supplies of salt, a commodity that every family was obliged to keep on hand, and if the works could be operated under the protection of the army, it was believed that they had the capacity for producing salt sufficient to supply the troops of General Blunt's command, and thus save the trouble and expense of transporting it nearly three hundred miles overland. It was found, however, impracticable to operate the works; it would require a protecting force which General Blunt was unable to spare in the presence of the enemy on his front. Colonel Jewell's retiring column was followed closely, less than twenty-four hours in his rear by General Marmaduke's mounted force, reported to be seven or eight thousand strong, to Cane Hill and Rhea's Mills, and com-

menced operating the mills in that section, preparing subsistence for the Southern forces, the infantry of which under General Hindman, would march from Fort Smith and Van Buren in a few days.

Under these conditions General Blunt sent a courier with dispatches to Elkhorn, the end of the telegraph line guarded by Lieutenant Colonel A. W. Bishop, of the First Arkansas Cavalry, to be telegraphed to General Curtis, St. Louis, stating the situation and requesting him to order the Second and Third Divisions of the Army of the Frontier, under Generals Totten and Herron, to be in position to march to his assistance at a moment's notice.

Before these troops were ready to march, however, General Blunt decided to park his trains at camp on Lindsay's Prairie, some thirty miles north of Cane Hill, to be guarded by General Salomon with the Ninth Wisconsin Infantry, several mounted detachments and a battery, and take the balance of his cavalry, infantry and artillery and, by making a day and night march, strike the Confederate force south of Rhea's Mills the next morning and drive it back upon Cane Hill, and then push the whole force back through the mountains before General Hindman could come up with his support of infantry and artillery.

General Blunt had been strengthened by two fine regiments of infantry the last month, the Eleventh Kansas, Colonel Thomas Ewing, Jr., commanding, and the Thirteenth Kansas, Colonel Thomas M. Bowen commanding, and felt that with his well equipped force well supplied with artillery he could defeat the Confederate advance under Marmaduke without calling on the Second and Third Divisions and so advised General Curtis by telegraph.

With four days' rations in haversacks and with ambulances and two or three wagons to the brigade, the expedition started out, and the first day marched within ten miles of the Confederate position near Cane Hill and then went into bivuoac for the night to give the troops and animals rest and food. The march was then resumed, and after

daylight the next morning the advance under Colonel Cloud with part of the Second Kansas Cavalry came upon and surprised and chased for some distance the enemy pickets who escaped to their camp and gave the alarm of the Federal approach.

General Marmaduke had information of the advance south of the Federal forces, but looked for them to approach on the Fayetteville or State Line road; instead, General Blunt, with the aid of his guides, found on resuming the march early in the morning, a country road between the two main roads that enabled him to approach within half a mile of the Confederate position and open fire upon it with two howitzers, to which the enemy replied with heavier guns. He looked around and saw that he had no support in sight, the main part of his command having been delayed in ascending a steep part of the mountain, which caused him to occupy the attention of the enemy mainly with his howitzers for more than half an hour, until his other troops could come up with the field batteries.

The country about Cane Hill was much broken by deep ravines or hollows and steep hillsides. It is the northern entrance to a gap in the mountain six or seven miles south of Cane Hill, where the road from Van Buren up Cove Creek forks, one of the forks leading to Fayetteville and the other to Cane Hill; but from the position taken up by the Federal forces on arrival in front of the enemy the mountains to the east, south and southwest seemed to rise to a height of a thousand feet or more above the surrounding country, in peaks and ridges, and on that clear day, with an intervening bluish haze that reminded the troops from the prairie regions of Kansas that they were in a mountainous country.

This broken terrain was difficult of maneuvering over by cavalry, infantry and artillery, and when General Blunt's troops formed in line the enemy were found to occupy a strong mound-shaped elevation which could be reached only by passing over a deep ravine or hollow with its descending

and ascending sides covered with a scanty growth of timber. It was found that the position of the enemy was beyond the effective range of the howitzers attached to the cavalry, and on arrival of the main body of his troops and artillery General Blount ordered up his field batteries of Allen's First Kansas; Rabbs' Second Indiana; Blair's Second Kansas and Hopkins' Battery, captured from Cooper at Fort Wayne, and opened an intense fire upon the Confederates, silencing most of their guns and compelling them to retire to a new position.

By this time his cavalry and infantry had come up and formed line, and they advanced over the rough ground and up and down steep hillsides, and after heavy rifle firing for a short time, drove the enemy from their sheltered positions to retire perhaps half a mile south of Cane Hill, where they made another stand. In this retirement the Federal cavalry, the Second and Sixth Kansas, and the Third and a battalion of First Indian Regiment kept in touch with and engaged the enemy until the infantry and artillery could be brought up, when they were again routed from their position.

Finding that he was unable to successfully engage the Federal forces in a decisive action, General Marmaduke adopted the tactics of holding them as long as practicable from his chosen position, and when that was rapidly becoming untenable to retreat with the main part of his command to a new strong position, leaving the smaller part to retire fighting as the Federal forces advanced. His maneuvers of this kind were quite successful in preventing the demoralization of his troops and was kept up until about the middle of the afternoon, when he passed through the gap in the mountains and entered the head of Cove Creek, that flows nearly south, when his operations would have to be confined to the narrow valley of that stream, rarely exceeding in width fifty yards, and in many places a narrow gorge between lofty walls of the mountain.

Every retirement of the Confederates from one position to another required a readjustment of the Federal line, which was an arduous task, exhausting to the infantry and the mounted men and their horses. The troops operating on the right and left flanks might be nearly a mile from the center, or main road, and every time the Confederates were driven from their position and retired a mile or so, these troops on the flanks, or right or left wings, had to be recalled to the main road to take up the pursuit again and go into new positions, and as they had been in continuous movement since five o'clock that morning and all the day before, it was getting more and more difficult to bring them to the front on each retirement of the Confederates, not that they were unwilling, but simply from the reason that they were worn out from constant marching and maneuvering and climbing and descending the hills and ravines over which the operations were conducted that day. On account of the nature of the terrain, the cavalry on the flanks could not form and move forward effectively in a charge to dislodge the enemy from a position, and the men were obliged to dismount and advance on foot for the purpose, leaving every third or fourth man to hold horses, and when their work was accomplished return to their horses, remount and move to some other part of the field as required, all of which made the work of the cavalry as exhausting as that of the infantry.

The Confederates would have had some advantage in the contest by their tactics of retiring and choosing strong positions had not General Blunt been well supplied with splendid field artillery. They could not operate their battery of six guns in one position more than a few minutes when it would be located by the Federal artillery officers, who in another moment would be pouring such a storm of shot and shell into it as to force it out of action, and in one instance dismounting a gun and knocking the gun carriage to splinters.

The Confederate force was all mounted, and every time General Marmaduke selected a good position to make a stand he was obliged to dismount, perhaps the larger part of his command to defend it, and it could not be defended very long, for General Blunt's advancing lines of skirmishers soon located it and sent back to have the Federal batteries brought into position for shelling it, and in a few instances they were able to use grape shot, which, in co-operation with the advancing lines of infantry, caused the Confederates to abandon their positions, the dismounted men to remount their horses and retreat to a new position without permitting the Federal infantry to approach within rifle range, otherwise there would have been bloody work on both sides.

General Blunt, with most of the members of his staff, kept right up to the front with his cavalry and gave directions for the movements of his troops, and believing that if he could get them up with very little delay he could capture all the Confederate artillery, particularly when he saw the Confederates attempting to make a stand in the gap of the mountain where the Fayetteville and Cane Hill roads unite and form the Cove Creek road. He had been informed of the nature of the valley and narrow gorges between the high walls of the mountain on each side of the road, and he knew of the desperate efforts Marmaduke was making to get his trains out of the way so as to not block the narrow valley and the narrow gorges and place his retreating troops in a helpless position, for it would have taken considerable time for seven or eight thousand men to pass a given point in that narrow valley, at no place of which could they show a front of more than twenty-five to fifty men.

After driving them from their last stand at the gap in the mountain, General Blunt pursued them hotly into Cove Creek valley with only a part of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry under Colonel Judson and Lieutenant Colonel Jewell, and part of the Third Indian Regiment under Colonel W. A.

Phillips and sent several aids back to hurry forward other troops and artillery. He was soon advised that the other troops and artillery except Rabb's Second Indiana Battery and the howitzers attached to the Sixth Kansas were several miles in the rear. He had pushed the enemy two or three miles down Cove Creek Valley, and the road was almost choked with the fleeing foe then in the utmost confusion.

Coming upon the very heels of the retreating enemy, the situation appealed to General Blunt as to what action he should take. He looked around and saw the small force he had at hand, but was anxious to capture the enemy battery just ahead. The sun had descended below the horizon; the deep shadow of the mountain made it appear that darkness was near, and he decided to call for volunteers to make a charge down the narrow valley to capture the guns. Colonel Jewell responded to the call, offering to lead the charge, and every man of his command present volunteered to follow their leader, and in a moment the bugle sounded the charge, and the Colonel, at the head of his men, hardly exceeding two hundred and fifty, with drawn sabers, dashed forward down the valley and soon came upon the enemy filling the road and commenced sabering them right and left, some of his men putting up their sabers and using their Colt's revolvers more effectively. The charge continued down the valley for a quarter of mile when the Colonel was just entering one of the narrow gorges described, to the left of which was a flat elevation ten to fifteen feet above the road at the proximal end of a ravine, made by the soil washing down from the mountain, and received a volley from the rifles of a company stationed on the elevation within two or three rods and was struck in the region of the hip with a ball and mortally wounded, together with several of his men. This checked the advance, and his men retired up the valley to where General Blunt was collecting other detachments coming up to meet a

counter charge which he looked for and which he did not have to wait long for. Seeing the effect of the volley and the retirement of the Sixth Kansas, the Confederates immediately advanced, charging and yelling, up the valley until they received the fire of the four howitzers which had been brought up and double loaded with grape shot and canister, supported by the Sixth Kansas, which had been rallied and formed across the valley, instantly checking them.

General Blunt was still determined to capture the enemy guns, which he believed were near the gorge where Colonel Jewell fell, and again had the four howitzers double loaded with grape and canister, and also a section of Rabb's Second Indiana Battery that had just come up, supported by the Sixth Kansas and some men of the Third Indian Regiment under Colonel Phillips, who had just arrived, and was ready to advance, when a Confederate officer came galloping up the road bearing a white flag and requested to be conducted to the commanding officer of the Federal forces present, and was taken to General Blunt. He stated to the General that he had been directed by the commanding officer of the Confederate forces to request permission of the Federal commander to remove their dead and wounded in the valley and to state that there was a Federal field officer lying badly wounded near the gorge who had made some requests about surgical attention that should not be delayed.

The truce was granted and under it the dead and wounded of both sides were gathered up and removed from the ground fought over and darkness having fallen and having performed the acts of mercy and humanity, each side retired to bivouac in the open without tents or camp equipage, the Confederates in the direction of Van Buren and the Federal forces in the direction of Cane Hill.

Colonel Jewell died that night, November 29, and was sent back to Fort Scott for interment. In writing of these operations it will not be out of place to set down a few

words of a personal nature. The Colonel had raised and organized Company D of the Sixth Kansas, which became Company K in the reorganization into which the writer enlisted, and when he was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel of the reorganized regiment he appointed his protege regimental commissary sergeant of the regiment a member of the non-commissioned staff, and knowing that his commissary sergeant was making notes of military operations within the range of his information, the Colonel allowed him to accompany him on scouts, when he could be spared from his regular work, and frequently told him of the results of scouts when he did not go along, if deemed of importance. He was a brave, generous officer, devoted to the Union cause, and when sent out on any mission by his superiors could always be relied upon to accomplish all that could be reasonably expected of him. He did not ask his men to plunge into danger where he could not lead them.

There were other features of the action that day that may be mentioned, as they come very close to the writer. Orderly Sergeant Richie, a very intelligent young Scotchman of Company K, fell mortally wounded only a few yards from where Colonel Jewell fell, and Lieutenant J. G. Harris, of the same company, was hit in the neck, the ball going through the Adam's apple and coming out at the back of his neck; but he recovered. A brother, James Britton, of Company C of the same regiment, was struck by a piece of shell, splinter or flying missile, which seemed to reopen a wound he had received in the shoulder in the action at Coon Creek, Missouri, in August, from which he never recovered.

General Blunt reported his losses in the action of Cane Hill during the day as four killed and thirty-six wounded, four mortally, from incomplete casualty lists.

Colonel Emmett McDonald, commanding a brigade in General Marmaduke's division of the Confederate forces, reported his losses at five killed, seventeen wounded and four missing, and Colonel C. A. Carroll reported losses in his brigade as eleven wounded and two missing.

The losses in this action were not large on either side, considereing the number of troops engaged, about five thousand on each side, and the extent of ground fought over, say ten to twelve miles, from morning until night.

The action was a maneuvering one from beginning to end in which General Blunt was prepared to come to close quarters with the foe, a feature that General Marmaduke, the Confederate commander, did not desire. He wished to ward off the blow intended for him until his forces could be united with those being prepared for the advance under General Hindman at Van Buren.

It was a keen disappointment to General Marmaduke that he was unable to hold his positions at Cane Hill and Rhea's Mills in order to gather supplies for the Southern forces when they advanced in General Hindman's proposed march for the invasion of Missouri.

CHAPTER VII

BATTLE OF PRAIRIE GROVE

When the action at Cane Hill closed, General Blunt knew that the struggle for the possession of western Arkansas and southwest Missouri by the Confederate forces was not ended, for he had accurate information through his scouts and spies that General Hindman had collected and concentrated all the available Southern forces of Arkansas and the Indian Territory in the vicinity of Fort Smith and Van Buren, estimated at 25,000 men, to carry the campaign into Missouri.

Determined to hold all that he had gained in the operations at Cane Hill, General Blunt ordered up his trains and the balance of his troops and artillery encamped at Lindsay's Prairie, and on their arrival, had part of the command and part of the trains go into camp at Rhea's Mills, and the balance at Cane Hill, eight miles south, and at once commenced collecting subsistence for his men and forage for his animals. Between Fayetteville and Cane Hill was the finest agricultural section in northwestern Arkansas, and most of the farms had raised on them that season good crops of corn, oats, wheat, potatoes and apples.

The possession of this fair valley, lying directly north of the Boston Mountains, had been won by the Federal forces after a short, sharp contest; but to hold it General Blunt became convinced that he would in a very short time be obliged to engage in a fierce struggle, for his troops had hardly pitched their tents in their new camps, when his scouts brought him information that General Hindman's army had crossed the Arkansas River at Van Buren and advanced north fifteen miles, until General Marmaduke's retreating division was met on Lee's Creek.

A decision of the belligerent forces was near at hand. Having made extensive preparations for the campaign,



MAJOR-GENERAL J. G. BLUNT

General Hindman, on meeting General Marmaduke, determined to move north rapidly with his entire army and attack, if possible, overwhelm General Blunt before his reinforcements could reach him, which he and his Generals believed to be practicable. Convinced by information in his possession that General Hindman, with an army fully twenty thousand strong, was advancing to attack him, General Blunt, immediately after the action of Cane Hill, advised General Curtis, the Department Commander, St. Louis, of the situation by telegraph from Elkhorn, on the Telegraph Road, and requested him to order the Second and Third Divisions of the Army of the Frontier, then encamped at Wilson Creek, ten miles southwest of Springfield, to move forward by forced marches to re-inforce him. On receipt of this dispatch, General Curtis, by telegraph, ordered General F. J. Herron, commanding the two divisions, to push forward with them as rapidly as practicable to the assistance of General Blunt. General Herron received General Curtis' telegraphic order at eight o'clock on the morning of December 3rd, and by twelve o'clock that day his troops were in motion and on the march in the direction of Fayetteville.

His promptness in the movement was characteristic of his soldierly bearing. From Wilson Creek, Missouri, to Fayetteville, Arkansas, the point to which he would be obliged to march on the Telegraph Road, was one hundred miles, and Rhea's Mills, where part of General Blunt's troops were encamped, was sixteen miles southwest. This was a long distance for infantry to be put on forced marches, and would tax their power of endurance to the utmost limit. The Springfield and Fayetteville road, known also as the Wire or Telegraph Road, was the nearest practicable route by which General Blunt could be reached.

This road was in splendid condition on the eve of the march, for it had not been much used by large armies and their trains passing over it since the battle of Pea Ridge, in March.

Without any delay General Herron sent General Blunt a dispatch stating that he would make the best time possible on the march, and keep him constantly advised of his position en route.

That there might be no delay, his baggage trains followed in the rear of each division, and carried the knapsacks of his men, thus relieving them of a burden that would have been much felt in the long march before them, had they been obliged to carry them on their backs. General Herron arrived at Elkhorn with the cavalry of the Second Division on the evening of December 5th. Here he received an order from General Blunt to send forward all the cavalry he could spare. He ordered forward Colonel Dudley Wickersham with the Tenth Illinois, First Iowa, a battalion of the Second Wisconsin, and Colonel Geiger's Eighth Missouri Cavalry, to report to General Blunt by forced marches. General Herron stayed all night at Elkhorn waiting for his infantry and artillery to come up. He moved forward the next day to Cross Hollow, fifteen miles, and halted again for his troops to close up. Colonel Daniel Huston, commanding the Second Division, arrived at Cross Hollow at seven o'clock on the evening of December 6th, and rested until midnight and then resumed the march, arriving at Fayetteville the next morning at sunrise. General Herron, who had moved forward at the head of his troops, arrived at Fayetteville about three hours in advance of Colonel Huston's Second Division.

While the Second and Third Divisions were thus moving to his assistance at the rate of thirty-five miles a day, General Blunt's cavalry was busily employed in skirmishing with the Confederate advance and endeavoring to keep General Marmaduke's cavalry from forcing the passes in the Boston Mountains.

He was determined to hold his positions at Cane Hill and Rhea's Mills until the re-inforcements of General Herron arrived. Frequent reconnaissances on all the roads that

approached his position from the south or southeast to keep him in close touch with the movements of the Confederates, led him to believe that General Hindman was preparing to cross the mountain by taking either the Telegraph Road, which passed about ten miles east of his position on Cane Hill, or by taking the Cove Creek road, which forked on the mountain, the left-hand fork of which led directly to Cane Hill, and the right to Fayetteville.

From the point where this road forked to General Blunt's position on Cane Hill was about six miles. The Fayetteville branch of the Cove Creek road was crossed one and two miles north of the point where it united with the Cane Hill branch, by two roads running west and southwest from the Telegraph Road to the Newburg and Cane Hill road. General Blunt saw the importance of keeping a strong outpost at the junction of the Cane Hill road with the Fayetteville and Cove Creek road, and at the crossings of the other roads referred to. He saw that if General Hindman was allowed to advance on the Cove Creek road to the point where it forked, he could, by making a strong feint, threaten a direct attack on Cane Hill, while his main army moved north on the Fayetteville road to turn the Union left flank.

On the 4th, General Blunt strengthened his outposts in the mountains and sent forward a cavalry reconnaissance on the Cove Creek road in the direction of Van Buren to ascertain if the enemy were advancing in force. The reconnaissance met the Confederate advance under Colonel Shelby, and after a slight skirmish fell back to the outpost on the mountain. The next morning Colonel Shelby threw forward a regiment and attacked the outpost, but his force was soon repulsed and driven back several miles through the mountains. Anticipating another attack upon this outpost, General Blunt on the night of the 5th directed Colonel Cloud, commanding the Third Brigade, to strengthen it by daybreak the next morning with one

hundred cavalry and two mountain howitzers. In the meantime, Colonel Shelby advanced up the Cove Creek road with a brigade of cavalry and encamped that night within a mile or so of the Federal outpost, and the next morning at daylight dismounted part of his command, made another attack, and before Colonel Cloud's support arrived, forced the detachment of the Second Kansas at the station to fall back about three miles in the direction of Cane Hill. Colonel Emmett McDonald, who had crossed over the mountains on the Telegraph Road with a brigade of Missouri Confederate cavalry, joined Colonel Shelby shortly after he had driven in the Federal picket.

Immediately after taking possession of the Fayetteville branch of the Cove Creek road, General Marmaduke advanced the brigades of Colonels Shelby, McDonald and Carroll to within three miles of General Blunt's position on Cane Hill, where they came in sight of the Federal cavalry under Colonel Cloud drawn up in line of battle. The opposing forces consumed the day in maneuvering and skirmishing, each side sustaining a few casualties in wounded. While the Confederate cavalry were thus threatening General Blunt with an attack in front, General Hindman was bringing forward his infantry and artillery on the Cove Creek road. As General Marmaduke's cavalry were now in possession of the Fayetteville branch of the Cove Creek road at its junction with the Cane Hill road, General Blunt was apprehensive that an effort would be made by the Confederate generals to turn his left flank so as to get between him and his re-inforcements under General Herron. That he might be advised at once if there were any indications of such a movement in progress, on the morning of the 6th he ordered Colonel John M. Richardson, Fourteenth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, who had arrived from Cassville the night before, to take a force of one hundred mounted men and proceed east on the Hog-Eye road to the crossing of the Cove Creek and Fayetteville road, and on

arriving there to send part of his men south on it to ascertain if the enemy were advancing. On arriving at the intersection of the roads described, Colonel Richardson ordered Captain Julian with his company to take the advance, and proceed south on the road in the direction of Cove Creek. Captain Julian had not advanced more than two miles, when he captured three Southern soldiers and sent them back, and advancing again a short distance, came in sight of the camp of the Southern forces which he thought were at least two thousand men strong. The Colonel examined the prisoners and obtained from them the information that he was within a mile of the main Confederate army, which was moving up the mountain on the direct road to Cane Hill. He then fell back a mile or so and immediately sent messengers to report to General Blunt the presence of this large Confederate force within a few miles of his headqaurters. The General could not feel certain whether the main Confederate force was being massed in his front to fight him early the next morning or whether the Confederate cavalry, with which his troops had been skirmishing during the day were concealing the real movements of the main force under General Hindman.

Knowing that the enemy were in force on the immediate Federal front and in view of the strong probability of a general engagement the next day, the men of Colonel Cloud's Third Brigade were ordered to bivouac on their arms that night at the front just south of Newburg. At two o'clock on the mornings of the 5th, 6th and 7th, the Federal troops at Cane Hill and Rhea's Mills were ordered to strike tents and load up their baggage and camp equipage, and the mule teams were harnessed and hitched up, and the wagons stood ready until daylight to move at a moment's notice.

In the midst of the preparations for the coming struggle General Blunt was much gratified to have Colonel Wickersham report to him about ten o'clock on the night of the 6th with a brigade of cavalry, which General Herron had

sent forward from Cross Hollow. He also received a dispatch from General Herron stating that he would reach Fayetteville by daylight Sunday morning, the 7th. Feeling that the impending conflict was at hand, shortly after midnight on the morning of the 7th, General Blunt again directed Colonel Richardson to proceed with his own battalion and Captain Conkey's company, Third Wisconsin Cavalry, east on the Hog-Eye road to the crossing of the Fayetteville and Cove Creek road, to ascertain whether the Southern forces were moving in the direction of Fayetteville, and if they were to resist them to the last extremity and to promptly notify him of their movements. The Colonel moved forward with his detachment, but before reaching the intersection of the roads met Captain Coleman of the Ninth Kansas Cavalry, with thirty men who had just been driven from the junction of the roads by the enemy and who reported that the Confederates were advancing up the Cove Creek road in strong force.

Thinking that the Southern forces were advancing on Cane Hill, Colonel Richardson fell back about a mile and took up a strong position to resist them, and sent a messenger to report to General Blunt; but waiting for a short time and finding that the enemy were not advancing, he sent Captain Julian forward again with a small detachment to ascertain their movements.

The Captain soon discovered that the Confederate forces were marching in the direction of Fayetteville, and then hastily returned and reported, and General Blunt was promptly notified.

Acting on the information that the enemy were advancing on Cane Hill, General Blunt and staff at seven o'clock left his headquarters and rode to the front, expecting soon to open the battle. Although a considerable force of Confederate cavalry were yet on the mountain in his front, he soon received information that the main Southern army were marching northeast in the direction of Fayette-

ville, on the Cove Creek road, and had already passed the point where that road was intersected by the Hog-Eye road. He was much chagrined on receiving this information, and immediately ordered all his transportation to Rhea's Mills, guarded by Colonel Phillips' Third Indian Regiment, and directed Colonel Judson to take his regiment, the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, and two howitzers, together with Colonel Richardson's detachment, and proceed as rapidly as practicable on the Hog-Eye road, and if, on arriving there, the enemy had passed in the direction of Fayetteville, to follow them and attack them vigorously, which he did with good effect.

Colonel Wickersham was ordered to proceed at once with his brigade of cavalry on the Cane Hill and Fayetteville road in the direction of Fayetteville, to form a junction with General Herron, who was coming up with his forces. General Salomon commanding the First Brigade, was ordered to follow Colonel Wickersham, and the Second Brigade, under Colonel William Weer, and the Third Brigade under Colonel Cloud, were withdrawn from the front south of Newburg about nine o'clock and directed to follow close in the rear of the first brigade. Time was an important element in the situation, and the moment General Blunt decided to make these movements he sent two mounted messenger parties with dispatches to notify General Herron, but failing to take the precaution to send them via Rhea's Mills, they were cut off by General Marmaduke's advance. Colonel Wickersham, who had moved in advance, instead of keeping on the direct road towards Fayetteville, about three miles north of Cane Hill, took a left hand road leading to Rhea's Mills.

The infantry and artillery following the cavalry kept the same road until General Blunt rode forward and overtook Colonel Wickersham and directed him to proceed in the direction of Fayetteville, and endeavor to open communication with General Herron, who had already engaged the enemy. General Salomon, with the First Brigade, was sent

to Rhea's Mills to guard the Federal trains, arriving there about twelve o'clock. General Blunt then took the Second and Third Brigades and marched on an obscure country road in a northeast direction, a direction in which artillery firing had just been heard.

General Hindman had up to a late hour of the 6th, made all his preparations to fight General Blunt in his position on Cane Hill. His infantry and artillery had moved up, and were in position to make an attack on the Federal troops the next morning.

He had heard of the arrival of Colonel Wickersham's cavalry brigade to re-inforce General Blunt, but this information did not change his purpose to make the proposed attack. On the night of the 6th, however, after his generals had assembled to receive their final instructions in regard to carrying into effect the movements decided upon, he received information that General Herron would reach Fayetteville that night with large re-inforcements of infantry and artillery for General Blunt.

After some consideration he came to the conclusion that if he attacked General Blunt in front and forced him from his position, he would fall back until he met his re-inforcements, after which he would probably assume the offensive. General Hindman, therefore, decided to abandon the proposed attack on the Federal position at Cane Hill, to withdraw his troops from their several positions, and to push them forward on the Cove Creek and Fayetteville road, and attack the Federal column under General Herron, and if possible, crush it before General Blunt could come up to its assistance. To deceive General Blunt as long as possible in regard to this new movement, General Hindman left Colonel Monroe with a brigade of Arkansas cavalry on the crest of the mountain in front of the Federal position, with instructions to dismount his men at daylight and skirmish as infantry with the Federal troops, and detain them as long as possible, a clever stratagem by which he hoped to benefit largely.

In the next place orders were issued to brigade and division commanders of the Southern army, to have their troops in proper positions and in readiness to march at three o'clock on Sunday morning, the 7th. But on account of some unavoidable detentions, the troops were not all in motion until nearly four o'clock. The road was very rough, so that the artillery and infantry were obliged to move slowly. General Marmaduke's cavalry division, consisting of Colonels Shelby's and McDonald's brigades, marched in the advance with a battery of light artillery.

Moving down the northern slope of the mountain, a distance of about eight miles northeast of Cane Hill, General Marmaduke's advance came in sight at daylight of Colonel M. La Rue Harrison's First Arkansas Unian Cavalry, and detachments of the Sixth and Seventh Regiments, Missouri Cavalry, marching southwest on the Cane Hill road near its junction with the Cove Creek and Fayetteville road, to re-inforce General Blunt. Colonel Harrison had been ordered forward from Elkhorn, and on the night of the 6th encamped on the Fayetteville and Cane Hill road near Illinois Creek. Major Bredett, commanding detachments of the Seventh and Sixth Missouri Cavalry, had marched nearly all night, and having no information that the enemy had flanked General Blunt, halted a few moments at daylight near the camp of the First Arkansas Cavalry, to feed and rest his tired and much-worn horses. Lieutenant L. Bunner had been marching with his company since two o'clock in the morning about half a mile in advance of the other companies of the regiment, to guard against a surprise. In probably less than ten minutes after Major Bredett's command had halted near the entrance to a lane to feed their horses, a company of the Eighth Missouri Cavalry, also on the march to Cane Hill, passed them and entering the lane, had got nearly through it, when a volley was fired into them by an unseen foe from the thick woods on their left front. The company instantly retreated, falling back

through Major Bredett's column. On hearing the firing the Major ordered his men to mount their horses and form in line to resist the enemy, who were seen approaching. He had scarcely formed his men in line when Colonel McDonald's Confederate Cavalry Brigade rapidly advanced within range and commenced pouring such heavy volleys of musketry into his line from his left, front and rear that he was obliged to order the retreat sounded.

After retreating a short distance this gallant officer rallied and formed his men in line, but being pressed by a superior force from all sides, he was wounded and killed and his men dispersed and pursued, some of whom were wounded and captured.

Colonel McDonald, in crossing over from the Cove Creek and Fayetteville road to the Cane Hill road, got between Major Bredett and his advance guard under Lieutenant Bunner, and on hearing the firing in his rear, the Lieutenant turned back with his company to join his command, but had proceeded only a few hundred yards when he saw advancing directly in his front a full company wearing the Federal uniform. Supposing the company to belong to the First Arkansas Cavalry, he allowed them to approach within fifty yards, when they opened fire upon him. But still thinking they were Federal soldiers, he called out to them to cease firing, that "We are friends." In another instant he became satisfied that they were disguised enemies, and then withdrew his company with the loss of one man severely wounded and five horses killed and wounded. The enemy who were wearing the Federal uniform proved to be Quantrill's company of bandits, whose hands were reeking with the blood of murdered Union citizens of Missouri. After the fall of Major Bredett, his command dispersed in every direction, but the men of each company kept together, and rallied and fought when not pressed by greatly superior numbers.

Captain William McKee, in making a stand with his company, became surrounded and was killed while trying to cut his way through the Confederate line. In their rapid movements, Colonels McDonald's and Shelby's brigades soon came up and attacked and routed the First Arkansas Union Cavalry, capturing all their wagons, baggage and camp equipage.

In pursuing the detachments of the Sixth and Seventh Regiments Missouri and First Arkansas Cavalry, the Confederate cavalry also became scattered, and it was at this time that a company of the Seventh Missouri Cavalry rallied and captured Colonel Shelby and two pieces of artillery. The Federal detachments, however, were unable to hold their prizes very long, for on returning from the pursuit of the main body of the Federal cavalry in the direction of Fayetteville, Lieutenant-Colonel M. L. Young, McDonald's cavalry regiment, and Lieutenant-Colonel R. P. Crump, First Texas Cavalry Regiment Partisan Rangers, of McDonald's cavalry brigade, recaptured Colonel Shelby and his battery.

After resting an hour at Fayetteville, General Herron, at four o'clock, pushed on with such of his troops as had arrived, sending forward Major Hubbard with two companies of the First Missouri Cavalry as an advance guard. When about ten miles southwest of Fayetteville, he met the First Arkansas Cavalry and detachments of the Seventh Missouri Cavalry retreating in great disorder. He succeeded in rallying part of the retreating troops and ordering the fence of a field thrown down on the left hand side of the road, threw his two companies into line in a wheat field to check the enemy. The Confederate cavalry soon approached in large numbers within two hundred yards and filing off to the right and left of the road, commenced to flank him. Seeing that the Confederate force was too strong to contend with, he was obliged to order a retreat, but having several fences to throw down, his command was much impeded in its movements.

The Confederate officers, seeing the situation, ordered a charge, and dashing upon the Federal cavalry, cut off and captured Major Hubbard and several of his men while trying to cross a fence. Captain A. L. Burrows then took command of the two companies and marched them rapidly in the direction of the mountain, a mile or so distant, and on arriving near its base fell in with some two hundred stragglers of the First Arkansas and Sixth and Seventh Regiments, Misssouri Cavalry, and ordered them into line to make a stand to check the enemy who were still pursuing them. On seeing the Federal cavalry forming in line, the Confederate column soon came to a halt, and after some skirmishing commenced to fall back. In the meantime detachments of the First Arkansas and Seventh Missouri Cavalry, which had retreated on the Fayetteville road, met General Herron with his escort, consisting of one company of the First Missouri Cavalry, under Captain J. M. Adams, and after some threats and decided and drastic action, halted his retreating troops, and formed them in line. He saw that the situation required energetic action to save his command from possible disaster. He immediately ordered forward two regiments of infantry and Captain Foust's battery Missouri Light Artillery. When his infantry and artillery arrived at the front, General Marmaduke's cavalry had approached in strong force and formed in line of battle to contest the Federal advance. With very little delay, General Herron examined and took in the situation and directed Captain Foust to open fire with his battery, using mostly shell, upon the enemy, and soon put them to flight, and pursued them four miles to the crossing of Illinois Creek. The course of the creek through the county is from southeast to northwest, but at the point where the Fayetteville road crosses it it flows nearly due west, and a short distance below the ford it changes its course and flows nearly due north for about one mile parallel with the road, when it again changes its course to the northwest.

On reaching the high ground just north of the creek, General Herron, looking over the fields and open spaces beyond it with his field glasses, discovered the Confederate army in position, occupying the high ridges covered with a thick growth of young timber and underbrush, about three-quarters of a mile south of the ford. On the left hand side of the road, for a distance of half a mile south of the creek, the ground was a high plateau covered with timber. South of this timber extending to the foot of the ridge on which the enemy were posted, there were several cultivated fields. On the right of the road from a short distance south of the creek to the foot of the ridge, there were several fields with intervening open ground.

Prairie Grove Church was two miles southwest of the crossing of Illinois Creek, near the junction of the Cane Hill with the Cove Creek and Fayetteville roads. The two hostile armies were now confronting each other and ready to engage in fierce conflict. After reviewing the situation for a moment, General Herron was satisfied that the Confederate army had passed General Blunt by turning his left flank. Though he was not advised of the strength of the Confederate army, he determined to attack it at once, hoping that the artillery firing would bring up and into action the Kansas General with his division. He crossed the creek with one of his staff and rode forward to place his infantry and artillery in position to open the battle. Inspired by the courage and devotion of their gallant leader, his artillery companies were bringing up his twenty guns at a gallop, and his foot-sore infantry were coming forward on the double-quick.

He desired to determine for himself suitable positions for his batteries and after a careful inspection of the ground in front, he ordered Lieutenant C. L. Edwards to cross the creek with a section of Foust's battery, First Missouri Light Artillery, advance to the high ground on the left of the road in the edge of the timber, and open

fire upon the enemy with shot and shell. Lieutenant-Colonel McNulta, commanding the Ninety-fourth Regiment Illinois Volunteers, was directed to support Lieutenant Edwards' section of artillery in the movement thus ordered. The Lieutenant soon reached a point with his guns from which the enemy were seen drawn up in line about half a mile off, and at ten o'clock opened fire upon them. In a few moments the Confederate batteries replied with twelve pieces, and with such energy that General Herron withdrew the section of artillery and the Ninety-fourth Illinois Infantry from the advanced position taken up. He saw it would not be prudent to order his troops to cross the stream at the ford, unless he could draw the attention of the Confederate batteries to some other point, as they were posted to command the ford by concentrating the fire of all their guns upon it. His infantry and artillery were rapidly coming up and forming in line, and he determined to cross the creek without unnecessarily exposing his troops to an enfilading fire of the Confederate artillery. He made some further examination of the terrain, and found that the stream could be crossed about a half mile below the regular ford by cutting a road through the timber, and this proposed crossing would enable him to take up a position south of the creek beyond the range of the Confederate batteries.

He therefore ordered Colonel Huston, commanding the second division, to have a sufficient number of men detailed to cut out the proposed road with as little delay as possible.

The plan of the General was to have one of his batteries cross the creek by the new road, advance to the high open ground on his extreme right, and open fire upon the enemy, hoping to draw the fire of their batteries, so that the artillery of his third division could cross the creek at the regular ford without having to face a storm of shot and shell. The moment the new road was opened, Colonel Hus-

ton moved Captain David Murphy's long-range rifle battery, First Missouri Light Artillery, across to the south side of the creek, and then dividing it into half batteries, placed the left half of three pieces, under Captain Murphy, in a commanding position north of the spring branch on the extreme right; and the right half pieces, under Lieutenant James Marr, in a good position four hundred yards to the left on the south side of the spring branch in front of the Confederate center. The section of the Peoria Battery, Illinois Light Artillery, under Lieutenant Borris, was posted about three hundred yards to the left of Lieutenant Marr, near the Fayetteville road. Colonel William McE. Dye, commanding the second brigade, Second Division, was ordered to support the two batteries, and Colonel John C. Black, commanding the thirty-seventh Illinois Infantry, was directed to move to the right to support the pieces under Captain Murphy. Lieutenant-Colonel J. B. Leake, commanding the Twentieth Iowa Infantry, was ordered to support the pieces under Lieutenant Marr on the left.

Col. J. G. Clark, commanding the first brigade, second division, was ordered to occupy with his regiment, the Twenty-sixth Indiana Infantry, a position one hundred yards in the rear of the center of Colonel Dye's brigade, as a reserve. At twelve o'clock the three regiments, following Captain Murphy's battery, waded the creek and marched to the positions assigned to them. While Colonel Huston was thus moving into position on the right with the troops and artillery of the second division, General Herron was preparing to cross the creek at the regular ford with the troops and artillery of the third division under the cover of Captain Murphy's battery.

At twelve-thirty o'clock Captain Murphy fired the signal gun, and a moment later the other two pieces, the half-battery under Lieutenant Marr and the section under Lieutenant Borris, opened fire upon the Confederates, who replied with twelve pieces with much energy. The moment

the signal gun was fired by Captain Murphy's battery, Colonel W. W. Orme, commanding the second brigade, third division, consisting of the Ninety-fourth Illinois, under Lieutenant-Colonel McNulta, the Nineteenth Iowa Infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel McFarland, and Captain Foust's battery, First Missouri Light Artillery, moved forward and crossed the creek at the regular ford, under a heavy fire from the Confederate artillery, and immediately prepared for action.

Colonel Henry Bertram, commanding the first brigade, third division, moved forward with the Twentieth Regiment, Wisconsin Infantry, and Captain Frank Backof's battery, First Missouri Light Artillery, following close upon the rear of Colonel Orme's brigade, also received a heavy fire from the Confederate batteries before his command had crossed the creek. The artillery companies of Captains Foust and Backof came to the front on a gallop and went into battery a short distance in the advance of the infantry, on the right and left of the road, and opened fire upon the Confederate batteries and position, and in less than fifteen minutes after his signal gun was fired General Herron had eighteen pieces of artillery on the south side of the creek, playing upon the Confederate position on the ridge, with shot and shell.

This storm of shot and shell sent by his batteries screeching into the Confederate lines, exploding and tearing the timber into splinters, soon brought out all General Hindman's artillery, consisting of twenty-two pieces.


Battle of Prairie Grove
Arkansas – Decbr 7th 62.
Scale
Mile
UNION FORCES
CONFED FORCES
N
R. I. West
Road to Rheas Mills
Gen. F. J. Herron Comdg
1st Position
Road to Fayetteville
Illinois Creek
J. Thompson's H.
Gen. Herron's 3rd Position
Gen. Blunt's Headqrs.
1st Kans. 2nd Ind. 2nd Kans.
Blunt's Union Line
3rd Wisc.
S. Wilson's House
Herron's Union Line
2nd Position
Roger's House
A. Borders H.
Confederate Line
FROST
HINDMAN
HOUP
MARMADUKE
Confederate Line
Prairie Grove Church
Drawn by J. in Glasmer

CHAPTER VIII

BATTLE OF PRAIRIE GROVE—Concluded

The battle was rapidly developing. After crossing the creek, Colonels Orme and Bertram formed their brigades in line under cover of the bluff on the left and right of the road. Colonel McNulta, with the Ninety-fourth Illinois, formed on the left of the line; Colonel McFarland, with the Nineteenth Iowa, formed in the center; and Colonel Bertram, with the Twentieth Wisconsin, formed on the right, the right of his line extending nearly to Colonel Huston's left. After the firing of General Herron's signal gun, the batteries of the opposing armies engaged in a furious contest, and the roar of artillery and of exploding shells was continuous for nearly an hour, when the superior handling of the Federal batteries had silenced nearly every gun of the Confederate batteries and compelled them to seek shelter behind the thick woods. During this artillery combat preparations were rapidly made on both sides for engaging in conflict with small-arms at close quarters. The detachments of the First, Sixth and Seventh Regiments, Missouri Cavalry, which had been dispersed in the morning by General Marmaduke's cavalry division, had now nearly all been collected under their proper officers, and, after reporting to General Herron, were assigned to duty on his flanks and as support to Lieutenant Borris's section of the Peoria battery. Having used a large amount of shot and shell during the day, the Federal batteries replenished their ammunition chests with grape and canister for close work, which was near at hand.

On the Confederate side, General Hindman had not yet been able to bring to the front all his forces to hurl against General Herron, as had been intended. His rear guard, trains, and a force detached to guard prisoners and wagons captured in the morning had been attacked by

Colonel Judson, who had been sent out by General Blunt from Cane Hill with the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, two mountain howitzers, and Colonel Richardson's detachment of the Fourteenth Missouri Cavalry. The booming of artillery in his rear alarmed General Hindman, and he detached General Parson's division of infantry and sent it back to check the advance of the Federal force under Colonel Judson, which he supposed was General Blunt's division. Shortly after twelve o'clock he received information that General Blunt had left Cane Hill, was approaching rapidly, and would probably form a junction with General Herron before General Parson could reach the field with his infantry. He was therefore greatly mortified when he saw that the time had passed for attacking with his combined forces the Federal divisions defiantly drawn up in his front. He was also astonished at the boldness of General Herron in crossing Illinois Creek in the face of superior force and commencing the attack, instead of waiting behind the stream to be attacked.

Having compelled the Confederate batteries to retire out of sight and having replenished his ammunition chests with grape and canister, General Herron ordered forward his left wing, consisting of the brigades of Colonels Orme and Bertram. In this movement Captain Foust's battery was flanked on the left by the Ninety-fourth Illinois Infantry, and on the right by the Nineteenth Iowa Infantry. And Captain Backof's battery was flanked on the left by the Nineteenth Iowa Infantry, and on the right by the Twentieth Wisconsin Infantry. Colonel McNulta, with the Ninety-fourth Illinois Infantry, advanced through the woods and brush on the left to an open field and engaged the Confederate infantry, and after several volleys of musketry compelled them to fall back to a position behind a fence on the south side of the field. To follow up the advantage thus gained, the Colonel moved his regiment by the left flank farther to the left through the woods and formed in line within two hundred yards of the Confederate infantry,

again opened fire upon them, and after a short conflict forced them to retire over the hill. Colonel McFarland, in compliance with instructions from Colonel Orme, detached three companies of the Nineteenth Iowa Infantry, under Lieutenant Richard Root and sent them forward under a heavy fire from the enemy as skirmishers to cover his advance, and to protect Captain Foust's battery, which had taken up a position in a wheat field on the left of the road, about one hundred and fifty yards from the foot of the ridge on which the Confederate infantry were formed in line.

The Twentieth Wisconsin Infantry, under Major A. H. Starr, advanced on the right of the road across an open field a distance of five hundred yards, when Colonel Bertram ordered the men to lie down under cover of a fence. Captain Backof moved forward his battery close on the right of Major Starr, pouring a destructive fire of grape and canister into the Confederate line below the brow of the ridge as he advanced.

In another moment General Shoup's division and Colonel Shelby's brigade of Confederates were seen advancing against the Federal left and threatening Captain Foust's battery.

To check this movement of the enemy, and to protect his battery, Colonel Orme ordered Colonel McNulta to withdraw the Ninety-fourth Illinois Infantry from their position on the extreme left and place them in position on the outside of the fence, near the battery, and to support it at all hazards.

Captain Foust then divided his battery into three sections, placing the first section under Lieutenant C. L. Edwards, the second section under Lieutenant J. B. Atwater, and took charge of the third section himself. All the pieces now opened with grape and canister upon the Confederate infantry not more than one hundred and fifty yards distant and drove them back into the woods on the ridge with

heavy casualties. Colonel McNulta now moved forward again to the position from which he had been withdrawn near the southwest corner of the wheat field and opened a heavy fire of musketry on the enemy, causing them to fall back over the hill in much confusion. While Colonel McNulta was thus engaged on the left of the Federal line, Colonel Bertram observed a Confederate battery supported by infantry about two hundred yards in his front near the brow of the hill, preparing to open fire upon him. He therefore ordered the Twentieth Wisconsin Infantry to rise from where they were lying down and charge and take the battery. The regiment, under Major Starr, moved forward in gallant style, shot down most of the artillery horses and gunners, captured the battery, and advanced to the crest of the hill, where they received a terrific musketry fire from four or five regiments of General Shoup's infantry division, which for a moment caused them to recoil, but, rallying, again returned the fire with great firmness and resolution.

The enemy, continuing to press forward in overwhelming numbers, Major Starr was obliged to fall back with his regiment much weakened by casualties, leaving the captured battery after destroying as much as possible of it and rendering it temporarily unfit for further use. In the meantime the Nineteenth Iowa Infantry, led by Colonel McFarland, had been ordered to move forward to support the Twentieth Wisconsin Infantry in their fierce struggle in the woods.

Ascending a hill to the left of the white house, near the road, Colonel McFarland advanced across the orchard back of the house to within a few yards of the fence, when the Confederate infantry, who had been lying down, concealed in the brush behind the fence, arose three regiments deep and poured a terribly destructive fire of musketry into his regiment from three sides, causing his men, after a short, fierce struggle, to fall back to Captain Foust's battery on the left of the road near the foot of the hill. In this furious

charge Colonel McFarland fell, shot through the body, and his regiment sustained a heavy loss in killed and wounded. After the death of Colonel McFarland, Major D. Kent took command and rallied the regiment, and in retiring recovered and brought off the field the colors of the Twentieth Wisconsin Infantry, which had been dropped by the color bearer, who had been shot by the enemy when the regiment commenced to fall back. Finding it impossible to hold the position on the ridge with the force engaged, Colonel Orme rode up and ordered the rallied portions of the Nineteenth Iowa Infantry to fall in and rally with the Ninety-fourth Illinois Infantry on the left, and then leading these troops in person, he opened a fire of musketry into the advancing line of Confederate infantry, and with the assistance of Captain Foust's battery, every piece of which was rapidly belching forth a perfect storm of canister into the Confederate line, succeeded in checking and driving it back into the woods on the brow of the hill. While the infantry of the third division were thus engaged in the desperate assault on the ridge, General Herron ordered Colonel Huston to bring up to their support two regiments of infantry from the second division on the right. The Colonel, leading his troops in person, brought forward at double-quick the Twenty-sixth Indiana Infantry, under Colonel Clark, and the Thirty-seventh Illinois Infantry, under Colonel John C. Black, and on arriving at the foot of the ridge, near the scene of the conflict, found the infantry of the third division falling back before a superior force of the enemy. That they had suffered severely in the conflict was evident from the number of wounded men moving and being borne to the rear. In order, therefore, to give the decimated regiments time to rally and reform near Backof's and Foust's batteries, Colonel Huston ordered his two regiments under Colonels Clark and Black to charge the Confederate position on the ridge. In advancing up the hill he took the precaution to throw out a company of skirmishers from each regiment to cover its front and guard against a surprise.

The two regiments moved steadily forward until they had passed the summit of the hill, when the skirmishers in advance commenced firing upon the enemy, only a few of whom could be seen through the thick brush and leaves. In another moment the Confederate infantry arose from where they were lying down and, advancing to the front three ranks deep, poured a destructive fire of musketry into the Federal line at a distance of less than one hundred yards. Anticipating an assault at any moment, and seeing the skirmish line retiring, the Federal infantry were prepared for hot work and delivered their fire at almost the same instant as the Confederates and kept it up with great determination and disastrous effect for some time, but were finally forced by superior numbers of the enemy to fall back to a position just in the rear of the Federal batteries.

After repulsing three desperate assaults of the Federal infantry, General Hindman determined to follow up his success by a counter charge, and in a few moments his infantry came pouring over the crest of the ridge in heavy masses, when Foust's and Backof's batteries opened upon them such a destructive fire of grape and canister that they were obliged to fall back out of range into the woods and brush. Captain Murphy's battery and the section of the Illinois Artillery under Lieutenant Borris were also constantly engaged in this last and preceding conflicts in throwing shot and shell into the Confederate line, and rendered efficient service in defending the right of the Federal line. When Colonel Huston moved with the Twenty-sixth Indiana and Thirty-seventh Illinois Infantry to the support of the infantry of the Third Division, he left Colonel Dye, of the Second Brigade, with the Twentieth Iowa Infantry and Captain Murphy's battery in position on the Federal right. While the conflict was thus raging with great fury on the ridge and to the left of the white house, Colonel Dye moved forward Murphy's battery and the Twentieth Iowa Infantry, under Colonel Leake, on the right of it, to a position in the middle of the field, on the right of the main road in front

of the white house. From this position his infantry advanced to the timber on the right of the orchard and attacked and drove back, with the assistance of Murphy's battery, a large Confederate force that were moving against the Federal right.

The fine rifled guns of Captain Murphy's battery, in the hands of his well-drilled company, threw percussion shells with the accuracy of sharp-shooters, and after disabling several Confederate batteries kept others from coming into action in exposed positions. After the terrible volleys of small arms had died away along the front, and General Herron's infantry had fallen back upon his artillery, complete silence reigned over the field for a short time, broken at intervals by a shot or shell from the hoarse-throated artillery. General Hindman declined to advance again from his strong position under cover of the timber and brush to attack the Federal troops in the open field, and General Herron did not feel strong enough to make another assault single-handed. His troops were already greatly exhausted by long, forced marches and the fatiguing operations of the day.

About two o'clock some of his troops on the extreme right heard distant rumbling sounds towards the west that gradually grew more distinct; a moment later General Blunt was seen approaching at the head of three thousand cavalry and twenty pieces of artillery, through a small prairie, at full gallop.

His infantry, having stripped for the fight at Rhea's Mills, were coming up at double-quick a short distance in his rear.

Arriving on the field, he soon discovered by rapid inspection that the Confederate forces were in position in his front and, ordering up a battery, opened fire upon them with shell.

General Herron was at once advised of the arrival of the First Division on the field, and the booming of artillery on the right announced to his nearly exhausted troops that their eagerly looked for comrades had come to their assistance, inspiring them with new courage and confidence. Colonel Wickersham, who had moved with his cavalry brigade in advance of the first division from Rhea's Mills, came upon, attacked and put to flight a detachment of Confederate cavalry who were posted on the extreme left of the Southern army, at the junction of the Cane Hill and Rhea's Mills roads, watching for the approach of General Blunt's division. Finding that he was in front of the position where the Southern forces were drawn up for battle, the Colonel at once deployed skirmishers in his front and detailed two companies from the First Iowa Cavalry to strengthen his advance guard and then moved forward in columns of squadrons. On moving forward and passing open ground for a quarter of a mile and approaching the timber to the southeast, his advance encountered and drew the fire of the enemy near a house on the left of the Confederate line and instantly replied with their carbines, and after receiving a re-enforcement of another squadron of the First Iowa Cavalry succeeded in driving the enemy back about one hundred and fifty yards.

To further strengthen his advance while forming his brigade in line of battle, Colonel Wickersham sent to its support a section of two-pounder steel howitzers attached to the Tenth Illinois Cavalry, under Corporal Levi Cassity. On proceeding down the road the Corporal passed a short distance beyond the line of the advance Federal squadrons with his howitzers when a Confederate force less than one hundred yards off fired a volley at him, wounded him in the arm severely, killed one of his horses and wounded the other. After this mishap the men in charge of the other gun fell back rapidly with it to the main column, then forming in line and unlimbering, sent several rounds of canister into the Confederate force, causing it to retire into the

timber. At the favorable moment, Lieutenant J. M. Simeral, First Iowa Cavalry, took twenty men, rescued the abandoned howitzer and Corporal Cassity, who had remained with it, and brought them back into the Federal line.

While General Blunt's cavalry were thus engaged on the right, his three field batteries coming up under whip, galloped into positions pointed out for them by the General and his aids-de-camp in an open field about four hundred yards to the left and in front of General Hindman's left wing.

Captain J. W Rabb's Second Indiana Battery being in advance, came into position first, and immediately commenced a heavy cross-fire with shot and shell upon the Confederate position, raking it from left to right and at some points enfilading the Confederate lines. Captain M. D. Tenney's First Kansas Battery of the Second Brigade coming up, took position on the right of Rabb, and Captain Henry Hopkins' Second Kansas four-gun battery was placed in position a short distance to his left.

The three batteries of sixteen pieces, supported by Colonel Wickersham's cavalry, now hurled a terrible storm of shot and shell into the Confederate lines, and with the assistance of General Herron's eighteen guns, about one-half mile to the left, succeeded in driving back the Confederate infantry who were being massed against General Herron's right flank.

His infantry coming up, General Blunt directed Colonel Wickersham to move his brigade of cavalry, consisting of the Tenth Illinois, under Lieutenant-Colonel James Stuart; the First Iowa, under Colonel James O. Gower; the Eighth Missouri Cavalry, under Colonel W F. Geiger, and the battalion of the Second Wisconsin Cavalry, under Major W. H. Miller, to the extreme right of the Federal line, to guard against the movement of the enemy in that direction, and to keep the road open to Rhea's Mills, where General Salomon, with part of the first brigade, and Colonel Phillips' Third Indian Regiment of the second brigade were sta-

tioned, guarding the first division trains. Colonel E. Lynde, with part of the Ninth Kansas Cavalry, and Major Calkins, with part of the Third Wisconsin Cavalry, also occupied positions on the Federal right flank.

On the arrival of General Blunt's infantry upon the field, the Second Brigade, Colonel William Weer commanding, consisted of the Tenth Kansas, under Major H. H. Williams, and the Thirteenth Kansas, under Colonel Thomas M. Bowen, and forty-four men of the Third Indian Regiment, under Lieutenant William Gallaher, formed in line on the right, in the rear of Captain Tenney's rifled-gun battery. The Tenth Kansas Infantry, with Lieutenant Gallaher's Indians on the right as skirmishers, formed the right wing, a dismounted detachment of the Second Kansas Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel O. A. Bassett, the center, and the Thirteenth Kansas Infantry, the left wing of the brigade. The Third Brigade, Colonel W. F. Cloud commanding, consisting of part of the Second Kansas Cavalry; the Eleventh Kansas Infantry, under Colonel Thomas Ewing, Jr., and the First Indian Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Stephen H. Wattles, formed on the left of Colonel Weer in the rear of Rabb's and Hopkins' batteries. The Eleventh Kansas Infantry formed the right wing, part of the Second Kansas Cavalry the center, and the First Indian Regiment the left wing of the Third Brigade; Colonels Bassett and Wattles dismounted their regiments to fight on foot beside the infantry.

On the left of Colonel Wattles' First Indian Regiment, Colonel Leake's Twentieth Iowa Infantry of the Second Division formed in line and very soon after these dispositions were made the left wing of the Eleventh Kansas Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Moonlight and Major P. B. Plumb, was detached to support Rabb's battery.

Directly after his batteries were silenced and his infantry driven back into the woods by Generals Blunt's and Herron's batteries, General Hindman determined to crush Blunt's division by throwing against it the division of Gen-

eral Frost and part of General Marmaduke's division. These troops, with two batteries, were at once ordered forward to assault the Federal right under General Blunt, while General Shoup's division, consisting of Generals Fagan's and McRae's brigades, and the brigades of McDonald and Shelby, of General Marmaduke's division, were ordered to continue the attack against the Federal left and center under General Herron. The artillery fire having slackened, the captains of the Federal batteries of the First Division having put a generous supply of grape and canister into their caissons, and preparations having been made on both sides for a desperate struggle, the forces of the Confederate left and center under Generals Frost, Parsons, Roane and Marmaduke, and of the Federal right under General Blunt, commenced the advance against each other about the same time. The second and third brigades of General Blunt's first division, in the order described, with skirmish lines thrown out, advanced from the field and prairie, and entering the timber to the south encountered the Confederate infantry of Generals Parson's and Roane's brigades. In another moment the opposing forces became engaged in a severe conflict with small arms, the dreadful roar of which extended along the entire front of the Federal right wing. The storm of leaden missiles, flying thick as hail, rapidly thinned the ranks of the combatants by death and wounds, and in a short time the Confederate line was driven back into the woods, but, receiving re-enforcements, advanced again and forced the Federal line to retire almost to the open ground.

On seeing the troops falling back before a superior force of the enemy, General Blunt ordered Lieutenant F. S. Stover to move the section of his twelve-pounder howitzers attached to the Second Kansas Cavalry into the timber on the right of the Eleventh Kansas Infantry. At the same time Captain Tenney's First Kansas Battery was ordered to a position on the left of that regiment near the edge of the timber.

The Federal infantry having re-formed their line, poured a galling fire of musketry into the advancing line of Confederates, and with the assistance of the howitzers and batteries, which now commenced playing upon the Confederate line with grape and canister, succeeded in checking and driving it back beyond the crest of the hill. But every time the Federal infantry endeavored to pass the summit of the hill they were met by a terrific musketry fire from the enemy, which obliged them to fall back a short distance to a less exposed position.

The men were ordered to lie down, and by doing so they not only escaped almost unharmed the volleys of leaden hail hurled at them, but they occupied themselves in keeping up an effective fire into the Confederate line the moment it came within range.

Thus the battle raged until the sun, descending behind the mountains, cast a dark shadow over the bloody field. The roar of artillery and small arms almost died away for a short time; the lingering rays of the sun were growing dim upon the western sides of the high mountain peaks to the eastward, and the leaders of the opposing forces knew that only a short space of time remained for continuing the struggle before the veil of darkness would cover all. A little later, as the shades of evening were fading into twilight, General Blunt ordered his infantry to advance again. They moved forward and reached the crest of the hill, when General Frost's infantry poured out of the woods in overwhelming numbers and charged and, extending his line beyond the Federal right, commenced a rapid flank movement. The roar of small arms again burst forth with great fury, but after firing a few rounds the Federal infantry were ordered by General Blunt to fall back so as to draw the enemy within range of his guns, which were double charged with grape and canister.

General Hindman ordered two batteries of ten pieces into position on his extreme left to support General Frost's infantry.

The Confederate infantry followed close upon the retiring Federal line, and on reaching the summit of the hill, rushed forward with wild shouts in a charge on the Federal batteries. They were permitted to approach near the edge of the timber, within about one hundred yards, when Captain Tenney's battery on the right, Rabb's battery in the center and Hopkins' battery on the left threw a perfect storm of grape and canister into their ranks and soon sent them in disorder back into the woods.

The Federal infantry, by forming on the flanks and in the space between the batteries and behind the broken panels of rail fence near the edge of the timber, also by rapid firing, assisted in repulsing the charge of the enemy.

While the conflict was thus raging along the front of the contending forces, the Confederate batteries just referred to as posted on General Hindman's left opened a hot fire upon the Federal position with shot and shell. To neutralize the effect of this artillery fire, General Blunt ordered Captain Tenney to turn his six ten-pound Parrott rifled guns upon the Confederate batteries. The Captain instantly complied, and wheeling his guns into position, commenced throwing percussion shells at them, and in less than ten minutes dismounted two of the Confederate guns, and forced the others to leave their position and seek shelter behind the hill in the thick wood. In this final struggle, two twelve-pounder howitzers of the Third Wisconsin Cavalry, posted on the Federal right, by throwing shell and canister shot, did good work in checking and driving back the Confederate force attacking from that quarter.

Farther to the Federal left, in front of Colonel Cloud's brigade, the Confederate infantry commenced collecting in large force behind a farm house and a stack of straw near the edge of the timber, with the apparent intention of charging Rabb's battery. A detachment of Confederate sharp-shooters had also taken shelter in and behind the house and outbuildings, and were endeavoring to pick off mounted Federal officers.

Captain Rabb's attention was called to the movement of the enemy behind the straw-pile and buildings, and he at once commenced throwing shell into them; the shells bursting, ignited the straw, and the house was soon in flames. In a few moments the enemy attempted to charge the battery, but were met by such a terrific discharge of grape and canister and volleys of musketry delivered by Lieutenant-Colonel Moonlight's battalion of the Eleventh Kansas Infantry, led by Major Plumb, that they were compelled to fall back into the wood.

Darkness having fallen, the firing of small arms ceased on both sides; but General Blunt's powerful batteries continued to sweep the brush and wood in front with a storm of shot and shell for some time afterward. Though General Herron's infantry of the second and third divisions, except Colonel Leake's Twentieth Iowa Infantry, were not engaged at close quarters with the enemy after General Blunt came upon the field, his batteries under Murphy, Backof, Foust, and Lieutenant Borris were constantly engaged from noon until dark in throwing shot and shell and grape and canister into the Confederate ranks and position. So effective and destructive was the terrible fire of the Federal batteries, that General Hindman stated "there was no place of shelter upon any part of the field;" that "wounds were given and death inflicted by the Federal artillery in the ranks of the reserves as well as in the front rank."

In the open fields the Federal batteries changed positions as often as desirable, and still kept up a steady fire into the Confederate position along the wooded ridge. In several instances the captains of these batteries, when closely pressed by the Confederate infantry, attached their guns to the limbers with prolonges and retired firing. The officers of the long range rifled-gun batteries of Murphy in the center and of Tenney on the Federal right were constantly on the lookout for Confederate batteries; the moment one was discovered coming into position, or opening fire, the guns of Captain Murphy's or Tenney's were turned

upon it, and two or three rounds of percussion shells were generally sufficient to silence it or drive it from the field. It was therefore a source of much satisfaction that they had by their excellent artillery practice prevented the Confederate batteries from inflicting upon the Federal forces any serious loss or damage.

Night dropped a veil of darkness between the combatants, and apparently left the contest undecided; when the firing ceased at dark, the opposing armies occupied the positions they had taken up on going into action. The Confederate forces bivouacked until about midnight on the wooded ridge upon which they formed in the morning; and the Federal forces bivouacked in the fields and open ground in front of the ridge.

As the fighting was in the timber south of the fields and open ground, some of the Federal dead and wounded fell within the Confederate lines. Although it was a cold, frosty night, neither side ventured to make up fires the early part of the night, so near each other were the combatants resting upon their arms. Assuming that General Hindman would be in position to renew the contest the next morning, General Blunt, commanding the three divisions of the Army of the Frontier, determined, under cover of the darkness of the night, to strengthen his line, and have everything in readiness to renew the battle at daylight.

His division trains, which were at Rhea's Mills, five miles west, and exposed to attack, he ordered to Fayetteville, in the rear of the army. General Salomon, commanding the first brigade of the first division, who was guarding the trains with the Ninth Wisconsin Infantry, Colonel Phillips' Third Indian Regiment second brigade, and some detachments of other regiments, was ordered to bring his men to the front immediately.

Colonel Wickersham, commanding the cavalry brigade, was directed to detail sufficient cavalry for an escort to the trains, and on arrival of the troops the trains commenced moving out from Rhea's Mills about eight o'clock, and

passing to the rear of the army the advanced teams reached Fayetteville early the next morning. In the fighting in the afternoon about three thousand of General Blunt's cavalry were not brought into action. The force sent out under Colonel Judson, Sixth Kansas Cavalry, to attack the rear of the Confederate army, did not reach the field until nearly dark. In the rapid movements of the Federal troops from Cane Hill to the battle field, quite a number of men of the infantry regiments were obliged to drop out of the ranks from exhaustion. The strength of the infantry regiments of General Herron's divisions was also greatly reduced during the three days' marches by the men who were unable to endure the prolonged exertion by dropping out of the ranks.

The stragglers and men who had thus fallen out of ranks were collected, as far as practicable, and brought to the front during the night to join their proper regiments. In General Blunt's division not one of the regiments had sustained a heavy loss, and in General Herron's second and third divisions, only three regiments had suffered severely. By dismounting part of his cavalry to fight on foot, General Blunt could therefore go into battle next morning much stronger than he had gone into the conflict just closed. It would be easier now to properly coordinate the movements of the troops than it was in the recent struggle. General Hindman had been permitted to throw the weight of his army first against General Herron's two divisions, and then engage General Blunt's first division.

He would not likely have an opportunity of doing this again, for General Blunt determined to have his three divisions next morning make a simultaneous attack upon the Confederate position, and placed his troops and artillery in position during the night, well supplied with ammunition.

To satisfy the pinch of hunger, provisions, consisting of hard bread and bacon, were supplied by the commissariat to the Federal troops to prepare them for battle. The

Federal wounded had also, as far as practicable, been taken up and properly cared by the surgeons and their corps of assistants.

On the Confederate side, General Hindman held a council with his generals, and, after considering the situation, decided to withdraw his army from the field without further struggle, and to fall back to Van Buren. His troops commenced to withdraw about midnight, and on retiring kindled numerous fires along his front and left them burning for the purpose of deceiving the Federal army. To get his artillery off the field with as little noise as possible, the wheels of the carriages and limbers were muffled with torn blankets of the soldiers. Having started his infantry and artillery on the retreat to Van Buren, General Hindman remained near the field with two brigades of cavalry, and sent General Marmaduke, accompanied by several members of his staff, under a flag of truce, with a communication to General Blunt, requesting a personal interview for the purpose of making provisions for burying the dead and caring for the wounded of the Confederate army left on the field. General Marmaduke and his party approached the Federal line on the Fayetteville road, and being halted by the vigilant picket guards, on whose eye-lids sweet sleep sat not, were conducted by the officer of the day to General Herron's headquarters, and held until General Blunt, whose headquarters were about a mile distant, could be communicated with. General Blunt granted the interview, and the next morning, shortly after sunrise, accompanied by General Herron and several officers of their respective staffs and escorts, rode forward to meet Generals Hindman and Marmaduke and members of their staffs.

The interview lasted until ten o'clock, during which time the commanding generals of the opposing forces entered into a mutual agreement in regard to the exchange of prisoners and disposition of the wounded left on the field. General Hindman was given six hours to bury his dead, but the two regiments of cavalry left for the purpose, instead

of attending to that duty commenced gathering up arms from the field. Their conduct was reported to General Herron, who went in person to the Confederate Colonels and informed them that any of their men found doing anything else than burying the dead would be held as prisoners of war. This firmness of the Federal General had the effect of stopping them from gathering up any more arms, and the Confederate cavalry soon afterward retired to overtake General Hindman, leaving the Confederate dead to be buried by the Federal forces.

General Blunt reported his losses in the three divisions of his army during the engagement, 167 men killed, 798 wounded, and 183 missing. On the Confederate side General Hindman reported his casualties at 164 men killed, 817 wounded, and 336 missing. A considerable proportion of the Confederate missing were probably among the wounded, from the fact that the day after the battle General Blunt furnished five thousand rations for one thousand Confederate wounded to keep them from starving.

There were many of General Hindman's recently organized Arkansas regiments made up largely of conscripts, most of whom probably were Union men at heart and determined they would not fight for the Confederacy, and when forced to the front could not be made to perform effective service. In the course of a week or two after the battle, hundreds of these men who had been forced to march to the front, deserted and threw away their arms and came into the Federal lines and gave themselves up, and soon afterwards enlisted in the First Arkansas Union Infantry regiment, which had just commenced its organization.

CHAPTER IX

EXPEDITION TO VAN BUREN

The battle of Prairie Grove was one of the three big battles between the Union and Southern forces in Western Arkansas and Missouri during the war in that region, and the success of the Union arms had far-reaching effects in maintaining the confidence in the Government of those who had espoused its cause early in the war, and it gave many of the people an opportunity of coming in and showing their devotion to the Union, and the men of military age a chance to enlist in one of several loyal Arkansas regiments then being organized.

In a few days after the battle the Federal wounded were removed from the field hospitals to Fayetteville, where the churches and college were turned into hospitals to receive them. As early as practicable the Confederate wounded were gathered up from the field and taken to Cane Hill in ambulances furnished by the Federal commanders, and there provided with proper facilities for treatment. The six hours' time given General Hindman to inter his dead was made good use of in getting his army over the mountains, safe from the pursuit of the Federal forces. When five o'clock came, the hour at which the flag of truce expired, it was too late in the day, and the Confederate army had got too far from the field for the Federal forces to commence pursuit. General Blunt did not see, until he had granted the flag of truce for six hours, that General Hindman's solicitude for his dead was simply an excuse to gain time for getting his army off the field without a panic.

In the heat of battle it was not unusual for the dead to lie upon the battlefield for several days, and certain it was that in the cool weather of December there was no need of being in a hurry to make the interments of those who fell

at Prairie Grove. There were quite a number of people who lived in that section within the sound of the cannon, who came to the scene of the conflict in a day or two after the battle, to ascertain if any of their relatives or friends were among the killed and wounded.

There were several affecting scenes of women who came to look for their husbands and found them among the Confederate dead in and about the orchard where the conflict was severest.

The day after the battle the troops of the second and third divisions, under General Herron, went into camp on the battlefield, and the troops of General Blunt's division returned to their former positions at Rhea's Mills and Cane Hill, their baggage and supply trains having been ordered back from Fayetteville to those places. When the troops of the second and third divisions had rested two or three days, and several large wagon trains had arrived with supplies for the army, Generals Blunt and Herron had a conference for the purpose of deciding upon a plan of further operations. They were proud of the achievements of the army and it was in excellent condition for any further movement; they had just received information that General Hindman, with the greater part of his army, was still north of the Arkansas River, encamped in the vicinity of Van Buren. They therefore decided to take eight thousand picked men of infantry, cavalry, and artillery from the three divisions; cross the mountains in two columns, one by the Telegraph road and the other by the Cove Creek road; and after forming a junction south of the mountains, move forward rapidly and attack and rout the Southern forces before they could have time to prepare defensive field-works. But severe winter weather setting in, with a snow storm and a six-inch fall of snow, caused the Federal generals to postpone the contemplated movement.

The few days the stress of weather obliged them to remain in camp at Rhea's Mills and Prairie Grove were usefully employed in strengthening their lines of communi-

cations with Fort Scott and Springfield, and in thoroughly scouting the country a day's march east and west of their positions with large detachments of cavalry. It was very evident from the large number of deserters from the Southern army brought in by detachments of Federal cavalry thus sent out, that General Hindman's army was greatly demoralized and weakened. Nearly all these deserters claimed that they were conscripts; that they were at heart Union men, and had been forced into the Confederate army against their wishes. They also stated that Colonel Adams' Arkansas regiment, made up mostly of conscripts, after the first volley threw down their arms, fled from the field, and afterwards deserted.

To inspire his troops with desperate courage, and to fill their minds with fanatical hatred of the Federal troops, General Hindman, on the eve of the battle, issued an address to his army, in which he drew a dreadful and fiendish picture of the foe his men were to engage. Most of the Confederate dead and wounded left on the field had a copy of this rabid address in their pockets; it probably had very little effect on his troops.

The weather having moderated, and a second snow having fallen and almost disappeared, Generals Blunt and Herron met on Christmas night and arranged the details for their expedition to Van Buren. At three o'clock on the morning of the 27th, the troops of the second and third divisions, under General Herron and Colonel Huston, were to march from Prairie Grove, taking the Telegraph road, and at the same hour the troops of the first division, under General Blunt, were to march from Rhea's Mills, taking the Cove Creek road in their march south.

The two columns, consisting of eight thousand infantry, cavalry and thirty pieces of artillery, were to form a junction near Lee's Creek south of the mountains. The day before the expedition started, Colonel W. A. Phillips, with twelve hundred Indian troops, two companies of the Sixth

Kansas Cavalry, and a section of artillery, was sent up on the right flank of the army through the Cherokee Nation to Fort Gibson, to attack a Confederate force of Indians and Texans under General Cooper at Fort Davis, on the south bank of the Arkansas River.

Brigadier General Salomon was left with a regiment of infantry, a battery of artillery, and detachments from different regiments to guard the first division trains at Rhea's Mills; there was also left a force considered sufficient to guard the trains of the second and third divisions at Prairie Grove.

While preparations were being made for the expedition to start, a report was purposely given out and circulated through the camps that a demonstration would be made in the direction of Huntsville, so that if any of General Hindman's spies were present, they would be misled in regard to the real destination of the troops. Everything being in readiness, at three o'clock on the morning of the 27th, the two Federal columns started on the march from Rhea's Mills and Prairie Grove for Van Buren to complete the work of driving the Southern forces out of Western Arkansas. Stripped for a fight and well supplied with artillery and cavalry, and having been successful in all its operations, this force was a thoroughly organized fighting machine. The night of starting out was chilly, with the temperature below the freezing point, for the puddles in the road were covered with thin sheets of ice. The three or four inches of snow which had recently fallen had not quite disappeared from the north sides of the mountains, and as all the slight depressions in the road were filled with slush, the outlook for the infantry and artillery was not very cheerful. A few hours marching, however, brought the troops daylight, and into a region where the snow and ice had entirely disappeared, and where the road was firmer and not quite so rough. The advance of General Blunt's division struck the head of Cove Creek about 10 o'clock; this stream winds through the mountains in a southerly direction, and increased in size as the

troops descended it. The rapid melting of the snow in the mountains and the recent heavy rainfall had started numerous little torrents which, pouring into it, had swelled it to overflowing. In its winding gurgling course through the mountains, from side to side of the narrow valley, the road crosses it in a distance of twenty miles some thirty-five times. At first the infantry were not much inconvenienced in crossing it, but gradually it became more disagreeable, for every time they waded it, their pants legs were wet a little higher. When they bivouacked about ten o'clock on the banks of the creek that night, nearly all the clothing they had on was wet, for at the different crossings, since dark, the water had been waist-deep, and it was almost ice-cold, for it came mostly from melted snow that had just run down in mountain torrents. The infantry stood the terrible day's march with very little complaint, and suffered less discomfort than one would have supposed. Though their clothing up to their waists was wet all the afternoon and evening, the physical exercise of marching kept them from getting chilled. Immediately after halting that night about ten o'clock, to bivouac on the bank of the raging foaming and splashing creek, they kindled numerous blazing fires and dried their clothing, after which food and refreshing sleep prepared them for the next day's march. The bugles sounded reveille at three o'clock the next morning, and in less than half an hour the troops and animals were refreshed with food to satisfy the demands of hunger and resumed the march.

The sky had become partly overcast during the night and there was no moon, so that it was pitch dark when the troops moved forward. Colonel Bassett, with part of the Second Kansas Cavalry, led the advance, and next came Colonel Judson with part of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry and two mountain howitzers. Next in the column was Colonel Barstow with the Third Wisconsin Cavalry and two howitzers, followed by the field artillery, infantry and ambu-

lances. After crossing Cove Creek five or six times and Lee's Creek once, the cavalry at daylight struck the Telegraph road at Oliver's store, eighteen miles north of Van Buren.

A short halt was made for the infantry and artillery to close up, and in a few moments General Herron's advance came in sight. That gallant officer had also encountered difficulties in his march over the mountains in the night. He was obliged to use twelve horses to the gun to get his artillery over, and in some places, in addition to these, the assistance of fifty men pulling on a rope was required. On resuming the march Generals Blunt and Herron rode at the head of the column a short distance in the rear of the advance guard. The road was now much wider and better and the cavalry marched by fours.

About three miles south of the junction of the Cove Creek and Telegraph roads, the Federal advance came upon the Confederate pickets, who, after exchanging shots with the Federal cavalry, fled in the direction of their camp on the road to Van Buren. An exciting chase ensued, in which the Federal cavalry kept close upon the heels of the flying pickets until they reached the Confederate camp at Dripping Springs, eight miles north of Van Buren. The reports of the shots in front had scarcely died away on the resonant morning air before the entire column of Federal cavalry had struck the gallop, which was kept up for five or six miles and until the troops came in sight of the Confederate camp. To watch the movements of the Federal forces encamped on the north side of the mountains, and to cover Van Buren against attack, General Hindman had posted Colonel R. P. Crump with a brigade of Texas cavalry eight miles north of that place at Dripping Spring. Colonel Crump's command was on the north side of a high hill, west of the main road; in his front, to the north, were open fields with unbroken fences.

He had very little time to prepare his men for action, for when the picket came into camp under whip and spurs, the Federal cavalry were coming up in sight. The fog and clouds had drifted away, the bright sunshine had dispelled the gloom and chill of the night, and it was a lovely Sunday morning, and no rumor having reached Colonel Crump of a Federal force being south of the mountains, he allowed his men to breakfast a little later than usual. On coming up on the north side of the field, in sight of the Confederate camp, General Blunt in a moment decided to charge it with his cavalry, and, having in a moment thrown down the fences in a number of places, his cavalry came into line at a trot, the Second Kansas on the left; the Sixth Kansas in the center, and the Third Wisconsin on the right, and dashing across the field at a full gallop, approached within a few yards of the Confederate camp, just beyond the fence, and opened a heavy fire with their carbines upon such of the Confederates as had the courage to stand. Most of Colonel Crump's command, however, fled before the Federal cavalry got half across the field, and the remainder, not disabled, fled on receiving the volley from the Federal carbines. A moment after firing the volley, the fence on the south side of the field was thrown down, and the Federal cavalry formed in the Confederate camp and moved forward rapidly in line over the hill and through the wood in pursuit of the flying foe. In his precipitate retreat, Colonel Crump twice endeavored to form his men in line to check his irresistible pursuers, but was unsuccessful. General Blunt at once saw that the Confederate force was utterly demoralized; that he need not advance further in line of battle, and drawing his men into the main road, moved forward by fours in a gallop, close upon the heels of the Confederate cavalry in their flight to Van Buren, through the streets of the city, and down the north bank of the river, passing many overturned and wrecked wagons and teams cut out. The sight of the Texas cavalry rush-

ing wildly through the streets, bareheaded, barebacked, and half dressed, closely pursued by two thousand mounted bluecoats, with rattling sabres, greatly astonished the citizens, who hurriedly came out of their houses to ascertain the cause of the confusion. After changing from line of battle to column by fours, General Blunt sent out detachments of cavalry on both sides of the main road to scour the country and pick up stragglers who had fled from Colonel Crump's camp.

At the same time, General Herron also sent Major Charles Banzhaf with a battalion of the First Missouri Cavalry to strike the road below Van Buren, with the hope of cutting off any of the Confederate cavalry and trains that should attempt to escape down the north bank of the river. On arriving upon the heights overlooking the town and river, the Federal Generals saw three steamboats, with steam up, leaving the wharf, and endeavoring to escape down the river. When the Federal cavalry reached the river, the leading boat had got upwards of half a mile off, and was making good time with a fair prospect of getting away. It was soon ascertained, however, that, about two miles below the city, the river made a bend to the north, and that the channel changed to the north side at that point.

General Blunt therefore ordered a force of cavalry and two howitzers to hurry forward and reach the bend, if possible, before the boats, and open fire on them if the officers attempted to pass or refused to land on the north side. Major Banzhaf, with his Missouri cavalry, was also marching toward the bend, and Captain Irving W. Fuller's company, being in advance, reached it before the cavalry, which had marched through the city, and seeing the steamer Rose Douglas steaming down the river, opened fire on her with their carbines and brought her to a landing. Under the Captain's instructions, one of his officers boarded her with detachments of soldiers and took her back up the river to Van Buren. Her cargo consisted of four thousand and

three hundred bushels of corn and six hogsheads of sugar, and a large quantity of molasses which had just arrived from Little Rock for General Hindman's army. Major Banzhaf's cavalry also captured and brought back to Van Buren a train of twenty-seven wagons loaded with ammunition, baggage, and camp and garrison equipage.

In the meantime, General Blunt's cavalry, with the assistance of his mountain howitzers, captured the other two steamers, the Notre and Key West, and brought them back to the wharf; they were also laden with corn and other supplies for the Southern forces in that vicinity; another steamer, laid up at the wharf for repairs, was also captured. The horse-power ferry, while attempting to cross to the other side of the river with a number of soldiers and citizens, was struck by a shell thrown by one of the howitzers of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry; the shell exploded, killing the horse at the tread-wheel, and wounding several men; in another moment the boat got into shallow water, and the uninjured men jumped overboard, waded to shore, and escaped.

Directly after the captured steamers were brought back to the wharf and made fast, the Federal cavalry commenced bringing in prisoners, wagons, and teams, captured while endeavoring to escape. Generals Blunt and Herron, with a number of their officers, went aboard the boats to examine their cargoes, and to obtain, if practicable, the strength of General Hindman's forces in the vicinity. In a short time several hundred Federal officers and soldiers, who had dismounted and left their horses a few blocks back to feed them, came down to the river-front to look at the captured boats. While they were thus amusing themselves, and talking over the exciting scenes of the morning, the sound of artillery was suddenly heard from the south bank of the river, and in another moment a solid shot came with a crash, striking the ground only a few yards from a group of soldiers, and ricochetting, struck a building a few rods away. A moment later, shot and shell from the

Confederate battery across the river commenced falling thick and fast along the levee, some striking the boats and some the buildings in the city. The Federal officers and soldiers at once retired behind some blocks of brick buildings, and soon afterward, to the side of the hill in full view of the Confederate battery. About two o'clock two batteries of General Blunt's long range rifle guns arrived on the heights in the suburbs of the city, near the river, and opened fire on the Confederate battery with percussion shells. The artillery duel, which now commenced, lasted until sunset, when the Confederate batteries and Shaver's brigade of infantry supporting them withdrew.

Late in the afternoon the echo of the thundering artillery rolled in undulations down the river to a great distance, growing gradually fainter until it died away.

Having ascertained that General Frost's division of infantry was encamped on the south bank of the Arkansas, five miles below Van Buren, General Blunt took part of his artillery down on the north side of the river to a point opposite the Confederate camp, and immediately opened a heavy fire upon it with shot and shell, and in about two hours compelled the Confederate General to break up his camp and retreat south. General Hindman was now getting alarmed at the situation; the two steamers, Eva and Arkansas, at Fort Smith, laden with supplies for his army, he ordered burned, after taking from them such stores as he was able to haul away with his limited means of transportation.

Knowing that General Blunt had three captured steamers with which he could cross his troops and artillery over the river, and knowing also that his own troops were too much demoralized to fight a battle with the victorious Federal forces, the Confederate leader decided to destroy all the public property which could not be removed, to abandon Fort Smith, and put his army on the retreat southward in the direction of Arkadelphia, southwest of Little Rock. The scarcity of transportation, and the disorder and

confusion that prevailed, obliged him to leave some six hundred sick soldiers at Fort Smith to take care of themselves. The retreat of General Hindman's forces during the night of the 28th saved General Blunt the trouble of crossing his troops over the river the next morning to attack them. General Hindman's conduct in ordering his batteries to throw shot and shell all the afternoon into the city filled with women and children was condemned as unwarrantable, for he could not hope to hurt the Federal troops as much as his own people in their houses and on their premises.

On dashing into the city at the head of his two thousand cavalry, General Blunt immediately ordered the telegraph office seized, and found in it some interesting dispatches from General Hindman to his officers and to General Holmes, commanding the Trans-Mississippi Department. Very soon, however, after the arrival of the Federal cavalry, the telegraph wire above and below Van Buren was cut and the line stopped working.

When it was ascertained that the Southern force had commenced to retreat from their different positions before midnight, the Federal troops returned to Van Buren, went into camp, and regaled themselves with a bountiful supply of the choicest captured commissary stores. The soldiers were also mindful of the care of their worn and hungry horses, and fed them generously from the large quantity of corn captured on the boats.

While the Federal arms were thus successful under Generals Blunt and Herron, the column sent out under Colonel Phillips crossed the Arkansas River above Fort Gibson on the 27th, and after a short skirmish captured and destroyed Fort Davis, upon which the Confederate Government had expended upwards of one million dollars. On reducing the extensive barracks and commissary buildings to ashes, the Colonel commenced the pursuit of General Cooper's and Colonel Watie's forces in the direction of Scullyville and Fort Smith. General Hindman received information by special courier of the advance of this force

under Colonel Phillips down through the Choctaw Nation, a few minutes after he heard of General Blunt's arrival in Van Buren, and being thus threatened on the flank and rear, immediately ordered General Cooper to retire to Johnson's station on the Canadian River, ninety miles southwest of Fort Smith in the direction of the Texas frontier.

Generals Blunt and Herron were now satisfied that the Federal arms should take Little Rock and control the navigation of the Arkansas River from that point to Fort Smith, before attempting to maintain a large Federal force in Western Arkansas south of the Boston Mountains. They decided, therefore, to return with their troops to Rhea's Mills and Prairie Grove to report to General Curtis, the department commander, that the Confederate forces had been driven from all that part of the Indian country north of the Canadian River and from Western Arkansas in great demoralization, and that the Army of the Frontier was ready for further aggressive operations. After the Federal troops and public animals used all the commissary supplies and forage they required, General Blunt ordered as much of the supplies as he could find transportation to haul back with him, removed from the boats. When it was decided that the army would not cross the river on the boats to attack the Confederate forces, or to pursue them in their retreat, after dark on the evening of the 29th, the four captured steamboats and ferry boats were set on fire and consumed, together with some fifteen thousand bushels of corn and other stores which had been brought up the river for the use of the Confederate army. The tents and camp equipage captured from Colonel Crump's command were also destroyed. In addition to the steamboats and supplies, the Federal forces also captured upwards of one hundred Confederate soldiers, sixty wagons and teams, two hundred and fifty head of fine beef cattle, and a large number of horses and mules.

The casualties on the Federal side were one killed and five wounded. No official report of the Confederate casual-

ties seems to have been made. On the morning of the 30th, General Blunt left Van Buren with his army, and arrived at Rhea's Mills on the afternoon of December 31st. General John M. Schofield, who had relinquished command of the Army of the Frontier early in November, on account of illness, returned to resume command.

When he arrived at Prairie Grove and found that nearly all the troops had gone on the expedition to Van Buren, he immediately set out to overtake them, but met them on the return march near Dripping Springs. He then returned with General Herron to Prairie Grove and resumed command of the Army of the Frontier.

He was an able officer and it was said by some who were close to him, that he deeply regretted that he had been unable to share in the brilliant achievements of that army after he left it, and would like to have led it in the closing scenes of the campaign.

CHAPTER X

THE UNION INDIAN BRIGADE

The expedition of Generals Blunt and Herron to Van Buren accomplished all that it was proposed it should accomplish; it had captured and destroyed the steamboats which were being used to transport supplies up the river from Little Rock for the use of the Confederate army operating in that region; it had captured and destroyed large quantities of supplies which had not yet been issued to the army; it had pushed the Confederate forces from the south side as well as the north side of the Arkansas River out of that section, and with the loss of their river transportation and supplies, made it impossible for them to reorganize as a fighting force for some time to come. It had shown what a well-equipped army inured to hard service could do under great difficulties. General Hindman had stated to his army that the Federal forces would not dare to cross the mountains to attack him at Van Buren or in that vicinity; if it should make such a rash attempt he would see to it that not one escaped, and yet the Federal forces in two columns crossed the mountains and swiftly fell upon his forces north of the river and captured their camp and train and sent them in demoralized flight southward.

After the return of the troops from the expedition to Van Buren to Rhea's Mills and Prairie Grove, General Schofield, who had been absent on account of illness for more than a month, returned and as stated, resumed command of the Army of the Frontier about the first of January, and as there were no organized forces of the enemy in Western Arkansas or Indiana Territory north of the Arkansas River, new operations were to be planned and new dispositions of the forces to be made.

It was the consensus of opinion of the military commanders of the Department, that it would not be advisable for the Federal forces to attempt to occupy the country south of the Boston Mountains and along the Arkansas

River until Little Rock should be captured by the Union forces and the Arkansas River opened to navigation to Fort Smith to bring up supplies by boats for the army.

The Federal wounded had been removed from Prairie Grove to Fayetteville for better hospital accommodations, and on resuming command General Schofield directed that the First Division retire to Elm Springs, twenty-two miles north, and that the Second and Third Divisions move to Fayetteville, at which places he held a grand review of the troops on the 6th and 7th of January, and immediately thereafter made new dispositions to meet new situations, for it was not expected that the enemy would remain inactive very long, but would reorganize for a campaign in some other direction with their large mounted force.

When at Van Buren General Blunt received information that practically all of General Hindman's cavalry under General Marmaduke was at Clarksville, about fifty miles below Van Buren and might attempt a movement north and pass into Missouri and attack the Federal supply line between Springfield and Rolla, or even attack Springfield, which was the base, of operations for the troops of the Department of Missouri operating in Southwest Missouri and Northwest Arkansas.

Active operations having closed in that section after the expedition to Van Buren returned, General Blunt left the army at Elm Springs and returned to Kansas to look after the affairs of his Department, which would require some new adjustment before opening the campaign for the new year.

Immediately after the grand review General Schofield reorganized the Army of the Frontier. He placed Colonel William Weer in command of the First Division, and General Herron in command of the Second and Third Divisions, and distributed the troops in Northwest Arkansas and Southwest Missouri to the best advantage in establishing the tranquillity of the country.

He considered it desirable to establish a post at Fayetteville, to be held by the First Arkansas and Tenth Illinois Cavalry, as a rallying point for the Union people of Western Arkansas, and to organize an infantry regiment from them, a step that had already been taken by Colonel James M. Johnson and Lieutenant-Colonel E. J. Searle, and only needed encouragement from the Federal authorities to recruit a full regiment.

The troops of General Herron's division moved in a northeast direction, and while the troops of the First Division were preparing to move, General Schofield received dispatches from General E. B. Brown commanding at Springfield, that General Marmaduke was marching on that place with two or three thousand men with artillery, and asking for immediate re-enforcements. Colonel Weer was therefore directed to move at once with the principal part of his command to re-enforce General Brown at Springfield; but he arrived too late. Marmaduke had arrived and made the attack, and was driven off with some loss and turned eastward and destroyed a blockhouse near Marshfield, and was finally defeated at Hartville with the loss of several of his best officers, Colonel Emmett McDonald among them, and retired into northeast Arkansas to recuperate and prepare for further operations.

In making the final disposition of his troops General Schofield directed Colonel W. A. Phillips to take command of the Indian Brigade, consisting of the First, Second and Third Indian Regiments, a battalion of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, under Captain John W. Orahood, senior captain, consisting of the companies of Captains Dobyns, Lucas and Rogers, and Captain Hopkins' four gun battery, and move to near Maysville on the line of Arkansas and the Cherokee Nation, where he would be in position to afford protection to the loyal Indians of the Territory during the winter.

His command left Elm Springs on the 10th of January and arrived at Camp Walker, near Marysville, on the 11th, having marched thirty-five miles, and went into camp for several weeks. In a few days severe winter weather fell upon that section; snow storms and hard freezing kept the troops busy for a while gathering forage for their animals and food and fuel for themselves, and straw for beds in their tents. They were able to keep fairly comfortable through the cold weather; there was plenty of wood and water near at hand, and the Indians were on the border of their own country and knew that only severe winter weather prevented their families from returning to their homes, nearly all of whom were then at Neosho, Missouri, for better housing conditions.

There was a good deal of responsibility placed upon the commander of such a force that required executive ability of a high order. The safety of his troops must be kept constantly in view and vigilance exercised in keeping out scouting detachments to warn of the approach of a hostile force, and the wants of the troops were to be looked after and forage, food and equipment provided; his supply line between that point and Fort Scott must be kept open and his supply trains suficiently guarded to prevent their destruction by guerrilla bands in the western counties of Missouri, who were frequently able to concentrate in considerable force—a hundred or so men.

In a short time there were coming to his camp quite a number of loyal Indian and white refugee families, consisting of old men, women and children, for protection, having been robbed of nearly everything they possessed by bandits infesting their neighborhoods, and these people had to be looked after to prevent them from starving or freezing and falling into immoralities that might affect the troops.

Their sanitary condition was an important problem for the Surgeons of the Indian command, and unsanitary conditions were certain to breed disease of some form or other,

which would affect the troops as well as the refugees. Families forced to leave their homes with scanty clothing and few of the comforts of life, to seek the protection of the troops, could hardly be expected to keep in a sanitary condition while living in improvised shelters on the borders of the camp with uncertain supplies of food and fuel.

If there was not a member of nearly every refugee family serving as a soldier in that part of the army, there was likely one serving with some other division of it, for no man of military age and fit for the military service could safely stay at home no matter which side he sympathized with. The chaplains or some one else generally looked after the most distressing cases.

There had been, since the army moved into Northwestern Arkansas after the Newtonia campaign, about two supply trains a month reaching it from Fort Scott, and as a rule most of the refugee white families coming to it were sent back with the returning trains, and there gradually come to be about Fort Scott quite a large number of refugee families, some of whom were provisioned by the Government until they could find employment. Among these the spotted or typhus fever broke out one winter, 1863, taking off some of those who could not have proper attention by the medical authorities and who had been exposed to unusual hardships after leaving their homes.

Another class of refugee families, refugee Indian families, who had come to Baxter Springs after the withdrawal of the white troops from the Indian expedition, deserves attention. These refugees consisted perhaps of the larger parts of the loyal Indian families of the Cherokee, Creek and Seminole Nations, who had recently been moved from Baxter Springs to Neosho, Newton county, Missouri, on account of the better housing facilities that could be provided for them at the latter place, and that they might be properly protected against the raids of Southern partisan organizations of Livingston and other Southern partisan

leaders, a battalion of the Third Indian Regiment, under Major J. A. Foreman, was sent to Neosho to occupy the place during the balance of the winter. In securing forage and supplies for the Indian soldiers and families, scouting detachments were kept out constantly, and killed some of the worst bandit leaders in that section who had been robbing and making life a burden to Union families since early in the war, some of the bandits having in their possession the clothing of women and children whom they had robbed.

The bandits hunted down by the Indians did not deserve the name of partisan rangers, who were perhaps a shade more respectable. The leaders of these bands did not generally have a following of more than three or four men, and when the Southern forces made a raid through that section, mingled freely with them, but when they were driven out by the Federal forces, did not leave with them. They stayed in the country, hiding in the broken, hilly and heavily timbered regions, and when an opportunity was offered, would make a night raid on some unprotected Union family and rob it and sometimes murder a male member if found present.

Major Foreman's Indian command was the first Federal force to occupy Neosho as a military post since the war, and it gave opportunity to many Union families of that section who had refugeed to Fort Scott and Springfield, to return and rehabilitate themselves in their homes; but the frequent raids of the Southern forces and the lawless operations of Southern partisans and bandits prevented a good many Unionists from returning home until the close of the war.

The Union and Southern families who had remained at home in the country raised good crops, and as the Southern forces were driven out of Southwest Missouri before using very much of the new crops, the Indian command found abundant forage and other supplies for its use and the use

of the Indian families at Neosho; the supplies taken from Unionists were paid for in vouchers given by the Post Quartermaster, and the vouchers could be readily cashed by business men who would take them in trade.

The town was well known to the Cherokees, for many of their prominent men had sent their daughters to school there before the war, and they had other business relations with the people. Seasons when their crops failed, they sent teams into Newton county and took their wagons back loaded with corn and flour purchased from the farmers whose crops never failed on the deep-soiled farms of Shoal Creek. The place was also probably well known to the people inhabiting that section from pre-historic times on account of the Big Spring in the western part of it, which pours out of a bluff at an elevation of ten to twelve feet in a descent of twenty feet, affording a fine water power for manufacturng purposes. On calm evenings the water pouring out of the bluff and down the descent may be heard for a distance of a mile or more. The town had four or five other excellent springs of pure water.

While Major Foreman's Indian Battalion and the Refugee Indian families were at Neosho, there was almost constant communication between them and the main force under Colonel Phillips, operating along the border of the Cherokee Nation, Northwest Arkansas and McDonald county, Missouri, and all were anxiously looking forward to spring when the exiles would return to their homes.

The Indian Brigade had been at Camp Walker, then called Camp Curtis, in honor of the Department Commander, only a short time when, in sending out a foraging expedition the mounted escort to it came into collision with several bandits, and in the action a soldier and a bandit was each killed, and one or two men wounded, showing that although the Southern army had been driven out of Western Arkansas to the south side of the Arkansas River, there were still Southern partisans endeavoring to stay in the rough,

hilly timbered region of that section, making it unsafe for small parties of soldiers to be away from their command without the risk of being fired upon from ambush.

To keep advised of and meet such movements of the Southern forces was the function of the Federal commanders in that region, and as early as January 12th, a day or two after taking up his position near Maysville, Colonel Phillips sent out a scout of about one hundred and fifty men under Captain H. S. Anderson, of the Third Indian Regiment, in the direction of Spavina Creek, and came upon a Southern force of about two hundred men under Major T. R. Livinston, of Jasper county, Missouri, and in the action that took place, Captain Anderson reported that not less than twenty-five or thirty of the enemy were killed and wounded; that Captain Fry Smith, of Jasper county, Missouri, was among the killed, and that the broken enemy were pursued until lost in the thick woods.

Information obtained by Captain Anderson indicated that Livingston had collected this force for the purpose of working his way back into Jasper county, his old field of operations, where he would be in a position to attack the Indian soldiers under Major Foreman at Neosho, or menace the Federal supply trains coming down from Fort Scott.

Major Livingston called his force of Missourians "Partisan Rangers." They knew every foot of the ground in Newton and Jasper counties; after they were driven south with the Southern forces it was impossible to prevent them from filtering back through the Federal lines, and in a few weeks after the action with Captain Anderson, Livingston was back in Jasper county, giving the Federal forces in that region all the trouble in his power, and as no Federal troops or Missouri Militia were yet stationed in Jasper or Barton county, and as most of the farm houses and fences around the farms in those counties had been destroyed, he could march over them almost at will without danger of attack except under conditions which would give him an advantage in numbers and position.

There were families of his followers and other Southern sympathizers in the field of his operations in Western Missouri, and even at Fort Scott, who kept him advised of the movements of Federal troops, so that it was difficult to bring him to an engagement with a superior force; but when in that section he was usually kept so well advised of the movements of Federal detachments that he could fall upon and cut to pieces an inferior force that had failed to exercise proper vigilance. On the night of the 3d of March he dashed into Granby with one hundred men where Major Eno of the Eighth Missouri State Militia Cavalry had twenty-five men stationed in a blockhouse, and captured three or four outside of it, and killed two of them, and then left without attacking the men inside of the blockhouse, who were able to beat him off and drive him out of range of their rifle fire.

A few days after the Granby affair, Livingston had a spirited little fight with Captain Theo. Conkey, Third Wisconsin Cavalry, who had been scouting the lower Spring River country with a detachment of about one hundred men of his regiment, and in the affair the honors were about even, several men being wounded and captured on each side.

The operations of Major Livingston in Jasper and Newton counties were becoming so annoying in his attacks on foraging parties and other Federal detachments passing through that section, that the commanding officers of posts and stations were determined to make a co-operative drive that would force him to leave that section, temporarily at least, and about the first of March Major David Mefford with parts of three companies of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, started out on a nine days' scout from near Mt. Vernon, and scouted the country thoroughly from Newtonia, Granby, down Shoal Creek to Neosho, thence north to Diamond Grove, down Turkey Creek to Sherwood in the western

part of Jasper county, and found a trail, but darkness coming on he did not deem it expedient to follow it into the thick brush and timber.

He bivouacked near Sherwood and took up the trail the next morning and followed it only a short distance when his advance ran into an enemy picket and in the exchange of shots had one of his men wounded, and also wounded one of the enemy. Searching the woods he soon found Livingston's camp, which had just been abandoned by a force of about eighty men who had retreated into the thick brush and timber. The Major then moved his command out to the edge of the prairie, and noticing an outpost of several men of the enemy in the open timber a few hundred yards ahead, sent his advance in pursuit and after a chase of half a mile, came upon Livingston's whole force, and was compelled to fall back pursued, the enemy coming up within one hundred yards of where the Major had dismounted part of his command and formed line to receive them, and after sharp firing of a few minutes they beat a hasty retreat, having two or three men wounded. Having been joined by forty Indians as scouts from the Third Indian Regiment of Captain Spillman's command at Neosho, Major Mefford took up the trail of the bandits again and pursued them beyond Crawford Seminary, Indian Territory, when it was abandoned and he returned to the headquarters of his regiment, being satisfied that the main part of Livingston's force had left that section.

After Mefford's scout there was little heard of Livingston's activities in Jasper and Newton counties for about two months, when he reported himself leaving the Creek Agency south of the Verdigris River, on the march to Southwest Missouri, where he arrived about the middle of May. In the meantime a post had been established at Baxter Springs with Colonel James M. Williams, First Kansas Colored Infantry, in command. He had his own regiment, which had been organized the latter part of winter and

during the spring, and a section of Blair's Second Kansas Battery, and this force was there for the protection of the supply trains from Fort Scott to Colonel Phillips' Indian troops at Fort Gibson, being near the scene of Livingston's operations.

On the 18th of May a foraging party of about sixty men, mostly colored soldiers from the Colored regiment, and some eight to ten white soldiers from the section of artillery were sent with five wagons and teams to the vicinity of Sherwood, Missouri, about eight miles distant, and their movements having been observed by Livingston's scouts and reported to him, he hastily collected upwards of one hundred of his men, surprised and attacked the party, and killed, as he reported 23 colored soldiers and 7 white men, and captured five wagons and teams. The next day Colonel Williams sent out a force of about two hundred men of his regiment and a section of the Battery, to the scene of the disaster, but was unable to draw the guerrillas into action, and as their force was well mounted, and his, infantry, he could not pursue them to advantage, and they disappeared in the thick brush and timber along Center Creek.

In this affair of the foraging party the Federal force suffered the severest loss it had sustained in the many contests it had with the guerrilla bands of that section. In extending the field of his operations, Livingston soon afterwards met his death while making an attack on a detachment of the Missouri Enrolled Militia under Lieutenant W. A. McMinn occupying the Court House at Stockton in Cedar county. Captain Vaughan of Osceola and three others of the guerrilla force were also killed and left on the ground of the Court House square, besides fifteen to twenty men badly wounded and left in the country on the retreat.

The attack was a surprise; the militia were fired upon in town before they knew of the presence of the enemy, and not more than twenty-five men under Lieutenants McMinn and Montgomery were able to get into the Court House

where the arms of the men not on duty were left, but which furnished plenty of ammunition for the men inside, who immediately bolted the doors down stairs and commenced firing from every window up and down stairs upon their assailants who were coming close up until their leaders were shot down, which ended the attack and precipitated their immediate retreat.

While the Indian Brigade was at Camp Curtis near Maysville, scouting and foraging and chasing Southern sympathizers and bandits who had such fear of Federal soldiers that they did not stay at home, it was found that some of them during the severe cold of the winter had been living in caves in parties of twos and threes, and in other instances in rude camps far in the depths of the hills, miles from any traveled roads, securing their food and scanty comforts from Southern sympathizers of the neighborhood.

All of those who were living this kind of a life were not bad men. Perhaps most of them were men of almost exemplary conduct, men past the military age and unfit for the military service, but men of decided southern sympathies who had gone off with the Southern army when it was driven out of that section, and had returned clandestinely to be as near their families as practicable, and if they found that they would not be disturbed at home, to go to some military post and take the oath of allegiance to the Government.

In war time it seemed almost natural for any one to run from an enemy, if he did not wish to be taken and there was a fair prospect of getting away, and it seemed equally as natural for the soldier to fire upon an enemy in flight if he did not halt on command, and thus it happened that many innocent men were doubtless killed or wounded, when, if they had offered to surrender on being surprised, they would have been taken and kindly treated by their captors.

In the vicinity of Maysville the forage had been mostly used in the early part of the autumn by the Southern forces

of General Cooper, and the Federal forces of General Blunt; but there was some left for the Indian command, and could be had by sending the foraging parties a little farther from camp each time an expedition was sent out to gather up and bring in forage.

Nearly all the small creeks and small streams north of Maysville emptied into Elk River in McDonald county, and had small farms along them, and very few of the Southern families owning them had left their homes. They raised good crops that year; but as the distance increased it become more and more difficult and inconvenient to find and haul the forage to camp. Colonel Phillips decided, after a couple of weeks in camp near Maysville, to move the command to Elk Mills on Elk River where he proposed to operate the mills in making flour and meal for refugee families and his troops, from the wheat and corn he would be able to secure in that vicinity.

Elk River Valley above and below the mills, and the valley of Buffalo Creek that emptied into the river near there, had many good farms and raised good crops that season, and while the Southern forces of General Cooper had used a good deal of the grain in the vicinity during the Newtonia campaign, in making flour and meal and collecting subsistence for his forces, foraging parties found considerable quantities of wheat, corn and oats, and with some repairing the mills were put into operation again making flour and meal for the Indian troops and refugees.

The mills, however, were not to be depended upon to a very large extent in making flour and meal for the troops, for just before moving his command to that place, Colonel Phillips had sent his first supply train to Fort Scott under an escort of two hundred mounted men, and a few negro refugees who had drifted into camp and were anxious to go north.

Nearly all the negro men fit for the military service who had belonged to the Cherokees and Creeks joined the Indian regiments; but those who had belonged to white men and

left them to seek their freedom and had come to the Indian command for protection had not yet found a suitable status for employment. A few might be employed as officers' servants, but that would not take care of all who were coming in; there was just beginning to be talk about organizing colored regiments, but the people of the country and the army were divided on that question. In arguments around camp fires of evenings, officers and men declared they would not fight beside negro soldiers; wagon masters would not hire negro men as teamsters because the white teamsters objected to associating with them, and the only thing to do was to send those who had found asylum with the troops to Fort Scott where they would probably have opportunities of securing employment about that post in some capacity or enlisting.

There were a few men in public life and others in humble positions in private life. who had a prophetic vision early in the war that the Rebellion would bring about the end of slavery and in the discussions around the camp fires, every angle of the subject was touched upon, and men who were very conservative about interfering with slavery, and who would have been willing to have returned to their disloyal masters, slaves who had escaped from them and come into the camps of the Federal soldiers for protection, were gradually changing their views and did not wish to be used as slave hunters for the men they were fighting.

It was difficult for men with prejudices of long standing to give them up, but they were doing it. The President's Proclamation of September 22d, to the country, that he would on January 1st, 1863 issue another Proclamation giving absolute freedom to the slaves of the States then in rebellion, and having issued his second proclamation giving them their freedom and stating that freedmen of suitable physical conditions would be received into the armed military service of the United States, for certain specified purposes, at once gave the negro a new status. He was no

longer a chattel; he was a human being and must be recognized as such by all law abiding men.

In Kansas there was a general sentiment from the commencement of the war against returning negroes who had escaped from their owners and come into the camps of the Federal troops, to their disloyal masters. There were many officers and men of prominence who were ready to recruit and organize colored men suitable for the military service into companies, and when a sufficient number were enlisted, into a regiment, and recruiting offices were opened at Fort Scott and other places in the State, for that purpose. When this recruiting was set in operation the Indian Brigade was no longer troubled with idle negro refugees. They were sent north with every train to Fort Scott and the men given an opportunity to enlist or secure empleyment, for which there was a demand.

Captain James M. Williams an officer of the Fifth Kansas Cavalry, had already commenced recruiting colored men in Kansas for the First Kansas Colored Infantry, of which he became Colonel, and performed valiant service with the Indian Brigade later that year, and showed to the country that those who were opposed to making soldiers of colored men, and fond of asserting that "niggers wouldn't fight," were mistaken, when colored organizations were properly officered.

It was the purpose of the Indian Brigade to occupy Southwest Missouri and the Cherokee country as far north as Elk River and to keep the troops employed scouting, foraging and providing for their wants until spring, when it was hoped that the command would move into the Cherokee Nation, probably to Tahlequah and Fort Gibson, and be in position to restore the families of the Indian soldiers to their homes and give them adequate protection. The Indian families were patient in their exile, but had an intense longing to be returned to their homes.

At different times since the early part of the war, Cowskin Prairie near Elk Mills, and Camp Walker near Mays-

ville, had been favorite places for concentration of the Southern forces in that section, and as a corps of observation, it was the intention of the commander of the Indian Brigade to prevent such concentrations the coming spring. The Federal forces had not prior to this time foraged very much from the farms in Elk River Valley and from the farms on the small streams emptying into it, and as most of the families in that region were represented in the Southern army or in the Southern Partisan Rangers, it was felt that they should divide their forage and supplies with the Federal forces, as the Unionists had been dividing their supplies with the Confederate forces without remuneration.

Having exhausted the forage and supplies in the vicinity of Elk Mills, about the middle of February the Indian Brigade moved up Elk River in the direction of Pineville, foraging and marking time and keeping in touch with Major Foreman's Battalion at Neosho, and with detachments sent into the Indian country for the purpose of keeping the commander informed of the condition of affairs in that region.

There was some fine scenery along this river that will always be attractive to those who love the rougher aspects of nature. Nearly every mile there were, on one side of the river or the other, precipitious bluffs, more than a hundred feet high, and in some instances ledges of solid limestone that projected far enough over the ground beneath to have sheltered an army of men marching by double platoons for a distance of half a mile or more, and in other places projecting over a considerable part of the stream, which had for ages been cutting out and washing away the strata of clay and rock beneath them.

This river, also locally known as Cowskin, was noted from the first settlement of the country by the whites, for the abundance of game fish found in it, and before the war fishing parties from surrounding counties, with boats, nets and hooks and lines and gigs, visited it nearly every spring for a week or so, fishing. for the water when not dis-

colored by recent freshets, was clear as a crystal, and a fish worth taking could be seen by a man in the boat with the gig, near the bottom of the deep holes.

While the troops of the command gave very little attention to fishing at that season of the year, they became more interested in hunting wild game, which had noticably increased since the war. With every foraging party sent out, the mounted men of the escort to the wagons were constantly on the lookout for deer, wild turkeys or wild hogs, and they were frequently rewarded with success in bringing in with their other supplies some of this wild game, to the delight of other members of their mess.

Many of the Union families had left their homes in the early part of the war and were refugees at either Fort Scott or Springfield, and on leaving they were unable to take with them their domestic animals, as hogs, sheep and cattle, and where these were not left in the care of neighbors became wild, if they were able to survive the winters, as many did.

The new distribution of the troops of the Army of the Frontier under General Schofield to subordinate commanders who were assigned to the occupation of posts and stations in Northwest Arkansas and Southwest Missouri did not mean that the activities of the forces under them would be curtailed, but that instead of fighting the enemy in one large body, they would be employed in fighting him in many detached units.

After the defeat and breaking up of General Hindman's Army at Prairie Grove and Van Buren, there were still nearly as many Southern soldiers to fight and who were as aggressive as they were prior to those events, with this difference, that instead of fighting in a single body and in one place, they would be employed in fighting in many detachments and in many places, with the commander of each detachment assigned to a particular field of operation.

On the Federal side the operations of the Indian Brigade under Colonel Phillips were confined to Northwest Arkansas, Newton and McDonald counties, Missouri, and the Indian Territory The operations of the troops at Fayetteville under Colonel Harrison embraced the territory of Western Arkansas to the Arkansas River. Colonel John F. Phillips Seventh Missouri State Militia Cavalry, was temporarily stationed at Elkhorn to keep the telegraph line open from that place to Cassville. Major E. B. Eno, Eighth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, with three companies of that regiment, was stationed at Newtonia, and Colonel W R. Judson, Sixth Kansas Cavalry, commanded a Sub-district in Southwest Missouri, with headquarters at Mt. Vernon.

On the Confederate side, General W. L. Cabell was assigned to the command of the District of Northwestern Arkansas, and General William Steele to the command of the troops in the Indian Territory, with headquarters at Fort Smith, and both commanders endeavored to organize their forces to make them as effective as practicable in contesting with the Federal forces the territory they were occupying since the close of the Prairie Grove campaign. They were constantly sending out from their positions on the Arkansas River detachments of mounted troops to attack and annoy the Federal occupying forces, and as far as possible make their positions untenable.

CHAPTER XI

OPERATIONS OF THE UNION INDIAN BRIGADE

To the commanding General of troops in the field the keeping open of the telegraph line between Elkhorn and Springfield and St. Louis, was of very great importance in advising him of threatened danger to any point of his supply line and of enabling him to move quickly a sufficient force to any threatened point to prevent interruption of communication.

This was a difficult task for the officers and troops employed in it in a country like that with partly hostile populations and through a country thickly wooded from Elkhorn to Springfield and from that place to Rolla, a distance of more than two hundred miles, and in many places from five to ten miles between houses in which families lived. It was an easy matter for one or two men living near the line, or at a considerable distance from it, to approach it and cut a wire and escape without much danger of detection or capture.

Colonel J. F Phillips not only kept small detachments of his mounted force constantly patrolling the Telegraph Road along that part of the line he was guarding, but he sent out larger detachments, sometimes a company, a day's march or more from his position at Elkhorn, to thoroughly scout the country and secure any possible information in regard to the movements of the enemy, in small detachments or as individuals.

In the early part of January one of the larger detachments he sent out under Captain T. W. Houts of about seventy-five men of the Seventh Missouri State Militia Cavalry, in the direction of Berryville, struck a force of Southern guerrillas near that place and killed ten and captured all their horses except those that were killed. The guerrillas were well mounted and armed and in Federal uniforms, a disguise they had practiced many times to the disadvantage and severe loss of the Federal soldiers operating in that region.

When guerrillas were found thus disguised, they never surrendered even when they saw no hope of escape, for they knew they were violating the usages of honorable warfare, and if caught, would be tried by court martial and shot. They knew that Federal soldiers captured within the Confederate lines wearing the Confederate uniform would be and had been court martialed and executed. They knew the risk they were taking to accomplish their diabolical ends.

In his efforts to hold the country north of the Boston Mountains, Colonel M. La Rue Harrison, First Arkansas Cavalry, at Fayetteville, was kept busily employed after the withdrawal of the Army of the Frontier from that section. He was obliged to use part of his force in keeping his communication open between that place and Cassville and Springfield, and to send out scouting detachments of a hundred or so men in the direction of the Arkansas River to secure information of the movements of the enemy from that quarter. On the 5th of February he sent out a scout of two hundred and twenty-five men under Lieutenant-Colonel James Stuart, Tenth Illinois Cavalry, consisting of one hundred men and two small howitzers of that regiment, and one hundred and twenty-five men of the First Arkansas Cavalry, through the mountains over the Frog Bayou Road to the Arkansas River, to ascertain whether the enemy were displaying any signs of re-organization and activity.

Arriving at the river below Frog Bayou, Colonel Stuart ascertained that there was a small Confederate force encamped two or three miles below on the south side, and he directed that one hundred men be ferried over and sent down on that side to capture them, while he moved down on the north side with the balance of his force and the howitzers to assist in the attack. The enemy, however, discovered his movement in time for part of them to get away. In the fight that took place his men killed several of the Confederates and captured seven prisoners. After his men had recrossed to the north side of the river he

marched up that side twelve miles and captured thirty bales of cotton that had been turned over by the Confederate Provost Marshal to a private citizen. This cotton was transported by Government teams he had with him to Fayetteville and turned over to the Post Commander; it was the first cotton that had been seized by the Government in that section and properly disposed of.

While marching along the Ozark road about eight miles below Van Buren, Colonel Stuart's command was attacked by about one hundred men of Colonel Carroll's Arkansas Confederate regiment; he immediately ordered Captain Chapin to charge the enemy with fifty men, which he did in gallant style, routing and dispersing them in every direction. He reported capturing twenty-one prisoners during the scout and brought them in and turned them over to the provost marshal.

On his return to Fayetteville the prisoners were sent to Springfield, and the sick and wounded in the hospitals there from the Prairie Grove campaign of the Second and Third Divisions were also sent to Springfield, and those of the First Division of the Army of the Frontier were sent to Fort Scott, as Fayetteville was then only an outpost on the southern limit of the Federal occupation of that section.

General Grant's operations against Vicksburg, which were just getting under way, required all the troops that could be spared from the Department of the Missouri, and had delayed operations against Little Rock longer than General Curtis, the Department Commander, had intended; but he still had a sufficiently large force operating in northeast Arkansas to threaten the State Capital, which led General Holmes, the Confederate Commander, to withdraw all the Confederate troops from Western Arkansas that could be spared, for its defense.

It was his design, however, to leave a sufficient force under General Cabell commanding the District of Western Arkansas, and General Steele commanding the District of the Indian Territory, to hold the country south of the

Arkansas River, and by raiding operations, attack the supply line of any Federal force attempting to occupy a position near that river, and as the season south of the river was several weeks more advanced than north of the Boston Mountains, the Confederates would have their cavalry horses and transportation animals in condition for service several weeks earlier than the Federal forces, except where they were able to secure forage for their animals. The Federal cammanders generally depended upon forage for their animals instead of grazing.

The latter part of February and the early days of March, the earlier varieties of wild flowers were making their appearance, and the budding of some of the trees of the forest were noticeable in Northwestern Arkansas, and the Federal commanders in that section knew that the Confederate forces in their front would soon commence showing activity.

Early in March Colonel Phillips moved the Indian Brigade from near Pineville to Bentonville, Arkansas, where he would be in a better position to observe the movements of the enemy in his front, and from which place he would advance by gradual marches into the Indian Territory and occupy and fortify Fort Gibson and hold it, and have his supply trains from Fort Scott come down and return on the west side of Grand River, which would subject them to less danger from attack by the enemy.

His command encamped at Bentonville about two weeks, and while there the smallpox broke out among the refugees and also among some of his Indian soldiers with quite a number of fatalities. A smallpox hospital was established and those exposed to the disease were quarantined in a camp to themselves; but there were a few cases in the command nearly all that spring and summer, in spite of the efforts of the surgeons to enforce vaccination.

As it was generally understood that the command was en route to the Cherokee Nation as fast as conditions would

warrant, the number of Indian families in the refugee camp increased, as they were anxious to enter their country with the troops, and plant such crops as they were in the habit of raising.

While encamped at Bentonville the white troops of the command belonging to the Sixth Kansas Cavalry and Captain Hopkins' Battery were able to make with the citizens of the town some satisfactory exchanges of their surplus rations of sugar, coffee, tea, salt and flour, for butter, eggs, chickens and other good things to eat. Some of the officers and soldiers boarded in the homes of families, establishing warm friendships. There were also parties and dances and courtships, resulting in some marriages of young couples. Some of the fair maidens of strong Southern sympathies were thus converted to the Union cause.

The safety of the command depended upon vigilance at all times, and a scout of a hundred or so mounted men was sent out nearly every day from ten, fifteen, twenty miles to the front and on the flanks, and it rarely returned to camp without having an exciting incident of chasing or having been fired into by several Southern sympathizers who were hiding out in the brush and hills of that country. A soldier was now and then killed or wounded, and as often one of the enemy was despatched by the white or Indian soldiers.

It was an interesting feature of these Indian scouts on starting out on the march in the morning, to see the Indian soldiers mostly Creeks and Seminoles, decorated in war paint and feathers, and to hear the war whoop commencing at the head of the column and running back to the rear, to be repeated several times. But there is one thing that should be mentioned to the credit of these Indian soldiers, and that is they were rarely, if ever, charged with unlawful depredations, plunder, robbery, on the march or in the neighborhood of their camps. The white people were afraid of them, but they did not molest any one in their homes; their

whole thought was to return to their own homes and live in peace. They had suffered many hardships and privations in a war for which they were not responsible, and in which many of their leaders would have preferred to have taken no part; they had in the last year seen the enemy driven from their country and their families restored to their homes for only a brief season when the fortunes of war again made them exiles, and now that the Federal authorities had expressed a determination to occupy and hold their country, the prospect of permanent restoration to their homes was vividly before their minds.

A mass meeting was called of the Union people of Washington county, Arkansas, to be held at Fayetteville on the 5th of March for the consideration and discussion of questions relating to their general welfare, and as that and Benton county were a part of Colonel Phillips' district, he was invited to be present and address the meeting. He accepted the ivitation and on the morning of the 4th of March with an escort of one hundred men set out for Fayetteville and arrived there that evening and was enthusiastically received by the soldiers of Colonel Harrison's command, and the next day addressed a large assemblage of citizens and soldiers. He briefly reviewed the general situation of affairs of the country; he mentioned the general success of the Federal arms, particularly in Western Arkansas where the enemy had been beaten at Prairie Grove and pushed to the south side of the Arkansas River, which had an important bearing on operations in the Indian country. He warmly commended the efforts of the Union people of western Arkansas in organizing two regiments, then nearly full for the defense of their homes and the cause of the Union, and did not doubt but that there were a sufficient number of Union men in Western Arkansas to organize several other full regiments. He also dwelt upon the necessity of close co-operation between the troops of Colonel Harrison's command at Fayetteville and the troops of the Indian Brigade, which would soon be in the Indian Territory, and believed

with the information he possessed, that with their united efforts, they could hold Western Arkansas and the Indian country north of the Arkansas River until the fall of Little Rock, which would assure the general advance of the Federal forces.

A friendly conference between the two principal Federal commanders in that section to talk over policies and co-operation for future operations, was certainly a desirable feature of the Colonel's visit to Fayetteville, for the occupation of the Indian country with his Indian command would be very difficult in the absence of Federal occupation of Western Arkansas.

Western Arkansas was rough, hilly and mountainous, and not favorable to a slave-owning class except in the Arkansas River Valley, and Southern leaders were unable to convince men who did not own slaves that it would be to their interest to espouse the Confederate cause, and rather than do so these men had kept out of the Confederate army, and did everything possible to keep out of the way of Confederate Conscription officers. So determined were these Union men not to serve in the Confederate army that early in March Colonel Harrison reported nearly one hundred in a body coming into Fayetteville from the Washita Mountains south of the Arkansas River.

The Union men who could not stay at home and who had been living in the mountains and out of the way places since early in the war when they came into the Federal lines were ragged and their clothing showed patch upon patch. With long hair and unkept beards, they had the appearance of wild men or cave men, and could hardly recognize themselves in their improved appearance when they had discarded their old clothing, had their hair cut and beards trimmed up and put on the new blue uniform of the Union army.

At the time of the visit of Colonel Phillips to Fayetteville, Colonel Harrison had just commenced and in a few weeks completed the construction of fortifications at that

place that would enable him to hold it against a largely superior force of the enemy not supplied with artillery. His position was isolated and it would be difficult to get re-enforcements from Southwest Missouri if he should be threatened by attack by a large force organized on the Arkansas River, and which, by making a night and day's forced march, could approach very near him without the movement being discovered. His command was frequently depleted by sending out scouting detachments in different directions and in escorting trains between that place and Cassville, Missouri, and with well-constructed fortifications that would command the town and the approaches to his camp might, with the First Arkansas Infantry, then being organized, hold out against a superior force even in the absence of part of his regiment.

While encamped at Bentonville the Indian Brigade was on the ground of the opening of the battle of Pea Ridge or Elkhorn Tavern, and in the first annual celebration of the event it was discussed from every angle by the white soldiers, and much interest manifested in looking up the movements of the troops of the opposing armies during the three days' struggle.

This was the first battle between the Union and Southern forces in which the Indians participated. They were the Choctaws and Chickasaws, and Creeks and Cherokees, who had, under the pressure of the Confederate authorities, espoused the Confederate cause, and were led into the battle by General Albert Pike. The Indians who had adhered to the cause of the Union were not represented in the battle; they had not yet commenced organization under guidance of Federal authorities for the defense of their country, and a few of those then in the Indian Brigade were at the time of the battle in the Confederate service.

There were people of the town who were able to tell very vividly of the narrow escape of General Sigel's Division from capture as it passed through, and of the statement of

General Van Dorn that if he had been ten minutes earlier he could have captured the entire Federal Division of five or six thousand men. The same people were able to tell in equally vivid language of the dreadfully demoralized condition of General Pike's Division of Indians and Texans as they passed back through Bentonville in their precipitate flight from the battle field, halting hardly long enough to tell what had happened, only that the Southern army had been practically destroyed, Generals McCulloch and McIntosh and Hebert killed, and Generals Van Dorn and Price captured and General Pike missing. Corrected reports of the battle were soon made public and the exaggerations eliminated.

The mounts and transportation animals of the Indian Brigade were brought through the winter in fairly good shape; but daily, forage was getting more scarce, and the area foraged from gradually widening, until it was found necessary while at Bentonville to send a foraging expedition of about one hundred wagons and teams to the White River country, twenty-five to thirty miles east, which, however, was successful and brought back the wagons loaded with corn and oats, a quantity sufficient to last several weeks if properly conserved and used along with the forage picked up in the neighborhood of the command.

In some instances the horses of the Indian soldiers fastened to young trees while in camp gnawed the bark from them as high as they could reach, thus showing how keen was the pinch of hunger on account of insufficient forage. A larger mounted force could not have sustained itself in that region during the latter part of the winter without a heavy loss of transport animals and mounts for the troops.

The spring was favorable for preparing the tillable land for the crops usually raised on it, and the troops passing through the country everywhere saw the people, old men, women and children, ploughing and working and sowing

their oats and planting their corn and cultivating their gardens with here and there a patch of an acre or so of tobacco, for up to the war Benton county practically raised more tobacco than any other county in Western Arkansas. A few of the two-story empty tobacco barns were still to be seen, having escaped the ravages of war.

There were very few men under sixty, except cripples, who considered it safe to try to stay at home, and even men above that age, if they took an active interest in either side, were not safe. The political status of every man was known to his neighbors, and while the occupation of that section by the Confederate and Federal forces had changed so many times as to make neighbors of different political sympathies and affiliations cautious or even reluctant to inform on each other; yet every man displaying political activities towards either side was known, and his safety at home could not be assured except when his friends were occupying the country. Even then he might become a victim of bandits passing through his neighborhood.

Those attempting to raise crops were handicapped for want of suitable work animals. No family could keep a good serviceable horse or mule, or even a pair of oxen for farming, even when the troops of the side with which the family were identified were occupying the country, for at that stage of the war every mounted force of either side had worn out horses that required replacing without waiting for the slow process of getting them on requisition from the nearest cavalry depot. The owner was generally told by the approaching officer that if he did not take the serviceable animal, the other side would; he gave a receipt for the animal and the owner could take it to the quartermaster and get a voucher for it.

In nearly all such cases, the party making the seizure left a broken down animal in place of the one taken, and in a few weeks or month or so the sorry looking, broken down animal with mane and tail chewed off by its hungry fellows in camp, with rest and feed commenced to mend up,

and was quite useful to the family in putting in and tending the crop. The army authorities in that section did not give any attention to salvaging its broken down mounts and transportation animals, as had been done in the Eastern Union armies.

This broken down stock left by the army was not the only dependence families had for work stock to cultivate their crops; nearly every family had an old horse or mule, or a blind horse or mule or with one eye out, that had escaped and would continue to escape representatives of the army looking for serviceable animals, that would answer the requirements of farm use. People do not generally realize what slender means they can get along with in an emergency, until put to the test, as the people were in the war-torn sections.

At a session of the Cherokee Council under the protection of the Indian command, prominent men of the Nation were present, and had under discussion measures of importance to the welfare of the Cherokee people, and which, when properly considered and formulated, would be presented to Congress by the Cherokee Delegation on its arrival in Washington. One of the important measures to be presented to the Congress was one providing for the abolition of slavery in the Cherokee Nation at an early date.

While slavery had existed for some generations among the Cherokee people, it had never existed in that form which had characterized the institution in the Southern States. It was the consensus of opinion among the white troops who had been with the Indians nearly a year, that slavery of the negroes among them had been only in name; that there were no outward signs of servitude in the negroes towards the Indian master, as was always noticeable in negroes who had belonged to white masters.

No one pretended that slavery among the Indians entailed hardships upon the negroes compared to the hardships entailed upon them by slavery among the whites of

the Southern States, and it would have been very difficult to impress a negro with the idea that there was as great a distance socially between him and an Indian as there was between him and a white man. In fact there seemed to be very little recognition of difference of social status between them, particularly between the half-breed and full-blood slave owners, of whom there were only a few.

The possibilities of the negro as an intellectual force seemed to be about equal to that of the Indian, and there was no prejudice against miscegenation of the two races. The Cherokees and Creeks did not seem to be losing in population on account of adopting civilized methods of living; but they were losing the characteristics of the Indian by their inter-marriages with the whites, which in a few generations will leave scarcely a full blood Indian among them.

Since this country was first settled by Europeans, traders and other adventurers of the whites have lived among the Indians, and it is generally known that by forming temporary unions, and sometimes lasting ones, with the native women, they gained certain rights and privileges that are not accorded to those who do not enter into such alliances. These alliances gave the white or squaw man and his descendants a great advantage in business and land interests.

In the organization of the three Indian regiments there was one white officer in every company, and the orderly sergeants of the different companies were white soldiers who had good records for efficiency in the companies of white regiments from which they had been transferred, and who were able to make out the Morning Reports and other reports of the companies to which they belonged. The Colonels were white men; of the other field officers and Captains, some were white and some were Indians.

Every scout sent out and every escort to the trains was under a white officer or non-commissioned officer, and in giving orders for any required movement, there was al-

ways an Indian present who understood and could speak English and quickly interpret the orders to his comrades, and while the discipline was good, there was nothing harsh or unreasonable about it, and of the scouts and escorts to trains sent out, a part of each was usually made up of a detachment from the Battalion of four companies of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry under an officer or non-commissioned officer.

On March 17th, the Indian Brigade left Bentonville and marched fifteen miles southwest to the Big Spring at the head of Flint Creek where it would be in position to thoroughly examine the country in front as far south as the Arkansas River before moving into the Indian Territory, only five or six miles west.

This spring of pure water was one of the finest in Northwest Arkansas, and would have furnished the water supply for quite a city. It bubbled up out of the ground almost like a fountain and flowed away in a strong, swift current, and like many other springs of that section did not dry up during the summer. A pure water supply for an army is an important factor in maintaining its health.

A reconnoissance of a mounted force of about one hundred men under Lieutenant Fred Crafts, First Indian Regiment, was sent out before the command left Bentonville, in the direction of Van Buren to ascertain the strength and movements of the enemy in the vicinity of that place. As he met no opposition he marched into town, and sent a spy to Fort Smith, where, on returning, he reported he found only about three hundred Confederates of Colonel Carroll's Arkansas regiment. No information was secured showing activity of General Steele's forces south of the Arkansas River in the Indian Territory. It was the movement of his force that the commander of the Indian Brigade was interested in watching.

During his reconnoissance the information obtained by Lieutenant Crafts pointed to the fact that General Cab had not been able to organize and concentrate a force

sufficient strength to make an aggressive movement north of the mountains. It was not likely, however, that he would remain very long inactive, but would keep on his front reconnoitering parties of his best mounted troops, to watch the movements of the Federal forces.

A short time after Lieutenant Crafts' reconnoissance to Van Buren, a deserter came into the camp of the Indian Brigade and on being carefully questioned stated that he had deserted from Colonel Carroll's regiment, which was near Clarksville on the north side of the Arkansas River when he left it; that it was employed in scouting to the north, and that there were no other Confederate troops in that section.

Some time after Lieutenant Crafts' reconnoissance to Van Buren, Captain John Rogers, Sixth Kansas Cavalry, with two hundred men of his battalion, made a scout into the Boston Mountains south of Cane Hill on the State line, and on return reported finding no sign of an enemy, but stated that he saw a number of Confederate wounded left there by General Hindman after the battle of Prairie Grove. Fairly good hospital accommodations were provided for them, but the mortality among them was reported to be very high, due it was claimed to insufficient medical supplies furnished by the Confederate authorities.

While encamped at the Big Spring, Colonel Phillips sent back his supply train to Fort Scott under an escort of about two hundred men to accompany it on the State Line Road as far as Baxter Springs, where the escort would wait for the train to return loaded. At that place Colonel Williams was stationed with his regiment, the First Kansas Colored Infantry, and if he deemed it advisable, could put a sufficient number of his infantrymen in the wagons as a guard for the protection of the train going to and returning from Fort Scott.

This was the last train sent north on the east side of Grand River, and the day after its departure a force of seventy-five men under Lieutenant Anderson was ordered

out to overtake it and re-enforce the escort, for there was some uneasiness for its safety on account of a Confederate force of about one hundred men reported to have been seen in the vicinity of Cane Hill moving north. Their reconnoisance was to ascertain the strength of the Indian Brigade, its movements and intentions of its commander.

A reconnoisance did not always develop the true situation in front; it might and did sometimes approach within a few miles of a considerable force of the enemy, and return without being conscious of having been in his immediate presence, to be followed by him almost back to camp. An army commander had all these difficulties to contend with; he might be surprised after using the greatest diligence in reconnoitering his front and flanks; even a friendly population on the line of march of the enemy, might not be able to advise him of their rapid advance to surprise and attack him.

A number of officers holding commissions from the Secretary of War in the Fourth and Fifth Indian Regiments, reported to Colonel Phillips for duty, when as a matter of fact not a single recruit had been enlisted for either of those regiments. The proceeding seemed unusual and caused some criticism of the action of the Department. Recruiting commissions were sometimes issued to men to raise companies with the view of organizing a regiment; but no one before had heard of commissions being issued to men of regiments that did not exist. The three Indian regiments were kept well filled up; but it would have been very difficult, if not impossible, to have recruited and organized another full regiment from the Creeks, Cherokees and Seminoles, for perhaps fully one-half of the able-bodied men of these three tribes had been taken into the Confederate service and most of those who desired to renew their allegiance to the Union States had already returned and enlisted in one of the loyal Indian regiments.

Even if there had been a probability of recruiting and organizing the two regiments of Indians, it was felt that

the Government was not acting fair towards the white officers and non-commissioned officers of the three Indian regiments who had been serving about a year, to have raw, inexperienced, and untried men commissioned and sent out to command them. Such a scheme it was felt would not be for the good of the service.

In the white regiments the company officers were elected by their men; but in the Indian regiments, as already stated, it was deemed expedient to have at least one company officer and the orderly sergeant white men, who were generally transferred and promoted from white regiments on account of their efficiency and fitness, and when promotions were made in their regiments, their claims were the first to be recognized by their commanding officers who had a sense of justice and appreciation of merit.

Suffering persecution for the sake of principle was a feature of the Civil War that might be much dilated upon. There were not many instances of greater suffering, persecution and hardships than was told in the stories of eleven men who came to the Indian command while it was encamped at the Big Spring. Their leader, Joseph R. Pratt, who lived near Neosho up to the breaking out of the war, and on the opening of hostilities moved to northern Texas, hoping to escape the turmoil and conflict that he felt certain was rapidly coming to Southwest Missouri. After moving to Texas he found it impossible to hold a neutral attitude. His neighbors insisted that he must be for one side or the other, and to be for the Union was treason to the State. He was born and brought up in Wisconsin, but married into a family that owned slaves, and thought that fact would sufficiently identify him with the South to save him from persecution in Texas. In this he was mistaken. He found that in Northern Texas there were many small farmers who raised mostly cattle, horses and sheep and did not own any slaves and had no interest in slavery and were still devoted to the Union. He became acquainted with many of these men, and they formed a secret society

pledged to the Union. The Confederate and State authorities got after these men and hunted them down to break up their organization, and caught some of them and after a farce of a trial convicted and hung sixteen at Gainsville.

The situation became so critical that Mr. Pratt found that he would be obliged to leave Texas, and collecting part of a company, they made their way north, traveling of nights and laying up during the day in the thickets and brush along the streams, until they were able to cross Red River into the Southeast part of the Choctaw Nation, being pursued most of the time by blood hounds. After passing through the Choctaw Nation they entered the mountains of Southwest Arkansas, but had great difficulty in working their way north, for the passes in the mountains were guarded by the Confederates who had instructions to intercept them if practicable. Much of the time, half starved and suffering from intolerable thirst and subject to the inclemency of the weather day and night, they had a toilsome journey of over two hundred miles before they found friendly greetings among the soldiers of the Indian command.

Some of these men enlisted in the two Arkansas regiments then completing their organization at Fayetteville, and Mr. Pratt went north to Fort Scott with the first empty supply train returning to that place, and that summer and autumn took an active part in recruiting the Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry, in which he was commissioned a Lieutenant, and later performed valuable service in connection with the Indian Brigade, proving by acts his devotion to the Union.

On the 24th, the Indian command marched from the Big Spring to the Illinois River, twelve miles south, where it encamped about ten days, sending out nearly every day reconnoitering expeditions to the south and southwest into the Cherokee Nation as far south as the Arkansas River,

in order to keep advised of the movements of the enemy manifestations of whose activity were looked for at any moment.

The young foliage of the forest trees was noticeable, the fragrance of the wild flowers on the line of march perfumed the air and the grass and wild onions in the creek and river bottoms afforded grazing for the ponies of the refugee Indian families, the number of which had lately gradually increased, and as these conditions further south were more pronounced, the Cherokees who had espoused the Southern cause, and then south of the Arkansas River, were certain to make efforts to return to their homes on the north side, which meant that the Union Indian soldiers would soon have plenty of work ahead.

After a few days in camp at Illinois River, Colonel Phillips sent a detachment of thirty men back to Neosho with mail for the north and instructions for the commanding officer of the Indian Battalion there, to bring away as early as practicable the refugee Indian families at that place and join him at Parkhill, Cherokee Nation. The difficulty of providing transportation for so many families and their belongings had been met, and the Indian soldiers stationed there during the winter it was believed would make a sufficient escort to protect them and the train in their journey to their own country.

The position of the Indian command on the Illinois River covered the gap in the mountains through which any considerable Confederate force from the neighborhood of Van Buren would likely pass to enter Northwest Arkansas west of Fayetteville, and prudence dictated the necessity of watching closely that gap and of keeping advised of any troops from the south passing through it or attempting to pass through it.

Several Unionists came into Fayetteville from near the Arkansas River below Van Buren and reported that when they left home Colonel Carroll with a Confederate force of about one thousand mounted men was preparing to march

north on the State Line Road, and this information was at once communicated to Colonel Phillips who ordered Captain N. B. Lucas and Lieutenant W. M. Smalley of the Battalion of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry to take two hundred men and make a reconnoissance as far south as Dutch Mills, which was on the road the enemy were reported as intending to advance on, and make careful inquiry in regard to enemy movements.

The reconnoissance under Captain Lucas did not develop any new movements of the enemy; but it secured information showing that Colonel Carroll was preparing for active operations in some quarter in a short time; whether his blow was intended for the troops under Colonel Harrison at Fayetteville, or the Indian command, could not be determined.

A reconnoissance of about three hundred men sent to Parkhill and to the vicinity of Fort Gibson to ascertain the condition of affairs in that part of the Territory, did not meet any hostile force, but on returning to the command reported that on their arrival at Parkhill they found a Confederate force of fifty to sixty white men in Federal uniforms had been there the day before, and coming upon a party of Union Indians, called Pin Indians, killed seven of them, being deceived by the uniform the enemy were wearing. These Pin Indians were a secret organization devoted to the Union, but did not enlist in the Union Indian regiments; they were known as abolitionists. They were decidedly opposed to slavery.

From such information as was obtained, it was believed that the enemy making the attack were a part of Quantrill's command returning from Northern Texas to its old haunts in Jackson and Lafayette counties, Missouri, for its fiendish operations were heard of at other points on its march after that date. It was generally known that it did not take any prisoners, but murdered the Federal soldiers and Union men who fell into its hands, and was particularly severe in dealing with Pin Indians.

There were many instances where these bandits who generally wore the Federal uniform were able to deceive small detachments of Federal soldiers and shoot them down before they could offer any resistance; and yet Quantrill and his men were in good standing with the Confederate Generals, and even with the leaders of the Confederate Government at Richmond, which he visited and ventured to give advice in regard to the conduct of the war in the west.



CHAPTER XII

UNION INDIAN BRIGADE CAPTURES FORT GIBSON

On the morning of April 3d, the Indian command marched from Illinois River twelve miles southwest to Cincinnati, a small village on the State line, where it encamped three or four days, keeping in touch with Colonel Harrison's force at Fayetteville, and by keeping out reconnoitering detachments to the south and southwest, was daily advised of conditions on its front for a distance of twenty to twenty-five miles.

Colonel Phillips had brought his command through the winter in good shape, and the troops had confidence in his judgment and patriotism; he had lately been joined by two companies of the Third Indian Regiment that had been stationed at Maysville in a fortified position during the winter, and when joined in a few days by a battalion of the same regiment, under Major Foreman, at Neosho, he would have an effective fighting force of about three thousand men and a battery of four guns.

He had information that Generals Steele and Cooper were having much difficulty in reorganizing their Indian forces for a spring campaign. They had not recovered from the demoralization that seized them in their flight from the action at Old Fort Wayne in October, in which they lost their artillery. They had not taken any part in the action at Cane Hill, or in the battle of Prairie Grove; nor had they as an organized unit taken any part in any operation north of the Arkansas River since their defeat, nor was it likely that they would take part in any aggressive movement north until they were joined by a strong contingent of white troops. Their morale was very low.

Colonel Watie, commanding the regiment of Cherokees in the Confederate service, had been able to keep his men together, and small parties of them had several times crossed to the north side of the Arkansas River and made some disturbance, and as he was an enterprising Indian

COLONEL W. A. PHILLIPS

officer, it was anticipated that he would display some activity when the Union Indians occupied their country to the Arkansas River, which separated the Cherokee from the Choctaw Nation.

There were many things connected with army operations in that section that appealed to the commander of the Indian Brigade for his consideration. His principal and immediate work was to restore the refugee Indian families in exile to their homes and give them protection; but there were white families of Unionists in the mountains south of him who represented that they had been stripped of nearly everything they possessed by Southern partisan bandits; that they were in distress, and desired to be removed to some point within the Federal lines, that the heads of these families were in the Federal army The question was up to him as to what action should be taken for their relief. On the representations made to him, Colonel Phillips directed Lieutenant Joseph Hall, of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, to take about one hundred men of his battalion and a sufficient number of four-mule teams and bring out the families and their belongings, which he did, and they were sent to Fayetteville where they had friends and relatives in the army.

There were many instances in which returning scouting expeditions had brought back with them Union families who had been unable to accompany their male members to the Federal lines when obliged to leave home. There was much more of this kind of work that fell to the troops at Fayetteville than to the troops of the Indian command, and there were frequent expeditions sent out from that place with teams a distance of fifty to sixty miles to bring in Union families, most of whom were families of soldiers who had enlisted in the Union army, and who had incurred the displeasures of the Southern partisan bands infesting their neighborhoods.

Having made the necessary preparations, on the 6th, the Indian command marched from Cincinnati twelve miles

south to Dutch Mills, on the State line, and at that place turned west into the Cherokee Nation on a road that led to Parkhill, but marched only three or four miles and went into camp for the night, and called it "Camp Jim Lane," in honor of Senator Lane, of Kansas. The march was resumed the next morning twenty-two miles west to Parkhill, where the command encamped near the residence of the Chief John Ross and waited the arrival of the Refugee train from Neosho, which was reported to be within a few days' march.

After the command passed into the Cherokee Nation the physical aspects of the country changed every mile; it was less broken and more inviting and seemed better adapted to agricultural and grazing purposes than Arkansas, and the Indians certainly showed good judgment in wishing to get back to their own country, where they hoped to enjoy life under their own fig tree.

The Refugee Indian train bearing the Indian families from Neosho arrived at Parkhill on the 9th, having been en route ten days. It was about a mile long, and as nearly every kind of vehicle was used, it was obliged to move slowly, some days making not more than three or four miles. It was estimated that it brought down one thousand families; many of them had been exiles from their homes for more than a year, and the joyful greetings between some of them and the Indian soldiers was attended with a good deal of pathos, although Indians are not considered very emotional. Many changes and heartaches had taken place during the interval of separation of members of families.

This restoring of the Refugee Indian families to their homes was an event that probably made a lasting impression upon their minds, and the humane and sympathetic policy of the Government in guarding their interests and welfare tended to strengthen their loyalty and devotion to it.

Most of these families dispersed in a few days to their homes in different parts of the Cherokee and Creek Nations, and as the season was not too far advanced, put in

such crops as they had usually raised, as far as they were able to get seed corn and seeds, and in many instances became self-supporting, which relieved the Government of the burden of feeding them. Some of the Indian families living in the northern part of the Cherokee Nation left the train en route and returned to their homes.

During the winter at Neosho there had been an epidemic of measles among them and many deaths from its resulting sequelæ, on account of inadequate care and nursing, for there were not at that time professional graduate female nurses connected with army hospitals, as was later the custom; nor were there committees of white women organized for the purpose of looking after the sick or families in distress among the refugees. The white families were too much divided in their political sympathies to engage in charitable work.

When the Indian expedition entered the Indian country in the spring of 1862, it found everywhere herds of cattle and horses running on the range, and on its withdrawal, of the Indian families that left their homes, nearly every one brought out one or more ponies, which they clung to tenaciously and took back with them on their return, and which would be of great assistance in tending their crops and visiting relations and friends of the Indian command.

There had not been destruction of houses and fences in the Indian country like there had been in the western counties of Western Missouri where the troops might march a day on some of the main roads without seeing a house or fence standing, where they saw only standing chimneys to mark the places where the houses had been burned.

Near Webber's Falls, twenty-five miles below Fort Gibson on the Arkansas River, there was a good ford at which a Southern force could cross for a raid into the northern part of the Cherokee Nation, and in order to keep advised of any hostile movement in that direction Colonel Phillips, on leaving Dutch Mills, ordered Major

Foreman, with three hundred mounted men of the Third Indian Regiment, to make a thorough reconnaissance of that region and rejoin the main command at Parkhill, where further movements would be decided upon.

During this reconnaissance the Major came up with and had a skirmish with a force of Southern Indians of General Cooper's command, and in the action near the mouth of Illinois River six of the enemy were slain, including one captain and one sergeant, and he captured several men who were terribly frightened, for they expected to be killed in retaliation for the killing of six loyal Indians recently near Parkhill by Southern men in Federal uniform. The troops of the reconnaissance also captured and brought in about three hundred head of cattle, most of which were in fair condition for beef, and would be an important acquisition to the commissary department of the command.

It was known that the Indians in that part of the Cherokee Nation had not suffered as much in losses of property as those living in the northern part. Those who had espoused the Southern cause had lost very little of their live stock, as cattle and horses and food supplies, and nearly all the Southern Indian families were still living in their homes except the men who were with Colonel Watie.

There was increasing evidence that the force at Fayetteville under Colonel Harrison would soon have all it could do to maintain its position there. A reconnoitering party of about fifty men of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, on returning to the Indian command from near that place, reported that it came near meeting a Confederate scout of one hundred and fifty men from Colonel Carroll's regiment encamped near Van Buren. So near were the hostile forces to each other that the Federal detachment captured one of the Confederates and brought him a prisoner into camp. The information he was able to give did not indicate that Colonel Carroll had lately been re-enforced, but that he would soon move his command north of the mountains

and endeavor to cut off Colonel Harrison's communication with Cassville and Springfield, and make his position at Fayetteville untenable.

Several days before marching with his main force from Parkhill to Fort Gibson, Colonel Phillips sent forward a battalion of the Second Indian Regiment and one company of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry to thoroughly reconnoiter the position and develop the strength of the enemy there and in that vicinity. On nearing the post the commanding officer of the detachment ascertained that there was a company of Colonel Watie's Cherokee regiment there, and at once made preparations to charge them, which he did with resolution and with the war whoop. It was all over in a few minutes, and the enemy put to flight with the loss of five killed and wounded and with as many prisoners, while the remainder of the force was pursued and hemmed in at the mouth of Grand River and obliged to plunge into the Arkansas and swim to the south side to save themselves from capture.

This operation accomplished, there was now no enemy north of the Arkansas River, and on the morning of the 13th, the troops, baggage trains and artillery of the Indian command, and perhaps most of the refugee Indians from Neosho, marched from Parkhill eighteen miles southwest to Fort Gibson, which had been the objective of the Federal forces operating in the Indian country for more than a year; for it was considered the key to all that section, in a military sense, by officers of the army who had been stationed there.

Fort Gibson was established as a military post in 1830. It had quarters for officers and men for two companies; it was on the east side of Grand River, three miles above its junction with the Arkansas; it had never been fortified except in the construction of two block houses, which were in a state of decay and practically useless as a defense against modern artillery. The position was naturally a

strong one with even temporary earthworks thrown up. There was no point as high as the bluff that overlooked Grand River that flowed at its foot, within a mile or so, from which an enemy could use artillery to advantage. The new Government buildings for quartermaster and commissary stores were of stone and covered with slate and stood on the bluff about seventy-five feet above the river. They were very useful to the Indian command in storing quartermaster and commissary supplies brought down in wagon trains from Fort Scott.

From the roofs of the stone buildings one could see on looking to the east, some ten miles off, in bold outlines, the range of hills which were the western terminus of the Ozark Mountains. Turning to the south and overlooking the Arkansas River, three miles distant, the eyes rested upon the opposite heights and the prairie beyond, and turning to the west and southwest, were presented to the view the western heights of Grand River, a mile and a half to two miles away. Farther to the southwest could be seen a prairie region with a strip of timber, green with the spring foliage, running through it in a southeast direction. This ribbon-like strip of timber marked the course of the Verdigris River, which emptied into the Arkansas five or six miles above the mouth of Grand River, and at that season of the year with the young grass of the prairies and the tender foliage of the trees in the distance, made the scene one of great beauty to the lover of nature. A notable feature of the timber was the mistletoe growing on the elms which many of the white soldiers had not seen before; it was a parasitic evergreen rarely seen growing on trees north of that latitude; but it was frequently brought north to Missouri to decorate rooms during Christmas times; it had a small berry on it of a viscid taste. There was another feature of that section not seen as far north as Missouri and Kansas, and that was canebrakes along the streams, which enabled cattle and ponies to live on the cane during the winter without other provender.

This cane along the streams and the fine wild grass on the prairies and uplands enabled the Indians to raise large numbers of cattle and ponies at a very small cost, and the armies of both sides operating in the Indian country during the war supplied themselves with beef, for which the Indians were never fully paid.

The junction of the three rivers within a few miles of each other had made Fort Gibson a central point from the fact it was the head of navigation of the Arkansas and its tributaries, and enjoyed quite a trade up to the war, supplying the Indians such goods and trinkets as they required.

Although it required a rise of four or five feet in the Arkansas to allow light draft steamers to pass Webber's Falls, that rise came every season and the Government took advantage of it to bring up the river on steamboats supplies for the troops at the fort and goods for distribution to the Indians to the west and southwest.

The officers' and soldiers' quarters were one story wooden structures built on a plazza or square similar to court house squares of county seat towns. The interiors of the buildings were well finished and in good condition, but the outsides were beginning to look old and the need of paint. A few days after the arrival of the Indian command at Fort Gibson, a day was given over to festivities in celebrating the event by raising the Stars and Stripes to their old place on the flagstaff from where they had been hauled down by the Confederates early in the war, and to which place they were to come down no more by enemy hands. The programme included speeches by Colonel Phillips and several prominent men of the Cherokees and Creeks who were present, and the firing of a national salute by the battery. There was a large crowd of Indians, old and young, at the exercises, who manifested a deep interest in the proceedings. They seemed to appreciate the event as their day of triumph.

In his speech Colonel Phillips referred briefly to the humane policy of the Government in dealing with the Indians, and of its determination to fulfill its covenants with them in a liberal spirit; that the National Flag, the emblem of National Unity, Liberty and Justice, was raised to its proper place on the flagstaff, as he hoped, to be hauled down no more by enemy hands; that if the Indian soldiers and their families at their homes in different parts of their country would keep in close touch with each other, they might advise him of enemy movements in time to enable him to meet them and defeat their purpose of robbery, pillage and murder; that the enemy south of the Arkansas River were already beginning to show signs of activity, and that he had no doubt but that he and his troops during the spring and summer would be fully employed in holding that position; that there must be loyal co-operation between all his forces; that each individual must do his part without considering it a hardship, and that in a few days he would commence the construction of fortifications, which, when finished, would make the place impregnable to any force likely to be brought against it; and that under the conditions then existing, he had a force sufficient to defend it, which meant holding the Indian country north of the Arkansas River.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis Downing, of the Third Indian Regiment and former Chief of the Cherokees, and Colonel William P Ross, a brother of Chief John Ross, were present and spoke briefly and appreciatively in behalf of the Indians and of the efforts of the Government to safe-guard their interests and welfare, and promised loyal co-operation in all movements to that end.

The leaders of the Creeks spoke in their native language, but interpreters stated that their words were expressive of confidence and devotion to the Government, and that it would use its power for the protection of their

rights, interests and welfare, that the future looked more promising to them than at any time since the beginning of the war.

There was no band with the Indian command, but the Star Spangled Banner and other national airs, were sung by an improvised choir of about a dozen ladies and gentlemen, some of the ladies being wives of officers on a visit to their husbands in the Indian Brigade; the solos and other features of the music were real treats to the white and Indian soldiers present.

It was a beautiful spring day, and the only thing to mar the proceedings was a serious accident that occurred while Major Hopkins' Battery was firing a National Salute of thirty-four guns. One of the pieces just after it had been fired and swabbed and the blank cartridge rammed home, went off accidentally before the rammer was withdrawn and still in hands of the gunner, blowing off one of his arms above the elbow, and almost tearing off the other hand. He was for an instant enveloped in a flame of fire and smoke, and badly burned about the body, and finally died from his injuries.

A day or two after the arrival of the Indian command at Fort Gibson the construction and completion of bake ovens was effected, which satisfied the Indians that the occupation of the place was to be of a permanent character, and that it was to be the headquarters of the Federal forces operating in the Indian country They were much gratified to be informed that there was no intention of the Government to withdraw the white troops from their country

There were several men of the contingent of white troops who had been engaged in the bakery business before their enlistment and a sufficient number of them were detailed to operate the bakery, which would be able to furnish the troops better bread than they had been having. It was considered healthier for the men and more

economical in the use of flour than the bread made by company cooks. There would at least be uniformity in the bread furnished the troops, and inspectors to look after its proper production and the sanitary conditions of the bakery .

The health and comfort of his troops and the sanitary condition of their camps would not be neglected by an intelligent commander who counted on their efficiency in his field of operations, and make or mar his reputation. Every commander was held responsible for the good or bad conduct of his men.

The command had barely settled down in its new position when, on account of rumors afloat concerning Confederate activities, it began to feel anxiety about the safety of its commissary train due from Fort Scott with instructions to join it at Parkhill, and in order to be correctly advised of its position and cause of delay, a detachment of sixty Indian and white soldiers was sent out north in the direction of Maysville, to meet it and re-enforce the escort. After waiting two or three days and not hearing from the detachment sent out or the train, Colonel Phillips ordered out a force of two hundred Indians and white soldiers to proceed north and northeast in the direction of Maysville until definite information was obtained in regard to the train of one hundred and twenty-five wagons loaded with commissary supplies, and the cause of its delay.

The troops sent out to meet the train and re-enforce the escort found that the delay had been due to its having been sent down by way of Neosho, Missouri, instead of by way of Baxter Springs on the Military Road on the west side of Grand River, a route that would have made it comparatively free from attack and shortened the distance at least fifty miles.

The arrival of the train was hailed with delight by the troops. They realized that any mishap to it would have been disastrous to their operations in that region,

and to the Union cause among the Indians. It was at once unloaded and the supplies stored in the two large stone buildings on the bluff; it was estimated that it brought down sufficient commissary supplies to last the troops for a month; but as Colonel Phillips had been obliged to feed the non-combatant Indians with his command and constantly coming in, he was short on the bread ration for his troops before the arrival of another train. He had accumulated some supplies for his men before leaving Arkansas, but they were soon exhausted on account of dividing his rations among the non-combatant Indians constantly near his command. He realized that he had a difficult problem on his hands to keep his lines of communication open and to bring down from Fort Scott supplies for his troops in the face of the increasingly threatening attitude of the Confederate forces of Generals Steele and Cooper south of the Arkansas River; the pressure upon his commissaries for rations for the non-combatant Indians might be relieved to some extent by the Indian women in different parts of their country raising garden stuff and gathering wild berries and fruits, and bringing them in and exchanging them with the soldiers for a part of their rations. It was not an unusual sight that spring to see in the camps of the soldiers Indian women with little sacks of wortleberries brought in on their ponies from a distance of thirty to forty miles, for exchange for some part of the regular food ration. His considerate care for the welfare of the non-combatant Indians spread into the hostile territory, and a few days after the arrival of his command at Fort Gibson, a flag of truce came in from the Creek Indians who had been identified with those who had espoused the Confederate cause, wishing to know on what terms they would be received; that they were desirous of renewing their allegiance to the Government, and that some of their able bodied men wished to enlist into the Federal service.

Their spokesman made a nice little speech, which was interpreted by one of their number who could speak English, to the Federal officers present. He went on to state that from the beginning of the war a majority of the Creek people had been opposed to breaking treaty relations with the Government; that their country was early occupied by a large force of Texas troops and under pressure of threats and promises of the Confederate authorities, and the withdrawal of the Federal forces from the Indian country, they had reluctantly submitted to the advice of their leaders; but that the promises of their protection and the abiding interest in their welfare had not been kept, which they considered relieved them from the situation that had been imposed upon them, a situation that was daily increasing their distress, and endangering the lives of their people.

In reply Colonel Phillips stated that they could on their return inform their friends that the Government was not disposed to exercise vengeance against those who had under pressure of threats and promises of the Confederate authorities, submitted to the new regime; that those who wished to return to their allegiance to the Government and to renew friendly relations with any of their friends in his command could do so without any fear of punishment or ill treatment so long as they observed good faith and honor in the changed relations; that it was the purpose of the Government to re-establish peace and tranquillity among the Indians, instead of arousing animosities and setting them at each others throats.

In less than a week more than one hundred Creeks and Seminoles came into Fort Gibson, many of them enlisting at once in the First and Second Indian Regiments, which had been in service nearly a year and were able to accept quite a number of recruits to fill their ranks.

Within a week after the Indian command arrived at Fort Gibson, under the instructions of Colonel Phillips, the engineers commenced surveying the ground and making

plans for the construction of fortifications at that place. The line of earthworks to be thrown up extended from the river north of the stone buildings on the bluff, east about a quarter of a mile, thence south nearly half a mile, thence west to the river, inclosing an area of about fifteen acres, which, in the event of a siege, would enable him to bring all his troops within the fortified position.

In the plans there were angles, facings and emplacements for his artillery to sweep the ground on all fronts, details were made from all the troops, Indian and white, to work on the fortifications, with instructions for each detail to bring with it picks and shovels, and under the guidance of several officers, the men were set to work making the dirt fly along the line laid out.

The weather was getting warm and neither Indian nor white soldiers coveted such work; but they were able to see the necessity of being prepared for an emergency, and few complaints were heard from the three or four hundred men employed every day. Rapid progress was made and in the course of a week fortifications were thrown up that could have been used to great advantage in an attack, which, however, was not immediately apprehended.

The fortified position had the advantage that the troops within it could not be cut off from their water supply, for Grand River ran close to the foot of the bluff on the west side, where three or four ferries were kept for crossing and recrossing the trains and the forces operating on the west side of the river when desirable.

There were times when fully one-half of the troops of the Indian command were absent from that station escorting trains and making reconnaissance to parts of the Indian country where Confederate forces were reported to be operating, and if an attack should be made on the place in the absence of their comrades, the fortifications could be used in repelling it, by those left in camp, probably never less than five or six hundred fighting men and at least one section of the battery.

Having received information that Colonel Phillips had moved into the Cherokee Nation with the Indian command, and that Colonel Harrison was preparing to re-enforce him with the Federal force at Fayetteville, General Cabell took the effective mounted force of his command encamped on the Arkansas River below Van Buren and two pieces of artillery, estimated at two thousand men, and marched north over the Mulberry and Frog Bayou Road to attack the Federal force at Fayetteville.

In approaching the town he captured the Federal pickets and several other Federal soldiers who were away from camp, and commenced the attack at daylight, on the 18th, and after nearly four hours heavy fighting was repulsed and driven off with severe loss in killed, wounded and captured. Federal losses in the action, 5 killed and 17 wounded, Confederate losses, 20 killed, 30 wounded and 20 missing.

On hearing of Colonel Harrison's success a few days later, in defeating and driving off the Confederates, the troops of the Indian command were congratulating themselves that he would probably be able to hold his position there, which would be to their great advantage; but in less than a week they received information that he had evacuated Fayetteville and retired to Cassville, Missouri, fifty miles northeast, bringing keen disappointment, for by this movement General Cabell could use his forces in co-operation with General Steele against Colonel Phillips and make it more difficult for him to hold his position at Fort Gibson.

The Confederate detachments operating north of the Arkansas River having been swept away by the Indian command before its occupation, General Cooper, commanding the Confederate forces in the field south of the river, was anxious to ascertain the strength and intentions of the forces opposing him, whether their occupation of Fort Gibson was intended to be only temporary or permanent;

and in order that he might be reliably informed on these points, sent a spy, a young man about twenty years old, into Colonel Phillips' camp for that purpose, dressed as a woman. He was inexperienced in the business he had undertaken; his movements were suspicious and attracted the attention of the Indians who watched him closely until they were satisfied that he was a young man disguised as a woman, and then reported the matter to the Provost Marshal, who ordered him arrested.

In his examination he was badly frightened; he admitted his disguise as a woman; he realized that his situation was a serious one; when the Indians first saw him they thought he was a white woman near the limits of the camp, and yet there were no white women with the command; on approaching him he started in flight, but was soon overtaken; in his fright, the information he was able to give of enemy movements may have saved his life.

A proclamation fell into the hands of Colonel Phillips announcing that the Cherokee Legislature representing the faction of the Cherokees that had espoused the cause of the Confederacy would meet at Webber's Falls on the 25th for the transaction of legislative business, and other information received stated that Colonel Watie's regiment would be there during the session for its protection.

The night before the Federal attack there was a meeting of the leaders of the Southern faction of the Cherokees at Webber's Falls for a preliminary discussion of the questions which were to be submitted to the legislative council the next day for consideration, and among these was the election of a Principal Chief of the Cherokees, and the Military Situation.

On motion of one of the leaders, Colonel Watie was made chairman by acclamation, and requested to state the purpose for which the meeting was called, and to make any other remarks he might consider pertinent to the situation. The Colonel gracefully accepted the honor of being

selected to preside over the deliberations of the meeting, and cordially thanked those present for the compliment. He then said in substance: "Leaders and Councilors of the Cherokee People: This meeting has been called for the purpose of talking over the questions to be submitted to the legislative council tomorrow, the most important of which are the election of principal chief, and the military situation. You know I am a candidate for principal chief and will be satisfied to leave that matter in the hands of my friends. The old chief, John Ross, you know, has gone over to the enemy after pledging his allegiance to the South, and is now living in the North with the Yankees, and is recognized by them as an abolitionist in full fellowship.

"In regard to the military situation, I can speak of it only with a heavy heart, for evil times have come upon our country. Many of our people have fled from their homes and living among the Indians south of us, and some in Texas, homeless and destitute. The Confederates in the Indian country and in Western Arkansas have had no substantial success since the Federal forces invaded and occupied our country last summer, and recently they have occupied Fort Gibson with several thousand Indians and a contingent of white soldiers, and, we are informed, with the determination of making the occupation permanent, having commenced fortifying it. Disaster upon disaster has followed the Confederate arms in the Cherokee country and near its borders, commencing with the battle of Pea Ridge, then Locust Grove, Newtonia, Old Fort Wayne, Cane Hill, Prairie Grove, Van Buren, and recently as I have stated, the Federal occupation of Fort Gibson. These reverses and disasters following each other in rapid succession without any important successes to our credit are very depressing to all of us, and discouraging and lower the morale of our troops everywhere, particularly those operating in the Indian country. And I know it is distress-

ing to everyone here to realize that we shall be obliged to hold our legislative council outside the limits of our own country. I am informed by higher Confederate authorities that the Confederate forces operating in the Indian country will not likely be materially strengthened until the larger Federal forces under General Grant operating against Vicksburg shall determine the fate of that strong position. We hope that the Confederate commanders will be able to defeat and drive back the Federal forces of Grant and throw a powerful Confederate army into Arkansas under aggressive leaders, and thus relieve our present uncertain situation. But we must remember that the Federal forces of Missouri, Arkansas and Kansas have been heavily drawn upon to strengthen the forces operating against Vicksburg, and that we should be able very soon, with the assistance of the Texas regiments we have had with us, and General Cabell's brigade in Western Arkansas, to attack and capture or drive out the Federal force of Indians and small contingent of white soldiers occupying Fort Gibson, or capture or destroy their supply trains and starve them into surrendering by making their position untenable. General Steele, commanding the Department of the Indian Territory, and General Cooper, commanding the Confederate forces in the field, are collecting supplies at Northfork, Perryville and Boggy Depot, and reorganizing our forces for a vigorous campaign. These forces will be largely superior in number to the Federal forces occupying Fort Gibson, and we must arouse ourselves in the determination to attack, capture or destroy, or by interrupting their communication with the North and cutting off their supplies, starve them into surrendering. Our successful operations in this region would hearten the Confederate forces in other quarters. I believe that the time is near at hand when the tide of success is due to return to the Confederate arms when we shall be able to drive the Federal forces out of our country which will

enable our people, many now exiles, to return to their country."

Colonel Phillips determined to prevent the meeting of the legislative body, and on the evening of the 24th, took six hundred men from the three Indian regiments and the Battalion of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, and crossed the Arkansas River four or five miles below Fort Gibson, and making a night march of nearly thirty miles down on the south side, struck the Confederate force at the Falls early Saturday morning, routing them and taking their camp equipage and some prisoners.

Coming at daybreak, the attack was a surprise, and some of Colonel Watie's men did not have time to dress for the occasion; they fled in the direction of Fort Smith and Northfork, leaving their camp and supplies to fall into the hands of the Federal forces, firing only a few minutes and making only feeble efforts to rally. They were pursued only a short distance, for the worn condition of the men and animals of the expedition during the strenuous night march, made it impracticable to continue the pursuit further, besides the Arkansas was rising and was even then at the danger point for fording at Webber's Falls, coming up well on the sides of the horses of the command when it crossed to the north side. In this short decisive action there were fifteen of the Southern Indians slain, including two captains, and as many wounded; the Federal loss was two killed and ten wounded. The captured camp equipage and supplies were destroyed, for it was impossible to bring them away on account of the swollen condition of the river and the want of transportation.

The most serious loss on the Federal side was the assassination of Dr. Rufus Gilpatrick, an agent of the Government in an advisory capacity, who accompanied the Indian command to look after the interests of the Indians in the occupied territory, and whose advice was considered

indispensable by the commander in the administration of the affairs of the Indians of that region. After the action was over he was called upon by an Indian woman to dress the wound of an Indian soldier who had fallen a hundred yards or so from where the pursuit ended, and while performing that service he was shot by a party of Southern Indians who came out of the cane. His remains were brought back by the expedition and buried at Fort Gibson with military honors. He had been identified with the Free State men in Kansas prior to the war, and was well known to the leaders of that party as one of its most active and useful members.

After crossing to the north side of the Arkansas at Webber's Falls, Colonel Phillips marched in the direction of Evansville on the Arkansas line where his scouts reported there was a Confederate force of one thousand men under General Cabell, but which, on hearing of the result of the action at Webber's Falls and the approach of eight hundred men and a section of artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel F W Schaurte of the Second Indian Regiment from Fort Gibson, hastily retreated to Fort Smith without risking an engagement.

No information had as yet been received of the evacuation of Fayetteville by Colonel Harrison, and his cooperation in the movement had for its object the pursuit of the Confederate force to Fort Smith and Van Buren to prevent the reorganization of the Southern forces which Generals Steele and Cabell were endeavoring to effect. The retirement of Colonel Harrison to Cassville left the line of communication of the Indian command exposed to raids from the enemy on the east for nearly a hundred miles north.

In the absence of Colonel Phillips two Confederate officers came into Fort Gibson under a flag of truce from General Cooper in regard to an exchange of prisoners, the numbers of which did not exceed a hundred or so held by

either side. The officers were kept to their quarters until the Colonel's arrival, and when their mission was finished, they were conducted blindfolded to the limits of the camp, and then furnished an escort to their lines and treated with the courtesies due them in their official capacity as commissioners.

The evacuation of Fayetteville by Colonel Harrison was a disappointment to Colonel Phillips, for there was an understanding that there would be loyal co-operation of the forces there with the Indian command in the operations in western Arkansas and in the Indian country, and wishing to know whether there would be any Federal forces operating in Northwestern Arkansas in the near future, he sent a Sergeant and eight men of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, with dispatches for Colonel Harrison at Cassville, and the Department commander at St. Louis, with instructions to bring back all dispatches and mail for the Indian command, that had been forwarded via Fayetteville. This party of dispatch bearers was absent from Fort Gibson nearly two weeks, being obliged to wait at Cassville, after delivering to the Post Commander the dispatches and mail brought up, for several days, for dispatches from Springfield, which were delivered to headquarters of the Indian command on the 14th of May, with a verbal report of observations in the territory passed over, which described the political situation in the northeastern part of the Cherokee Nation at that time. It brought back information that was of some interest to the Indian command. It disclosed to the commander that Southwest Missouri was occupied by Federal forces that should be able to afford protection to his line of communication as far south as the Neosho River; that Colonel Harrison was at Cassville with the First Arkansas Cavalry and part of the First Arkansas Infantry; that Lieutenant-Colonel T. T. Crittenden was stationed at Newtonia with eight companies of the Seventh Missouri State Militia Cavalry, and that Major Milton Burch was

at Neosho with a battalion of four companies of the Eighth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, and that these different commands were well mounted, and armed, under energetic officers who were daily scouting the country in every direction and hunting down any guerrilla bands venturing to come within the sphere of their operations.

Lieutenant John R. Kelso of Major Burch's command at Neosho, was known in Southwest Missouri as one of the most fearless and successful fighters of Southern bandits to be found in all that region. He did not hesitate to take two or three to half a dozen men and start out afoot at night and seek the bandits in their dens in the hills and engage them in hand to hand conflicts. He was without fear and a genius in many respects and like a tiger in his war-like activities. The stories of his fearless operations against Southern bandits were familiar to nearly every family in Southwest Missouri.

In its march of more than two hundred and fifty miles, the party of dispatch bearers passed over a good deal of desolate country, country in which many of the houses were unoccupied fields untilled and growing up in grass and weeds, and roads dim and unused and washed out in many places; it found that very few of the Indian families had returned to their homes, and those that had returned had not heard of an enemy in that section for some time. A day's march was sometimes made without seeing any Indians about their homes or in the fields.

There being no Federal force holding a position in Western Arkansas, or in the larger area of the Cherokee Nation east of Grand River and north of Fort Gibson, since Colonel Harrison's retirement to Cassville, made it a region over which the Confederate forces could march almost at will and be a constant menace to the supply trains of the Indian command coming down from Fort Scott.

CHAPTER XIII

KEEPING THE BREAD LINE OPEN

The last train from the north brought down clothing, arms and ammunition for the Indian command, which were issued to the men on the approved requisitions of the regimental and battalion commanders. There was a marked difference in appearance between the Indian and white soldiers when dressed in the new uniform. What was known at that time as the "Hancock Hat" was issued to the Indian soldiers, while the white soldiers generally wore the regulation cap. The Indian mounts were nearly all ponies. Care was not taken to see to it that the clothing issued to the Indian soldiers fitted them properly. The pants legs were frequently too short or too long, and the coat rarely ever fitted as a white soldier would have insisted that it should, giving the Indian soldiers a comical appearance, mounted on their ponies with badly fitted clothing, and wearing "Hancock Hats," with their long black hair falling over their shoulders, and legs astride their mounts coning down near the ground.

But the comical appearance of the Indian soldiers did not prevent them from shooting straight when skirmishing with the foe and he was within the range of their long-barrel rifles. They were in their element when they were able to engage the enemy in the brush and timber where they could screen themselves behind trees and logs and take deliberate aim.

On the first of May, after issuing the new clothing to the troops, Colonel Phillips held a review of the Indian command at Fort Gibson on the sloping ground southeast of the fortifications on the bluff, and while the Indian soldiers in passing the reviewing stand did not exhibit that precision of movement, step and alignment seen in regular soldiers, they acquitted themselves well and showed by their enthusiasm that they were an effective fighting force

under good control; it also showed that the successful operations in which they had participated strengthened their confidence in the Government and its power to aid them. There were more than 2,000 men in line in the review.

After the review the program included an address by Colonel Phillips, which was arranged for the troops to hear. In his address he briefly reviewed the operations of the Indian Brigade since it had become an independent command under his guidance. He stated he had successfully led his troops to Fort Gibson, which was the objective of the campaign until large re-enforcements arrived to carry operations south of the Arkansas River; that the time of arrival of the re-enforcements might depend upon the success of military operations elsewhere, but that he did not believe General Blunt, commanding the Department of Kansas, which included the Indian Territory, would allow the Indian command to be imperiled; that he was giving it close attention; that the evacuation of Fayetteville by Colonel Harrison was making it more difficult to hold Fort Gibson, since the enemy were occupying Western Arkansas, and preparing to send raiding forces north through the Cherokee Nation to menace his trains coming down from the north; that the Confederate Indian and Texas forces of Generals Steele and Cooper had reorganized and moved up to within five or six miles of his position, and that some of their movements could be seen from the roof of the buildings on the bluff, while picket firing between the opposing pickets was of daily occurrence over the Arkansas River, as they all knew and could sometimes hear from the camp.

He also endeavored to impress upon the people and the soldiers the importance of exercising the greatest vigilance to prevent surprise by the enemy, which might imperil the safety of the command; that hitherto his troops had been doing all the striking, but in the future they should be

prepared for receiving return blows which might fall at almost any moment all of which was received with expressions of approval.

There was heavy timber on both sides of the Arkansas below the mouth of Grand River, and many fallen trees which afforded good protection to the pickets of both sides, very few of whom exposed themselves to the point blank range of the rifles then in use. The river was fully half a mile wide from bank to bank, and the Sharp's carbines of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, the best cavalry arm then in use, even with raised sight, was not always effective at that distance.

In some instances the pickets of each side came down to the water's edge of the river and took deliberate aim at each other, which resulted in some casualties. Later the pickets communicated with each other and declared a truce and came down to the river and talked with each other from a sandbar to the opposite shore; they then went in swimming, each party keeping to their own side of the river, near enough, however, on several occasions for the Confederates to exchange tobacco with the Federal soldiers for coffee, which was not then issued to the Confederate forces in the west. Several substitutes, however, were used in the Confederate army and by the Southern people.

When the firing of the Confederate pickets and outposts along the Arkansas River was unusually heavy in the Federal front, as if preparations were being made to cross the river, it was interpreted by the Federal commander as a demonstration to occupy his attention while Confederate forces were crossing the river above and below Fort Gibson and marching north to attack and capture the Federal supply train coming down from Fort Scott on the old Military Road.

From the best information obtainable, Colonel Phillips was led to believe that General Cooper had in his front a force of about five thousand Texans and Indians, and

two batteries, which made his strength superior to that of the Indian command, and being very mobile would enable him to use it effectively in making the Federal position at Fort Gibson untenable by interrupting its communication with the north.

In holding Fort Gibson Colonel Phillips had not only this large force of Generals Steele and Cooper in his front to reckon with, but he also had the force of General Cabell of not less than two or three thousand men and a battery of light artillery, in Western Arkansas, who was not embarrassed by a large river to cross, to menace his flank on the east. General Cabell's command was mounted and could easily strike the Federal train escort in a day and night's march.

When these conditions were beginning to develop, Colonel Phillips determined to make every effort to hasten his supply trains from the north to bring down from a month to six weeks' supplies for his troops and store them in the Government buildings inside of the fortifications, which would enable him to stand a siege for at least a month, by which time he would have re-enforcements sufficient to drive the enemy from his front and flanks.

He felt confident that with his fortifications nearly complete, and conditions did not require him to furnish large details of his troops for escort duty to trains, he could hold the place against more than ten thousand of the enemy; but to do so and save his stock he would be obliged to keep the Southern forces off a distance of at least five or six miles in order to allow the public animals of his command to graze on the range, which they were doing every day by being sent out every morning under strong guards.

Scouts sent out to watch the movements of the enemy reported considerable activity in their camp on the 16th, and observers on the roof of the Government building on the bluff reported clouds of dust from mounted troops marching on the roads near the Confederate camp south

of Fort Gibson, showing that General Cooper was engaged in a movement that had for its object the capture of the Federal supply train, due in a few days, or an attack on the Indian command at Fort Gibson, or a demonstration against it that would prevent it from re-enforcing the escort to the train.

On the 18th a force of four hundred mounted men were sent out from Fort Gibson on a reconnaissance in the direction of the Creek Agency, south of the Arkansas River, to ascertain the movements of the enemy in that quarter, and captured and brought in sixty head of horses and mules from General Cooper's command, and information derived from a prisoner and friendly Creeks was to the effect that General Cooper was preparing a heavy force to march up on the west side of Grand River to capture the Federal supply train which he had ascertained was coming down from the north.

There was considerable maneuvering on both sides; General Cooper desired by making a strong demonstration against Fort Gibson to compel Colonel Phillips to hold his forces there for the defense of that place and prevent him from re-inforcing his troops guarding his supply trains. He also ordered a section of his artillery, supported by troops, to the south bank of the river below Fort Gibson, to shell the Federal outposts guarding the fords, and maneuvered to create the impression that he was preparing to cross the river to attack the Federal forces in their position at Fort Gibson, while at the same time he was sending a larger force from five regiments of Texans and Indians to cross the river near Webber's Falls march up on the north side and attack Colonel Phillips' left flank, hoping by a rapid movement and night march to take the Federal forces by surprise.

In sending out the stock to graze every morning, it had been necessary to drive the herds a little further from camp each day in order to get better grass than that

which had been grazed over the day before, until they were being driven out a distance of about three miles, so that the enemy, by capturing and killing the pickets on the roads on which they were approaching, were able to raid and capture some of the herds before the herders knew of the presence of a hostile force. As there were shots fired between the pickets and herders and the enemy, the alarm was at once given to the other herders to drive their herds back to camp, and the pickets who had not been captured hurried in to give the alarm and report the situation to headquarters so that re-inforcement might be immediately sent to the assistance of the pickets and herders not captured.

The presence of the enemy within two or three miles of the fort, and his probable advance to make an immediate attack, rapidly spread throughout the camp and caused a good deal of excitement among the soldiers and people. On the arrival of the pickets and herders who had not been cut off by the enemy, the bugles sounded the alarm and the troops at the fort were under arms in a few moments, but mostly dismounted, for their horses had been sent out with the herds early that morning.

Colonel Phillips directed Majors Foreman, Wright and Pomeroy and Captain Lucas, Sixth Kansas Cavalry, to take the men that could be mounted at the post and move out at once to check the advance of the enemy, and if possible, recapture some of the stock that had been driven off. After passing the open ground for nearly a mile east of the post, this Federal mounted force came in sight of the enemy, who were forming in line in the timber on the western slope of the mountain.

The hostile forces were now face to face with each other, and a brisk fire was opened by the opposing lines, which developed the fact that the Confederates were preparing to turn the flanks of the Federal Cavalry, which compelled it to retire some distance, and it looked for a

time as if it might be driven back to the fortifications, or until it came within range of the artillery at the post.

In the meantime, however, a number of herds had been driven in to the post, and as fast as the troops could be mounted, they were sent forward to re-inforce those at the front, while the dismounted men were ordered out as infantry, well supplied with ammunition, and with a section of Captain Hopkins' Battery under Lieutenant Bassett, moved forward to the support of the cavalry under the immediate command of Colonel Phillips.

As he did not know the strength of the hostile force in his front, and to be ready for any contingency, he ordered everything inside of the fortification at the post. On arriving at the front and ascertaining from his skirmishers the position of the enemy he directed Lieutenant Bassett to open upon them with shell, which he did effectively, and with his cavalry re-inforced, he ordered an advance on his left, and with the assistance of his artillery, drove the enemy from their position in the timber and gradually pushed them back over the mountain, recapturing part of the stock that had been taken in the morning.

Most of the Confederate force was Choctaw and Chickasaw Indians, and when Lieutenant Bassett's section of the Battery got their range in the brush and timber, and landed a shell in their midst, killing and wounding half a dozen or more, the rest fled in a panic and could not be effectively rallied in the further operations of the day.

The Federal cavalry kept up the pursuit beyond Greenleaf Prairie, ten miles southeast of the post in the direction of Webber's Falls, frequently charging and keeping up an almost continuous fire, to which their rear was exposed, recapturing more of the stock which had been taken in the raid.

In the early part of the action Captain Lucas, Sixth Kansas and Captain Anderson, Third Indian Regiment, were nearly surrounded, but gallantly fought their way out

and participated in the operations to the close of the day, which were highly creditable to the Indian command and its commander in achieving a substantial success with the small loss of twenty killed and a few men wounded.

While Colonel Phillips was pursuing the retreating Confederates up the mountain, he received information that General Cooper had sent the captain of his battery of three guns down to the south bank of the Arkansas River opposite the Federal outpost on the north bank of the river, three miles south of Fort Gibson, and was heavily cannonading it to cover the crossing of a large infantry force which had been brought down, and which were designed to march up and attack the Federal troops left in the camp. This movement, however, was intended to attract the attention of the Federal commander and have him recall his troops in pursuit of the raiders.

In starting out to engage the enemy in the morning, Colonel Phillips had left Colonel Dole in command of six or seven hundred Indian soldiers, dismounted, and a section of Hopkins' Battery which moved inside of the fortifications, and he then believed that this force would be sufficient to defend the post against any force General Cooper would be able to bring over. He found, however, that the enemy troops he had been engaging were nearly all Indians, and that General Cooper was holding practically all the white troops, three or four Texas regiments, on the south side of the river, three or four miles from Fort Gibson, for some purpose, possibly to attack the force left in camp.

He therefore determined to leave his mounted force to continue the pursuit of the retreating enemy in the direction of Webber's Falls, and to take the two battalions of infantry and the section of artillery and march down to the river opposite to the position of the Confederate battery and open fire upon it and endeavor to develop the intentions of the Confederates, as they could be seen in considerable numbers.

After engaging the Confederate pieces for some time in the hope of dismounting them, they withdrew, and being convinced that General Cooper's movement at that point was a demonstration that had for its object the keeping of the Federal forces near their fortifications, which would give the Southern forces north of the river a wider range of operations, Colonel Phillips returned in the evening to Fort Gibson to prepare for more strenuous work if it should become necessary.

The next day after these operations the first part of the supply train and the Paymaster arrived from Fort Scott escorted by a force of seven or eight hundred Indian soldiers under Lieutenant Colonel Schauerte, Second Indian Regiment. Colonel Schauerte met the train at Baxter Springs and brought it through without meeting or hearing of any Confederate force sent out to attack it. The refugee train which had also been re-inforced, arrived safely from Tahlequah and Parkhill with sick and convalescent; some smallpox convalescent who had been left there were also brought in.

On the return of his expedition from the north side of the Arkansas to test the fighing spirit of the soldiers of the Indian Brigade at Fort Gibson, General Cooper held a council of war of the principal officers of his command to formulate plans for immediate future operations, a council at which the officers present would give their views in regard to the best methods of achieving success for the cause for which they were fighting and had so much at heart.

Colonel D. N. McIntosh, the senior officer in command of the expedition just returned, spoke briefly, and regretted that it had not accomplished all that he had hoped for, but stated that it had accomplished something worth while. It had crossed a large river barely fordable, surprised and killed or captured the enemy pickets, and approached within a mile of the enemy fortifications and

drew his fire, and drove back his attacking force until re-inforced by infantry and artillery, and that when obliged to retire, brought away upwards of a hundred head of captured horses and mules, sustaining only a small loss in killed and wounded.

When all had spoken who desired to speak, General Cooper addressed the council. He thanked them for their loyalty and devotion to the cause of the South; that by their heroic efforts and fortitude the Confederate armies of the East were everywhere successful and the Northern armies on the defensive; that his command was superior in strength to the Federal command at Fort Gibson; that his troops could probably take the place by assault, but that he considered that would entail too great a loss of life when by siege operations the same end could be accomplished; that General Cabell commanding the Confederate forces in Western Arkansas, was under instructions to co-operate with the commander of the Confederate forces in the Indian country, in all operations against the Federal troops occupying Fort Gibson, and would see to it that re-inforcements should not reach them through Western Arkansas or the eastern part of the Cherokee Nation; that the forces under his immediate command must be so disposed as to prevent Federal re-inforcements and supply trains for Fort Gibson from coming down on the west side of Grand River, and that with the loyal co-operation of his officers their efforts were certain to be crowned with success; that he was regularly and correctly advised by scouts and couriers from Major Livingston in the vicinity of Baxter Springs, of the movements of all supply trains and the strength of their escorts, from the time of their departure from Fort Scott until their arrival at Fort Gibson; that part of a train had just slipped into Fort Gibson under a strong escort, but that the main part of it was back several days drive, then probably at Cabin Creek, and that it was his purpose, and he had already made the order, for Colonel

Watie to take a mounted force of upwards of a thuosand men and cross the Arkansas near the mouth of the Verdigris and march north until he met the train, and then to attack and disperse the escort and capture or destroy the train.

The daily cannonading of the Federal picket stations on the north bank of the Arkansas below Fort Gibson by the Confederate artillery did not deceive Colonel Phillips as to its purpose. He was convinced it was intended to conceal other movements General Cooper had in progress relating to the capture or destruction of the approaching train. His scouts brought in information to Fort Gibson on the 22d, that a large Confederate force had crossed the Arkansas above the mouth of the Verdigris River marching north, leaving no doubt but that a tremendous effort was being made to capture the train.

On the 23d observers on the roof of the Government building on the bluff reported seeing clouds of dust, made by moving mounted troops, hanging over the roads in the vicinity of the Confederate camp south of the river, showing unusual activity, and scouts and Indian women who had been watching the movements of the Southern forces came into Fort Gibson and reported that General Cooper was sending out a large body of troops north of the Arkansas and east of Grand River to co-operate with the force sent north on the west side of that stream.

Believing that General Cooper's force in camp would be depleted to the danger point by the large forces he had sent out and was sending out, Colonel Phillips determined to make a strong feint at the Rocky Ford of the Arkansas, four or five miles below Fort Gibson, and for that purpose, Sunday afternoon of the 24th, took five hundred Indian and white soldiers and a section of Hopkins' Battery down to the river and opened fire with shot and shell from his two guns upon the Confederate picket station on the south side, and quickly sent the men on guard scurrying to shelter behind trees and logs. That ford was the nearest

point to the Confederate camp, which was about two miles south of it; the channel of the river at the ford was on the south side, and on the north side an extensive sand bar sloped down to the water's edge. After searching every square rod of ground with shot and shell for some distance above and below the ford for more than half an hour the Colonel at the head of his men marched down over the sand bar and entered the stream and when about midway with the water running up on the sides of his horses, halted for a short time, having left about one hundred and twenty men on the bar to watch out for the appearance of any Confederates who might have kept concealed until a favorable opportunity was presented for firing upon the head of the column.

While the troops were marching and counter-marching in the river and on the bar, there was a good deal of random firing on both sides, but the Confederates did not come near enough to the bank to get a view of the soldiers in the middle of the river, and their fire was ineffective; no damage was done.

Confederates who had posted themselves so that they could watch the movement of the troops, on seeing them advance to the middle of the river, hastened back to camp and reported that a crossing was being effected, which caused intense excitement and preparations to meet an immediate attack. Other messengers arrived in camp reported that the Federal force had not crossed the river, but was still maneuvering to test the strength of the outpost; General Cooper at once re-inforced it with all the troops he could spare.

Artillery firing at the ford all the afternoon was heard for a distance of fifteen to twenty miles, and when General Cooper recalled Old Fort Wayne, he was reminded that the Federal soldiers were capable of performing some very daring acts and might attempt to capture his camp

in the absence of most of his troops. He therefore made preparations to meet an attack at any moment, day or night.

The reconnaissance returned to the post at dark, and with everything inside the fortifications, Colonel Phillips took out that night nearly all his available mounted and dismounted men to meet and re-inforce the escort to the train, which he believed would be attacked that night or early the next morning.

After leaving Cabin Creek the escort and train made night marches, and stopped to feed and rest during the day, for the train could be defended during the night as well as during the day, a movement that might throw the enemy off his guard in locating it. The wagonmasters were instructed that if the enemy were sighted to drive the teams two abreast as far as the road would permit, to shorten the length of the train, which had about two hundred wagons in it and stretched out a distance of more than a mile, even by this formation.

There were about one thousand white and Indian soldiers in the force that Colonel Phillips marched out with from the post to re-inforce the escort to the train and he formed a junction with it about ten miles out on the Military Road, and found all moving along briskly in the stillness of the night with teams well closed up, without any excitement and apparently unconscious of the nearness of the enemy, but prepared for instant action should an attack be made. On marching out to meet the train his attention was called to fresh enemy trails where the prairie grass had been tramped down by horses feet, showing that the Confederates were somewhere near the road in position ready to make the attack on the approach of the train, which their scouts had been eagerly watching for since the early part of the night. From information brought him by his scouts the Colonel was convinced that there was a Confederate force on each side of the road,

and that an attack would certainly be made before daylight, and as the road was over open prairie to within three or four miles of Fort Gibson, and in places less than a mile from the timber on Grand River on his left, he exercised caution to guard against a surprise. He directed that his troops be distributed so as to march on each side of the moving train, with strong advance and rear guards with skirmishers kept out half a mile on each side of the road, with instructions to fire signals on sighting the enemy.

Even with this precaution it was possible for the Confederates to wait concealed behind the crest of a ridge in the prairie until the skirmishers were almost upon them, within rifle range of them, but in this order the train and escort moved on until about an hour before day-break, when approaching the timber on Grand River, about five miles northwest of the post, the report of a rifle shot was heard above the rumbling of the wagons, by the marching troops in the direction of the skirmishers on the right, and in another moment the reports of several shots, when the skirmishers fell back upon the advance and main column, and reported the enemy advancing in heavy force.

The teams were moving two abreast where it was practicable, and the troops so disposed as to keep the road opened and to meet the attack without confusion. There were ridges in the prairie, and the advancing Confederates passing the sky-lines made good targets for the Federal soldiers who were on lower ground enveloped in darkness. Part of the Federal troops were dismounted and fought as infantry, and on seeing an advancing line of Confederates, fell upon the ground and could not be seen by the foe until the flashes from their rifles disclosed their positions.

A volley from three or four hundred troops lying down in line a distance of three or four hundred yards and watching every movement of the advancing foe until the order was given to fire, would likely break the line of well drilled troops, and broke the line of the enemy every time they advanced against the Federal soldiers that morning, formed in that manner.

The mounted troops defending the train also acted in a gallant manner. They stood with their backs to the train, and when the Confederates advanced within range of their rifles and carbines, delivered their fire and kept it up until the enemy turned, and then pursued them until they disappeared in the darkness behind intervening ridges.

Having defeated every effort of the enemy to break any part of his line after nearly an hour's fighting, Colonel Phillips determined to take the offensive, and ordered his mounted troops to charge, which they did in fine style, routing the Confederates and pursuing them almost to the Verdigris River, without the loss of a single wagon and team of the train, and with the loss of only one sutler wagon load of goods, the team having fallen far in the rear, and through fright of the teamster, was abandoned and found by the enemy and the goods taken.

The train and the part of the escort which had not engaged in the pursuit of the enemy arrived at the post on the west side of Grand River at sunrise and were ferried over during the day, ending the suspense and anxiety that had filled the minds of soldiers and people the last week.

General Cooper does not appear to have made a report of this movement; but as nearly as could be ascertained, there were from twelve to fifteen hundred Texas and Indian mounted troops employed under the command of Colonel Watie, and they left twenty-six men dead on the ground fought over. Nearly two wagon loads of these were gathered up during the day and brought into the post for burial; the Federal loss was seven killed and twenty-five wounded. The Union Indians were much elated and proud of their success in the affair.

The supplies brought down by the train were sufficient to last the Indian command for a month, provided the commander of that Military District, Colonel Phillips, would not feel obliged to use part of them to feed the

refugee Indians who had gathered about the post in considerable numbers on account of fear of staying at their homes when enemy raiding parties were in the country

An intelligent negro man of the Indian command who was captured by the Southern forces in the raid on the stock grazing near the post on the 20th, and who escaped and returned, stated, on being interviewed, that the Confederates claimed to have six thousand men in their camp south of the river, that they were very much elated over their success in capturing the stock, but sorely disappointed in the failure of the expedition to capture the commissary train; that the white officers quizzed him a good deal about the strength of the Indian command, and wished to know the number of white troops with it and the equipment; the nature of the fortifications, and whether the troops had supplies and ammunition for a siege; whether there was dissatisfaction among the troops, and whether re-enforcements were looked for in the near future. He stated also that he had claimed to them he was a white officer's servant and had frequently accompanied the troops on expeditions, and seeming to think that he had been in a position to possess valuable information, questioned him on different points nearly every day he was a prisoner; that he had replied to their questions honestly and without much exaggeration, as he was not in possession of any secret information, the disclosing of which would be detrimental to his own command.

He stated further he had in reply to their questions, told them that the fortifications were considered of great strength, and could not be effectively reached by any hostile artillery then in use, and that the officers and soldiers claimed they could hold the place against an assaulting force of fifteen thousand men; that when everything was brought inside of the fortifications, for which there was ample room, and the artillery in its emplacements, it could sweep every yard of the front for more

than half a mile; that the white and Indian soldiers were well satisfied, claiming that they had had unbroken success for more than a year, and had no doubt but that they would stay there until they were ready to cross the Arkansas to commence operations south of the river; that the Union Indians spoke with affection for the Government, for it had fed and taken care of the families of the Indian soldiers in Missouri during the winter, and brought them back in Government wagons to their homes in the Cherokee Nation in the spring, and had been assisting them in recovering their stock and putting in such crops as they usually raised, furnishing them seed corn and seeds, and giving them such protection as was possible.

He also stated that the Southern officers and soldiers of the Texas regiments manifested much interest in the organization of the Colored Regiment, the "Nigger Regiment" as they called it at Baxter Springs, and said that frequent couriers from Major Livingston commanding the Southern Partisan Rangers in Missouri in the vicinity of Baxter Springs, brought dispatches relating to events in that section, and mentioned the fact that his command had recently had a fight with the niggers and killed a number of them, and wanted to know of the prisoner if he thought "niggers" would fight Southern men, and whether he had heard of the regiment at Baxter Springs being ordered to Fort Gibson as a re-enforcement.

To these questions the escaped prisoner replied, that he had lately been with an expedition to Baxter Springs, as an escort to the supply train, and stopped there two or three days, and saw and talked with the soldiers of the Colored Regiment; that since President Lincoln had issued his proclamation giving the colored people their freedom, the soldiers told him that colored men were eager to enlist in the army and fight for the Government and their freedom; that they were enthusiastic about their service and took great pride in it, and were asking to be sent to the

front, to Fort Gibson, as early as possible; that he had seen the Colored Regiment, a thousand strong, on dress parade at Baxter Springs and that when in line they seemed to stretch out fully half a mile; that they wore military caps, dark blue coats and light blue trousers, and every man had his shoes polished black, and as he thought, made a fine appearance; that the barrels of their muskets and bayonets were polished as bright as silver; that they were well drilled; that he saw them drilling, and that when the order was given, "order arms," the butts of their muskets struck the ground with a thud, all at the same instant, and that on the drill ground they went through beautiful movements with their arms on their shoulders and with glistening bayonets in the sunlight; that the troops at Gibson could not compare with them in drilling; that their commissioned officers were all white men, selected from white regiments for their intelligence and bravery, and their non-commissioned officers, sergeants and corporals, were colored men promoted from the ranks, after showing intelligence and interest in the service.

As the Southern officers and soldiers manifested an interest in his story, the escaped prisoner gave them further impressions of what he had seen and heard, and in reply to questions as to whether the officers treated the colored soldiers roughly and kicked them around, told his captors that an officer was not allowed to abuse a colored soldier or touch him; that if a soldier disobeyed orders or committed some offence, he might be punished by being put on extra duty, or sent to the guard house and court-martialed, and in reply to the question as to whether the "nigger" soldiers were paid for their services, he stated that they received the same pay and allowances as the white soldiers; that according to his information the colored regiment was made up mostly of colored men from Missouri, healthy, husky looking fellows,

who were considered almost as intelligent as the average white man, and were to be sent down as a re-enforcement with the next train.

From all he could see and hear, the escaped prisoner stated that there was no enthusiasm among the white or Indian soldiers for the cause of the South, and that generally they appeared indifferent as to the outcome of the war, and that the reports of the officers spread among the soldiers, of great victories of the Confederate armies in the east, was for the purpose of keeping up the courage of their troops, who were poorly clothed and fed.

News brought down with the train of the operations of the Union armies in the East was not very favorable, but of the operations of General Grant's armies around Vicksburg, in his siege of that stronghold, the outlook was encouraging, and it was the consensus of opinion of the highest military authorities, that the place must fall in a few weeks, which would be an event of the first importance; it would open the Mississippi River, cut the Confederacy in two, and release a large number of troops that had been borrowed from the Department of Missouri and enable the commander of that Department to throw a heavy force into Northwest Arkansas, which would in turn relieve the pressure on the Indian command at Fort Gibson.

On the 30th, the commissary train having discharged the army supplies brought down, started back to Fort Scott, guarded by an escort of nearly one thousand mounted troops, and crossed Grand River twelve miles above the post, near Flat Rock, a rise of two or three feet, making it unsafe fording at Fort Gibson.

CHAPTER XIV

THE ACTION AT CABIN CREEK

In the great drama of life, from the lowest to the highest form, the dominating feature in the struggle for existence has been a struggle for food, and in war the people or social aggregate that furnishes its fighting forces sufficient wholesome food and clothing for their offensive or defensive operations must, other things being equal, win in a struggle with a people or social aggregate that fails to furnish its fighting forces with sufficient food and clothing for their offensive or defensive operations.

In war there is a constant matching of wits between the opposing commanders of the belligerent forces. They both have bases and sub-bases of supplies for furnishing their troops with food, arms and equipments, and if they advance towards each other for the purpose of occupying debatable ground, each will see to it, if he is a prudent commander, that at the end of every march he makes his communication with his base is made certain, that his bread line shall not be interrupted.

Where both belligerent forces are occupying the debatable ground, and one of the commanders does not feel that he is strong enough to try conclusions with his opponent in a pitched battle, he may believe that by maneuvering he can win a decisive advantage. If he knows he has a superior mounted force, but is weak in infantry and artillery, he hopes that by cutting off detachments of his opponent and attacking and interrupting his communication with his base, to accomplish all that would be possible were their forces equal in arms and equipment. Morale of the belligerent forces is also an important factor in determining results.

Such were the conditions at Fort Gibson during the spring and early summer. General Cooper was greatly superior to his opponent, Colonel Phillips, in mounted

troops. He had the Choctaw and Chickasaw regiment, two Creek regiments, two Cherokee regiments, three Texas regiments, besides the co-operation of General Cabell with two brigades of cavalry and one battery at Fayetteville to operate on the Federal flank east of Grand River, which was fordable except in time of high water.

General Cooper could cross the Arkansas above and below the mouth of Grand River any time except during high water, and with these large forces might reasonably hope to accomplish definite results; but the morale of his troops was very low. They had been defeated in all the larger operations during the past year, and the offensive spirit, the elan was taken out of them.

On the Federal side Colonel Phillips had the three loyal Indian regiments, and the Battalion of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry and Captain Hopkins' Battery of four guns of white troops, but the morale of these troops was good, for they had been successful in all the operations in which they had participated during the past year, and they believed that they could hold their fortified position against any Southern force likely to be brought to bear upon it, and their only doubt of being able to hold on was in the difficulty of receiving sufficient supplies to last until re-enforcements arrived.

In the Trojan War where the operations depended almost entirely upon the strength, valor and skill in the use of the arms of the leaders, Homer makes his Grecian and Trojan leaders, on approaching each other within easy talking distance in the heat of action on the field, address each other, giving his genealogical history and descent from heroic ancestors whose achievements and praise had filled the world, before hurling his spear at his opponent. In modern wars the arms used do not make such performances of the leaders practicable. The qualifications, however, of the Federal and Confederate commanders as leaders in the operations under consideration may be briefly stated. Colonel Phillips was not a politician

up to the war, but a man of wonderful energy, and had had large experience in dealing with political and military matters. He was the New York Tribune correspondent in Kansas during the Free State and Border Ruffian troubles in Kansas, and in his professional capacity was brought into close relation with the leaders of both parties. He attended their conventions and legislative assemblies and knew their leaders and heard the speeches they made in the discussions of the question at issue and reported them. He mingled with the leaders personally. There were also military operations conducted by the Free State and Pro-Slavery leaders, which he wrote about; nor did he fail to notice the part taken by the United States forces in co-operation with the Territorial authorities in endeavoring to maintain the National Administration regime. He saw more of the military and of military administration than any other man in Kansas outside of officers of the Regular Army. His varied experience in public affairs as an independent critic made him better qualified in handling troops and in the administration of a Department, than perhaps any other man in Kansas. He wrote the first History of Kansas, giving an account of the struggles of the Free State men, which ended in making the Territory a Free State, and his management of the operations of the Indian command showed that he had the capacity for dealing with military problems of the highest order. General Schofield carefully considered his ability and honesty before directing him to take command of the Indian Brigade of the Eighth and Ninth Districts, Department of Missouri.

General Cooper, the Confederate commander, had been a politician of some local prominence, sufficient, however, to secure him under the Democratic Administration of Mr. Buchanan the appointment as Indian Agent of the Choctaws and Chickasaws, which gave him some prestige among those Indians, and as the Confederate authorities on the breaking out of the war were anxious to have the

Indians committed to the cause of the Confederacy, his influence was sought for that purpose, and he was authorized to raise a regiment among them and appointed Colonel.

He was very much like many other Southern leaders who underestimated the fighting qualities of Northern men and of the Union armies, and the resources of the Northern, Middle and Western States, and as he had early failed to take into account these fighting qualities and resources, when the time came to meet them, he failed utterly, suffering defeat after defeat until there was such a collapse of his Indian forces that it was with much difficulty that they were reorganized. In recruiting his Choctaw and Chickasaw regiment in 1861 he thought that in their war paint the Indians would be useful in frightening the Yankees.

While a combination of circumstances connected with operations in other parts of the country had permitted General Cooper to take up a threatening attitude on the Federal front and flank, Colonel Phillips believed that his representations of the situation to the Department commander would bring down re-enforcements with the next train from the north, that would quiet all uneasiness.

After the defeat and return of the expedition sent out to capture or destroy the Federal train, General Cooper was prevented from sending other troops north of the Arkansas River for about two weeks on account of a rise in that stream; but a force he had already sent over, in co-operation with General Cabell, was making trouble in the eastern part of the Cherokee Nation, causing a number of Union Indian families to leave their homes and seek protection of the troops at the post at Fort Gibson.

A daring incident occurred while a detachment of Southern Indians of Colonel Watie's command were looting the house of a loyal Indian family near Tahlequah. At a moment when the hostile Indians were busily engaged in looting, a woman of the house mounted one of their

horses and rode into Fort Gibson and reported to headquarters what she had seen taking place. It was such conduct as was exhibited by this Indian woman that aided the commander of the Indian Brigade in keeping advised of the movements of the hostile Indian forces in the Cherokee Nation and to send his forces immediately against them and drive them out. Small parties, too, of two, three or four Indian soldiers were permitted to return to their homes on furlough from time to time to see their families and to assist in putting in and tending their crops, and when like privileges were granted to the followers of the Confederate leaders, the parties at home on leave, sometimes met in deadly conflict, resulting in the death of one or more of the participants. Reports of these isolated conflicts in different parts of the Indian country from time to time came into headquarters, and in response to them, troops were sent to the disturbed localities to restore tranquillity and capture if practicable the hostile Indians found within the Federal lines.

As soon as the Arkansas was fordable, General Cooper directed Colonel Watie to take the available mounted men of his Cherokee regiment and cross to the north side of the river, at some point above Webber's Falls, and advance to the northern part of the Cherokee Nation, to collect supplies for the Southern forces, and if practicable to remain in that region, with such detachments as he might have join him, until the latter part of June when the Federal supply train would be due again, the movements of which he should closely watch after leaving Baxter Springs, and endeavor to ascertain the strength of the escort.

When the supply train unloaded at Fort Gibson and returned, Major Foreman commanding the escort that accompanied it to Baxter Springs, was directed by Colonel Phillips on leaving it there, to march back down on the east side of Grand River, and by securing information from

loyal Indian families at home, of the presence of hostile Indian forces in that region, endeavor to sweep it clean of them in his march down.

On leaving the train at Baxter Springs, the Major, with 325 men of the Third Indian Regiment, crossed to the east side of Grand River, and on hearing of the operations of Colonel Watie in the vicinity of Maysville, moved forward to attack him. Colonel Watie was informed by his scouts of the advance of the Federal force under Foreman and to avoid a fight moved southwest to Grand River, near the mouth of Spavina Creek, where he endeavored to cross it to join a Confederate force which he had been advised had been sent down on the west side of that stream. He was unable to cross on account of high water, losing several men and horses that were drowned. He then retreated down the river to Grand Saline, where he again attempted to cross to the west side and failed. Here his rear guard was overtaken by Major Foreman and in the fierce assault that followed three of the Southern Indians were slain and the others put to flight.

Finding that he was hotly pursued, Colonel Watie retreated rapidly in a southeast direction through Tahlequah and Parkhill to the Arkansas River, where he was met by a large force under Colonel Bass, Twentieth Texas Cavalry, and Colonel Tandy Walker, First Choctaw regiment, to cover his retreat.

Information of the retreat of Colonel Watie through Tahlequah was conveyed to and reached Colonel Phillips in about two hours. He immediately directed Colonel Wattles of the First Indian Regiment to take four hundred men and one piece of Hopkins' Battery and march down on the north side of the Arkansas and intercept the retreating Indians, at the same time sending a courier with a dispatch to Major Foreman advising him of this action, and urging him to press the enemy with the utmost energy.

Major Foreman, however, had given up the pursuit and was on the march to Fort Gibson when the courier met him, claiming in his report that his men and horses were too much exhausted by constant marching for more than a week, for further effective service. He was a brave, gallant officer and never shirked from a fight and made a good record.

After marching about fifteen miles down the river during the night, Colonel Wattles received information that Major Foreman had given up the pursuit of Watie and was returning to Fort Gibson. He was at a loss, therefore, to determine what further movement to make. At daylight he received information from his scouts, whom he had stationed at several points to watch any movement the enemy might attempt to make against his flank or rear, that the Confederates had crossed the Arkansas in force during the night and were forming in his rear in the timber on the south side of Greenleaf Prairie.

To meet this unexpected phase of the situation, he determined to counter-march and attack the enemy formed in his rear, which he did and drove them back in the direction of the river. They were re-enforced, however, and rallied and drove the mounted Federal force back upon the infantry and howitzer and attempted to take the gun, when Captain Sol Kaufman, commanding the piece, used shell and canister and repulsed them and they again retired and were maneuvering for a better position, when Colonel Schauerte, Second Indian Regiment, arrived on the field with a force of five hundred infantry and cavalry and one howitzer, and relieved Colonel Wattles and assumed command of the united forces.

Colonel Schauerte had been an orderly sergeant in the Regular Army and with his thorough military training knew how to handle his men, and when he commenced moving them as if they were on the drill ground, the Confederates hastily retreated down the river and

recrossed it to the south side at Webber's Falls, with a loss of seven killed, number of wounded not known. The Federal loss was seven killed, eight wounded and five prisoners.

In the fall of 1862 the Southern Indian forces were drawn out of the Cherokee Nation for operations in Southwest Missouri and Northwest Arkansas, which permitted the old Indian men and women to sow almost their usual acreage of wheat, and as the season had been favorable for the crop, it was for the purpose of securing as much of it as possible that Colonel Watie was making his raids into the northern and central parts of the Indian country in the early part of June. In this part of the Indian country there had not been any serious disturbance during the autumn, winter or spring, for after the action of Old Fort Wayne the Southern Indians were driven south of the Arkansas, and had not ventured to return, so that many of the loyal Indians had not only put in crops of wheat, but had gathered up part of their scattered stock.

It was therefore the purpose of General Cooper to prevent the Indian command at Fort Gibson from not only receiving supplies by wagon trains from the north, but also to prevent it from receiving any part of the wheat crop being harvested, and in order to do this it would be necessary to keep the troops confined within a very small area around their fortifications.

Before Colonel Watie had been driven out of the northern and central part of the Cherokee Nation by Major Foreman, General Cooper sent a force of three hundred cavalry down on the west side of Grand River to re-enforce him or co-operate with him should he be disturbed, but the co-operation was impracticable on account of high water, and this cavalry force marched back down the river, passing within two or three miles of Fort Gibson, hoping to raid the herds, some of which were being sent out to west side of the river from the post, due to the growing

scarcity of grass for grazing the stock. The herders were vigilant, however, and drove the stock in near the post without any loss.

In the vicinity of the Confederate camp, too, the wild grass was being used up by the mounts of the troops and transport animals, and the Confederate commander was obliged to move his camp back fifteen miles to Elk Creek for better grazing, after leaving heavy outposts and picket guards at the fords of the Arkansas, to watch and report the movements of the Indian command at Fort Gibson. He had no forage for his public animals and was obliged to depend on grazing to keep them fit for service.

At that time the intelligence department of the Army of each independent command had not reached a very high state of development. Still the commander could employ scouts and spies to keep him informed of the movements of the enemy. There was, however, much useful information to be derived from other sources, showing what was going on in the enemy camps, scarcely less important than his movements, particularly when it reflected the morale of his troops.

In the continuous firing at each other of the belligerent pickets of the white troops of each side on the Arkansas River, they sometimes arranged a truce for a day or so, and while bathing, approached each other near the middle of the stream and exchanged coffee for tobacco and held quite lengthy conversations concerning the talk and gossip of their respective camps.

In one of these mid-stream conversations or symposiums, the Confederate pickets talked freely of the great number of desertions in their army, and stated that only recently four men had been tried by court-martial for desertion and convicted and sentenced to be shot, the execution to take place in a few days, and that the Confederate authorities were very severe in dealing with deserters, generally inflicting the death penalty. That these South-

ern soldiers were not exaggerating the situation that existed in the Southern army in that region, and of the very low morale, is shown by the fact that General Steele, in reporting his operations covering that period, stated that desertions in Cabell's Arkansas Brigade became alarming without any apparent cause; that they left by tens and hundreds, as many as two hundred leaving in one night, several officers going with them. Such conditions as he reported would not likely escape the notice of the soldiers in the ranks.

If General Steele had made careful inquiry he would probably have found that practically all these desertions were of Union men who had been conscripted into the Southern army, hunted down and taken to the instruction camps and were determined they would not fight for the Confederacy, as they had no interest in maintaining slavery, or in extending slave territory.

It had been the policy of the Federal Government to deal leniently with its soldiers for all ordinary offenses, and even in cases of desertion, except where the deserters enlisted and deserted to convey information to the Confederate authorities of army operations, which put the deserters in the catalogue of spies, and if caught they were tried by court-martial and if convicted, executed. There were very few deserters from the Union armies who went over to the Confederacy. There were many desertions because the deserters did not have the courage to face dangers on the battle field.

There was very little in the administration of army operations or in the discipline of the soldiers of the Union armies that grated harshly on the feelings of the intelligent soldier, or impressed him that being a soldier lowered his manhood or social status, for he knew that a milder form of discipline and control had been inaugurated since the beginning of the war than existed in the Old Army; that Congress had passed a law abolishing flogging in

the Army and Navy, and forbidding abuse of soldiers by their officers, and that soldiers had rights which must be respected.

There was at that time no other army in the world that had as mild a form of discipline as that which governed the Union armies, and yet there was no other army as well disciplined for performing the work for which this army was organized. The old idea that the soldier would perform his duty only through fear of punishment, had vanished; the morale of the army had not suffered; it could not have been higher.

A government whose corner stone was slavery and a social status of slave-owning class that furnished nearly all the officers of the army, could not possibly exercise that form of discipline that existed in the Union armies where the soldiers knew and felt their equal rights, even in the presence of the highest officers, who were generally sympathetic towards their men, instead of assuming an attitude of class superiority, as was assumed by Southern officers who were sons of slave owners.

While Colonel Phillips was having his troubles in maintaining his position at Fort Gibson and in receiving his supplies from the north in wagon trains, each wagon being drawn by a four-mule team over an excellent road, the Old Military Road, from Fort Scott, the Confederate leaders, Generals Steele and Cooper, were also having their troubles in securing precarious supplies from the country, and their supplies of ammunition from San Antonio, Texas, to Bonham, were hauled by ox teams, and thence to the troops in the field by such means of transportation as they were able to provide. They were conscious of the desertions and low morale of their men and unsuccessful expeditions to cripple seriously the Indian command at Fort Gibson after many strenuous efforts.

About the middle of June the indications were multiplying that General Cooper was going to make another

desperate effort to capture the Federal supply train coming down from the north about the end of the month. General Cabell, commanding the Confederate forces in Western Arkansas, had promised co-operation and would cross Grand River and join the forces sent out by General Cooper on the west side of that stream at the point designated for making the attack. This co-operating movement of the Confederate Generals seemed to give promise of success. As a confirmation that such a movement was under way, several loyal Cherokee women came into headquarters from near Cincinnati on the State line, sixty miles east, and reported that a large Confederate force of white troops mounted, more than a thousand strong, were encamped at that place, preparing to move north through the Cherokee Nation.

It was considered advisable by General Cabell to move as far north as practicable that he might come in touch with Major Livingston's scouts, who would keep him informed of the movements of the train and escort from day to day. His march would be made leisurely, which would enable him to recruit the strength of his mounts, which had been impaired by hard service and scanty forage in the section of his operations.

The large number of Refugee Indian families around Fort Gibson who were fed from the commissary supplies brought down for the troops made it necessary to commence issuing half rations to the soldiers after June 20th, and a few days later the ration was reduced to fresh beef, salt, rice and wheat, the wheat having been obtained from the farms of the Indians who were just completing their harvest.

This was the first time the troops were short of food supplies since the Indian Brigade had become an independent command. The radical change of diet, it was claimed, caused some sickness among the soldiers and the refugees, and there were several deaths reported by the

surgeons at the post to be due to cholera, called sporadic cases; the few cases reported caused some anxiety among the medical officers, but there was no general outbreak of the disease.

The surgeons and assistant surgeons of the three Indian Regiments were white men, graduate physicians, and looked after the sanitary condition of the troops; but it was impossible to enforce cleanliness and sanitary rules among the large number of Indian families camping out and using poorly improvised shelters around the post with scanty provisions and few conveniences, all of which imposed many hardships upon them.

These families were mostly Creeks and Seminoles, the families of the soldiers of the First and Second Indian regiments. Their country was occupied by the Southern forces, and they did not consider it safe to return to their homes, as many of the Cherokee families had been doing. The country north of the Arkansas was regarded as within the Federal lines, and the country south of the river within the Confederate lines at that time.

On June 20th Colonel Phillips ordered Major Foreman to take six hundred mounted men from the First, Second and Third Indian regiments, and one twelve pound howitzer, and move north on the Military Road to Baxter Springs, where he would meet the supply train from Fort Scott and bring it down under escort as early as practicable, as his troops at the post were running short of commissary supplies.

His scouts and spies brought him information daily of the movements of the Confederate forces, and he knew that General Cooper had prepared to send a large force of fifteen hundred to two thousand mounted troops north on the west side of Grand River, and that General Cabell with a brigade of cavalry and three guns were near the State line between Cincinnati and Maysville within supporting distance of the force on the west side, when it was

ready to attack the train coming down, and in a communication to General Blunt, the Department commander, Colonel Phillips, laid the situation before him, emphasizing the fact that if the position at Fort Gibson was to be held, re-enforcements should accompany the train down from Baxter Springs; that his troops were suffering for want of supplies, and that it would be ruinous to the Union cause among the Indians to abandon his position.

The General had been prompt in giving attention to everything relating to the administration of affairs in his department, and appreciating the situation, informed Colonel Phillips that Colonel Williams, commanding the colored regiment at Baxter Springs, with a section of the Second Kansas Battery, and Lieutenant Colonel Dodd, commanding the Second Colorado Infantry, had been ordered to re-enforce him and would accompany the next commissary train south.

On leaving Baxter Springs on the 25th, the escort to the train consisted of the following troops: Major Foreman's Indian battalion and one howitzer, one company of cavalry from each the Third Wisconsin, Ninth and Fourteenth regiments Kansas Cavalry, the Second Colorado Infantry, Lieutenant Colonel Dodd commanding, and the First Kansas Colored Infantry and a section of the Second Kansas Battery, Colonel J. M. Williams commanding, and by virtue of his rank in command of the whole force.

Soldiers of the colored regiment expressed themselves as eager for a fight; it would be the first fight in which they had taken part as a regimental unit since their organization; they knew that there was prejudice among the white soldiers against them on account of their color, and they determined that if they became engaged with the enemy, that their performance should be creditable to any military organization, and Colonel Williams, who had drilled them and handled them, had the utmost confidence in their steadiness under fire.

On arriving at the Neosho River it was found past fording, and the train and escort were detained there three days by high water, and then the march south was resumed on the Military Road, Major Foreman's battalion of Indians in advance. A trail was discovered, the grass was beaten down by horses' feet; the Major detached Lieutenant Luke Parsons with thirty Cherokees to ascertain what made it, and after following it for four miles, came up with thirty enemy Indians and immediately charged them, killing four and taking three prisoners. They were Colonel Watie's advance outpost and in a position to watch the movements of the Federal train and escort and to give warning to their comrades of the approach of the Federal forces.

The train and escort continued the movement south until noon July first, when they came upon the Confederates strongly posted at Cabin Creek, concealed in the thickets on the south bank of the stream, which was then past fording from recent heavy rains in that region. The situation disclosed to Colonel Williams that the enemy would have to be dislodged from their position before he could proceed with the train.

A deserter from the Confederate camp on Elk Creek was brought into headquarters at Fort Gibson on the first of July, and on being carefully questioned stated that before he left on the 28th of June, General Cooper had sent out a second column of mounted troops to re-enforce the first column sent out under Colonel Watie a few days before, which confirmed the reports of Colonel Phillips' scouts who had been watching the movements of the enemy south of the Arkansas.

It was ascertained from prisoners taken and from other reliable sources, that when the two columns formed a junction near Cabin Creek, that Colonel Watie, the senior officer present, had in his command the following organizations: His own regiment, the First Cherokee, the

First Creek Regiment, Colonel McIntosh, part of DeMorse's Twenty-ninth Texas, and Colonel Martin's Sixth Texas Partisan Rangers, a total force of sixteen to eighteen hundred men, and an engineer officer who selected Cabin Creek as the strongest position on the Military Road for making the attack on the train and escort. Colonel Williams also ascertained that General Cabell with twelve to fifteen hundred cavalry and three guns was on the east side of Grand River, about three miles from the scene of operations and unable to come to the assistance of Colonel Watie on account of high water in that stream.

The Military Road at that time crossed Cabin Creek about three miles above where it empties into Grand River, and there was a strip of timber and brush along the creek above and below the ford, nearly two miles wide. North of the ford the heights overlooked the strip of timber and the country several miles to the south. The Southern forces were occupying a strong position, from which it would not be an easy task to dislodge them without artillery.

On arriving upon the heights north of the ford, the train was parked, and Colonel Dodd, with the Second Colorado Infantry, one company of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, and one company of the First Kansas Colored Infantry, was left to guard it while Colonel Williams, with the balance of the command, moved forward, and on approaching the timber, formed his line on each side of the road, and advancing, dispersed the enemy skirmishers, and coming near the north bank of the creek, received the fire of the Confederates who were posted behind trees and logs, and in some places, behind rifle pits hastily thrown up, but without doing any damage, the range being too great for effective work.

In the pursuit of the Confederate pickets and outposts on the north side of the creek, it was found that the Confederate forces were occupying the brush and timber near

the south bank of the stream, above and below the ford, for nearly a mile, and in readiness to defend their position. They were dismounted except the men who held the horses of the dismounted men, in the rear.

This first reconnoissance developed the fact that there was not a sufficient force of the enemy on the north side of the creek to offer any serious resistance, and Colonel Williams determined to ascertain at once whether it was fordable, and ordered his infantry to form on the north bank above and below the entrance of the ford, supported by two howitzers, and opened fire upon the enemy in response to their firing, the howitzers using shell and canister for searching every yard of the ground for a hundred yards or so back of the south bank.

After the howitzers and infantry had kept up a brisk fire for half an hour, the enemy firing almost ceased, and Major Foreman, under instructions from Colonel Williams, moved forward with his command and entered the creek, and finding that it was too deep for fording, returned to his former position, when, after consulting with the principal officers present, the troops were ordered into camp for the night, except that strong guards and outposts were left to watch the movements of the enemy, and to report the condition of the stream, hourly.

That evening Colonel Williams held a consultation with the officers of each independent command, at which each officer expressed his views in regard to the plan of operations for the next morning, when the stream would no doubt be fordable. They knew of the presence of General Cabell's Confederate force on the east side of Grand River, only three or four miles distant, and unable to cross on account of high water, and they recognized that the Confederate force in their immediate front should be disposed of before it could be re-enforced.

In accordance with the plans evolved at the conference of the officers, the whole force with the train, united

under Colonel Williams, after leaving a sufficient force under Colonel Dodd to guard the train, two miles north of the ford on the prairie, moved forward the next morning at eight o'clock, to open the fight in the following order: Lieutenant Wilson, commanding a section of the Second Kansas Battery, placed his two guns on an elevated position on the extreme left; Captain Armstrong, with a section of artillery, took up a position within about two hundred yards of the position occupied by the Confederates, and Lieutenant J. C. Cayot, with one mountain howitzer, was placed in position on the right; Major Foreman, commanding a company of the Third Indian Regiment, was assigned to the advance to lead in the attack, the balance of his Indian detachment being posted to guard the creek above and below the ford, and to open fire upon any of the enemy who showed themselves.

In the rear of Major Foreman was the First Kansas Colored Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John Bowles, followed by a battalion of the Second Colorado Infantry, under Major J. Nelson Smith, and last in the formation was a battalion of three companies of cavalry commanded by Captain John E. Stewart, Ninth Kansas Cavalry.

On the Confederate side Colonel Watie had a consultation with his officers in the evening after the Federal forces retired to their camp, for an expression of views in regard to the situation. In the discussion most of those who took an active part expressed the opinion that their position was so strong that it could not be taken by the Federal forces by further attacks, and that if they could be held off two or three days, General Cabell would be able to cross Grand River and come to their aid with his white troops and artillery, which would make success certain, with every man doing his duty.

Colonel Williams having ascertained that the creek had run down during the night and was fordable, and his troops and artillery being in position, ordered his batteries

to open fire on the enemy position with shell and canister, which was continued for forty minutes, when it ceased, the Confederates having sought shelter behind trees, logs and breastworks. They had prepared to meet the movements they knew the commander of the Federal troops would make. They had a number of men up in trees as signal stations to watch and report the movements of the Federal troops from the time they left their camps on the prairie, marching in perfect order, the bright bayonets of the infantry glistening in the morning sunshine, until they took up their position on the north bank of the creek.

When reports came to him from his signal stations that his heavy artillery fire was causing confusion in the ranks of the enemy and appeared to have silenced their firing, Colonel Williams ordered Major Foreman to advance, and in a moment he entered the stream and when nearing the opposite shore, the Confederates, who were lying in a ditch down behind a breastwork they had thrown up along the sloping side of the creek bank and covered with the boughs of willows, only a few rods from where the Federal force would be obliged to pass, rose up and delivered a heavy volley of musketry into them, wounding Major Foreman and several of his men, which halted the column, and seeing their leader wounded, they retired to the north side of the creek.

Colonel Williams, who was on the ground watching and directing the movement of his troops, on the retirement of his advance ordered the officers of his batteries to open fire again upon the Confederate position with shell and canister for twenty minutes, searching the woods and brush thoroughly on the opposite shore near the exit of the ford, and while this was taking place, brought up a company of the Ninth Kansas Cavalry under Lieutenant R. C. Philbrick to take the position of the Indian company in the advance, and ordered him to move forward at a double quick, which he did under cover of the artillery

fire on the right and the fire of the three infantry companies on the north bank, until he secured a footing on the south side of the creek.

This gallant movement of the Lieutenant with his men holding their carbines ready for instant action, was not accomplished without drawing a hot but ineffectual fire from the Confederates behind their defense, ineffectual because the moment they showed themselves they were exposed to the fire of the Federal artillery and small arms of the infantry companies formed along the north bank of the stream. It was a critical moment; his cavalry having successfully crossed and formed on the south side of the stream, Colonel Williams immediately pushed forward his infantry and cavalry and crossed over, his infantry wading in the water up to their waist belts, and formed in line on the south bank in front of the enemy who were keeping up a desultory firing while reforming their lines for a stubborn resistance.

The Federal troops were there to fight, and the Colonel advanced his line and drove the Confederates from their position in the brush and temporary defenses, but they formed in line again in the edge of the prairie where the ground was more open and suitable for maneuvering on both sides; they made an imposing appearance and seemed determined to stand. After having remounted their horses and formed it was not difficult to break their new line.

The belligerent forces were face to face, and the crucial moment for the test of strength at hand. The Federal infantry advanced in line with fixed bayonets; Colonel Williams ordered Captain Stewart, with two companies of cavalry, to take position on his right, to prevent a flank movement of the Confederates in that direction, and Lieutenant Philbrick was directed to move forward with his company and charge the front line of the Confederates and break through it and endeavor to ascertain their strength and position.

It was a tense moment with the Lieutenant, but on receiving his instructions he dashed forward, his troopers coming into line at a trot, charged upon the Confederate front, breaking it and throwing them into disorder, which being noted by Colonel Williams, he ordered all his cavalry to the front, under Captain Stewart, to follow up the success achieved and give the enemy no time to rally.

After the Confederates were driven from their positions along the creek, their morale was a good deal shaken, and when their line was broken by Lieutenant Philbrick's charge, Colonel Watie seems to have made very little effort to rally them, so that Captain Stewart, with the cavalry, pursued the fugitives about five miles south, killing and wounding a good many and dispersing the others, who took to the brush and timber along Grand River and other streams intersecting their line of retreat.

Having completely routed and dispersed the enemy and recalled his cavalry from the pursuit, Colonel Williams communicated the result of his operation to Colonel Dodd, commanding the troops guarding the train, who at once put them in motion and crossed the creek that evening, and the train and whole force arrived at Fort Gibson without further interruption.

The Union losses in this action were nine killed and thirty wounded; the Confederate loss was not definitely known, as Colonel Watie, the commander, appears to have made no report, but Colonel Williams, who was on the ground, reported the enemy losses fifty killed, wounded not known, and nine prisoners.

This was the first action in the west in which the recently organized colored soldiers had an opportunity of showing their fighting qualities as a regimental unit, and it was admitted by white officers of other organizations who witnessed their conduct under fire, that it was excellent, and that they were as reliable as other soldiers when properly led by efficient officers.

There was still, however, opposition among the white soldiers to being brigaded with the colored regiment; but their soldierly appearance and splendid conduct at Cabin Creek had a good effect in destroying such unreasonable prejudice, and when there was a prospect of further fighting, those who had been opposed to using them in the service were willing enough that they should take the place of danger in difficult operations where there was certain to be heavy casualties.

While the leaders of the South had been using their negro slaves in producing food supplies for their armies, and doing the hard work in constructing their fortifications, and aiding them in many ways in their military operations, they had not given any thought to the idea that the Federal Government would organize the colored men into regiments, arm, equip and drill them and make effective soldiers out of them and put them in the field where they would make an important contribution in bringing the war to a close.

CHAPTER XV

BATTLE OF ELK CREEK

With the arrival of supplies for the army at Fort Gibson for a month, and re-enforcements of cavalry, infantry and artillery of about two thousand men, the attitude of the Federal forces would now pass from defensive to offensive operations against the enemy who were concentrating at Elk Creek after their decisive defeat at Cabin Creek on the second of July

A good deal of anxiety had been manifested by the troops at the post in regard to the safety of the train. Many reports and rumors were current of large Confederate forces moving north on the east and west sides of Grand River, and General Cabell, with a Confederate force of twelve to fifteen hundred cavalry and artillery from Western Arkansas marching in the direction of Grand Saline, where he would cross Grand River and form a junction with the other Confederate columns.

In addition to the information Colonel Phillips received from his scouts he had out watching the movements of the enemy, Cherokee women living east of Grand River, on hearing of or seeing a Confederate force in the neighborhood, mounted their ponies and rode into Fort Gibson and reported all they had seen and heard. When the Federal artillery opened fire upon the Confederate position at Cabin Creek on the evening of July 1st and in the morning of July 2nd, Cherokee women rode into the post and reported hearing the firing two days before the arrival of the train; they were excited and anxious to know the result of the engagement which they knew had taken place at Cabin Creek.

After the commissary supplies had been unloaded from the train, the wagons and teams were ferried back over the river to the west side, which took nearly all one night. The escort to accompany it north was commanded by

Colonel Dole, and was made up of several detachments from the Indian regiments and the battalion of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry and one howitzer. The reported movements of General Cabell after the action at Cabin Creek were still a menace to the returning train and escort on their eastern flank and were given consideration.

To guard against a surprise attack, flankers were kept out well in advance of the train, particularly skirting the timber along Grand River on the east, and careful examination was made for any fresh trails the enemy might make in marching over the prairie grass; but the enemy had not rallied after their precipitate retreat from Cabin Creek, and the train and escort arrived at the crossing of the stream without any interruption, to find, however, with a little surprise, General Blunt with re-enforcements of cavalry and artillery on his way to Fort Gibson to take command of all the troops for an immediate offensive campaign against the Southern forces in his front.

He had halted a few hours to feed and rest; on hearing of the attack on the train and escort at that point on the first, and fearing that the enemy might be blocking the road to Fort Gibson, he left Fort Scott on the 6th, and by making forced marches, had arrived at Cabin Creek on the 9th, a distance of one hundred and twenty miles in three days. The troops he had with him were under the command of Colonel William R. Judson, Sixth Kansas Cavalry, and consisted of a battalion of that regiment, and two twelve pound howitzers, a battalion of the Third Wisconsin Cavalry, commanded by Captain E. R. Stevens, and two sections of the Second Kansas Battery, commanded by Captain E. A. Smith, in all about six hundred men.

He arrived at Fort Gibson on the 11th, and commenced immediate preparations to cross the Arkansas and attack the enemy in their position on Elk Creek, twenty-five miles south of the post. His presence was very grati-

fying to the troops and people after nearly three months of strenuous effort to hold the position there and keep the bread line open, and arrangements were made to give him a reception the next evening.

Colonel Phillips presided at the reception, and in introducing the General stated that that feature of the program was not necessary, for the Indian people and soldiers present were familiar with the brilliant achievements of the General in closing the campaign of last year, which had to his credit Newtonia, Fort Wayne, Cane Hill and Prairie Grove, ending in the capture of Van Buren and destruction of the enemy's steamboats and supplies on the Arkansas River, and that his presence was a guarantee that while he was in the field the enemy would not find it convenient to pitch their camps as near that post, as they had been doing during the spring when the Indian command was holding the most advanced position of any Federal force west of the Mississippi River, and that he had no doubt but that the General was in a position to give those present information of very great interest and importance in regard to the operations of the Union armies on other fronts.

General Blunt in response to the address of welcome, thanked the soldiers and people for their loyal and hearty greeting, stated that on hearing of the Confederate attack on the supply train at Cabin Creek he had hastily collected at Fort Scott about five hundred cavalry and two howitzers, and two sections of the Second Kansas Battery, and by forced march reached Cabin Creek in three days, a distance of one hundred and twenty miles; that he had been in a position to know the situation in the Indian country while he was in command of the Department, and that he felt it his duty to compliment Colonel Phillips and the troops under his command for their gallantry and perseverance in holding the position at that place under so many disadvantages, but that the disadvantages were now at an end.

The General went on to state further that before leaving Fort Scott he had received dispatches announcing that a great three days' battle had been fought, July 1, 2 and 3, between the Confederate armies under General Lee and the Union armies under General Mead at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, in which the Southern armies were defeated and driven back into Virginia; that on the 4th of July General Grant had received the surrender of Vicksburg with thirty thousand prisoners and hundreds of guns, ending the siege of that place, and that Generals Holmes and Price, with all the Confederate troops they were able to concentrate in Arkansas, made an attack on the Federal forces under General Prentiss at Helena, on the 4th of July, and were badly defeated with the loss of twenty-five hundred men killed, wounded and prisoners, and that everything looked bright for the Union cause.

He further stated that the military operations in his department were closely connected with military operations in the Department of Missouri, and that that department had been so depleted of troops since the latter part of the winter, borrowed for conducting siege operations against Vicksburg, that the Department commander had had barely sufficient forces at his disposal to maintain order in the State, and none to spare for aggressive movements such as were now contemplated and would soon be initiated.

He further stated that the fall of Vicksburg had relieved these conditions; that the troops borrowed from the Department of Missouri would at once be returned to General Schofield, the Department commander, who was already preparing an expedition under General Steele, to start from Helena or some point on White River for operations against Little Rock, with the hope of capturing the place in a few weeks; that he had requested General Schofield to send him a brigade of cavalry, which he looked for by the early part of August, but that in the meantime

he proposed to commence active operations against the enemy in his front, and had no doubt of the result when the opposing forces met.

When Colonel Watie and the officers of the Texas regiments, who had participated with him in the action at Cabin Creek in their efforts to capture the Federal supply train, returned to the Confederate camp at Elk Creek and reported the result of their operations to General Cooper, it caused almost consternation; a council of war was held for an expression of views to determine the further movements of the Confederate forces.

In the discussion the officers who had taken part in the action spoke of the large re-enforcements of cavalry, infantry and artillery that accompanied the train to Fort Gibson, all well drilled and equipped troops, including the "Nigger Regiment," who went into action as if on parade as soon as the stream was fordable, and that Colonel Phillips, commanding the Federal forces, knowing his strength, would, no doubt, the moment the Arkansas was fordable, cross it and assume the offensive, which they should take immediate measures to meet.

It was suggested by a member of the council that in as much as General Cabell had not been able to come to their assistance in their attack on the train, that he should be advised of the situation at once and requested to join them with as little delay as practicable with all his available cavalry and artillery. The suggestion was concurred in, and General Cooper dispatched a courier to General Cabell's headquarters with instructions for him to march immediately by the most practicable route with his entire force and join the Confederates at Elk Creek, where it was proposed the combined forces should make a stand.

In the further discussion of the situation, members of the council spoke of the Arkansas as being too deep for fording for cavalry and artillery below the mouth of Grand River, and said it was falling and would probably

be fordable in a few days, and that strong pickets should be posted at all the fords above Webber's Falls, with instructions to exercise the greatest possible vigilance in watching the movements of the Federal forces, to guard against a surprise attack, and that the moment a hostile movement was detected, to communicate the fact immediately to headquarters, where General Cooper would have everything in readiness to meet it with determination and an unconquerable spirit.

In the course of the discussion reference was made to rumors afloat that the Southern armies in the east under General Lee had fought a great battle, lasting three days, in which he had been severely defeated and driven back into Virginia; that the large Southern army defending Vicksburg, after a long siege, had been compelled to surrender to General Grant with nearly thirty thousand troops and all its artillery and supplies, and that Lieutenant-General Holmes, commanding the Department of Arkansas, including the District of the Indian Territory, had, on the 4th of July, with all his available forces, attacked the Federal forces under General Prentiss at Helena, and had been badly defeated, with the loss of 2,500 men killed, wounded and prisoners, and that these disasters to the Confederate cause should be denied or minimized to the troops, or they would have the effect of depressing their morale, which had already suffered from the unsuccessful operations the last few months, and that among other rumors afloat were, that after the fall of Vicksburg, a large number of the Federal troops employed in conducting the siege were being returned to the Commander of the Department of Missouri, who was organizing an expedition under Federal General Steele, at Helena, or some point on White River, for the capture of Little Rock, and that a column of Federal troops was being prepared to march from Southwest Missouri into Northwest Arkansas in cooperation with the forces under General Blunt.

Feeling that events were rapidly approaching a crisis, General Cooper organized his forces for meeting the anticipated attack in the following order: His right wing consisted of the First and Second Cherokee Regiments, Colonel Watie commanding; his left wing was composed of the First and Second Creek Regiments, Colonel D. N. McIntosh commanding; his center was composed of the Twentieth Texas dismounted cavalry, Twenty-ninth Texas Cavalry, and Fifth Texas Partisan Rangers, Colonel Thomas C. Bass, senior Colonel, commanding; and his reserve consisted of the squadrons of Captains John Scanland and L. E. Gillett, and the First Choctaw and Chickasaw Regiment, Colonel Tandy Walker commanding, with Captain Lee's Battery ready for action on any part of the field.

On his arrival at Fort Gibson General Blunt organized his troops for offensive operations against the enemy into two brigades as follows: The First Brigade, Colonel William R. Judson commanding, consisting of the First Kansas Colored Infantry, Colonel James M. Williams; the Second Indian Regiment dismounted as infantry, Lieutenant Colonel Fred W. Schaurte; a battalion of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry and two howitzers; a battalion of the Third Wisconsin Cavalry and two howitzers, under Captain E. R. Stevens; and four guns of the Second Kansas Battery under Captain E. A. Smith.

The Second Brigade, Colonel William A. Phillips commanding, was composed of six companies of the Second Colorado Infantry, Lieutenant Colonel T. H. Dodd commanding; the First Indian Regiment, dismounted as infantry, Colonel S. A. Wattles commanding; and Hopkins' Kansas Battery, Captain Henry Hopkins commanding.

Scouts sent out by Colonel Phillips to watch the movements of General Cabell after the action of Cabin Creek, returned and reported that he had swung around in the direction of Fort Smith and had received instructions from General Cooper to move forward as rapidly as practicable

and re-enforce him at Elk Creek. This information was communicated to General Blunt on his arrival at Fort Gibson, and he determined to cross the Arkansas and attack Cooper before the arrival of General Cabell with re-enforcements.

As the Arkansas was not fordable at any point below the mouth of the Verdigris, he had flatboats constructed for taking over some of his troops, artillery and ammunition, and by the time these preparations were completed, the river commenced falling, and on July 15th, his scouts reported that it was fordable a short distance above the mouth of the Verdigris.

He was impatient of any delay in his movement, and after midnight he took the battalion of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, with the two howitzers and a section of the Kansas Battery, and crossed the Verdigris and Arkansas, twelve miles above Fort Gibson without opposition, and marching rapidly down the south side of the Arkansas, was anxious to capture the Confederate pickets guarding the fords of the river.

He was unable to accomplish this part of his plan of operations; the Confederate pickets heard of his movement in time to escape to General Cooper's main outpost, four or five miles north of Elk Creek, and the officer in command of it, at once dispatched one of his mounted detachment to report to General Cooper the advance of the Federal forces.

Having failed to capture the Confederate pickets, General Blunt continued his march down on the south side of the Arkansas to the mouth of Grand River, where he commenced crossing his troops over in boats, and completing the work by ten o'clock that night, resumed the march south on the Texas road, and at daylight came upon the enemy outpost five miles north of Elk Creek. His cavalry advance, under Captain Gordon, Sixth Kansas,

charged them and drove them back upon the main force, after he had been re-enforced by three other companies of the battalion, which were brought up at a gallop.

There was a strong force of Choctaws and Texans at this outpost, which led General Blunt for a moment to believe that General Cooper had determined to meet him at that point, and he commenced to form his line as his troops came up. It was at this time that the Confederates retired on their main force. The Federal advance moved forward again until it came within half a mile of the timber on Elk Creek, where it halted and a company from the battalion of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry was thrown forward to reconnoiter the position of the enemy, and soon found that their line was formed in the timber about half a mile in length on each side of the Texas road.

General Blunt, with some members of his staff and escort, rode forward with this advance cavalry to examine the Confederate position and to ascertain where General Cooper's battery was posted, and getting a good view of the topography of the ground over which he would maneuver his troops, left the companies of the Sixth Kansas on the skirmish line to watch the movements of the enemy, and rode back and halted the head of the column, and all his troops as they came up, behind a ridge in the prairie, about half a mile in front of the Confederate line, for an hour's rest and refreshments of food from their haversacks, and to prepare for action.

His troops of all arms were much in need of an hour or so rest; they had been marching all night and up to eight o'clock that morning, and as he was a practicing physician up to the war, he knew that this rest and time to eat their lunches, would make them more efficient in performing their duties in the operations laid out for them.

This halt served another purpose. Just before the column halted, a hard shower of rain came up, lasting perhaps a quarter of an hour and filling all the little de-

pressions along the road with water, from which many of the soldiers filled their canteens, which had become empty during the night's march, and then after the downpour, the halt had given the men an opportunity to examine their cartridge boxes to see whether their ammunition was dry and in condition for immediate use. Having rested and refreshed his troops on the prairie for more than an hour, and having instructed his brigade commanders the parts they were to take in the engagement, he formed his whole force into two columns, the First Brigade under Colonel Judson on the right of the road, and the Second Brigade under Colonel Phillips on the left of the road, and moved forward, the infantry in close columns of companies, the cavalry by platoons, and the artillery by sections.

By advancing in this order, he desired in coming onto the field to deceive the enemy as to his strength; on arriving within a quarter of a mile of the timber in which the Confederate line was formed, his two columns suddenly deployed to the right and left into line of battle, covering the Confederate front, which appeared to be more than a mile in length.

This movement was as spectacular as if the troops were on the drill ground; as they came into line, the First Kansas Colored Infantry formed on the left of the First Brigade on the right of the Texas road, supporting the two sections of Captain Smith's battery, a short distance in their front.

While the batteries were going into positions for opening fire upon the enemy, Colonel Williams rode to the front of his regiment and spoke in a clear, ringing voice, "Attention!" In a moment his men were standing at attention. He then said, "This is the day we have been patiently waiting for; the enemy at Cabin Creek did not wait to give you an opportunity of showing them what men can do fighting for their natural rights and for their recently acquired freedom and the freedom of their children and

their children's children. I am proud of your soldierly appearance; and it is especially gratifying to know that it has been by my strenuous efforts in drilling you, in handling you, and providing for you the past months, that I find you in such splendid condition, physically and in morale. We are going to engage the enemy in a few moments and I am going to lead you. We are engaged in a holy war; in the history of the world, soldiers never fought for a holier cause than the cause for which the Union soldiers are fighting, the preservation of the Union and the equal rights and freedom of all men. You know what the soldiers of the Southern armies are fighting for; you know that they are fighting for the continued existence and extension of slavery on this continent, and if they are successful, to take you and your wives and children back into slavery. You know it is common report that the Confederate troops boast that they will not give quarters to colored troops and their officers, and you know that they did not give any quarters to your comrades in the fight with the forage detachment near Sherwood last May. Show the enemy this day that you are not asking for quarter, and that you know how and are eager to fight for your freedom and finally, keep cool and do not fire until you receive the order, and then aim deliberately below the waist belt. The people of the whole country will read the reports of your conduct in this engagement; let it be that of brave, disciplined men."

Continuing the formation of the Federal line: The Second Indian Regiment formed on the right of the colored infantry, and the battalion of the Third Wisconsin Cavalry, with two howitzers, formed on the right of the Second Indian Regiment.

Coming now to the Second Brigade: The Second Colorado Infantry formed on the right on the left of the road, and on the left of the Colored Infantry. The First Indian Regiment formed on the left of the Second Colorado, and the battalion of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry with two how-

itzers, formed on the left of the First Indian Regiment, having been assigned to this position in the Second Brigade after the troops came onto the field. Hopkins' Battery was assigned to a position in front of the Second Colorado.

Having ample time for preparation for the pending engagement General Cooper had his lines formed on both sides of the Texas road along the edge of the timber on the north side of Elk Creek when the Union troops came in sight. He had the Twentieth Texas, dismounted cavalry, under Colonel Thomas C. Bass, form his left center; the Twenty-ninth Texas Cavalry, under Colonel Charles De Morse, and the Fifth Texas Partisan Rangers, under Colonel L. M. Martin, formed his right center. His right wing was composed of the First and Second Cherokee Regiments, commanded by Colonel Watie, and his left wing was composed of the First and Second Creek Regiments, commanded by Colonel D. N. McIntosh. His reserve consisted of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Regiment, commanded by Colonel Tandy Walker, and two squadrons of Texas cavalry, commanded by Captains Scanland and Gillett, and was posted near his headquarters at Honey Springs, about two miles in his rear. His battery under Captain R. W. Lee occupied a position in front of the Twentieth Texas, and was supported by that regiment during the engagement.

Having made disposition of his troops for action, General Blunt, after they came into line, threw out a skirmish line and moved forward until he drew the fire of the Confederate artillery, when he halted and directed Captain Smith, commanding the battery on the right, and Captain Hopkins, commanding the battery on the left, to open fire on the Confederate battery, as revealed by the smoke of each discharge, which they did, using shot and shell and canister, which was continued for more than an hour, dismounting one of the Confederate guns, and causing the withdrawal of the other pieces.

While this contest was going on between the batteries of the belligerent forces the Federal cavalry on the right and left of General Blunt's line had dismounted and were skirmishing in the timber with the Southern Indians and Texans, whose movements were a threat of flanking the Federal position. Three companies of the Sixth Kansas, however, were dismounted and sent into the timber as skirmishers, on the extreme left, and after hot work for more than an hour, drove the enemy back with the assistance of Colonel Wattles, who, with the First Indian Regiment, made a charge and forced them back across the creek.

Turning to operations in the center. The Colored Infantry had been standing in line and advanced the moment the artillery ceased firing to attack the Confederate position in the timber, which had been concealed from view until they had approached within forty to fifty yards of it, when Colonel Williams gave the order to his regiment, "Ready, aim, fire!" at almost the same instant that Colonel De Morse had ordered his regiment, the Twentieth Texas, to fire, and immediately there burst forth from the opposing forces two lines of smoke and flame and death dealing missiles, and a terrific roar of small arms.

In the volley delivered by the Confederates, Colonel Williams had his horse killed, and also fell himself severely wounded in the breast and face and hands and had to be borne to the rear, and the volley from his men also severely wounded in the right arm Colonel De Morse, the Confederate commander in his front, together with a number of his men in the front line. This was the first time the Texas colonel had faced colored troops on the battle field.

After Colonel Williams was wounded and taken to the rear, Lieutenant-Colonel Bowles assumed command of the regiment and ordered his men to fall upon the ground with their heads raised sufficiently to scan the sights of their Springfield muskets, and to continue the firing, loading and firing, until the enemy's line yielded.

During this firing some of Colonel Schaurte's mounted men of the Second Indian Regiment were passing in the brush between the right of the Colored Infantry and the enemy in the line of fire, and Colonel Bowles ordered them back to the right, and Colonel De Morse commanding the Texas regiment in front, hearing the order and supposing that it was for the colored regiment to retire, advanced to within twenty-five paces of it when the men rose from the ground and delivered a volley into the Texans, which sent them back in disorder and confusion, with a number of men severely wounded.

In this volley the color bearer of the Texans was shot down; the colors were raised again a moment later and again the color bearer was shot down and the colors picked up by Colonel Schaurte's Indians when they passed to the front as skirmishers, and soon compelled the Southern Indians to retire across Elk Creek. In co-operation with this movement, Captain Stevens commanding the battalion of the Third Wisconsin Cavalry, who was posted on the extreme right of the Federal line, dismounted part of his men to skirmish in the brush and timber, and with the assistance of his howitzers, forced the left of the Confederate line back upon their center, capturing eight prisoners.

Before the Confederate center commenced to yield, three companies of the right wing of the Second Colorado Infantry, on the left of the Colored Infantry, came near being cut off and captured while the Federal line was advancing through the brush, which was thick enough in places with the leaves and heavy foliage to hide a foe a few yards in advance. In the forward movement in progress, these companies had got out of alignment, had got as much perhaps as twenty paces in advance of the left of the line of the Colored Infantry, and coming to an impassable ditch or washout directly in their front, filed to the right and crossed it just in front of the left of the line of the Colored Infantry, and then filing to the left, came into line, but still in advance of the Colored Infantry on their right.

Having executed this movement the companies were surprised by a Confederate force which had been lying down behind the ditch concealed in the brush, but now between them and the ditch, who rose up and delivered a volley into their ranks and endeavored to cut them off and would have succeeded in another moment, but seeing the critical situation of the Colorado men, the left wing of the colored regiment was ordered to oblique to the left, and coming up within less than fifty yards of the Confederate forces, poured several heavy volleys of musketry into it, which caused it to break, and endeavor to escape in the direction of the Colorado men, who, now, realizing the situation, and seeing the enemy in confusion, turned and opened fire upon them only a few yards distant, killing and wounding several men, and taking some prisoners.

In co-operation with these movements in the center of the Federal line, Colonel Wattles with the First Indian Regiment on the left of the Second Colorado, and the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, on the left of the First Indian, had entered the timber and were driving the Southern Indians under Colonel Watie, and the Texans supporting him, back upon Elk Creek, and soon compelled them to cross to the south side at the lower ford.

On this part of the field the Federal troops were fighting dismounted through the brush and timber, the Confederates were in disorder and confusion, being forced to retire to the south side of Elk Creek, leaving one of their guns, which had been dismounted, and the tents and camp equipage of one regiment to fall into the hands of the Union forces.

The Confederate officers rallied some of their troops to hold the bridge over the creek and some of the fords, but they were quickly driven from their positions by the Federal Infantry, firing as they advanced, and by shell and canister by the guns of Captain Hopkins' battery, which had moved forward and taken up the position just oc-

cupied by the Confederate battery, one of the guns of which, the dismounted piece, was lying on the ground near the corner of the field.

There was no easing up of the operations of the Union forces on any part of their line. After the Southern troops were driven from all their positions on Elk Creek, General Blunt's forces crossed to the south side and pursued the enemy about three miles south, or a mile or so south of Honey Springs, the Confederate headquarters, where their supplies were stored, the buildings of which they fired in their hurried retreat. They were pressed so closely by the Federal forces that they were barely able to get their baggage trains out of the way.

It was found on the arrival of the Federal soldiers that one of the Confederate commissary buildings had not yet burned past saving and the fire was immediately extinguished. It contained large quantities of bacon, flour, salt and dried beef, from which the tired and hungry victorious soldiers made a bountiful supper after they had been recalled from the pursuit.

There was the usual curiosity of the soldiers, white, colored and Indian, in looking over the ground of the Confederate headquarters for loot or anything worth bringing away, and the soldiers of the Colored Regiment inspected with a good deal of interest three or four hundred handcuffs found in one of the depot buildings, which the Southern troops had there for the purpose of putting on the colored soldiers they expected to capture and send back south as trophies of their valor.

The history of the handcuffs found was obtained from a colored man, David Griffith, who was a servant, waiting on Major J. A. Carroll of one of General Cooper's regiments of Texans at the time of the battle, and who left him and came to the Colored Regiment at Fort Smith in September and enlisted in Company G of that regiment and served his time out, and he stated that he frequently

heard Southern officers say that the handcuffs were brought there to be put on colored soldiers they expected to capture and send back south in their operations.

There was a great deal of talk at the time by people on both sides as to whether colored soldiers would fight, and Mr. Griffith said that he frequently heard Southern officers talking among themselves, say they did not believe colored soldiers would fight, and that all the Southern troops would have to do would be to march up to the colored men and take them in, as they would a herd of stock in a pasture.

Nor was the belief that colored soldiers would not fight confined to Southern officers at that time; it was the subject of heated argument between Union officers and soldiers, and among the people throughout the North, those who were opposed to continuing the war to a successful issue, and to enlisting and arming the colored men, maintaining the negative, and those who were in favor of prosecuting the war to a successful issue, and enlisting and arming the colored men, maintaining the affirmative. These discussions were around the camp fires, and wherever groups of people were assembled and issues of the war were the subject of conversation.

Colonel Williams, who was familiar with the arguments of both sides and with the disparaging comments in regard to enlisting colored soldiers, and who had great faith that they would acquit themselves creditably if given a fair opportunity, when the battle was over, and the troops recalled from the pursuit, sent for General Blunt to come and see him in the field hospital where he was suffering from his wounds.

Every one who knew the Colonel well knew that he always talked as if he was grinding his molars or gritting his teeth. When the General came in the first thing he said to him was, "General, how did my regiment fight?" The General replied, "Like veterans; most gallantly, Sir,"

and the Colonel added, "I am now ready to die." It was a great satisfaction to him to know that his regiment had creditably met the test that tries the courage of men in the ordeal of battle.

After that the Colonel was proud of the achievements of his regiment, and he was absent from it no longer than the nature of his wounds made necessary, and no one was afterwards in that part of the army heard asserting that colored soldiers would not fight. They had by their valor on the field destroyed a prejudice that had been hampering army operations; they had shown that there was no excuse for with-holding their enlistment and organization for combat troops in the war.

Having routed the enemy and driven them several miles beyond the scene of conflict, General Blunt recalled his troops about two o'clock in the afternoon and went into camp on the battle field, where he remained until five o'clock the next evening, collecting the wounded and burying the dead of both sides, and resting his men and animals.

After having destroyed the tents and camp equipage of one regiment, fifteen wagons, and all the depot buildings and the supplies in them which he could not use, he returned to Fort Gibson to await re-enforcements from Southwest Missouri, having accomplished the purpose of the expedition, that is, to strike General Cooper's force and beat it and demoralize it before the arrival of re-enforcements under General Cabell from Arkansas.

In this engagement, General Blunt reported his loss 17 killed and 60 wounded, and that he took 77 prisoners, one piece of artillery, one stand of colors, and 200 stands of arms. He also reported that his troops buried 150 Confederate dead, and that they had 400 wounded.

General Cooper reported his loss at 134 killed and wounded; he attributed his defeat to the worthless condition of the powder his troops used, stating that on a damp morning or in damp weather it became paste-like and

would not ignite, and that just before the battle opened, a hard shower of rain came up and wet the ammunition of some of his men, who were obliged to return to camp and have it replaced with dry powder. In the operations that day, he had eight regiments and two squadrons of cavalry, to General Blunt's three regiments and three battalions; but to make up for inferiority in numbers, General Blunt had eight field pieces and four howitzers, to General Cooper's one four-gun battery.

General Blunt made his movement just in time to escape a hard struggle or possible defeat. The roar of his guns had been silent only three or four hours when the advance of General Cabell with a brigade of more than two thousand Arkansas cavalry and four pieces of artillery, was reported to General Cooper as coming in sight from the direction of Fort Smith.

Even with this substantial re-enforcement, his troops were too much scattered and demoralized to be brought into action without re-organization, which would require some time, and the combined Confederate forces retired south of the Canadian River where they encamped until July 22d, when, under instructions from General Steele, they took up a position at Prairie Springs fifteen miles southeast of Fort Gibson, south of the Arkansas, with the view of moving still closer to that place on the arrival of re-enforcement of a brigade of Texas cavalry under General Smith R. Bankhead, who was reported on the march north from Red River.

While waiting for General Bankhead's brigade, the desertions from Cabell's brigade became so alarming and demoralizing that the Confederate commander deemed it advisable to move back again to the south side of the Canadian, which terminated the threatening attitude of the Confederate forces in front of Fort Gibson to prevent re-enforcements and supplies from reaching that place.

CHAPTER XVI

FEDERAL OCCUPATION OF FORT SMITH

The fall of Vicksburg, the defeat of Generals Holmes and Price at Helena, and the organization of an expedition against Little Rock under General Steele, enabled General Schofield to make new dispositions of his forces in Southwest Missouri; to push operations and occupy Western Arkansas, and to re-enforce General Blunt at Fort Gibson so that he could take the offensive against Confederate Generals Steele and Cooper, who were concentrating their forces south of the Arkansas.

Brigadier General John McNeil was assigned to the command of the District of Southwest Missouri, with headquarters at Springfield, about the middle of July, relieving Colonel W F Cloud, who desired to go into the field with such troops as could be spared from that district, to participate in the general advance being made by the forces in that department. The Colonel had led his regiment, the Second Kansas, through the battle of Wilson Creek in August, 1861, after the fall of Colonel Mitchell, and he was known as one of the most active and energetic officers in the Army of the Frontier, and was given a brigade with instructions to move through Northwestern Arkansas, thence to Fort Gibson to re-enforce General Blunt. He arrived at Cassville the latter part of July, where he spent a few days preparing his command to move south. On leaving that place his brigade consisted of the Second Kansas Cavalry, the First Arkansas Infantry, and two sections of Rabb's Second Indiana Battery. At Bentonville he was advised by General McNeil that Colonel Catherwood, commanding the Sixth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, and Major Eno, commanding a battalion of the Eighth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, who were completing an expedition against Colonel Coffee in McDonald county, had been instructed to report to him, and that with the forces under his command, he would report to General Blunt

at Fort Gibson and co-operate with him in a movement against the Confederate forces south of the Arkansas. He arrived at Fort Gibson on the 21st of August, and crossed the Arkansas with General Blunt's forces to commence operations against the Southern forces under Generals Steele and Cooper, then south of the Canadian River. Before leaving Cassville he desired to clean out the Southern partisan bands in Southwest Missouri and Northwest Arkansas and not leave them as a menace to General Blunt's line of communication between Fort Gibson and Fort Scott. Before relinquishing command at Springfield, he had been informed of the death of Major Tom Livingston of the Southern Partisan Rangers of Jasper county on the 11th of July at Stockton in an attack on the Missouri Militia at that place. He knew also of the successful expedition of Colonel Catherwood against Colonel Coffee's Southern Partisan bands of several hundred men, who were attacked at Pineville by the Union Militia and completely routed, with the loss of sixty to seventy killed, wounded and prisoners, and the loss of their trains and supplies, and he felt that he could now safely march to re-enforce General Blunt without leaving any threatening hostile forces in his rear. He also had reason to hope that Colonel Harrison at Cassville would be ordered back to Fayetteville in a short time.

When the forces from Southwest Missouri under Colonel Cloud joined him, General Blunt had an effective strength of about forty-five hundred men south of the Arkansas, and General Steele had an effective strength, counting General Bankhead's brigade, which was in supporting distance of nearly nine thousand men. But at this time the Southern forces in the Indian country were becoming badly demoralized and of very low morale. There were still many desertions from General Cabell's Arkansas brigade and the Indian forces of Cooper's brigade, were lacking in interest and indifferent in executing the parts

of the service assigned to them, and there also appears to have been a want of harmony among the general officers, which afterwards became more acute, which no doubt in some measure affected the morale of their troops.

Having received re-enforcements of General Cabell's and General Bankhead's brigades, and reorganized General Cooper's forces, General Steele felt himself strong enough to challenge the Federal forces at Fort Gibson to battle by moving his command up to within fifteen to twenty miles of that post and now on the arrival of Colonel Cloud, General Blunt was in fighting mood again and determined to immediately cross the Arkansas, advance south and attack the Confederates, and if possible make the result more decisive than the battle at Elk Creek. With his forces thus united, and strong in artillery, he advanced rapidly to attack General Steele, who, he had assertained from his scouts, had concentrated all his troops on the south side of the Canadian, sixty miles south of Fort Gibson, prepared to make a stand and a fight to the last extremity.

On arriving near the place where he supposed General Steele would be in position to give him battle, he found that the Confederate commander had retreated and divided his force; that he had ordered General Cabell, with his brigade, in the direction of Fort Smith; that Steele had himself retired with Cooper's command of about five thousand men, southwest on the Texas road in the direction of Perryville, and was then encamped about twenty miles distant, waiting further developments of General Blunt's movements. He did not have long to wait.

Although his troops and animals were very much exhausted by two days of almost constant marching, General Blunt determined if practicable, to strike the force under Steele and Cooper and disperse it before it got beyond his reach and before they could remove supplies from their depot at Perryville, and then turn upon Cabell and capture Fort Smith.

He halted his men a few hours to feed and rest and give them an opportunity to make coffee and eat from the rations they had brought along in their haversacks, and at three o'clock in the morning of August 25th resumed the march in pursuit of the enemy on the Texas road, and about ten o'clock his advance met a company of Choctaws formed in the timber, having been detached to watch the movements of the Federal forces. In the skirmish that took place, four of the Southern Indians were killed, and their captain captured, from whom General Blunt obtained important information in regard to the strength and disposition of the Confederate forces in his front. In the continued pursuit the Federal advance came up with General Steele's rear-guard several times that afternoon and exchanged shots with them. They made very little effort to hold the Federal troops until their advance arrived before the little town of Perryville at eight o'clock that night. In front of the town the Confederate commander had posted part of his force and two howitzers in the timber commanding the road upon which the Union troops were advancing, with the view of detaining them until his trains could get out of the way.

When General Blunt's advance came up and approached the timber they could not see the Confederates and their howitzers, which were loaded with canister, and opened fire upon the hostile force, wounding four men. This resistance brought up the four companies of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry and their two howitzers, and the men were dismounted, every fourth man holding horses, and deploying to the right and left of the road, they advanced up to within two hundred and fifty yards of the barricades which the Confederates had hastily constructed, and opened fire upon them with their Sharps' carbines by moonlight. In a few moments the two howitzers of the Sixth were brought up at a gallop and went into action, and after throwing about a dozen shells into the position of

the Confederates, they retreated, leaving a large amount of commissary and quartermaster stores to fall into the hands of the Union soldiers. General Blunt, who was in advance, entered the town with his troops and found it was a regular military post and an important depot. It was the only point between Boggy Depot and Northfork for furnishing supplies for the Confederate forces, and as nearly every building contained Confederate property, he ordered the burning of the place, after keeping out such supplies as he could use. He also captured and destroyed a large amount of enemy clothing at Northfork, on the Canadian. His troops and animals had marched about forty miles that day and were too much exhausted as they came up to continue the pursuit during the night over a rough road and timbered country, with advantage. He had, however, by the destruction of the Confederate supply depots at Northfork and Perryville, crippled his adversary almost as much as if he had defeated him in battle. His movements were rapid, overcoming all obstacles, and having pursued the Southern forces under General Steele into the southern part of the Indian Territory, and having destroyed his supply depots in that section, the General determined to lose no time in marching against General Cabell in the vicinty of Fort Smith before he could get re-enforcements.

At Perryville the General found it necessary to make new dispositions of his troops. He ascertained that General Steele had with him at that place only a small part of the two Cherokee regiments, and that nearly all the two Creek regiments were with Colonel McIntosh on the Upper Canadian in the western part of the Creek Nation, and to meet the situation, he sent Colonel Judson with the troops and artillery of his own district, which he had brought from Fort Gibson, in pursuit of McIntosh, and took the troops and artillery of Colonel Cloud's brigade from Southwest Missouri, and started for Fort Smith to attack Gen-

eral Cabell, who had three regiments and three batttlions of cavalry, one regiment of infantry and one battery of artillery for the defense of his position on the Poteau River, nine miles southwest of Fort Smith.

In the march from Perryville to the vicinity of Fort Smith, a distance of upwards of one hundred miles in four days, the men and horses of Colonel Cloud's brigade were put to the severest test of physical endurance, for they had been constantly marching for three weeks, and a good deal of the time day and night; but they had been uniformly successful in routing the foe, and they bore their hardships with cheerfulness and without complaint.

General Cabell was kept informed of the movements of the Federal forces, and anticipating that they would probably turn upon Fort Smith after giving up the pursuit of Steele, he kept out scouts as far west as the San Bois on the roads leading to Perryville and Fort Gibson, to give him timely notice of the approach of hostile forces. He also by felling trees blocked up the roads and fords above his position, and the Poteau bottom road, leading to Fort Smith, to retard the movements of the Federal forces as much as practicable.

He ordered Colonel L. L. Thompson's regiment of cavalry to occupy a position near Scullyville and to picket the road the Federal troops would probably advance upon, and so certain was he that he would be attacked, that he ordered the public property at Fort Smith to be loaded into a wagon train and sent to the rear of his position on the Poteau and on the road to Waldron.

He had barely completed these dispositions when, on the 30th of August, General Blunt's advance came upon and exchanged shots with the Confederate scouts a few miles west of the San Bois, and kept in sight of them at intervals during the day until he went into camp that evening, twelve miles west of Scullyville. He rested his men and animals until about midnight, when he moved

forward again, and about two o'clock in the morning struck the Confederate pickets, who, after a short resistance, were obliged to fall back upon the regiment under Colonel Thompson near Scullyville, with the loss of one man killed and several wounded.

The Federal cavalry under Colonel Cloud pushed forward close upon the retiring pickets, and after some skirmishing, forced Colonel Thompson to retreat from his position in the direction of the main force under General Cabell, at the crossing of the Poteau River. In retiring he formed his men in line several times during the day, but they did not stand until the Federal cavalry approached within firing range.

With scarcely a halt, General Blunt's troops arrived that evening within three miles of General Cabell's position and encamped. It was too late to make an attack that day, and he knew that after a night's rest, his troops and stock would be more efficient in going into action. Before attacking, he also desired to reconnoiter the Confederate position, so that about dark Colonel Cloud took a small force, and driving in General Cabell's outpost, captured a Confederate soldier who was able to give some information of the enemy position, and continuing to advance, penetrated nearly to the river, and within three hundred yards of the Confederate battery, when he received a number of rounds of shell and canister from it, and volleys of musketry from the dismounted troops in his front. The firing on both sides lasted nearly an hour, but in the darkness it appears to have been ineffective, as no casualties were reported on either side. This attack, however, had a depressing effect on the nerves of the Confederates.

A night attack, the rapid movements of the Federal troops and their audacity and uncertain numbers, determined General Cabell to abandon his position without a fight, and his troops commenced to retire that night shortly after nine o'clock, almost as soon as the skirmish with Colonel Cloud had ended.

Having refreshed his troops with sleep and rest and food, and having received no information of the movements of his adversary during the night after the skirmish, at daylight General Blunt advanced with his cavalry, infantry and artillery to attack the Confederate position, but soon found that the enemy forces had retreated, giving him a bloodless victory. The pursuit of the enemy was commenced immediately. After crossing the Poteau River the Federal troops soon struck the trail of the Confederates, and found that after retreating a short distance in the direction of Fort Smith they had turned southeast in the direction of Jenny Lind and taken the road on which General Cabell had sent his train to Waldron in Scott county, a mountainous region in which it would be difficult for the Union forces to keep up the pursuit. It was decided at once, however, by General Blunt to detach Colonel Cloud with the Second Kansas Cavalry and a detachment of the Sixth Regiment, Missouri State Militia Cavalry, and two sections of Rabb's Second Indiana Battery, to take up the pursuit of the retreating Confederate forces, while he, the General, with his escort and the First Arkansas Infantry, marched to Fort Smith and occupied the post and city without opposition, on the evening of the first of September.

It had been quite a task for the Confederate commander to collect the public property of every description at Fort Smith and have it loaded into wagons and the trains started on the road to Waldron. It had hampered the movements of his troops in his retreat, and enabled Colonel Cloud to come up with the Confederate pickets at Jenny Lind and skirmish with them until they fell back upon the main force at Backbone Mountain, sixteen miles southeast of Fort Smith. On finding that he was being pursued by the Federal forces, General Cabell formed his troops on the side of the mountain near the road, with his artillery in position to command the road and the ap-

proaches, and posted Colonel Monroe's regiment, Arkansas Cavalry in ambush at the foot of the mountain, with instructions to open fire upon the foe the moment he came within gun-shot range.

There was brush and timber along the side of the mountain sufficient to conceal the regiment in ambush, and when the Federal advance came dashing up, the Confederates fired a volley into it, killing Captain Lines of the Second Kansas and several of his men and wounding twelve others, and bringing the column to a halt until assistance could come up.

At this critical moment Colonel Cloud brought up his cavalry and artillery, when a fierce contest commenced between the opposing batteries, which lasted for three hours, both sides using freely shell and solid shot, with no decisive results. Then the Colonel dismounted part of his cavalry, and with the assistance of his howitzers, drove Monroe's regiment from their position at the foot of the mountain and up the mountain side, back upon Cabell's line of battle.

After the retirement of Monroe's regiment, one battalion and three regiments of Confederates broke, and in running, ran through General Cabell's provost guard, and carried off with them eighty prisoners, most of whom were Union men whom he was holding under sentence of death for treason and desertion.

Probably no one believed it was because the men of those regiments were frightened by the sound of battle that they ran, but because they were Union men and did not wish to fire upon their friends, or be placed in a position to be shot down by them, for General Cabell stated that those regiments were composed of men who were deserters from other regiments, and men who had been conscripted and forced into service.

This action at Backbone Mountain practically closed offensive operations of the Federal forces in the Indian country and Western Arkansas for the year. General

Cabell continued his retreat to Waldron, arriving there the next day, where he found his ox train hauling his ammunition. He reported his loss in the action with Colonel Cloud, five killed, twelve wounded, and an unknown number missing.

On the retirement of the Confederate forces, Colonel Cloud at once occupied the field, extended his pickets, collected his killed and wounded, received deserters from the Confederate service that evening, who accompanied him to Fort Smith the next morning. He reported his loss two killed and twelve wounded, and that he took thirty prisoners.

Arriving at Fort Smith he found General Blunt sick. The General directed him to assume command of the forces there. The Union men from the mountains and Union men who had been conscripted into the Confederate army and deserted came flocking into the post in large numbers, from fifty to seventy-five miles south of the Arkansas River, many of whom enlisted at once into the Arkansas regiments that were being recruited for the Federal service.

These Unionists were generally known as "Mountain Feds," a name given to the Union men who collected in the mountains in considerable numbers to resist Confederate conscripting officers who were hunting them down and taking them away to put them into the Southern army. It had been difficult up to this time for the Unionists in the mountains south of the Arkansas River to reach the Federal lines.

To those who were familiar with the situation, it was not surprising that Confederate officers met with the trouble they complained of in making such men fight to establish a form of government whose corner stone was slavery, an institution in which they had no sympathy or interest, and whose leaders and supporters regarded them with indifference, and socially as inferiors, having nothing in common with the aristocratic class.

There was probably no section of this country that had a more honest class of men than these same hardy mountaineers who voluntarily came into the Federal lines and enlisted in the Union army, and they made excellent soldiers. No charge of cowardice was ever brought against them, for they felt that they were fighting for a cause and a government that recognized equal rights and equal opportunities among men.

Having participated in all General Blunt's operations in the Indian country south of the Arkansas during the month of August, ending in the capture of Fort Smith and the action at Backbone Mountain, September 1st, Colonel Catherwood, with his regiment, the Sixth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, was ready to return to the District of Southwest Missouri, as soon as re-enforcements arrived from Fort Gibson.

He had been for more than a month since leaving Missouri, constantly marching, scouting and skirmishing with the enemy, his men without tents or a change of clothing and part of the time on short rations, and on representation of the situation, and on the arrival of re-enforcements, he was relieved by General Blunt on the 8th, and returned to Missouri, having lost only two men killed and two wounded in the action at Backbone Mountain, during the expedition. His regiment made an enviable record in the operations of General Blunt's forces in that campaign.

Confederate officers considered Fort Smith the key to operations in the Indian country, and its capture by the Federal forces made a deep impression upon the Southern people of that section. For a week after Colonel Cloud's arrival at that post, his office was thronged every day with Union men and deserters from the Southern army from every direction in that section, who came in to express their devotion and loyalty to the Government, and who wished to inform him of the happenings in their

neighborhoods. Many were deeply affected by the friendly and sympathetic greetings of men representing the strong arm of the Government.

He ascertained from these people that there was a Confederate force of about two hundred men at Dardenelle, one hundred miles down the Arkansas River. He desired to cut off this force from joining Price, or disperse it, besides his information led him to believe that an expedition into that section would do much good in encouraging the Union men to organize for their own defense. In this belief he was not disappointed.

A re-enforcement of part of the Second Colorado Infantry having arrived to strengthen the force at Fort Smith, the Colonel took two hundred men of the Second Kansas Cavalry under Captain Mentzer, and a section of the Second Indiana Battery under Lieutenant Haines, and on the morning of September 9th started out on the march for Dardenelle, through a hostile country, partly occupied by hostile forces.

The news of the Federal occupation of Fort Smith spread through the country, and on the march down he was joined by about three hundred Union men, who were assembled on one day's notice, cheering and enthusiastic for the Union, and an odd feature of it all was, that several officers and about one hundred of these men had opposed him at Backbone Mountain, under General Cabell, only a few days before, and some of them were still wearing the Confederate uniform and Confederate beltplate.

These Unionists were organized into six companies, and with this re-enforcement he continued his march to Dardenelle, and on arriving there found a Confederate brigade under Colonel R. Stirman, Arkansas Cavalry, estimated at one thousand strong, with four pieces of artillery. He made a vigorous attack upon this force, and after about three hours fighting the Confederates retreated down the river, leaving two hundred head of cattle, a large amount of wheat and flour and other commissary supplies to fall

into his hands, besides capturing one captain and twenty privates as prisoners.

Colonel Cloud was a man easily approachable, stood little on his dignity as a commanding officer, mingled freely with all classes, chatted pleasantly to all who came to him, and made them feel that all were equally interested in the Union cause, which championed the rights of the plain people, and he easily won their respect and confidence. His position as commander of a regiment, and sometimes of a brigade, had brought him in close relations with commanding generals and prominent men, and his wide experience and keen observations had given him command of language, so that he could make an interesting address on impromptu occasions, usually introducing some humorous incident.

He was at Dardanelle three days; he was the first Federal officer who had been there during the war, and as his fame had out-traveled his movements, a committee of Unionists called on him and desired to know if he could find it convenient to address them at a meeting arranged for that evening, and he accepted the invitation, and when the people assembled, he was introduced to the audience by a prominent man of that section, who, in a few introductory remarks, stated that the people were glad to have the opportunity of honoring and hearing from him; that they had heard of his achievements in the military operations in Southwest Missouri, Northwest Arkansas and the Indian Territory for more than a year; that it was a keen pleasure to have so distinguished an officer of the Union among them, and that he could probably give them accurate information in regard to important events in recent operations.

The Colonel rising to speak, thanked the chairman for the complimentary remarks he had made, and acknowledged and appreciated the distinguished honor the Unionists had conferred upon him by inviting him to speak, and of the pleasure it gave him to find so many Unionists in that part of the State; that henceforward they could rely

on the Government to assist and support them in their struggle for liberty and justice, and he hoped that it might have their loyal co-operation.

He was the only officer of his rank in the Army of the Frontier who had long dark hair falling down over his shoulders. It gave him a rather dashing appearance, and probably would make him better remembered by soldiers and people for many years to come than any other officer, and continuing his address he went on to relate important events in recent operations of the army. He stated that he had just received information that Federal General Steele captured Little Rock on the 10th, and that General Price's army was in full retreat in the direction of Arkadelphia; that General Blunt in his recent operations had crossed the Arkansas at Fort Gibson and defeated Generals Steele and Cooper at Elk Creek, and later pursued them nearly to Boggy Depot, captured their supply depots at Northfork and Perryville and turning upon Cabell, had driven him from Fort Smith and defeated him at Backbone Mountain.

He touched upon the persistent efforts of Southern leaders to misrepresent Union officers and soldiers and their ideals and characters, to make the Southern people bitter toward them, without any justification, and related an incident that came under his notice at Fort Smith where he was boarding in a private family. He stated that the lady, the boarding house keeper or hostess with whom he boarded, he knew was a strong Southern sympathizer, but treated him with courtesy and proper consideration; that he made it a point to make the people feel at ease in all business relations with him, when they knew as a matter of fact his "mailed fist," could make them feel very uncomfortable; that a niece of the lady with whom he boarded frequently came over to see her, and was introduced to him, and was not slow in letting him know of her bitter feeling towards all Northern men, and told him that she would want a permit and pass to go south; that she could not live under Yankee rule. The Colonel told his audience

that he took her raillery good-naturedly, and replied that he would give her a permit to go South when she desired it, but added that she might like the Federals better when she got better acquainted with them; that she admitted if they were all as nice and gentlemanly as he, she might, but did not think she could stand it long to live under Federal authority. He further told his audience that he thought no more about the matter until a short time afterward, when his hostess invited him to a wedding on a certain evening, and on inquiring in regard to the parties, was told that one of the contracting parties, the lady, the bride-to-be, was her niece, who was so determined on going South when the Federal troops came in, and that the groom was a soldier in his command; that he graciously accepted the invitation, attended the wedding and kissed and danced with the bride, which brought hearty applause.

The Colonel had at one time been a Methodist preacher, and in his concluding remarks to his audience, told them that courtesy and gentleness of conduct towards our opponents when we are in the ascendant would do more to disarm their opposition and bring them over to our side, than words of abuse and harsh treatment, and that until the struggle shall have ended, every man should ask himself the solemn question, "What am I fighting for, more liberty and justice, or less liberty and justice? If the South succeeds, will her government improve my condition, give me greater opportunities for happiness than under the Federal Government? If not, why support the Confederate cause?"*

Having heard of the occupation of Little Rock by General Steele, the Colonel determined to open up communication with the Federal forces at that place, and taking one hundred men of his regiment, the Second Kansas, left Dardenelle and started down the river on the march for that purpose, arriving there on the 18th, and reported to General Steele the successful operations of General Blunt and the occupation of Fort Smith.

*"A Day with Colonel Cloud," in manuscript.

The Arkansas River was usually navigable for light draft steamers to Fort Smith the greater part of the year, and if the Federal forces could control the river above Little Rock, it would be of very great importance in bringing up supplies for the troops operating from Fort Smith and Fort Gibson; it would save transporting the supplies by wagon trains from Fort Scott, a distance of more than two hundred miles, through a section in which they were liable to attack at any time.

The Federal occupation of Fort Smith and Little Rock did not lessen the operations of the Southern Partisan bands in Western Arkansas and in the western counties of Missouri, but rather increased their activtities, for when the Confederate forces of General Price were driven from Little Rock, and he was holding no particular place, he relieved many Southern Partisan leaders who were with him, and they returned with their followers to the scenes of their former operations in the western counties of Missouri.

In many instances these Partisan leaders, each with a small number of followers, from a half dozen to fifty had remained in Western Arkansas and the counties of Western Missouri during the summer, and kept the Federal authorities busy in hunting them down and dispersing them. Among the most noted of these leaders was Quantrill, whose operations were mostly confined to the counties of Jackson, Lafayette, Johnson and Cass, in Western Missouri. He had returned from Northern Texas to those counties early in the spring, and was able to concentrate under his command the companies of different Partisan leaders, to the number of two, three and four hundred men, well mounted and equipped.

On the 21st of August, the country was startled and horrified by the raid of this bandit leader, with three or four hundred men, on Lawrence, Kansas, and the massacre of one hundred and fifty of her people, and the loot-

ing and burning of the city, and his escape with small loss, to the thickly wooded region of the counties he had infested during the summer, was very disappointing to the loyal people of that section.

This barbarous act of the Southern Partisan bandits in marching forty miles through Kansas and looting and burning and massacreing a large number of the people of the principal city of the State, aroused deepest indignation in every section of it, and in the mass meetings called and addressed by General Lane, then United States Senator, and other leaders, strong resolutions were adopted, favoring the immediate invasion of Missouri by the people of Kansas en masse, and the burning and destruction of everything in the two western tiers of counties.

It required all the tact, good judgment and firmness of General Schofield, commanding the Department, to prevent the carrying into effect the resolutions. He issued orders to the commanding officers of troops in the border counties of both States, strictly forbidding the passing of citizens or militia organizations from one State into the other, and finally restored tranquillity in that respect. He knew that at least one-half of the people of the western counties of Missouri were Unionists, and had furnished their quotas of volunteer regiments, then at the front, besides regiments of loyal militia who had been active in their operations against Southern Partisan bandits. Many Kansans could not get over the idea that all Missourians were of the kind that invaded Kansas in Territorial days.

Where the people were divided in their views on the issues of the war, as they were in Missouri, Arkansas and the Indian country, it was difficult for the loyal militia and Federal forces operating therein to prevent the organization and concentration of hostile forces in the rear of the Federal lines, for they often returned from the South to their neighborhoods in parties of twos, threes, or more in numbers, with an understanding where they should meet

their leaders, and after making a raid on some unprotected place, or an attack on a small Federal detachment, disperse, after making an arrangement for another meeting at an appointed place and date.

These small concentrations were generally in or near the neighborhoods in which most of the families were Southern sympathizers, and it was a problem as to whether the families should be removed so as to leave no inducement for the Southern men to stay near them, ready to be called upon at any moment for active movements against the Federal forces.

CHAPTER XVII

THE BAXTER SPRINGS MASSACRE

In the early part of September, General McNeil sent an expedition from Springfield under Colonel Harrison, First Arkansas Cavalry, of three hundred men, including a section of Stark's First Arkansas Battery, into McDonald county, Missouri, and Benton County, Arkansas, to break up and disperse Confederate detachments under Colonels Coffee and Hunter of Missouri, and Captain "Buck" Brown of Arkansas, operating in those counties and in the eastern part of the Cherokee Nation. On moving to Pineville, he received information that the enemy were concentrating at Elk Mills, five or six hundred strong; he then marched down Elk River to Elk Mills, and near there, drove in the Confederate pickets upon the main force in line in a dense thicket a mile west of Enterprise, and commenced shelling them and the reserve in town, and after some skirmishing between the belligerent forces, the Confederates retreated south without much damage, and were ready to join Colonel Shelby at Bentonville when he encamped there on the 29th, in his raid through Western Arkansas and Missouri.

General Blunt having closed a brilliant campaign in which he defeated the Confederate forces of Generals Steele and Cooper at the battle of Elk Creek and drove them into the southern part of the Indian Territory, and in which he captured Fort Smith and dispersed General Cabell's forces, returned to Fort Scott, September 23d, for the purpose of arranging the affairs of his district so that he could remove his headquarters to Fort Smith, which would be near the scene of his operations during the autumn, and enable him to co-operate with Federal General Steele in holding the line of the Arkansas River and in any aggressive operations they might plan.

The reports of his successful operations had already reached Kansas, and the energy and good judgment he had uniformly displayed had made him very popular with

the people of the State, so that he was given a warm reception by the citizens and soldiers at Fort Scott on his arrival at that place. Before leaving Fort Smith he had made such disposition of the troops at that post, Webber's Falls and Fort Gibson as would, by proper vigilance of the commanding officers of those stations, secure the tranquillity of the section which had recently been wrested from Southern domination. He believed that it would be several weeks before the demoralized forces of Steele, Cooper and Cabell could be sufficiently reorganized to take the field again, on account of the great loss of supplies of different kinds they had sustained in the recent campaign, and the low morale of their troops. On his arrival at Fort Scott he found that the excitement in regard to the Lawrence massacre and the talk of invasion of Missouri by General Lane with the armed citizens of Kansas, to search for the stolen property taken by Quantrill during his raid had not entirely subsided.

The operation of General Ewing's **Order Number Eleven,** depopulating the border counties in his district as far south as Vernon county; the destruction of property in these counties; the removal of the Southern families from those counties, and the daily reports of conflicts with guerrilla bands were subjects of general interest and discussion.

There were persons of Southern sympathies who condemned the issuing of that order, but it was almost universally approved by the people of Kansas, and though it did not contemplate the wholesale destruction of property, yet most of the farm houses and barns with the forage stored in them, were burned and destroyed in those counties after the families were removed.

General Schofield and General Ewing were both officers of humane feelings and would have conducted the war with as little suffering and inconvenience to the noncombatant population of Southern sympathizers as possible, provided they strictly observed an attitude of refusing aid

and comfort to the enemy; but atrocious acts of the Southern guerrillas in Missouri made many conservative Union men and Federal officers in favor of adopting severe measures against the outlaws and their allies, the Southern sympthizers. No honorable man would violate the hospitality of his host.

There were at that time few persons who stopped to think that the loss of life and property at Lawrence was small in comparison with the loss of life and property suffered by the Unionists in Missouri, for in nearly every neighborhood in that State Union men were murdered and their property taken or destroyed by guerrillas and Confederate raiding forces.

Scouts sent out by Colonel Charles W Blair, commanding the post of Fort Scott, in the counties of Western Missouri, to secure information in regard to the movements of Southern Partisan bands, reported to him several times of their intended raid on that post; but by his vigilance the raids were always averted.

During the war the Government buildings were around a plaza flanked on three sides by high precipitous bluffs and could not be easily approached by cavalry or infantry except from the south, and to hold up the advance of an enemy from that direction there were two blockhouses with portholes, and stockades around them, also with portholes, and later there were three lunettes with emplacements for their three thirty-two pounder siege guns in commanding positions to sweep the ground in front for half a mile or more, should the enemy make an attack. There were also detailed soldiers well drilled to man the guns, should the necessity arise.

As Fort Scott was the base of supplies for the troops operating in the Indian Territory and Western Arkansas, there were large quantities of Government supplies for the army kept there and made it a place of special importance, and at times there were serious apprehensions felt for its safety, for the demands for troops as escorts to

trains and for scouting purposes frequently reduced the force there to three or four hundred men, barely sufficient in number to man the guns and hold the blockhouses and stockade in case of attack.

There were Southern sympathizers from Missouri trading in Fort Scott nearly every day. They were generally women and had no difficulty in ascertaining when there was a marked depletion of troops at the post, and it was frequently asserted that some of these women not only carried information of the movements of troops to the enemy, but also supplies of different kinds, particularly quinine and other medical supplies.

During August and the early part of September, a Confederate force estimated at not less than five or six hundred men under Colonels Coffee and Hunter, had been in Southwest Missouri, Northwest Arkansas and along the eastern line of the Cherokee Nation, threatening General Blunt's supply line between Fort Scott and Fort Gibson; and though this hostile force had several times been attacked and dispersed by the Missouri Militia from Springfield and Neosho, and later by Colonel Harrison of the First Arkansas Cavalry, the leaders were prominent men of influence and were able to rally their men, and it was frequently reported by scouts that they intended to make a raid north through Missouri, and if possible, enter the border counties of Kansas, for the purpose of plundering the people and destroying their property.

Nearly all the Union families at and around Fort Scott had moved out of the western border counties of Missouri, or into the military stations in those counties, and a Southern force could easily march from the Arkansas line to within a few miles of Fort Scott without causing alarm. The families living on their farms in those counties were mostly the families of Southern soldiers or Southern Partisan bands, and naturally would not give information concerning the movements of Southern forces.

There were several companies of Missouri State Militia stationed at Neosho and Carthage, and by their activity in that section made it unsafe for Southern Partisan bands to let their presence be known in a neighborhood for more than a day or so; but there were no Federal troops or Militia stationed in Barton, Vernon or Bates counties, east and southeast of Fort Scott, and it was generally known that the bandit forces of Quantrill and Jackman passed through those counties in their movements south from the Missouri River counties, or in returning from the south to the Missouri River counties.

With a few scouts kept well in advance, when the bandits were passing through the country by rapid marches, it was by mere accident if they were met by Federal scouting detachments, so that the chances were largely in favor of the movements of the outlaws going many days without coming to the knowledge of commanding officers of Federal forces in the field or at posts.

A company of the Third Wisconsin Cavalry was stationed at Dry Wood, twelve miles south of Fort Scott, where there was a stockade, which would enable them to hold the place if suddenly attacked by a superior force; a scout of two or three men from the station was usually kept out in Vernon and Barton counties to watch for and secure information of the movements of the enemy, passing either north or south.

Colonel Williams, commanding the First Kansas Colored Regiment with a section of the Second Kansas Battery, was encamped at Baxter Springs during the spring, but the later part of June left there to re-enforce the supply train for Fort Gibson, leaving the place about two months without troops. It was within ten to fifteen miles of a thickly wooded region in Jasper county Missouri, that had been notorious for concealing the movements of Southern Partisan bands, and the constant passing of supply trains, escorts, and messengers over the Military Road

from Fort Scott to Fort Gibson, a distance of one hundred and sixty miles, through a country almost uninhabited at that time, made it very important that there should be established at Baxter Springs a military station so fortified that it could be held by a small number of troops against any force likely to make an attack upon it.

The situation appealed so strongly to Colonel Blair, commanding the District of Southern Kansas and the Post of Fort Scott, that on the 17th of August he ordered Lieutenant John Crites, with his company of the Third Wisconsin Cavalry, to Baxter Springs, and a short time afterwards Lieutenant R. E. Cook, with a company of colored recruits for the Second Kansas Colored Infantry, was ordered to re-enforce him.

There was not a more beautiful site on the Military Road for a camping ground than at Baxter. From the early days of the war, it had been a noted camping ground for the Federal troops operating in Southwest Missouri and the Indian Territory; it was convenient to wood and water; the spring of pure water, near which the troops generally encamped, was about half a mile north of the State line, a quarter of a mile west of Spring River, and a few rods east of the Military Road from Fort Scott to Fort Gibson.

The ground was open around the camp; the timber along Spring River extended to near the Military Road, so that the spring was almost in the edge of the prairie, near the head of the hollow that deepened and widened until the Spring Branch fell into Spring River, that flowed due south at that point.

After arrival with their commands, Lieutenants Crites and Cook started and completed the construction of a blockhouse a hundred yards or so southeast of the Spring Branch on high ground, but for some reason or other they removed this blockhouse to the north side of the Spring Branch, a hundred yards perhaps northeast of the spring on the sloping side of the hollow.

To give the position additional strength against an attack of a superior force, they constructed a line of breastworks made of earth and logs, extending around the north, east and south sides of the blockhouse, the west side being unfinished and open. There was sufficient room inside of the breastworks for the soldiers, their tents, their supplies and animals.

The latter part of September reports came to Colonel Blair of the unusual activity of the Southern Partisan bands in Northwest Arkansas and Southwest Missouri, which induced him to order Lieutenant J. B. Pond, Third Wisconsin Cavalry, to march with his company and one twelve pounder howitzer from Dry Wood to strengthen the station at Baxter Springs, and on arrival there October 5th, being the senior officer present, assumed command, and put his men to work to strengthen his position, and to extend the breastworks on the north and south sides to accommodate the re-enforcement he had brought down.

In his march north on his expedition to Missouri from Arkadelphia, Colonel Shelby came into collision with a detachment of the First Arkansas Infantry, Union, south of Ozark, Arkansas, and in the skirmish that took place several of the Federal detachment were killed, wounded and captured, and the commander of the detachment in reporting the affair to the commanding officer at Fort Smith, was led to believe that Shelby's force was much larger than it really was, and thought it was a movement of a part of Price's army against Fort Smith.

After driving the Confederate forces of Price from Little Rock, General Steele was not prepared to follow up their pursuit to Arkadelphia, and the Federal commander at Fort Smith thought it very likely that Price would take part of the troops he had with him in the vicinity of that place, and such of the troops of Generals Cooper and

Cabell as could be rallied, and commence immediate and active operations against the Federal forces in Western Arkansas.

Having reliable information of Shelby's rapid movement north with artillery, and other reported Confederate movements in front, the Federal Commander at Fort Smith despatched messengers to General Blunt, detailing the situation to him as it then appeared, a situation that required the immediate attention of the Department Commander, if all he had recently gained was to be held.

On October 3d the couriers arrived at Fort Scott with despatches, and General Blunt at once commenced preparations to return to Fort Smith with the headquarters of his district for the purpose of concentrating and making such disposition of his troops as might seem necessary to meet the threatened attack. No report of Shelby's movement north of the Arkansas River had yet reached General Blunt, although Shelby was at that moment in Southwest Missouri, with fifteen hundred to two thousand men and three pieces of artillery.

Colonel Blair, commanding at Fort Scott, was in almost daily communication with General Ewing's headquarters, District of the Border at Kansas City, in regard to the co-operation of their forces, and had received no recent reports of unusual activity of the Southern bandits in that district. It was known, however, by the intelligence department of the district, the Chief of Scouts, that Quantrill had not yet gone south; that his men were scattered in small bands over the district, and were preparing to start south in a short time. He had not up to that time given the Federal troops any trouble in Southwest Missouri or Southern Kansas, and since the Federal occupation of Fort Gibson, small detachments of Colonel Phillips' command had been constantly passing over the Military Road between that post and Fort Scott without any apprehension of meeting with the outlaws.

After the bands of Quantrill had been pursued from Lawrence, and after they had scattered into the thickly wooded regions of Western Missouri, they had not shown much aggressiveness, and only occupied themselves in keeping out of the way of the Federal troops until the latter part of September, when he sent instructions to the leaders of different bands to assemble at a former rendezvous, which was on the farm of Captain Perdee, on Blackwater in Johnson county, a county that had Union Militia stationed at Warrensburg.

In compliance with instructions of Colonel Quantrill, as he signed himself, the leaders of his different bands brought their men together at the appointed rendezvous, and after some discussion it was decided to march south, to Texas, where they proposed to spend the winter, and the next morning, October 2d, at daybreak, his command of between four and five hundred men, well mounted, started, out on their long journey, going into camp that night on Grand River, for three hours for feed and rest.

There were very few people living in the counties through which his command passed, after the issuance of **Order Number Eleven,** and his march south continued for more than three days without his movements becoming known to the Federal officers at any of the stations along the border.

The bandits were pursued relentlessly by General Ewing's troops after the Lawrence Massacre; they lost heavily in killed; they dispersed over several counties, many of them going to their homes or the homes of their friends, and taking with them the loot they had brought from Lawrence, were shot down by the Federal soldiers when found with it. If a Union citizen or soldier fell into their hands on their line of march, he did not live to report the fact, for they boasted they did not take any prisoners. It was a grim and desperate fight on both sides.

On their march south through Vernon county, on the night of October 4th, the bandits captured and killed two soldiers of the Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry, stationed with their company at Fort Scott, who were permitted to go home to visit their families in that county for a few days, before going south with the next supply train as part of the escort.

There were several persons who were near and saw the outlaws, but who escaped from them and came into the post and reported what they had seen, which caused an alarm that night and the calling out of the troops and the strengthening of the pickets on all the roads leading into the post from the east.

The threatening situation at Fort Smith, according to his latest advices, gave General Blunt much anxiety, and having made the necessary preparations for returning to that place with his headquarters, and members of his staff, he left Fort Scott at four o'clock Sunday afternoon, October 4th, with an escort of one hundred men, composed of part of a company of the Third Wisconsin Cavalry, under Lieutenant J. G. Cavert, and part of a company of the Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry, under Lieutenant R. H. Pierce and his brigade band and clerks and orderlies.

Before his departure his brigade band played in front of his headquarters on the plaza, and a good many citizens and soldiers turned out to see him off; it was a clear, lovely afternoon, and many of those present said that they never before heard music sound so sweetly. With members of his staff, band, escort, and train, the General marched out that evening six miles south of the post and encamped until the next morning, when, starting early, he resumed the march to Cow Creek, where he went into camp for the night.

Resuming the march on the morning of the 6th, he arrived about twelve o'clock that day within a quarter of a mile of Lieutenant Pond's camp at Baxter Springs, but not in sight of it on account of intervening higher ground,

and being in advance of his train and escort, for perhaps a quarter of a mile, with members of his staff, halted a few moments for them to come up. At this time and while waiting for his wagons to close up, his attention was called to about 150 mounted men, some three hundred yards to his left, forming in line and advancing from the timber on Spring River.

The situation was puzzling although the movements of the advancing force were such as to arouse the suspicion that they were not friends, the General and members of his staff at first thought that they were Lieutenant Pond's men out on drill, returning from a scout, or out to give him a reception. To ascertain the meaning of this large force approaching from his left front, Captain W. S. Tough, his chief of scouts, rode forward a hundred yards or so to make an examination, and returned in a moment and reported to the General that the men were rebels, and that a fight was going on at Lieutenant Pond's camp.

There was little time afforded to determine who the men were, and General Blunt himself rode forward far enough to hear a brisk firing at Lieutenant Pond's camp, and satisfy himself that the force on his left were enemies, although they were all wearing the Federal uniform. His Assistant Adjutant General, Major H. Z. Curtis, immediately ordered the escort into line facing the enemy, with the wagons and band in the rear, but hesitated to commence the attack of superior numbers. The three companies of bandits on the left of General Blunt were under the immediate command of Quantrill, who had just charged Lieutenant Pond's camp, part of the tents of which were on the west of and on the outside of the fortifications, and who had been driven off and had rallied and reformed on the edge of the prairie about two hundred yards north of the camp. Quantrill had scarcely reformed his three companies in line when he observed General Blunt's escort advancing on the Military Road from the direction of Fort Scott, and at the same time heard sharp firing around

the camp at Baxter Springs where the other half of his command which had gone around on the south side of it were hotly engaged. He ordered these men to join him at once, which they did on the double quick.

Having concentrated his men in front of General Blunt's escort, and seeing from the length of the line that there were less than one hundred men in it ordered his men to fire a volley into them and then to charge, and on approaching within sixty yards, the escort fired a volley into the bandits, but seeing that in another moment they would be surrounded by a force that looked like a regiment, turned in flight over the prairie.

It was then a race for life with the men of the escort. General Blunt and his Assistant Adjutant General, Major Curtis, vainly endeavored to rally the men; but it was impossible to rally them against such vastly superior numbers in the open prairie, and the bandits closed in on them, and in the pursuit of two or three miles, shot down and killed all the men overtaken wounded, or captured, except about half a dozen who feigned death after they were terribly wounded. After a flight of about a mile and a half, General Blunt succeeded in rallying fifteen men of his scattered escort, with whom he kept off at a distance the bandits who were pursuing him, and even turned upon them, causing them to retire upon their main force. Reflecting on the further course he should pursue, he determined to send Lieutenant J. E. Tappan, one of his aides-de-camp with five men, back to Fort Scott, with instructions to Colonel Blair to send forward at once re-enforcements of all the men who could be spared from that post, and with the other nine men he watched the movements of the bandits until they left the field about five o'clock and moved off south on the military road in the direction of Fort Gibson.

In the excitement of the moment, Major Curtis, who had become separated from General Blunt after the escort broke, had his horse shot in the hip while riding beside

Lieutenant Pierce, which so excited or disabled the animal, that in jumping a ravine, it fell, throwing the Major over its head, when he was captured and shot. His new uniform, with gold lace and regulation buttons, made him a conspicuous mark for the outlaws.

Determined to let no part of the escort escape, even though unarmed, part of the bandits turned their attention to murdering the teamsters with the wagons, and the members of the band.

During the excitement of the bloody scenes around him, the driver of the band wagon, with the members of the band in it, endeavored to escape in a direction different from that taken by the escort; but after getting about half a mile away one of the wheels came off the wagon, and it was soon overtaken by the bandits, and all the members of the band, fourteen in number, and the driver and James O'Neal, special artist for Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper, were murdered, shot through the head, and their bodies thrown into or under the wagon and the wagon set on fire, so that some of them were found to be horribly burned and disfigured, when the killed and wounded were collected.

No sense of honor or humanity was shown by the bandits for in many instances where the soldiers were closely pursued, they were told that if they would surrender they would be treated as prisoners of war; but in every case the moment they surrendered and were disarmed, they were shot down, sometimes even with their own arms in the hands of the bandits.

Having heard nothing of Quantrill's operations in that section, and the large force he was commanding, led many of the Federal soldiers to believe that it was a regular Confederate force, and that the promises of fair treatment would be respected, otherwise they would have sold their lives as dearly as possible, and the bandits would have had a heavier list of casualties than they had at the end of their bloody and fiendish work.

While Quantrill was being re-enforced by that part of his command which had attacked Lieutenant Pond's camp on the south and southwest sides, Major Henning, Provost-Marshal on General Blunt's staff, rode forward a few yards in advance of the General until he came to the crest of the ridge and in sight of the camp, to reconnoiter, so that when the bandits opened fire and advanced on a charge, he and Captain Tough were so far on the right of the Federal line that the difficulty of reaching Lieutenant Pond's camp seemed less than rejoining the escort.

Having witnessed from the crest of the ridge the break in the line of the escort, and the failure of General Blunt and Major Curtis to rally the men, Major Henning and Captain Tough dashed forward and arrived at the camp in safety, but in doing so passed several bandits who had not reached their line in time to participate in the charge, and exchanged shots with them killing one and wounding another and rescuing several prisoners.

Major Henning at once saw Lieutenant Pond and urged him to collect all his cavalry and go to the immediate assistance of General Blunt and the escort; but unfortunately all the available mounted men at the station had that morning been sent out with a forage train and had not returned. With keen disappointment at finding that the cavalry were nearly all absent from the station, and that there were not enough of the Colored Infantry, being less than a full company, to engage on the open prairie the superior forces of the bandits with any prospect of success, the Major took half a dozen mounted men from the camp, and with Captain Tough returned to the high ground on the prairie where the escort had first formed, in time to witness the last scene of the bloody tragedy, the murdering of the members of the band, and the plundering of the train of the valuable effects of the officers and soldiers.

It was ascertained that the alarm at Fort Scott the night General Blunt left, was caused by Quantrill's force

passing some fifteen miles east of that post that night, and the belief of the parties who saw them that they intended to attack that place. Instead, however, of going to Fort Scott, the bandits continued their march nearly south, bearing a little west all the time, and marching almost on a parallel line with General Blunt, the lines of march of the two forces converging to a point at Baxter Springs. When Captain Brinker, commanding Quantrill's advance, arrived near Baxter Springs, about twelve o'clock, he halted and reported a train ahead. He immediately received instructions to press on and ascertain to whom the train belonged and what troops were with it. Advancing at a brisk pace, he soon came in sight of Lieutenant Pond's camp which he supposed was the camp of the train, and finding that he was not discovered, fell back a hundred yards or so until the main command came up.

All unconscious of danger, it so happened that at the time Quantrill's advance came up in sight of the Federal camp, most of Lieutenant Pond's men were at dinner, and others were strolling about camp, or in the woods near camp. There was no picket or camp guard out to give warning of an approaching foe, so that when Quantrill came up with his main force to where his advance halted, he formed his men in column by fours and ordered them to charge the camp, leading the head of the column himself.

In the charge the bandits saw several of the Union soldiers who were between the camp and the river, and fired upon them, and it was these scattering shots that attracted the attention of some of the soldiers in camp; but before they could get inside the fortifications and to their arms, the outlaws were all around and in camp, firing desperately with pistols and carbines, and receiving from the defenders shot for shot until they were driven out. In the conflict in camp, Sergeant W. L. McKenzie, Third Wisconsin Cavalry, was among the first of the men to hear the hostile

shots in the direction of the river, and hastened to Lieutenant Pond's tent to arouse him and to give the alarm of the nearness of the enemy. At this moment the colored soldiers, who were eating their dinner under a shed or an arbor a few yards south of the breastworks on the south side of them, started for their quarters in the blockhouse, where they had their arms and ammunition, when they heard and saw the bandits coming up on a charge and firing at the soldiers near camp.

It was under great difficulties that the Federal soldiers were rallied for making a stubborn fight. Lieutenant Pond and some of his men who were in the western part and on the outskirts of the camp were obliged to pass through the ranks of the bandits to get to their arms, and four of his men were shot down in endeavoring to accomplish this task. It took only a few moments, however, after the white and colored soldiers were rallied to drive the bandits out of the breastworks and out of camp.

While the struggle was going on in and around the camp, Lieutenant Pond got his twelve pounder howitzer to work, which was outside the rifle pits on the north side, and after a few rounds of canister, drove the bandits beyond range of that side, and when the colored soldiers got into the blockhouse, they kept up such a hot fire that they drove the bandits beyond range or to seek shelter behind trees.

The Union soldiers realized the desperate nature of the conflict, and a desultory and sometimes sharp firing was kept up between them and the bandits until Quantrill ordered that part of his command south and southwest of the camp to join him where he had formed line in the edge of the prairie north of the camp to attack General Blunt's escort in line facing him.

When the Union soldiers saw this movement of the bandits, as the latter passed around the west side of the camp to the south side, they supposed that the enemy were preparing for a more determined attack, and a few

moments later when they heard the firing between them and the escort, they did not know what it meant until Major Henning and Captain Tough dashed in.

Having completed their bloody work of murdering all the prisoners and wounded Federal soldiers who fell into their hands and stripping most of them of their clothing, and plundering the train, the bandits formed in line of battle on the prairie west of camp, and Captain Todd was sent by Quantrill under a flag of truce to demand the surrender of the station, which was, of course, refused by Lieutenant Pond. Todd also spoke about an exchange of prisoners; but Lieutenant Pond had not captured any of the bandits, and those who were wounded near camp were carried away, or managed to get away before the arrival of the flag of truce.

The question of attacking the camp again was debated by Quantrill and his officers, but finding that the troops were fortified, that they had one howitzer, that they would be better prepared than in the first attack, and that it would be a fight to the death with them, they concluded that it would cost them too great a sacrifice of life to attempt to take the camp by assault. They therefore marched off south about five o'clock, taking their wounded along and some of the most important trophies that fell into in their hands.

Their movements were watched by General Blunt with a few men whom he had rallied, keeping in sight of them until they had crossed the Neosho River, when he returned to Lieutenant Pond's camp at Baxter that evening and awaited the arrival of Colonel Blair with troops from Fort Scott. Mindful of the danger to the troops at Fort Gibson and vicinity, of being surprised by the outlaws, the General put scouts on their trail, and dispatched couriers to the commanding officers at Fort Gibson and Webber's Falls, directing them to be on the lookout for the bandits, and if possible intercept them at the Arkansas River.

On the departure of the bandits from the field, the work of collecting the dead and wounded was commenced. They were scattered over the prairie for nearly two miles from the scene of the first attack. Lieutenant Cook, commanding the company of the Second Kansas Colored Infantry, and several soldiers were killed east of the camp before they could get to their quarters; Lieutenant A. W. Farr, Third Wisconsin Cavalry, Judge Advocate on General Blunt's staff, was killed near where the escort first formed and received the charge of the enemy.

The Federal loss in the disaster was three officers, sixty-seven enlisted men, and ten citizens killed, and eighteen enlisted men wounded, including the killed and wounded in the fight at the camp. Lieutenant Pond reported that the bandits left eleven men killed on the field, number of wounded not known.

Nearly all the soldiers and citizens of the escort who were killed were found to have been shot through the head, and most of them had been shot five or six times, thus showing the fiendish character of the outlaws.

According to Quantrill's report to General Price, he left a trail of murder through the Indian country until he arrived at the camp of General Cooper in the Choctaw Nation.

After giving Lieutenant Pond instructions to strengthen his position at Baxter, General Blunt with the troops under Colonel Blair, returned to Fort Scott to look after the safety of that post, as Colonel Shelby was then making his raid north through Missouri, and it was thought that he might send a part of his force to attack the Federal stations along the line of Missouri and Kansas.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE SHELBY RAID—OPERATIONS IN INDIAN TERRITORY

One of the principal events in the fall of 1863 was Shelby's Raid into Missouri. After Price's army was driven from Little Rock, the General detached Colonel Shelby for an expedition into Missouri, with a picked force of six hundred men from three regiments and three pieces of artillery, for hostile operations and to secure recruits for the Southern army.

With this force the Colonel left Price's army on the 22d of September, and forded the Arkansas River near Ozark. From this point his progress north was rapid, and on the 30th he encamped at McKissick Springs, Benton county, where he was joined by Colonel Hunter, of Vernon county, Missouri, with two hundred men. He then marched to Pineville, Missouri, where he was joined by Colonel Coffee, of Dade county, with four hundred men.

He now had a veteran force of twelve hundred well mounted men and three pieces of artillery, and was able to successfully attack and reduce any fortified position held by the Union Militia in Southwest Missouri. His advance north had been so rapid and without opposition that no reports of his movements had reached the commanding officers of stations in Southwest Missouri, until he was before them and preparing to attack.

His first offensive movement, after receiving his reenforcements, was against Neosho, where two or three companies of Union Militia were usually stationed, using the brick court house, whose walls were pierced for loopholes, for defense if attacked by a superior force of the enemy. Captain McAfee of the Sixth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, was there at the time with three companies of his regiment, and a few Enrolled Missouri Militia under Lieutenant Waters, in all about one hundred and eighty men.

On leaving Pineville early on the morning of the 4th

of October, Colonel Shelby divided his command into two columns, one under Colonel Coffee to advance on the Buffalo road and approach the town from the west, and the other column under Colonels Gordon, Shanks, Hunter and Hooper to advance north on the Neosho and Pineville road and approach the town from the south.

Captain McAfee had arrived at Neosho about eleven o'clock that day from Newtonia to join Major King of his regiment in the field, supposed to be in the neighborhood of Pineville, and marching out on the Buffalo road, met Coffee's men about two miles out. They commenced to form line, then retired a short distance and commenced to move around his left in the direction of Neosho. Captain McAfee then fell back to town and entered it on one side while the enemy entered it on the other. In a few moments there was lively firing between the belligerent forces. Captain McAfee finally drove the enemy back out of range, but they soon advanced again, and at the same time his attention was called to bodies of the enemy moving upon the town in different directions, and believing it impossible to cut his way out, he ordered his men to occupy the court house, and he fought them from that position until they had shot four cannon balls through it, when Shelby sent in a flag of truce demanding the surrender of the place.

Captain McAfee had a few of the Missouri Enrolled Militia in the court house with him, and also a number of Union citizens, and in the parley under the flag of truce, agreed to the terms of surrender, provided all were treated as prisoners of war. Colonel Shelby at first refused to treat the Enrolled Militia as prisoners of war, but finally agreed to do so, and the whole force of about 180 Militia and citizens were surrendered and paroled that evening, losing all their baggage and equipage.*

*The writer's father was one of the Union men captured in the court house. He was told he was listed for execution. He exchanged his coat and hat with a soldier and slipped out and escaped.

Captain McAfee reported the Union loss four killed and four wounded, and the Confederate loss five killed and nine wounded. Lieutenant Waters and one man of the Enrolled Militia were killed after they were paroled by Coffee's men.

From Neosho Shelby marched to Sarcoxie, Greenfield, Stockton and Warsaw on the Osage, without any serious opposition. The information of his capture of Captain McAfee's force at Neosho, and his march north from that place with a large force of fifteen hundred to two thousand men and three pieces of artillery, was conveyed quickly to the commanding officers of the Federal forces in Southwest Missouri, and messengers sent to the commanding officers of stations on his probable line of march, to be on the lookout for his advance, and not to attempt to engage him, but to retire with all their supplies and equipments.

It was the consensus of opinion of the Federal officers in Southwest Missouri that Shelby's first objective was the Missouri River counties in Central and Western Missouri, and that immediate steps should be taken to concentrate all the available Union forces south of the Osage at points favorable for intercepting his return march south for they knew that the Union commanders of the Districts of Central and Western Missouri, would be advised of his movements after crossing to the north side of the Osage, and be able to concentrate their forces in suffient number to engage and defeat him, and possibly capture and break up his organization and prevent him from taking a large amount of loot or captured property out of the State with him.

General Brown, commanding the Ceneral District of Missouri, and General Ewing, the Western, were advised by General Schofield, the Department Commander, of the movements of the Confederate forces north, and they con-

centrated their forces and gave Shelby no rest after his forces crossed to the north side of the Osage, until they were defeated, demoralized and driven out.

General Brown assumed command of the troops of his district in person, and directed their movements in all operations against the enemy from the time they entered his district until they were driven out of it. His active troops in the field were the First, Fourth and Seventh Regiments Missouri State Militia Cavalry, and part of the Ninth Regiment of Missouri Enrolled Militia, and Captain Thos. Carr's Battery, First Missouri State Militia Light Artillery. A running fight was kept up with Shelby's forces for several days, when General Brown, who was in pursuit, directed Colonel Lazear of the First Missouri State Militia Cavalry to take his regiment and march on a road direct to Marshall, to head off the enemy, which he did. He had been in position only a short time when Shelby's whole force came up and commenced the attack at eight o'clock with artillery and the mounted men of several regiments.

Colonel Lazear's command was made up of five hundred men of his regiment, the First, Major Kelley's Battalion of the Fourth State Militia Cavalry, Major Gentry's battalion of the Fifth Provisional Regiment, Missouri Enrolled Militia, and a detachment of the Ninth Provisional Regiment, Missouri Enrolled Militia, under Captain Wear, and two guns of Thurbur's Battery, a total of 1,020 men. Colonel Lazear was determined to hold the enemy until the arrival of re-enforcements under General Brown.

The Confederates made desperate efforts to fight their way into town, but Colonel Lazear's forces repulsed them every time they advanced for more than two hours, when General Brown came up with Colonel Philips' Seventh Missouri State Militia Cavalry and two pieces of Thurbur's Battery, and attacked the Confederates in the rear and flank breaking their line and capturing their best gun.

After the Confederate line was broken, the main force under Colonel Shelby retreated rapidly north in the direction of Miami, and was hotly pursued by Colonel Phillips with most of his regiment and the battalions of Major Kelley and Major Gentry, and forced to abandon their train of plunder and ammunition. After passing through Waverly on the Missouri River, they turned south, still pursued by Colonel Phillips until Colonel Weer, Tenth Kansas Infantry, of General Ewing's District, passed to the front and took up the pursuit, later to be relieved by Colonel Lazear, First Missouri State Militia Cavalry, from Marshall, who continued the pursuit to Warrensburg, where General Ewing came up with part of his forces.

That part of the Confederate forces under Colonel Hunter, which was cut off from the main force in the action at Marshall retreated east and in a southeast direction, and was pursued by Colonel Hall of the Fourth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, with part of his regiment, until he lost their trail near Duroc, on the Osage River.

The two columns of the Confederate forces, after they crossed to the south side of the Osage River, were pursued by the Federal forces of Southwest Missouri, and by General Ewing with part of the forces of his District of the Border, far into the Boston Mountains in Arkansas, in a demoralized condition.

Very soon after Colonel Hunter crossed to the south side of the Osage, he was vigorously pursued by Major Austin A. King, Jr., commanding detachments of the Sixth and Eighth Regiments, Missouri State Militia Cavalry. He had been watching the fords of the Osage in the vicinity of Warsaw, and when he ascertained that the Confederates had crossed the Osage below him he marched rapidly and overtook their rear guard and had a running fight with them to Humansville, where he captured their last piece of artillery that they brought into the State, with forty rounds of ammunition, besides killing three of their men.

When Shelby returned with his command to Price's army near Washington, in southern Arkansas, on November 3d, there was no menacing Southern force between the Missouri and Arkansas Rivers. His expedition was probably more beneficial to the Union than to the Confederate cause. The loss of his artillery and his loss in killed and wounded could not possibly have strengthened the morale of his friends in Missouri, or the Confederate troops at the front. He claimed to have gained a few hundred recruits, but they were men who belonged to Southern Partisan bands, that the Unionists of Missouri and Arkansas were glad to get rid of. It was certainly a boon to the Unionists to have the forces of Colonels Coffee and Hunter, and the remnant of Livingston's band, removed from Southwest Missouri and Northwest Arkansas and the eastern part of the Cherokee Nation, where they had been operating the latter part of the summer, in spite of a number of expeditions of Federal forces sent against them.

After Shelby's expedition into Missouri, there was some readjustment of Federal troops and commanders in Western Arkansas. Colonel Harrison of the First Arkansas Cavalry, who had taken part in the operations against Shelby, reoccupied Fayetteville on the 18th of October. General McNeil, who had been in command of the District of Southwest Missouri, and who pursued Shelby through the mountains of Arkansas to Clarksville on the Arkansas River, arrived at Fort Smith on the 30th, and assumed command of the District of the Frontier in compliance with orders from General Schofield.

The country between Cassville, Fayetteville and Van Buren had been so thoroughly purged of Southern Partisan bands that General McNeil reported the completion of the Telegraph line to the latter place in the early part of November, giving him direct communication with Department headquarters at St. Louis.

After Quantrill marched south from the Baxter Springs massacre, there was almost three months of undisturbed peace and quiet in the Indian Teritory north of the Arkansas River; but south of the river in the Choctaw Nation there came a ripple of excitement among the Federal troops at Fort Smith, Fort Gibson, and outposts at Webber's Falls and other points, caused by the hostile movements of Confederate General Steele, commanding the Southern forces in the Indian country, the latter part of October.

Hearing of Shelby's successful expedition into Missouri, and without waiting to hear of the denouement, and on receiving the re-enforcement of General Bankhead's Brigade of Texas Cavalry, General Steele undertook the reorganization of his forces with the view of capturing Fort Smith. He concentrated his forces at Northfork, worked out the plan of surprising and capturing the Federal force at Fort Smith, and advanced within thirty-five miles of that place with his brigade of Indians and brigade of Texans under General Gano, in all a total force of three thousand mounted troops and a battery of artillery. He made out the orders to each of his brigade commanders, assigning them to the positions they were to take with their troops in making the attack. General Cooper reported to him that the distance was so great that he could not reach the position with his Indians in the prescribed time to be effective.

General Steele then moved his command around to a position twenty miles south of Fort Smith, and was preparing to make the attack from that quarter when he was struck by a severe rain and snow storm which interrupted operations. The commanding officers of companies and regiments of the Texas brigade came to him in a body and informed him that their men were suffering for want of adequate clothing, and that under such conditions it was impossible to keep them together.

While these operations of the Confederate commander were in progress, he received information of the arrival at Fort Smith of General McNeil with re-enforcements, and whose scouts had discovered and reported to him the Confederate movements and threatened attack, all of which impressed General Steele with the futility of making it.

The Texas Brigade was withdrawn and marched to Boggy Depot to receive their clothing, after which they were ordered to take up a position near the Arkansas line about seventy-five miles south of Fort Smith, and the whole command being out of flour and other breadstuffs, General Steele retired to Doaksville, in the Choctaw Nation, taking part of the Indian troops with him, and sending the balance under General Cooper to Boggy Depot.

After the Federal occupation of Fort Smith, the commander of the District of the Frontier kept a strong outpost at Waldron, about fifty-five miles southeast in Scott county, which was between that post and Price's army, which had retreated from Arkadelphia and was in the vicinity of Washington and Camden.

Colonel J. M. Johnson, First Arkansas Union Infantry, and Lieutenant-Colonel O. A. Bassett, Second Kansas Cavalry, with a section of Rabb's Second Indiana Battery, were sent to Waldron and occupied the place for some time, sending scouting detachments to the vicinity of Arkadelphia and Washington to keep in touch with Price's army, and into the Choctaw Nation to watch and secure information of the movements of General Steele's forces.

There were many Unionists who came into the Federal lines at Waldron from the mountainous region of Southern Arkansas, and were sent to Fort Smith where most of those fit for the military service enlisted in the companies and regiments being organized from that State.

It was too late in the season to expect navigation on the Arkansas River before the next spring. Shelby's raiding force had recently forded it at Clarksville showing that

it was not then navigable for light draft steamers and was not likely to be during the winter. This left the Federal forces in Western Arkansas and Indian Territory in a situation which required that the supplies should be brought down by wagon transportation from Fort Scott by way of Fort Gibson to Fort Smith, a distance of more than two hundred miles. This was a long distance to transport in wagon trains supplies for the army including forage for the animals, in mid-winter.

It was a tremendous task, and made it practically impossible for the Federal commander at Fort Smith to undertake any aggressive operations from that place until spring, or until he could receive his supplies by steamer from Little Rock.

The Military Road from Fort Scott to Fort Gibson was over a prairie region except where it crossed the streams, and if the winter was severe, the icy blasts from the north were certain to cause much discomfort, and even suffering, among the teamsters and soldiers of the escort, and their mounts and train animals. Baxter Springs and Fort Gibson were the only stations between Fort Scott and Fort Smith.

As early as the tenth of November, the Marmaton River at Fort Scott, and nearly all the streams in Southern Kansas, were frozen over almost solid by the first cold wave, which extended south beyond Fort Gibson into Northern Texas. A large train with an escort was ready and started south in the midst of this cold wave, the temperature going down to nearly zero, and the soldiers and teamsters and animals not only suffered from the cold, but had great difficulty in getting water on account of the ice being so thick on the streams. Fuel, too, was difficult to obtain for warmth at many of the places where the escort and train encamped.

As the train and escort were moving south, they did not suffer as much discomfort from the cold as if they had been moving north, facing the cold northwest wind. In

a few days, however, the weather moderated, making it more endurable to the men and animals passing over the bleak prairies en route.

When another train and escort started south from Fort Scott to Fort Smith, about the middle of December, the ice had not entirely left the rivers and streams, and on the 18th, another cold wave spread over the country of the middle west, followed by a heavy snow, and when the trains arrived at Fort Smith in the early part of January, the Arkansas River was frozen over with ice about a foot thick, or thick enough to pass over the heavily loaded wagons of the train and the teams, and the artillery and caissons. It would be difficult to describe the sufferings and discomforts of the soldiers, teamsters and animals in transporting supplies to the army at Fort Smith that winter.

With a Federal force of fifteen hundred to two thousand men of all arms at each Fort Smith, Fort Gibson and Fayetteville, with scouts and reconnoitering parties constantly kept out in all directions, the movements of a most certain to be communicated to the commander of one certain to be communicated to the commander of one of of those posts in a very short time.

The Cherokees who had entered the Confederate service under the leadership of Colonels Watie and Adair, and whose country was north of the Arkansas, had been kept south of that river during the last year, except when on raiding expeditions and were impatient to return to their homes to remove their families south or provide for their necessities during the winter. The Confederate authorities had not kept their promises to prevent the occupation of their country by the Federal forces, and they were greatly discouraged by the turn of events.

After the greater part of the Southern Indian forces had retired with Generals Steele and Cooper to the southern part of the Choctaw Nation, Colonel Watie had kept

his Cherokees as near the borders of his country as practicable, and when he saw an opportunity, determined to make an expedition into it, which would give many of his men a chance of visiting their families until their presence became known to the Federal commanders whose forces were operating in that section.

About the middle of December, Colonel Watie, with some three hundred well mounted Cherokees crossed the Arkansas River below Webber's Falls, and on the 22d passed through Cincinnati, on the State line, marching north in the direction of Maysville. A Union citizen whose house this Indian force passed reported the fact at once to Colonel Harrison, at Fayetteville, and reported also that his information was, the Indians were going to concentrate at Colonel Watie's Mill west of Maysville, where they would stop a few days and then return south; that the purpose of the expedition was to remove the Southern Indian families out of the Nation.

In the early part of the month, Colonel Phillips directed Major Foreman of the Third Indian Regiment to take his battalion of that regiment and move to Rhea's Mill in Arkansas, about sixty miles northeast of Fort Gibson, to operate the mill in making meal and flour for his command, and receiving information from his scouts that Colonel Watie was preparing to attack the Major with a superior force, ordered Captain A. C. Spillman of the Third Indian to re-enforce him with three hundred men and a howitzer, from the First, Second and Third Indian Regiments with an ample supply of ammunition.

In the afternoon of the 17th, Captain Spillman moved out of Fort Gibson on the Parkhill Road, and on arrival at that place, ascertained that Colonel Watie's men had just looted the house of a loyal Cherokee and left, marching in the direction of Illinois River, his force estimated at from 500 to 800 mounted men. Having obtained reliable information of the movements of the enemy, Captain Spillman pushed on and encamped about mid-night at the

crossing of the Illinois River, feeling that he was very near the hostile force in his front. Resuming the march the next morning up the Barren Fork of the Illinois, he was soon approached by two small parties of five and ten men of the enemy, and firing upon them, killed one, the others escaping, as his force was dismounted and he could not pursue them.

He was satisfied that the enemy was near, and moving forward about three quarters of a mile up the stream, his advance reported the Southern Indians in force ahead, and after some reconnoitering, found the hostiles formed in line in a thickly wooded ravine, dismounted, their right resting on the road, and their left extending up the ravine to the hill on the right of the road. Having ascertained the position of the enemy, he brought up his howitzer under Captain Willets, supported by 95 men of the First Indian Regiment on the right of the road, and then deployed the Cherokees under Lieutenant Parsons of the Third Indian Regiment to the right of the howitzer to the foot of the hill. Without waiting for the completion of his preparations, the Southern Indians opened a heavy rifle fire upon his line, which was replied to by volleys from his men, and several rounds of shell and canister from his howitzer, which broke the enemy line, causing them to retire to a new position and attempt to make a stand. They were, however, quickly driven from their new position when the Union Indians advanced and opened fire upon them with their rifles and shell and canister from their howitzer. The Southern Indians showed some persistence and rallied again to be driven from their position by the rifle fire and a few rounds of shell and canister from the howitzer of the Union Indians, and were finally routed and made no further attempt to rally and continue the fight.

Captain Spillman had no mounted force with which to push his advantage over the routed enemy, and continued his march to Rhea's Mill to re-enforce Major Fore-

man. Colonel Watie moved his men north in several detachments to his mill on Spavina, and after spending a few days in that section collecting provisions and making arrangements to move Southern Indian families south, retreated to the south side of the Arkansas, and made little further trouble north of the river during the winter.

In all military operations the ranking officer present of any body of troops, may assume command. If there are two or more officers of the same rank, the officer holding the oldest commission becomes the ranking officer by virtue of seniority of rank and may assume command without regard to his qualifications. His juniors in rank, even when better qualified by training for commander, were subject to his orders. There were many general officers appointed by the President from civil life on account of their prominence in political affairs, and there were Regular Army Officers promoted to general officers on account of their military training at West Point, or who had been promoted from the Volunteer Army in the Mexican War, and from early in the war there were frequent charges made by the friends of the Volunteer Officers, that Regular Army Officers who had been promoted to the same rank, but were junior in rank by virtue of their commissions, did not always loyally co-operate with them in military operations, to the serious detriment of the service and interest of the country.

It was also charged that Regular Army Officers who had been promoted to commanding generals in the field, or of Departments, did not always desire to see their subordinate Volunteer commanders eclipse them by skillful and vigorous operations that attracted the attention and applause of the country.

Major General Schofield, commanding the Department of the Missouri, had been promoted from the Regular Army, and his subordinate, Major General Blunt commanding the District of Kansas and the Indian Territory, had been promoted for distinguished services, and it was

talked by very many of the people of Kansas and asserted in newspaper articles, that the Department commander had relieved his District commander on the 18th of October, because he had been winning too many laurels, having just completed a brilliant campaign in which he had defeated Generals Steele and Cooper in the battle of Honey Springs or Elk Creek, and pursued their demoralized forces far in the direction of Red River after destroying their supply depots at Northfork and Perryville, and then turning back and capturing and occupying Fort Smith, and communicating with General Steele at Little Rock.

The newspapers of Kansas and General Lane and other politicians of the State bitterly denounced General Schofield's policy of dealing with the guerrilla bands in Western Missouri after the Lawrence Massacre, and endeavored to have the President remove him. His firm stand, too, and issuing orders against the invasion of the Western counties of Missouri by the citizens of Kansas, to look for their property taken by Quantrill, was also denounced by the politicians, but approved by sober minded people everywhere in the State.

While General Blunt was a friend of General Lane, Senator from Kansas, he had taken no part in the wild talk of burning everything in the Western counties of Missouri, and it was generally felt that he had not been treated fairly by the Department Commander at the close of his brilliant campaign in the Indian Territory and Western Arkansas.

In the administration of a Department, General Schofield probably had few superiors. He had been connected with military operations in Missouri from the first year of the war; he had been unfortunate in not being present at the head of his command when a considerable battle was fought; he was in command of a fine army of ten to twelve thousand men in Southwest Missouri and Northwest Arkansas until a short time before the battle of Prairie Grove, when he returned to Springfield, and there were some reports that he was sick, and some that he wasn't.

He knew that General Hindman was concentrating his forces for an advance north of the Boston Mountains, and officers of the Army of the Frontier claimed that he should have been with them at the head of his troops. He rejoined them soon after the battle when they were returning from an expedition from Van Buren, and after they destroyed the Confederate supplies and transportation, steamboats at that place, but could not properly enjoy any of the prestige and military glory won by Generals Blunt and Heron in these operations in closing the campaign.

It was by the indomitable energy and good judgment displayed by General Blunt in these successful operations that won him the promotion of Major General. He was always right up to the front when there was any fighting to be done, and his soldiers had confidence in him and loved him as a fighting officer; he never made any excuses that required urging by superiors.

When he returned to Kansas the latter part of September to remove his headquarters to Fort Smith, the press and the people of the State acclaimed him a hero for his brilliant achievement of having swept the Southern forces to the southern border of the Indian Territory and from Western Arkansas in a campaign of two months; nor was his praise withheld for his brilliant and successful Prairie Grove campaign, with which his present achievements were compared by those familiar with his military operations.

While he was receiving these songs of praise and adulation from the press and people of his State, General Schofield was receiving from the same sources the bitterest denunciation for his "incompetency and imbecility." He was a Regular Army officer and a graduate of West Point. He had for three years as a general officer held important commands in Missouri, Arkansas and Indian Territory, and did not have a single military achievement to his credit that would test his fitness to command in the face of the enemy.

Feeling deeply the injustice which had been done him, General Blunt did not fail to give to the public his view of the causes which had led to his removal from the command of his District, and in a short time afterward General Schofield was removed from the command of the Department of Missouri.

As a general proposition, everyone knows that Regular Army officers, graduates from West Point, are better qualified to handle troops in the field than Volunteer officers who have had very little, if any, intensive training prior to their service; but special training does not constitute all that makes a successful officer in the military service. He must use common sense and judgment and a will to meet danger in all the forms incident to military service in time of war.

After General Blunt organized his forces at Fort Gibson and crossed to the south side of the Arkansas River and by his swift and powerful blows struck and defeated the combined Confederate Indian and White forces of Generals Steele and Cooper at Elk Creek and Perryville, and pursued them in utter demoralization almost to Red River, capturing and destroying their depots of supplies, and then turning back and driving General Cabell from Western Arkansas and capturing and occupying Fort Smith, it left the chiefs and leaders of the hostile Indian warrior tribes in amazement and deep discouragement at the quick turn of events.

When they had sufficiently recovered from the profound gloom and despondency into which they had been thrown, and ventured an attempt to analyze the situation, they decided to hold a conference of the chiefs and leaders of the Southern factions of the warrior tribes, for a discussion of their troubles and to formulate their grievances for the purpose of laying them before the President of the Southern Confederacy, and to outline a policy for the future as far as practicable.

At all great crises in the affairs of men there has always been some chief mover, some leader, who was looked to by men of lesser influence, for suggestions, advice, and to give his views in regard to the proper steps to be taken for the common welfare, and when the conference was opened, Colonel Watie, chief of the Cherokee faction, was called upon to address the members. He arose and said in substance:

"Chiefs and leaders of the Warrior Tribes: It is with a heavy heart that I rise to perform the solemn duty you have imposed upon me. Evil times have fallen upon us and our people. The troops of the enemy have been occupying the country of my people for a year, and they are now occupying the greater part of your country, and Fort Smith and Western Arkansas, and I do not see any present prospect of arresting their progress south to Red River. You know they have come like a whirlwind and swept our forces from Elk Creek, Northfork and Perryville, and captured and destroyed our supply depots at those places, leaving us neither arms, ammunition, food nor clothing, which we had been collecting with the greatest difficulty. Our people have become discouraged and indifferent. Many of our warriors have returned to their homes and are hiding out, or gone over to the enemy. When by treaty stipulations we pledged our allegiance to the South, the agents and officers of the Confederate Government told us that we would organize our men for the Confederate service, we would be furnished with arms, ammunition, clothing, food supplies and equipments, and that white troops would co-operate with us in defending our country and preventing its invasion by the enemy; yet you know that our warriors have been poorly armed, with few exceptions, and furnished with worthless ammunition, and have received but little clothing, being part of the time almost naked, without hats, shoes, and their clothing in rags. We have had to depend upon the country most of the time for our food supplies, and the promised protec-

tion from invasion of our country by our enemies has not been made good; nor have our people suffering for the common comforts of life been regularly paid their annunities, as under the Old Government with which we gave up our treaty obligations; that in the spring a force of hostile Indians and negroes and a battalion of white troops from Kansas, numbering about two thousand, took possession of Fort Gibson and have since held and fortified the place without any effort being made to dislodge them, when it was known we had three times as many troops as they, who were two hundred miles from their base of supplies."

Continuing, the speaker said: "Chiefs and leaders of the warrior tribes: You know we have lived up strictly to our treaty stipulations. We have performed our part; we have even gone out of our country to defend it; the people of my country devoted to the South have been robbed of nearly everything they possessed. They are scattered over the Choctaw and Creek Nations and in Texas, and are utterly destitute. Though the commanding General, Steele, has been strengthened by infantry and artillery, the same lethargy and procrastination prevails, and our prospects are more gloomy than ever. The movements of our troops have been around and about, but never against a much inferior foe, and this has produced universal dissatisfaction and despondency. I would therefore propose that we lay the whole distressing situation as I have depicted it, before General Smith, commanding the Trans-Mississippi Department, and the President of the Southern Confederacy at Richmond to determine whether we are to be abandoned or must continue the struggle with our own resources, unaided by our white allies. You know the Confederate Government has done practically nothing to relieve the destitution among our people."

The suggestions of the speaker were approved by the conference and the main points reduced to writing and submitted to the President of the Confederacy the latter

part of December for his consideration. General Steele was relieved of the command of the Department of the Indian Territory at his own request, and General S. B. Maxey of Texas appointed to his place. But the change of military commanders did not strengthen the cause of the Confederacy in the Indian country, and the end of the year found the Federal forces occupying Fort Smith and the territory they had wrested from the Southern forces early in the autumn, with a determination to hold it.

CHAPTER XIX

THE CAMDEN EXPEDITION

At the end of the year the Union Armies had swept the Confederate forces from nearly all the territory of Arkansas and the Indian country south of the Arkansas River nearly to Red River, causing great demoralization and desertions of Southern soldiers by the hundreds in the Trans-Mississippi Department.

There was a feeling among many of the leaders of both sides, shared largely by the people of the country, that the close of the year 1864 would disclose unmistakable indications how the war must end, which side would win in the dreadful struggle.

Taking this view of the situation, early in the year the leaders of each side commenced making preparations for marshalling their resources for making their supreme efforts and for delivering their most powerful blows upon their adversaries, seeking by every possible means to discover their most vulnerable points of attack. From early in the war, Arkansas and the Indian Territory had been so identified in military operations that an advance of either the Union or Confederate forces in the one was followed by an advance in the other, and a retreat or retirement in the one was followed by a retreat or retirement in the other. Not only was this true, but in 1864 there was a close connection between the major and minor operations of the Union and Confederate forces west of the Mississippi River, so that the success or failure in the military operations of either belligerent force was followed by the advance or retirement of that belligerent force along its whole front.

As early as January, General E. Kirby Smith, commanding the Trans-Mississippi Department, commenced reorganizing his forces for more efficient and effective service. He replaced as has been stated General Steele, commanding the District of the Indian Territory, by General S. B. Maxey of Texas whom he was led to believe would

be able to revive the morale of the Southern Indian forces, which had become very low under General Steele, for an often defeated general, whether due to his own inefficiency or want of proper support, is certain to weaken the confidence of his men in him as a commander. They do not stop to consider whether he has used the resources put into his hands to the best advantage in securing success.

General Maxey was hardly warm in the seat of his new position, when he was requested by General Smith to furnish his headquarters, as early as practicable, information of the disposition of his troops. He also called his attention to the importance of keeping constantly and reliably advised of the movements, strength, and as far as possible of the plans or intentions of the Federal forces in his front, and to spare neither trouble nor expense to attain his object.

There was a Grand Council of the Southern factions of the Five Civilized Tribes of the Indian country at Armstrong Academy near Fort Washita, February first, for the purpose of establishing peace and friendship between all the tribes and to unite them all and get them to pledge their adherence to the Confederate cause, and after that to plan a raid on Southern Kansas, and attack Humboldt, on the Neosho River, from the southwest to cause a diversion in favor of the Confederate forces south of the Arkansas River. It was easier, however, to plan such diversions than to execute them as the Confederate leaders found out later.

Nearly all the chiefs and leaders of these Indian Tribes spoke at the council and gave their views of the situation, and generally supported the propositions which were introduced for their consideration by the representative of the Confederate Government. General Maxey, ex-officio Superintendent of Indian Affairs, and Commander of the Southern Indian forces in the District of the Indian Territory, was invited, and addressed the Council as follows:

"Chiefs and Leaders of the Indian Nations: I have been assigned by the Confederate Government to the command of the Confederate forces in the District of the Indian Territory; I salute you as your friend and brother in the desperate struggle in which we are mutually engaged. I beg to assure you that I shall do everything in my power for the happiness and welfare of your people, and to protect and restore them to their homes. But we must first prepare ourselves for the work before us and drive out the invaders who have driven your non-combatant people from their homes and taken or destroyed their property. Before I took command of the Confederate forces in this district, they had been defeated so many times and retired so often that they could not have retired any further south without crossing Red River into Texas. Your troops did not have the confidence in their commander essential to successful operations. We must not retire another step; we must advance and make the enemy retire. Let us advance, and let 'advance' be our watchword all along the line; we can do it; we must do it. General Smith, commanding the Trans-Mississippi Department, has promised to support me with troops and supplies. We confidently believe that his forces will recapture Little Rock, and we must drive out the Federal white and negro troops from Fort Smith, and the renegade Indians and white troops from Fort Gibson and recapture and occupy those places and hold the Arkansas River until we shall be ready to advance to the northern part of the Indian country. And finally, let me appeal to you to advise all your people, except your warriors, who have left their homes, to return and raise crops, part of which we will need for our forces, and for which we will pay you fair prices. You shall soon see the effect of my active, aggressive policy. I shall lose no time in setting my forces in operation; I propose to drive in the enemy outposts at Waldron and at points in the Choctaw Nation. I want your full co-operation in carrying out all movements de-

signed in my plans of ridding your country of the enemy who have insolently trampled upon your rights. We hope to win the war this year; we hear that the enemy people at home are tired of the war to conquer the South and will not support war measures with men and money much longer." *This address of the General had very little effect in arousing the fighting spirit of the Indians; they had been fed on promises too often.

At the opening of the new year, General Grant had not yet been appointed Lieutenant-General and Commander-in-Chief of all the Union Armies; but there had been correspondence between him and General Halleck, the Commander-in-Chief at Washington, and Generals Sherman and Banks, in regard to plans of operations in the campaign to be opened on all fronts as early as practicable. In accordance with the plans agreed upon, General Banks, commanding the Department of the Gulf, commenced preparations for the **Red River Expedition** for the purpose of capturing and occupying Shreveport and using it as a base of operations against Eastern Texas.

The movement was suggested and approved by the War Department and the General-in-Chief, and General Banks was promised the co-operation of General Steele, commanding the Department of Arkansas, with ten to fifteen thousand troops, and General Sherman, commanding the Department of Tennessee, promised the loan of ten thousand men, to co-operate in the expedition up to the latter part of March.

In the plan of operations there were to be three columns converging upon Shreveport within the enemy lines, each column starting from such distant points as New Orleans, Vicksburg, Little Rock and Fort Smith. General Banks, by virtue of rank, was commander of the expedition; his column, 17,000 strong, under General Franklin, left Franklin, Louisiana, and was to be at Alexandria,

*See Vol. XXXIV, Part II, Rebellion Record, p. 960.

on the 17th of March. General Sherman's quota of ten thousand men, under General A. J. Smith, was to form a junction with Banks on the same day, and General Steele's columns from Little Rock and Fort Smith were to join the other columns at Shreveport, or en route, with the navy under Admiral Porter, co-operating.

When the Federal columns were in motion and well advanced in the direction of the common point of concentration, General E. Kirby Smith, commanding the Trans-Mississippi Department, was able to concentrate the Confederate forces and attack either Federal column he considered himself strong enough to defeat.

He met the main columns under General Banks at Mansfield, and after a desperate battle under Federal disadvantages, defeated him and drove back his army to Alexandria, with heavy losses in men, guns and material, with a narrow escape of the gunboats of the Navy, which were caught above the Falls or Rapids at Alexandria, with a rapidly falling river.

In the general movement, General Steele's columns from Little Rock and Fort Smith had advanced after a series of battles with General Price's forces to Camden, when news of the disaster to Banks' army reached him. He knew now that Smith and Price would immediately concentrate nearly their entire forces against him, and that the only safety for his army, would be found in its retirement to Little Rock, where it, with such defensive works as had been constructed, would enable him to hold the victorious Confederate forces at bay. In his retreat to Little Rock, he was pursued by Generals Smith and Price, who brought up their forces rapidly and endeavored to cut him off from Little Rock, and overtook his rear division at Saline River, where was fought the battle of Jenkins' Ferry, resulting in the repulse of the Confederates, which enabled General Steele to continue his march to Little Rock without further trouble, but with the loss of a good

deal of transportation in crossing the Saline River bottom that was partly flooded and a quagmire of swamp.

General Steele's operations in the campaign were known as the **Camden Expedition**, and his army as the **Seventh Army Corps**; the Frontier Division of that Corps under General Thayer, was from Fort Smith, and consisted of troops of the **Army of the Frontier**, with which General Blunt had made the brilliant campaign in the latter part of the summer and autumn of 1863, in sweeping the forces of the Southern Indians and Texans from the Arkansas to the Red River in the Indian country.

The disaster to Banks' army rapidly changed the whole plans of operations from an offensive to a defensive campaign in Arkansas and the Indian country, for General Smith was now able to throw almost the whole of the Confederate forces in the Trans-Mississippi Department against General Steele's forces at Little Rock and Fort Smith, and incidentally against the forces of General Curtis holding Fort Gibson, and those operating south of the Arkansas River. It was at once evident that the Confederate generals would make desperate efforts to force the Federal arms from the line of the Arkansas River.

When General Thayer with the Frontier Division of the Seventh Army Corps left Fort Smith the 25th of March, under orders to join Steele's column from Little Rock en route to Camden and Shreveport to join Banks' Red River Expedition, Colonel W R. Judson, Sixth Kansas Cavalry, was placed in command of the District of the Frontier, with headquarters at Fort Smith, with about three thousand men of all arms, for the defense of the place and for outposts south and on the Arkansas River.

The troops General Thayer took with him consisted of three brigades, two of infantry and one of cavalry; the First Brigade, commanded by Colonel John Edwards, consisted of his own regiment, the Eighteenth Iowa Infantry, the First and Second Arkansas Union Infantry, and Cap-

tain Starks' First Arkansas Light Artillery, six guns; the Second Brigade commanded by Colonel Charles W. Adams, consisted of his own regiment, the Twelfth Kansas Infantry, and the First and Second Kansas Colored Infantry, commanded respectively by Colonels James M. Williams and Samuel J. Crawford, and Rabb's Second Indiana Battery, six guns; and the Third Brigade, cavalry, commanded by Leutenant-Colonel Owen A. Bassett, consisted partly of his own regiment, the Second Kansas and detachments of the Sixth and Fourteenth Regiments, Kansas Cavalry, and two twelve pounder mountain howitzers attached to the Sixth Kansas, in all about five thousand men, nearly all of whom had been in active service more than a year.

On the 23d of March General Steele left Little Rock with three divisions, two of infantry and one of cavalry. The infantry divisions were commanded respectively by Brigadier Generals Frederick Salomon and S. A. Rice, and the cavalry division was commanded by Brigadier-General E. A. Carr, an effective strength of all arms of about nine thousand men, with a complement of field artillery. The immediate objective of the expedition was Camden, but the remote objective was Shreveport, in co-operation with General Banks' Army, which had already commenced the movement from several points. The gunboats of the Navy under Admiral Porter were also moving up Red River in co-operation.

The Confederate forces to oppose the advance of General Steele were commanded by General Price and they occupied well fortified positions at Camden, Arkadelphia and Washington, with the cavalry and some light artillery thrown forward in the direction of Little Rock and Fort Smith to watch the Federal movements and delay them as much as practicable; but not to bring on a general engagement after the Federal forces had united.

There was a great deal of rain that spring over the region of the field of operations, and the soldiers and

animals of both of the Federal columns, from Little Rock and Fort Smith, endured many hardships as they advanced over a rough mountainous region of nearly two hundred miles. The Confederates had obstructed the advance as much as practicable by felling trees in difficult places for artillery and trains to pass, and the torrential rains had washed out the roads in the narrow valleys and made quagmires of the bottom lands along the streams, which required much work of repairs by the sappers and miners, who were sometimes assisted by details from the infantry regiments.

General Thayer's Division met with very little opposition on the march until it joined General Steele's forces on the Little Missouri River, after which there were almost continual skirmishes and actions; but the Southern Partisan bandits in the mountains and in the country through which he marched, generally in small parties, watched his movements and hung on his flanks and now and then dashed in and fired on his advance or rear, doing very little damage. They were quickly pursued and sometimes captured, killed or wounded, making honors about even.

When the command was in camp these bandits were sometimes bold enough to come up within gunshot range and fire on the pickets and then attempt to dodge out of sight; but the Federal infantry were armed with long range rifles, and the cavalry with long range Sharps' carbines, and the foe, after displaying his bravado, was lucky if he got away without being hit. Some of those who were not captured, killed or wounded fell in the rear of the Federal command for the purpose of picking up any stragglers, dispatch bearers and parties carrying the mail to and from the troops between them and Fort Smith. Only a week or so after General Thayer's command left Fort Smith, one or two packages of mail containing a large number of letters were captured by the guerrillas, nearly a hundred miles southeast on the Petit Jean River, but

fortunately no dispatches of importance to the enemy were taken by the bandits, being torn up to prevent them from falling into their hands. The party carrying the mail managed to make their escape, after losing the mail pouches with the letters. A short time after the capture of the mail, three scouts were sent out from Fort Smith with dispatches for General Thayer, and were fired upon several times by Southern Partisan bands while they were crossing the mountains and followed by a party of about twenty-five nearly half a day. While crossing a creek they were fired upon again, having one of their horses killed, and at the same time were surrounded, part of the enemy having managed to get in the front.

The two scouts whose horses were not injured by the fusillade, and who were also surrounded, with little chance of making their escape, determined to share the fate of their comrade. Immediately after they were taken prisoner, the enemy commenced searching them and soon took from them all the letters and papers and some of the dispatches, but none that would give any information in regard to the movements of the Federal Army, or that would be of much value to them. After seeing some of the newspapers, the bandits seemed very anxious to read them and know what was going on, and laid most of the letters and dispatches aside, until the papers were about looked over.

They then compelled one of the prisoners, one of the scouts, to read over some of the dispatches, as none of their party could read writing, and told the reader if he did not read correctly, they would put him to death the next morning. It was now getting near night, for they had been busily engaged quite a while in looking over the papers and some of the dispatches and letters, thinking it likely they might find some money while searching the letters, for it was generally known that a good many soldiers sent money in bills to their families through the

mails; having the privilege of franking their letters, they were not obliged to use postage stamps. Some of the bandits could read plain handwriting to some extent, but not sufficiently well to get the true meaning of the different communications. They told the Federal scouts that they were going to a house the next morning where there was a woman who could read all the letters and dispatches without any difficulty, and if the reader made any mistakes or kept back anything, the party would surely suffer the penalty of death. Some of the important dispatches the Federal scouts managed to get into an envelope the enemy had first opened and thrown aside, and which was soon put into the fire and burned, and those they were compelled to read were not read correctly, and some of the most important sentences were omitted entirely.

The Federal scouts expected to be killed anyway if they remained with their captors until the next day, and trusted to their good fortune to make their escape during the night. They were all encamped in the mountain near Reveille Creek that empties into the Petit Jean River; they built up a blazing fire and all but two or three men left to guard the prisoners were soon stretched upon their blankets on the ground asleep, and the prisoners, also pretending to be asleep, were not, but were only watching when the guards would fall asleep, that they might get up and attempt their escape. As they were not relieved the guards fell asleep about midnight, when the Federal scouts cautiously crept from their beds into the darkness, taking with them only a part of their clothing and one or two revolvers, and were soon wandering in the mountains several miles away from their captors on their way to Little Rock, as that was the nearest point they could reach with safety. It was more than a week, however, before they reached that place, being obliged to avoid nearly all the main roads and travel through the mountains and brush. When taken by the enemy they were probably not more than forty miles from General

Thayer's command; but the difficulty of getting accurate information of its position made their progress slow in joining their comrades. They found, however, that General Thayer was within one or two days' march of General Steele, whose forces had reached the Washita River, and had been for several days skirmishing with the enemy, who were using every possible effort to check the Federal advance.

After General Thayer's command struck the trail of Steele's forces, signs of artillery fighting were visible at different places on the road, particularly where there was timber in which the enemy could form his lines and place artillery in position; but there had been no severe struggle at any of these points. Nearly all the artillery firing was at long range, so that only a few men were killed and wounded on either side. The movements and maneuvering of the enemy showed plainly that it was not the intention of General Price to bring on a general engagement until his troops had retired behind their fortifications at Camden. He had a large cavalry and mounted infantry force with which he could slow up the Federal advance until General E. Kirby Smith, commanding the Trans-Mississippi Department, could determine whether General Banks' expedition up Red River for the occupation of Shreveport would end in success or failure. As the Confederates were on the defensive, in retiring they watched every opportunity to attack the Federal reconnaissance at a disadvantage; but were unable to gain anything decisive in this respect, losing as often as they won a point.

They probably had better cavalry horses than were in the Federal cavalry in that section, and perhaps a larger mounted force, including their mounted infantry, than General Steele had, which were very convenient for the defensive operations they were forced to adopt. But the Federal troops had better arms and equipments, and were not lacking in elan or dash and enthusiasm; besides they had been uniformly successful in all the major operations

the last year in the West. Some of the Federal soldiers who had been captured and escaped reported that they had never seen better looking horses than those they saw in Marmaduke's and Shelby's commands; that they were large and in splendid condition for active cavalry service, having been well taken care of during the winter on Red River and about Washington and Camden. They had been required to perform but little active service until the commencement of that campaign, and as good crops had been raised in that section the year before, there was little difficulty in having the mounts supplied with abundance of forage.

When General Steele's command reached the vicinity of Camden, his chief quartermaster had little difficulty in obtaining a sufficient quantity of forage for the different cavalry brigades. Many of the owners of large and small plantations who had been raising mainly cotton had dropped their cotton crops and commenced raising corn and other foodstuffs which were required to subsist the Southern Army and the civilian population of the South.

Skirmishing continued almost daily from Arkadelphia until the Federal forces reached the Little Missouri River, and there they engaged the enemy in about six hours' artillery fighting, and some small arms skirmishing; but with no decisive results except the retirement of the Confederate forces in the direction of Camden. The Federal loss was about twenty killed and wounded, and the Confederate loss about the same. The action of Little Missouri River was more noise than fight. Although the roar of artillery was heavy and constant for hours, and might have led one at a distance to believe that a hot battle was raging; yet those on the field knew that the combatants were too great a distance from each other to do much damage.

The ground upon which the opposing forces had their artillery practice had many marks of a real battle field.

The timber of the positions they occupied was torn and splintered by the shot and exploding shells of the artillery as if the trees had been struck by lightning. It was the policy of the Confederate commanders to harass, annoy and make as much of a show of resistance as practicable without bringing on a general engagement, to prevent the Federal forces from crossing the river.

The obstructions they had laboriously planned to make the roads impassable by felling trees across them were quickly swept away, and the heavy force of infantry and artillery on the opposite side of the river were driven away by the concentrated fire of the Federal batteries, after which General Steele ordered forward his pontoons, and as soon as they were thrown across the river, his troops commenced crossing. The Confederate officers retired their batteries to high ground, and care was taken that the pontoons should be laid at a point where the enemy would be unable to locate them, in order to protect the troops while passing over them from artillery fire. Several Federal batteries were brought down near the river and placed in position to open fire upon the enemy batteries the moment they should undertake to search out the location of the pontoons, or to support the Confederate infantry massed some distance back for the purpose of attacking the Federal troops as soon as they had crossed over the river on the pontoons. A brigade of Federal infantry were quickly crossed over and advanced a few hundred yards beyond the river when they were met by the massed enemy infantry and driven back almost to the pontoons; but the Federal batteries in position at once opened such a heavy fire of shell and shrapnel upon the Confederates that they were obliged to retire out of range. In a short time after this action, a sufficient number of Federal troops were crossed over to hold the position until the entire command and baggage trains could get over.

When the Confederate commanders found that they could not hold the Federal forces at the river, they retreated about five miles back to Prairie De'Ann, where they had thrown up rifle pits and breastworks of considerable strength where they intended to give battle. While these movements were taking place General Thayer's Frontier Division of the Seventh Army Corps had overtaken General Steele at the Little Missouri River and crossed over on the following day and night and encamped with him on the 8th of April.

After remaining at Prairie De'Ann three or four days, General Steele had his whole command, comprising nearly all of the Seventh Army Corps, drawn up in line of battle as a challenge to the enemy; but General Price declined to accept battle, and retreated towards Washington, leaving the road open to Camden, as he believed the Federal forces would pursue him, which they did for some distance. In these movements General Steele executed a brilliant piece of strategy that perhaps had few equals in the war. His immediate objective was Camden, and he desired to take the place with as little loss of life as possible. His movements had caused Price to withdraw nearly all of the Confederate troops from Camden to strengthen his immediate front in opposing the Federal advance. The position at Prairie De'Ann was the northern point of a triangle, with Camden at the southeast and Washington at the southwest points of it.

After his demonstration in front of Prairie De'Ann with fully twelve thousand men, splendidly equipped, and forcing General Price out of his strong fortifications and pursuing him in the direction of Washington, with a strong force, General Steele turned suddenly and took the left hand road to Camden, pushing his cavalry forward rapidly, closely followed by his infantry and artillery, and was well on the way before his movement was reported to General Price. The Frontier Division, under General Thayer, was left to bring up the Federal rear;

but the road from Washington to Camden was south of the one General Steele's army was marching on, and when General Price found that the Federal commander was marching straight for Camden, quickly set his large mounted force in motion, and it became a race as to which should reach the coveted city and stronghold first.

When General Price found that he was not being pursued by the main part of the Federal forces concentrated at Prairie De'Ann, he suspected that General Steele was intending to make a dash for Camden, and to meet such a movement, threw forward the brigades of Shelby and Greene of General Marmaduke's Division on the Middle Camden and Washington road, and they reached the junction of that road with the one General Steele's forces were marching on a short time before the Federal forces sent forward, under General Carr, arrived, thus blocking the road to Camden.

General Carr at once made a vigorous attack with cavalry, infantry and artillery upon the Confederates under General Marmaduke, and drove them from their position in the direction of Camden and closely pursued them until they arrived within two or three miles of the city, when Marmaduke turned to the right, leaving one mounted regiment to skirmish with the Federal forces into the city, which Generals Carr and Rice occupied that evening before dark without further opposition. By midnight the rest of the troops General Steele brought from Little Rock marched in, and the next day the Frontier Division, under General Thayer, arrived.

The rapid movements of General Steele's forces almost paralyzed with fear, the Southern people of Camden and vicinity. Many of them were so dazed by the sudden turn of events that they packed up and moved further south. They even burned the jail where some Union prisoners were confined, for fear that when the Federal forces arrived it would be used to imprison some of their own people who had been loudest in their denunciation of the

"Yankees." The great number of Federal soldiers and their discipline and cleanliness made a deep impression upon the minds of the people of that section, for the Federal forces had not before that campaign penetrated far south in that part of Arkansas.

It will be well to notice in somewhat more detail the operations of the Federal forces around Prairie De'Ann, before striking out for Camden, for General Steele found it necessary to do some fighting and maneuvering before he could get the Confederate forces in position where he could safely make the race for Camden, with the prospect of reaching and occupying the city before the Confederates could get there. While his forces were encamped on the prairie in sight of the Confederate entrenchments at Prairie De'Ann for several days, there was almost continual skirmishing and fighting between the belligerent forces, the heavy batteries of both sides being frequently brought into action. On the night of the 10th of April the Confederates made three different charges on one of the batteries of Colonel Engellmann's brigade, with a determination to capture it, and once came within thirty yards of it, when they were repulsed and driven back to their entrenchments, with a heavy loss in killed and wounded. When they made these charges the volleys of musketry were rapid and heavy, but being dark and the smoke from the discharges from the rifles becoming very dense, neither side could see his foe and know of the execution made except from the flashes from their muskets. The failure of the Confederate night attack on the Federal forces convinced General Price that he could not hold his position at Prairie De'Ann longer, and that there was nothing left for him but to retreat. General Steele had determined and made preparations to move on the Confederate position the next morning and take it by assault if necessary; but he had not more than made the proper distribution of his troops and commenced to advance when General Price abandoned his strongly fortified position

without further opposition. His fortifications and rifle pits extended more than a mile in length and could have been used very effectively against an assaulting force.

When marching over the ground where the fight took place the night before, the Federal soldiers noticed a number of horses that had been killed, and concluded that they were artillery horses, and did not doubt but that the casualties among the Confederate troops must have been quite severe. The Federal losses during the night attack and in the skirmishing and artillery fighting of the two days previous were forty killed and sixty wounded. After these operations on Prairie De'Ann and the retirement of the Confederate forces in the direction of Washington, General Steele moved forward on the Camden road with the divisions of Generals Carr, Rice and Salomon, leaving the Frontier Division under General Thayer to bring up the rear, with instructions for the divisions to keep in touch with each other and ready to meet an attack by the enemy at any moment.

When General Price found that the Federal forces were pursuing him only a short distance beyond Prairie De'Ann, and had turned and were marching rapidly in the direction of Camden, he concentrated all his troops which had not been sent forward under Marmaduke to interpose the Federal march on Camden, to attack the Federal rear under Thayer.

While General Steele had been keeping out cavalry reconnoissances to watch the movements of the enemy, the attack on the Frontier Division was a surprise. General Thayer had encamped in the edge of the timber near the little village of Moscow, and had no notice whatever of the approach of the enemy until they had driven in his pickets; his command was just getting ready to move out when the firing commenced; some of the Federal outposts hastened into camp and reported to the General that the prairie was covered with Confederate mounted troops advancing in compact lines to make the attack.

As the troops and trains were ready to move, General Thayer quickly made disposition of his forces to meet the attack. A heavy line of mounted skirmishers was thrown out, supported by infantry, and the batteries placed in position and soon commenced throwing shell and shrapnel into the ranks of the Confederates with good effect. Part of the infantry was also brought into action, and the rattle of musketry was mingled with the roar of the artillery, which were heard for miles around by the frightened people. The attacking Confederate forces were commanded by Generals Fagan and Maxey, comprised of white and Indian soldiers, and after several hours' fighting they were driven from the field and pursued a short distance. General Thayer did not continue the pursuit further because he knew it was the purpose of General Steele to push on and occupy Camden before it could be re-enforced by the Confederates, which General Price was making desperate efforts to accomplish. General Steele had marched several days on the Arkadelphia and Washington road to Prairie De'Ann to convince the Confederate commander that his immediate objective was Washington, and many Confederates were surprised that he took tne road he did take to Camden, as it was the least practicable for trains and artillery of any road in that section. He was obliged to corduroy miles of the road across the swamps and bottom lands of the streams with rails and timber to enable his artillery and trains to cross over. But with all these difficulties he succeeded in maneuvering General Price out of Camden, at that time one of the most important towns in the State, and fortified with nine forts.

CHAPTER XX

BATTLE OF POISON SPRING

The Union and Confederate commanders in Western Arkansas and the Indian Territory, were able to do but little more than mark time during the progress of the Red River and Camden Expeditions, for the Department commanders of both sides gradually withdrew all the troops that could be spared from the western parts of their departments, for participation in the larger operations involved in those expeditions. When therefore the campaign ended, for which the forces of both sides were concentrated, the troops that had been detached from Western Arkansas and Indian Territory returned to their former positions, with the Confederate commanders assuming the offensive, and the Federal commanders the defensive.

General Maxey, commanding the District of the Indian Territory, took with him to the aid of General Price Colonel Tandy Walker's Choctaw Indian Brigade and a brigade of three Texas regiments, all the white troops of his district, and in the battle of Poison Spring played a conspicuous part in achieving the success that fell to the Confederates in the capture of the Federal forage train, and almost annihilation of the escort.

General Steele had handled his army with consummate skill from the time of leaving Little Rock until his return. He had, after a number of fierce engagements in demonstrating against Washington, which was almost on the direct route to Shreveport, the objective of the campaign, and by a brilliant piece of strategy, maneuvered Price out of Camden, which had been strongly fortified, without a battle. In the event of unlooked for obstacles on his march to form a junction with Banks at Shreveport, he desired to occupy Camden and use it as a base for bringing supplies up the Ouachita River which was in good navigable condition that spring, with twenty-four feet of water in the channel at Camden.

On arrival of his army at that place, information had just been received there by telegraphic dispatches that General Banks had been defeated above Natchitoches and obliged to fall back in the direction of Grand Ecore and Alexandria. This information by telegraph, which had come through Southern sources, was soon confirmed by the return and report of one of General Steele's spies, who had been sent to communicate with General Banks. A day or so later an officer on the staff of General Banks arrived with dispatches confirming the reports of his defeat, and stated that he was falling back to Alexandria.

When it was definitely known that General Banks had been defeated and was retiring on Alexandria, General Steele saw it was useless for him to advance any further in the direction of Red River. His column was a co-operating one, and the point upon which the several columns were converging, was now a point from which the other columns were retreating. A crisis was now rapidly approaching when he must either get supplies up the Ouachita River, or retire with his army to Little Rock or Pine Bluff on the Arkansas River. Already there were rumors that General E. Kirby Smith had promised to send Price eight thousand infantry and the complement of artillery from the forces that had been operating against Banks in Louisiana.

In his fighting march from Little Rock to Camden, General Steele found that the country had been nearly exhausted of supplies by the Confederate troops during the past winter and spring, and that they had destroyed all the forage on the Federal line of march, as far as practicable, which they could not use or take away. His troops had been on half rations of bread since he started out upon the expedition, and less than that proportion of the meat ration had been issued to them.

His cavalry, artillery and transportation animals, numbering as many as ten thousand head, required a large

amount of forage, and on account of the short ration and hard service imposed upon them, many of them were daily becoming unserviceable. Indeed, the bread ration was so nearly exhausted that a part of the corn ration for the animals was turned over to the commissary department to be ground into meal for the troops.

As the Confederates were driven back they destroyed nearly all the best mills in that section, to prevent the Federal army from using them, so that most of the meal made had to be ground by the soldiers by hand-mills. The large steamer Homer, with a cargo of four thousand bushels of corn, was captured by General Steele's cavalry under Colonel Ritter, on the Ouachita thirty miles below Camden, on the night of the 16th, and brought back up the river to the city and unloaded, and the corn issued to the army, relieving the immediate situation.

There were a few Union people in Camden, and they reported to Captain C. A. Henry, chief quartermaster of the expedition, how much corn they could spare, and he purchased it and paid them for it. He also ascertained that there were considerable quantities of corn at a number of plantations in the vicinity of Camden, and made arrangements to secure it. In that section very few of the slaves had left their masters on the arrival of the Federal troops, and the last year the planters and small farmers had raised an increased acreage of corn, and a decreased acreage of cotton and tobacco, for the demand for corn to supply subsistence and forage for the Southern army and for home consumption had increased, while the market for cotton and tobacco had become uncertain, uncertain because the United States blockade of the Southern coast cities had become so effective that blockade runners had almost been put out of business in their attempts to bring in supplies for the Confederate armies and take out cotton and tobacco in payment for the supplies.

The Confederate officers had made it a point to use up and destroy the forage in the disputed territory occupied by the outpost of the two armies between Arkadelphia and Little Rock, up to the time General Steele's expedition started out, and had drawn as sparingly as possible on the supplies of the citizens in the vicinity of Camden. When the people found that the Confederates were burning the forage likely to fall into the hands of the Federal troops, a good many endeavored to hide their corn for their own use, or take their chances of selling to the Federal forces when they heard they were paying for it. In the advance on Camden, Captain Henry ascertained that there was a large amount of corn, estimated at from four to five thousand bushels, at several plantations near the road on which the Federal troops had passed, out about eighteen miles and on the morning of the 17th made up a train of 198 wagons and teams, and asked for an escort for it of a regiment of each, cavalry and infantry, and a section of artillery, to send and get this forage. General Thayer was instructed to detail troops from his division for the escort. He directed Colonel James M. Williams, First Kansas Colored Infantry, to take command of the escort, which consisted of his own regiment, under Major Richard C. Ward, 195 cavalry of the Second, Sixth, and Fourteenth Kansas Regiments, and two ten pounder brass pieces Second Indiana Battery, under Lieutenant W W Haines, in all 695 men.

Although the road, the Washington road, near which the forage would be found, was the one over which the Federal army had just passed, it was by no means the rear of the army—was in fact as much the front as the rear. It was contrary to the general policy of military commanders to forage to the front.

But in the face of this sound military maxim, the train and escort were sent out, and upwards of one hundred wagons loaded with corn that evening and the early part

of the night, and brought to the main road and parked. The next morning details were sent out with teams, and the empty wagons were to be loaded with forage from plantations on either flank, with instructions to join the loaded part of the train en route to Camden. The balance of the troops of the escort and the loaded part of the train were at once put in motion on the road to Camden, and about four miles east of the point where they had encamped during the night, near Poison Spring, met a re-enforcement, under Captain William M. Duncan of 383 men of the Eighteenth Iowa Infantry, 90 cavalry of the Second, Sixth and Fourteenth Kansas Regiments, and two twelve pounder mountain howitzers attached to the Sixth Kansas, under Lieutenant Anson J. Walker of that regiment. This re-enforcement halted until the train passed and then became the rear guard. About a mile east of this point the advance guard came up to and fired upon the Confederate picket in the road and pursued it nearly a mile, when it joined the Confederate line of skirmishers which occupied a good position in the pine woods on each side of the Camden road, prepared to contest the further advance of the train and escort on their return.

When the train and escort left Camden, General Price's headquarters were at Woodlawn, sixteen miles southwest, and about ten miles southeast of the place where Colonel Williams encamped that night, and his scouts had watched the movements of the train and escort from the moment they left Camden until they went into camp that night, and knew the number of wagons in the train and approximately the number of troops in the escort, and reported all this to General Marmaduke near Woodlawn that evening. Later in the evening they also reported to him the advance of the troops under Captain Duncan, which left Camden in the afternoon of the day the train and escort left in the morning, to re-enforce Colonel Williams. With this information it was determined that

night by General Marmaduke to make an effort to capture the train, and preparations were made to start early the next morning with picked men from three divisions, the divisions of Marmaduke, Cabell and Maxey, with a four gun battery to each division, the whole force of 3,700 men and twelve pieces of artillery to be under the command of General S. B. Maxey, the senior officer of the three brigadier-generals who were to direct the movements of the troops in the enterprise. In the plan of attack, Marmaduke's division was to form on the right, with a battery near its center; Cabell's division in the center, with a battery near his center, and Maxey's division of Texans and Choctaw Indians on the left of the Confederate line, with a battery near his center. In taking their positions on the field, Marmaduke's and Cabell's lines faced west, covering the Federal front, and Maxey's line faced north, covering the Federal right.

When his advance guard fired upon and drove in the Confederate picket, Colonel Williams knew nothing about these dispositions of the Confederate troops in his front and on his flanks, nor the strength of the force confronting him.

But from what he saw of the movements and boldness of the Confederate skirmish line, he suspected that the situation might be a serious one, and one that demanded of him extreme caution. Up to that moment it was thought that if an attack should be made on the train, it would more likely be made on the rear than in front, and as a consequence most of his troops who were not out with the forage details were in rear of the train.

He ordered the train halted and parked, and forming in line the small force of his cavalry advance, directed Lieutenant Haines, commanding the section of the battery, to open fire upon the Confederate position for the purpose of ascertaining whether the enemy had artillery, and that the sound of artillery firing might warn his forage details which were out to come in.

The fire of his two guns did not have the effect of at once drawing a response from the Confederate artillery, but the Confederate skirmishers opened a brisk fire of musketry at long range, doing very little damage. The moment the Confederate skirmish line was observed, Colonel Williams ordered his colored infantry, under Major Ward to the front. As they came up they formed in line on each side of the road at the top of hill, the right of the line overlooking the north end of a field which was a hundred yards or so in front. The field may have had twenty to thirty acres in it, and the north end of it was about two hundred yards south of the Camden road.

Nearly all the high ground in that section not in cultivation was covered with pine timber, and in some places with a young growth of pine, making it impossible to see objects more than a hundred yards or so in front. While the Confederate commander was making disposition of his troops on his left, most of Colonel Williams' forage details which were out, on hearing the cannonading of the first skirmish, hastily came in, and Lieutenant Robert Henderson, of the Sixth Kansas, who had been out with a train of eighteen wagons, on returning turned them over to the quartermaster, and then marched to the front and reported. Colonel Williams had just noticed through the openings in the pine woods a movement of Confederate infantry toward his right; but, still desiring to know the nature of the force in his front, sent forward from his right Lieutenants Henderson and Mitchell with their cavalry with instructions to press the Confederate line, and if possible ascertain the position and strength of the enemy. While moving along the north end of the field in the pine woods between the field and the road, and just as it was nearing the northeast corner, his cavalry received a heavy volley of musketry from the enemy posted in the brush in front, wounding Lieutenant Henderson severely, who was held on his horse and taken to the rear. On returning the fire with their carbines this cavalry was driven

back upon the line of colored infantry, and were then ordered to take a position on the extreme right of that regiment. On bringing up the colored infantry, a skirmish line was thrown forward about a hundred yards in front, covering the left wing. This skirmish line was kept out upwards of half an hour, exchanging shots with the Confederate skirmishers, and was called in only when it was evident that the Confederate infantry were on the point of advancing against the Federal right.

In a short time after the cavalry under Lieutenants Henderson and Mitchell were driven in on the Federal right, the batteries of Marmaduke's and Cabell's divisions in the Federal front and the battery of Maxey's division on the right of the Federal position opened a heavy cross-fire of shot and shell upon the Federal line, lasting perhaps half an hour. During this heavy cannonade, Major Ward ordered his men to lie down on the ground just behind the crest of the hill, and though exposed to the storm of shot and shell from this terrible cross-fire, his line suffered very few casualties. This was due to the fact that the pine woods concealed the exact location of his line from the view of the Confederate artillery officers.

In the course of this fierce artillery contest, a piece of shell struck one of the colored infantry between the shoulders, and he jumped up and spun around for a moment in great agony. A mounted Confederate officer near his battery in front, through an opening in the woods, saw the wounded soldier jump up, disclosing the position of the Federal line, and at once turned his guns in that direction and swept nearly every foot of the ground a few paces in front of the colored infantry with a storm of shot and shell. Colonel Williams sat on his horse a few paces in the rear of his line with his field-glass in his hands, looking through it and carefully watched every movement of the enemy as far as could be seen through the openings in the woods, and while a storm of shot and bursting shell were flying thickly around him, cautioned his men to keep

their eyes to the front. Even before the Confederate battery had opened fire on his right, he had noticed through the openings in the pine forest heavy masses of Confederate infantry moving to his right, and feeling satisfied that he would soon be attacked from that quarter, directed Major Ward to form the right wing of his regiment facing south. To guard against a flank movement against his left front, Lieutenant Josephus Utt was posted on his extreme left, with seventy-five men of the Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry. Captain Duncan, commanding the rear guard of the train, when it was found that the enemy were advancing against the Federal front and right flank, formed his men of the Eighteenth Iowa Infantry in line south of the road, facing southeast, with a section of howitzers, under Lieutenant Walker, and the cavalry, under Lieutenant R. L. Phillips, Sixth Kansas, on his right. When the Confederate artillery ceased firing, the Confederate infantry advanced through the pine woods on the left and right of the road in front, through the field south of the road, and through the brush southwest of the field, and came up at a trail-arms within one hundred yards of the Federal line, when Major Ward gave the order and the colored infantry rose from the ground and commenced firing from the right of each wing, and then along the entire line, and kept it up, firing four or five volleys, using buck and ball, until the Confederates retired out of range. In this second assault the men of the opposing lines were near enough to hear each other talking, and part of General Maxey's line on the Federal right introduced themselves as the Twenty-ninth Texas, and called out so as to be heard, "You First Kansas Niggers now buck to the Twenty-ninth Texas." The Twenty-ninth Texas and the First Kansas Colored Infantry were opposed to each other in the battle of Elk Creek, Indian Territory, in July, 1863, and in that fight the Texans were driven off the field in much confusion and with a heavy loss in killed and wounded.

After the charge, Colonel Williams saw from the overwhelming forces hurled against him, supported by twelve pieces of artillery posted so as to cross-fire his position, that there was no reasonable prospect of defeating the enemy; but he determined to defend the train as long as possible, hoping that the roar of the battle would bring out re-enforcements from Camden to his assistance. He kept the section of the Second Indiana Battery under Lieutenant Haines steadily at work on the Confederate positions in his front and on his right from the first skirmish, now nearly two hours, and he did not doubt but that this continuous cannonading would notify the officers and troops at Camden, ten miles distant, that he was heavily engaged. In order to strengthen his left center, which had twice been driven back, General Maxey ordered Greene's brigade of Marmaduke's division on the right to take position in the center between Maxey's and Cabell's divisions, and then the Confederate forces moved forward, four lines deep, in a third charge, their continuous shouting at times rising above the roar of the musketry. They were permitted to approach within easy musket range, when Major Ward ordered his men to open fire upon them, to which the Confederates replied with vigor, but were again obliged to retire out of range after a sharp conflict of fifteen to twenty minutes.

Every time the Confederate infantry retired out of range to lower ground, the Confederate batteries, from elevated positions, firing over their heads, cross-fired the Federal position with a perfect storm of shot and shell. Just at the close of the third assault the two pieces of the Second Indiana Battery having nearly exhausted their shell and canister, and nearly all the gunners of the right piece being wounded and disabled, Lieutenant Haines was ordered to report to Captain Duncan, commanding the rear guard, and number one on the left was limbered towards the rear on the north side of the road.

In the three desperate assaults which the enemy had made on his lines, Colonel Williams saw that his right and front had suffered so heavily in killed and wounded that he could not sustain another charge, for which the Confederates were preparing, without too great a sacrifice, and started to ride to the rear to form the Eighteenth Iowa in a favorable position for the colored infantry to fall back upon, when his horse was shot under him. Major Ward immediately gave him his horse, and he mounted it and rode back and formed the Eighteenth Iowa in line facing in the direction from which the enemy were advancing; but he had hardly completed this duty when the Confederates made their fourth charge, forcing the line of the colored infantry, which from the first assault had been a curved line, with the center of the curve outward, back about one hundred yards, close upon the train. At this time the smoke was so dense along the line of battle that the troops could see each other distinctly only a few yards distant, making it difficult to keep a perfect alignment. Two companies of the colored regiment which had at first formed the left of the left wing, under Lieutenant W. C. Gibbons, on the north side of the road, on retiring on that side of the road became separated from the other companies by the train, which was now between them.

But as the Confederates were also pressing forward on the Federal left, Lieutenant Gibbons had all he could do to keep them off until his men joined their comrades north of the road near the rear of the train. Early in the action Colonel Williams was convinced from the movements of the Confederates and from information obtained from a Confederate soldier, who rode into his line inquiring for Colonel De Morse, that their main attack was going to be directed against his front and right flank, and to strengthen this part of his line, and to be prepared for the charge which he knew was coming, ordered up four companies of the Eighteenth Iowa. In the meantime Colonel Tandy Walker's Choctaw Indian Brigade had

formed in line on General Maxey's left about half a mile south of the rear of the train, on Captain Duncan's right when his line faced east, but directly in his front when he changed his line facing south, and in view of the situation he sent a message to Colonel Williams, stating that he was so closely pressed by the enemy that he could not spare the men called for. Though he was threatened by this Indian Brigade in his front while the desperate conflict was going on in front and on the right of the train, his command did not become heavily engaged until the line of colored infantry was broken, and the retreat had commenced. After the line of colored infantry was forced back in the fourth assault, the Confederate commander rapidly drew his line closer around the Federal position, and his troops seeing that success was assured, went into the closing scenes of the fight with a wild hurrah and war whoop of the Indians, shooting down the colored wounded soldiers as they came upon any who were left on the field. With desperate valor and contesting every inch of ground, the colored infantry were forced from their position back upon the rear of the train and formed on the left of the Eighteenth Iowa, pouring volley after volley into the ranks of the exulting foe as they retired.

The Federal troops and train were now entirely surrounded, and the firing of small arms and artillery, the crashing of shot and bursting shell in among the teams of the large train, the roar of battle, and the shouting and war whoops of the victorious Confederates, soon caused a scene of great confusion.

Colonel Williams now saw that it was impossible to save the train, and that it would require heroic courage to save his troops who were not already left on the field, killed and wounded. In a few moments after part of the colored infantry formed on the left of the Eighteenth Iowa, the united commands were compelled by overpowering numbers of the enemy to retire to the north side of the

Camden road, where a stand was made for a short time to enable the section of the battery to move to the rear, which was then north of the road. When forced from this position the Federal troops retired through an open field, and in the timber on the north side of it formed in line again, and after a few volleys checked the Confederates, who were advancing with yells from the front and left and right flanks.

In retiring to this position, this main part of the command was joined by quite a number of colored soldiers who had fallen back from the front on the north side of the train under Lieutenant Gibbons, and by others who made their way through the teams to the north side of the road when Colonel Williams' front and right flank were forced back after the fourth charge.

Having had a short respite to allow the scattered detachments to join the main command, it was the purpose of Colonel Williams to have the Federal troops retreat to Camden by the most direct route practicable. Closely pressed by the enemy from all sides, and retreating through timber and thick brush and over ground cut up by ravines over which it was impracticable to move artillery, it became necessary to cut the horses loose from the two pieces of the Second Indiana Battery and the two howitzers of the Sixth Kansas, and abandon the guns. Near the field north of the Camden road, Colonel Williams rallied part of the cavalry, under Lieutenant Phillips, Sixth Kansas, and held them in line long enough to enable the wounded colored soldiers who had fallen in the rear to come up and reach a swamp which lay in his front and get away. After leaving the position behind the field in the timber, the Confederate infantry did not get up within rifle range of the Federal troops; but the Confederate cavalry continued the pursuit about two miles, frequently pressing closely upon Colonel Williams' flanks and rear,

so that his troops were obliged to form four or five times, face to the rear, and give the enemy a volley each time to hold them off.

As General Maxey wished to secure the large train and the abandoned guns, and fearing that a large Federal force would come out from Camden and attack him, he very soon called off his troops from the pursuit, and placed part of them in position on the Camden road east of the train. It was about two o'clock when the Confederate cavalry disappeared from the rear and flanks of the retreating Federal troops, after which, by toilsome marching through swamps and pine woods, they reached Camden that night about eight o'clock, without further interruption, in a nearly exhausted condition.

On account of the repeated threats which the Confederates had made that they would show no quarter to colored soldiers, and having that day seen the Confederates shooting and bayoneting the wounded colored soldiers where they had fallen, every colored soldier who was wounded in the fight and who could walk came off the field with the troops in the retreat. Some who were too badly wounded to walk lay on the field, and when the Confederates came near them, feigned death, and crawled off the field after dark, and endeavored to make their way back to camp, marching while they had strength and then lying down in the grass and weeds to rest. Several colored soldiers who were badly wounded, and who from weakness and loss of blood were obliged to march and rest at intervals, were bitten by poisonous snakes while lying down in the grass and weeds during the night, and when they got into camp the next day their bodies were horribly swollen from the effect of the poison which had spread through their systems. One of the colored soldiers who was wounded and lay on the field until night feigning death, and then crawled off and made his way [illegible], stated that he saw the Confederates shooting

the wounded colored soldiers who were left on the field, and that the Confederate soldiers went over the field after the battle, calling out and answering each other, "Where is the First Kansas Nigger now?" "All cut to pieces and gone to hell by bad management."

The Federal loss in the battle was 122 men and officers killed, 97 wounded, and 81 missing. In the fight and in the retreat, the colored regiment had 117 men and officers killed and 65 wounded. When separated from their command or cut off from it, the colored soldiers were shot down without mercy, and General Cabell reported that one of his regiments, stationed east of the battle field on the Camden road, killed at least 80 negroes.

General Maxey reported his loss, from incomplete returns of casualties in his different commands, at 17 men killed and 88 wounded. His officers reported only 4 colored men captured. Immediately after the fight was over he commenced removing the train, artillery and captured property from the scene of the conflict to the Confederate camp near Woodlawn, the last of his troops not leaving the field until nearly dark.

CHAPTER XXI

OPERATIONS OF THE INDIAN BRIGADE

The post of Fort Smith was in the Choctaw Nation west of the State line and separated from the town of Fort Smith in Arkansas by a narrow street. It was bounded on the north by the Arkansas River, on the west by the Poteau River, and covered only a few acres of ground, with a stone wall five or six feet high on the east and south sides; but it had no defensive works.

To the south and southeast of the city, which had a population of about two thousand, there was high ground suitable for defensive works, and upon which the chief engineer of the district worked out plans for constructing fortifications after the departure of the troops under General Thayer to join General Steele on the Camden Expedition; but after keeping out mounted scouting detachments, and detachments for keeping up communication with his outposts and details for provost duty, Colonel Judson commanding the district and post, had very few men available for working on fortifications. Generals Steele and Thayer both knew of the defenseless condition of Fort Smith and Western Arkansas, and on the return of the troops from the Camden Expedition to Little Rock, General Thayer was ordered to return with his division to Fort Smith, and resume command of the District of the Frontier, arriving there about the middle of May.

On the first of January, 1864, Major-General S. R. Curtis was assigned to the command of the Department of Kansas, which included the State of Kansas and the Indian Territory and the post of Fort Smith, with headquarters at Fort Leavenworth. He soon made a reconnaissance of a part of his Department, going as far south as Fort Gibson, and returned via Fort Smith, Fayetteville, Neosho and Fort Scott, inspecting the condition of his troops and the defensive positions they occupied, and found

that there was great need of the improvement of both, except that Fort Gibson had been fairly well fortified under the direction of Colonel Phillips, who had improved the works from time to time as he found opportunity and the means.

There had been much complaint of the people of the western counties of Missouri, since the early days of the war, up to the assignment of General Curtis as commander of the Department of Kansas, of Kansas troops operating in the western border counties of Missouri, and of citizens of Kansas coming into those counties for the purpose of robbing and looting and taking the loot with them back to Kansas, without any regard to the political status of the people from whom it was taken.

It seemed very difficult for the politicians of Kansas, who were very numerous, to get into their heads that there was any loyalty in Missouri, for they seemed to think that all the people there should be treated indiscriminately as the worst of rebels, and the whole country swept with fire and sword, whereas as a matter of fact the whole effort of Kansas in the war was but a mere trifle of what Missouri was doing in men and resources to sustain the Union cause at home and on all fronts.

General Lane, Senator from Kansas, had great influence with Mr. Lincoln, and sometimes Kansas was in the Department of the Missouri, and at other times it was arranged for Kansas troops to operate in Missouri through his influence, and the generals commanding the District of the Border were men whom he had been instrumental in promoting, and it was claimed were ready to do his bidding.

Hon. Austin A. King, member of Congress from the Sixth District of Missouri, which included the western border counties to Vernon, wrote General W. S. Rosecrans, the new commander of the Department of Missouri, that he was truly gratified that Kansas had been cut off from Missouri in the new arrangement of Departments; that all the trouble on the border had grown out of the

contiguity of the people of his District to Kansas; that the Military District had been composed of part of Kansas and a tier of border counties in Missouri, and had been commanded by a Kansas general who was a Kansas politician with Kansas troops in his command; that he did not consider it wise and just to allow Kansas politicians to make capital out of the lives and property of the people of Missouri, and that two millions of dollars would not compensate the people of Jackson, Cass and Bates counties for the property taken by Kansas thieves, and mostly by men having military commands, or by their known connivance.

The population of those counties was nearly evenly divided on the issues of the war; they had probably furnished as many troops for the Union as for the Confederate army, and a much larger number if the Missouri Enrolled Militia should be included, and the loyal part of the people were certainly entitled to fair treatment and protection, which they could not get at the hands of Kansas commanding officers, dominated by Kansas politicians, who were willing to put their selfish interests above the common welfare of the country.

The Kansas politicians were not only largely responsible for the trouble and almost intolerable conditions on the borders of Missouri and Kansas the past years of the war, but they were now scheming to introduce chaotic conditions in the Indian country by proposing to muster out of service the three regiments of the loyal Indian Brigade for the purpose of getting rid of Colonel Phillips, the Indian Brigade commander, whose wonderful energy and foresight had made these troops, with a small contingent, a battalion of white troops, so efficient that he had been able to seize and hold Fort Gibson for six months, a position one hundred miles south of any other position held by the Federal forces west of the Mississippi River.

His disinterested and honest course in protecting the rights and interests of the Indians during the nearly two years he had been with them won their respect and almost affection, with an abiding confidence in his judgment, in all matters in which he was called to act as a military commander, or in the capacity of a civil administrator.

While officers of an adjacent military district made a scout into the Indian country under the pretense of following the trail of enemy partisan bands, but for the real purpose of gathering up stock of the Indians without regard to the political status of the Indians from whom it was taken and driving it to Kansas and selling it and appropriating the money to their own use, he had ordered all stock taken up off the range turned over to the subsistence department for feeding his troops, with instructions to officers to ascertain the political status of the parties from whom the stock was taken, and if loyal to pay for it, if disloyal to confiscate it and appropriate it for subsisting his command, and thus save the Government large sums of money, which it had been paying out for fresh beef for the troops.

The administration of affairs of the Indian country was unquestionably getting difficult to handle, and a commander of less energy and sturdy honesty, than Colonel Phillips would certainly have failed to check or expose men, who it was asserted, had by political influence secured large contracts for putting up hay and furnishing subsistence supplies for the troops in the Indian country, where there would be room for fraud on a great scale, unless the keenest vigilance was exercised by the commanding officer.

It was known to these schemers and contractors that Colonel Phillips had an eye open to everything going on about him. He was an incessant worker and when General Curtis was at Fort Gibson on his reconnaissance of that part of his Department in the early part of February,

the Colonel was unable to see him to talk over the general situation in the Indian country. He had a few days before the General's arrival, started on an expedition to clean out the Southern Indian forces south of the Canadian River, and in which he succeeded, after several skirmishes, in driving them beyond Middle Boggy, and almost to Red River, capturing and destroying large quantities of their supplies, and to further demoralize them, he succeeded in putting into the hands of some of their leaders copies of the President's Proclamation, offering amnesty to those who returned to their former status under treaty relations. The latter part of winter his command was short of rations and forage, and he was obliged to send a battalion of Indians to Rhea's Mill in Arkansas, to collect wheat and corn and run the mill in making flour and meal for his troops at Fort Gibson, for the Arkansas River had not yet been navigable for bringing supplies up the river by steamer to Fort Smith, and it had been impossible to bring supplies down from Fort Scott by wagon trains. He felt that there was a disposition in some quarters to neglect furnishing not only food supplies for the Indian command, but also supplies of clothing and equipments. In his reconnaissance and inspection to Fort Gibson General Curtis not only became convinced of the importance of the Indian Brigade, but saw the necessity of improving it instead of recommending its muster out of service.

After the expedition of Colonel Phillips to South Boggy in the early part of February, the Southern Indian forces displayed very little activity in the Indian country south of the Arkansas, until spring, when, under the leadership of General Maxey, they commenced showing some aggressiveness in the eastern part of the Choctaw Nation.

The Federal administration of affairs in the Indian country during the winter of 1863-4 was not as efficient as it should have been in the estimation of many of those

who had the welfare of the loyal Indians at heart, on account of the bickerings and quarrels between Department commanders and their subordinates, resulting in changes of Department commanders and Department lines and controversies in regard to which department certain troops were in when the changes were made by the War Department under political pressure.

There was no doubt but that the administration of the affairs of the Indian Territory under Colonel Phillips was as efficient as could be looked for with the means at his disposal; but practically all the white troops were taken from him and ordered to Fort Smith, and he was unable to secure transportation to bring down barely needed supplies from Fort Scott or up from Fort Smith, making it necessary to weaken his command at Fort Gibson by sending heavy detachments with such wagons and teams as he could press into service to Western Arkansas, to purchase wheat and corn to make into flour and meal to feed his troops. After General Blunt was relieved of his command at Fort Smith, in December, he returned to Kansas and was for several months without a command, and for some reason or other, perhaps because he was a partisan of General Lane, had not by his recommendations cordially supported Colonel Phillips when he made requisitions for much needed supplies to bring the Indian Brigade up to a good state of efficiency; but on the contrary, when the Colonel was taken sick the latter part of summer after the Elk Creek campaign, and sent home to Kansas, the General recommended that the Indian Brigade be mustered out of serviec as "worthless," in the face of the fact of its splendid achievements under the guidance of Colonel Phillips in seizing and holding Fort Gibson, and of keeping the forces of the Southern Indians and Texans south of the Arkansas River during the spring and summer, up to the arrival of Blunt with re-enforcements in July. It was the general belief, which was alleged to have been supported by inside information, that the recommendation of General Blunt for

the muster out of service of the loyal Indian Brigade as "worthless," was instigated by Senator Lane, who had secured the appointment and promotion of General Blunt, was for the purpose of destroying the prestige of Colonel Phillips, whose successful operations and handling of the Indian troops were attracting attention, and might win the recommendation of some other Department commander for promotion.

A knowledge of the recommendation of General Blunt in regard to the muster out of service of the Indian Brigade as "worthless" was made known to Colonel Phillips, an dwhen the General returned to Fort Smith as commander of the District of the Frontier in March, 1864, the relations between them were not as cordial as they should have been between a military commander and his subordinate, where both had the loyal interest of the Government at heart. But if General Blunt had been a party to humiliating Colonel Phillips and destroying his prestige, someone else had been a party to humiliating the General and destroying his prestige, for on his arrival at Fort Smith he found practically all the white troops of his district were in the Department of Arkansas under General Steele, leaving him only the Indian Brigade and a few detachments subject to his orders. This situation left him almost without a command, and after a little more than a month at Fort Smith, he was relieved, and reported to General Curtis for assignment, leaving Colonel Phillips still in command of the Indian Brigade, with a prospect of improving its morale and efficiency, which had depreciated with the reports that it was to be mustered out of service. But after its inspection by General Curtis and he saw what Colonel Phillips had been doing and was doing to keep up its efficiency under great difficulties, he let it be known that he was opposed to its muster out of service, and that he would do everything in his power to have it supplied with food and clothing and equipment the same as white

troops, and that he would send an engineer officer to Fort Gibson to work out plans for strengthening the fortifications, and that he would request the Department commander of Arkansas to occupy the western counties of the State contiguous to the Indian Territory, with a sufficient number of troops to protect the left or eastern flank of the Indian Brigade to prevent incursions of the enemy.

When Colonel Phillips communicated this information to his command, the effect was almost immediate in improving the morale and efficiency of his troops, which was shown in the cheerfulness with which those at the post put in every day in drilling and perfecting their soldierly bearing.

When General Curtis was at Fort Gibson the Indian command was mostly dismounted, probably two-thirds, the hard service of scouting and escorting trains, with scanty forage, had rendered their ponies unserviceable, which was a serious disadvantage to Colonel Phillips in conducting operations in the field, and General Curtis fully appreciating the situation, promised to get authority for arming and remounting the Second and Third Indian Regiments as Mounted Riflemen on ponies, to increase their efficiency in holding the Indian country.

The General got the impression that the Indian soldiers abused regular cavalry horses, and thought that pony mounts would be more suitable for the Indian character and habits, which was a fact; besides pony mounts could be purchased for $25 to $30 each, whereas regular cavalry horses would cost from $150 to $175 each at Fort Scott or Fort Leavenworth.

The Arkansas River above and below Fort Gibson to Fort Smith and through the Indian country, when properly guarded, was a kind of buffer against the inroads upon Southern Kansas and Southwest Missouri, by Southern Partisan bands of Missourians, particularly Quantrill's band, who had been spending their winters in Northern

Texas, with the view of slipping back to their old haunts in Missouri in the spring when the grass was up sufficient to allow their horses to live by grazing during their easy marches north through the Indian country. In this manner it was possible for these partisan bands and desperadoes to march from Red River through the Indian country to Southern Kansas or Southwest Missouri, without any reliable information of their movements reaching the Federal Department or District commanders of those States until the outlaws had struck a dreadful blow to some unprotected town, neighborhood, or small detachment of troops, leaving a trail of blood and murder behind them.

Knowing the importance of the Arkansas River as a buffer and a barrier to the Southern Indians crossing to the north side of it in making raids through the Cherokee Nation, Colonel Phillips had undertaken to guard all the principal fords below Fort Gibson to the neighborhood of Fort Smith, and above for a distance of fifty to sixty miles, when he had a sufficient number of mounted men for the purpose. He was then able to receive information of every movement of the Southern Partisan bands marching north to enter Missouri or Kansas for guerrilla operations. If they were white men, there was no mistake as to who they were, and their probable destination. With the aid of his scouts and spies and Indian men and women coming to his command from the southern part of the Indian Territory, he received information of the intentions of the enemy, when a movement north would be made, what troops would be in it, and whether they proposed to cross the Arkansas above or below Fort Gibson, and their destination.

The latter part of March General Cooper arranged to send Quantrill's command north into Southern Kansas or Southwest Missouri, and to cross the Arkansas above Fort Gibson, and when the bandit leader arrived at one of the fords above, the guard stationed there by Colonel Phillips

skirmished with them, ascertained that they were white men, and reported the fact to headquarters at Fort Gibson as quickly as possible, and the Colonel immediately sent out a force against the bandits and succeeded in driving them back south of the river, as some of the streams on their line of march were past fording from recent heavy rains in that region. He knew that as soon as their march would not likely be impeded by high waters, the bandits would make other efforts to move north through the Indian country and he sent a dispatch to Fort Smith by courier to be forwarded by telegraph to the Department commanders of Missouri and Kansas, to be on the lookout for the outlaws, who were certainly intending to go into Kansas or Missouri.

In a short time after this, however, Quantrill succeeded in crossing the Arkansas River at another point, but not without the knowledge of Colonel Phillips, and moved north through the western counties of Missouri to the Missouri River counties and where early in May he was giving the Federal commanders of the Districts of Central and Western Missouri much trouble by his murdering, plundering and robbing operations, besides the anxiety he gave General Curtis, commanding the Department of Kansas, for fear of the outlaws making a raid into that State and leaving a trail of devastation and murder in their wake.

It was a singular fact that Quantrill and his men were almost as much of a terror to the people of Northern Texas and the Southern part of the Indian Territory as they were to the Union people of Western Missouri and Eastern Kansas. They were charged with robbing and murdering the people in Texas without regard to their political affiliations, and General McCulloch, commanding the District of Northern Texas, reported to his superior the trouble he had in dealing with Quantrill and his men; that he had been unable to control them; that they wore

blue overcoats; that they were a terror to the country, and a curse to the land and Southern cause, and when engaged in robbing and murdering, they intimidated their victims and friends by telling them they were Quantrill's men, and threatened them with revenge and retaliation if anyone informed against them.

Quantrill, who seems to have been commissioned by General Price as Colonel of Confederate Cavalry, was recognized after the Lawrence Massacre as the leader of all the Southern bandit organizations in Western Missouri, extending as far south as Bates county, and all cooperated under his leadership in all their black-flag operations until some time after the Baxter Springs Massacre; but when they were in their winter camp in and near Sherman in Northern Texas, in the spring of 1864, a dissension arose among the followers of Quantrill and Bill Anderson, the two chief bandits, which caused a bitter feud and permanent separation.

The feud became so acute that they turned their arms upon each other when General McCulloch ordered Quantrill arrested and brought to trial for the lawless conduct of his men charged with murdering and robbing reputable citizens of Northern Texas, and when he returned to Missouri in the spring the bandit leader had a following of only forty to fifty men, and his rival, Bill Anderson, had about the same number; but they never co-operated with each other in any movement against the Federal forces afterwards; nor did Quantrill ever return to Texas after his trouble with General McCulloch. He lost his prestige with the guerrilla leaders, and also with Price and Shelby, and after Price's Missouri Expedition, he collected in December, 1864, some twenty-five to thirty of his old company and started for Kentucky to retrieve his lost prestige.

He and his men wore Federal uniforms; they arrived at Hartford, Ohio county, Kentucky, January 22, 1865; they deceived the Federal officers by representing themselves as belonging to the Fourth Missouri Cavalry, and

several Federal soldiers lost their lives at the hands of the bandits by the deception; but their murdering and robbing soon disclosed their true characters, and General John M. Palmer, commanding the Department of Kentucky, quickly had his mounted forces in pursuit of them; but as his regular forces were not meeting with success in running down the bandits, he commissioned Captain Edwin Terrill, a successful guerrilla fighter, to organize a company of Federal scouts, nearly all citizens, to pursue and hunt down and bring in Quantrill dead or alive. Captain Terrill had thirty men in his company and at once took up the pursuit of the outlaws, and striking a fresh trail of mounted men, followed it until he found that they had stopped at the farm house of James A. Wakefield, near Bloomfield, Spencer county, the headquarters of the bandits.

Having been informed by a colored blacksmith near Wakefield's on May 10, that the outlaws had turned in at the barn of Wakefield out of a shower of rain, Captain Terrill charged down upon them, shouting and firing as his men closed up, which threw the bandits into confusion, and in scrambling to get out of the barn to reach their horses, hitched in the barn lot, three or four of the outlaws were killed and Quantrill wounded in the back, which paralyzed him except his head and arms. He was taken into Mr. Wakefield's house and treated for his wound, by a physician, and the next day Captain Terrill and his men came and took him and put him in a wagon with straw for bedding and started with him for Louisville, where they arrived May 13th, and reported to General Palmer's headquarters. From the General's headquarters, Quantrill was sent to the Military Prison Hospital, where he died June 6, 1865. His followers surrendered the following July.

Major Cyrus J. Wilson, who belonged to a Kentucky Cavalry regiment and who took part in running down Quantrill and his men, and was near at hand when he was wounded and captured, lived at Rives, near Union City, in Obion county, West Tennessee, in 1883-4. The writer,

who was an agent of the War Department at the time investigating war claims in that section, and when at work in that neighborhood made the Major's home his headquarters and had frequent conversations with him about features of the war, particularly bandit operations in Kentucky and Missouri. Among the incidents related by the Major was the part he took in running down the outlaw and his followers and of being near at hand when he was mortally wounded by Captain Terrill's men and taken to Louisville and turned over to General Palmer. It seemed difficult up to the time of meeting Major Wilson to secure definite and first hand information about the last days of the noted bandit and his followers.*

The recommendation of General Curtis for authority to mount the soldiers of the Indian Brigade on ponies, was submitted to General Grant, who had recently been appointed Lieutenant General and Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the United States, and was approved, which, as soon as accomplished, greatly increased the efficiency of the Indian forces. In the summer of 1863, no effort was made by the Chief Quartermaster of the Department to have large quantities of hay put up at Fort Gibson, Cabin Creek and Baxter Springs, which would have been a big item of forage for the public animals during the winter.

This, however, was to be remedied, and in due time contracts were let for putting up hay at Fort Gibson, Flat Rock, Cabin Creek and Baxter Springs, with a force at each place deemed sufficient to protect it against raids of the enemy. When that region had seasonable rains during the spring and summer, there was no part of the country that produced finer wild grass for hay that could be had for the cutting, curing and putting up in ricks, and with a pair of good strong horses to each mowing machine, a large quantity of hay could be cut, cured and put up in a short time.

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*Note: For a full account of the life of this desperate outlaw, the reader is referred to an octavo volume, "Quantrill and His Border Wars," by William E. Connelley, Secretary Kansas Historical Society, Topeka, Kansas.

In April the Arkansas River became navigable for steamers of light draft from Little Rock to Fort Smith, and the transportation department of the Army took advantage of the rise of the river to secure as many boats as practicable for the purpose of bringing up large quantities of munitions of war to Fort Smith for the troops in Western Arkansas and the Indian Territory.

Even with good navigation of the river, it was quite a task to bring up supplies, for every steamer that came up the river from Little Rock to Fort Smith with supplies for the army had on board a detachment of infantry and usually two howitzers or field pieces, manned by a sufficient number of men to afford protection against attacks by Southern Partisan bands who made strenuous efforts to prevent supplies from coming up the river by steamers and probably not a single boat arrived at Fort Smith that had not encountered their attacks at favorable points on the river, and most of the pilot houses and other parts of the boats had bullet holes where they had been hit; but a few volleys from the infantry and several rounds of shell and canister from the guns usually dispersed the enemy without damage to the soldiers or crew. Several bales of cotton were generally placed in suitable positions on each boat for protecting the infantry detachments and the soldiers manning the guns and the lookouts against rifle shots from a concealed foe on the bank of the river.

The Federal troops at Fort Smith and in that vicinity were on half rations a good deal of the time from the latter part of winter up to the opening of navigation on the Arkansas River on the 20th of April, when there was a good stage of water in the channel, and steamboats commenced coming up from Little Rock every day or so heavily laden with army supplies of every kind.

At times there were as many as half a dozen boats at the wharf in a single day, unloading their cargoes. The following named steamers were running on the river between Little Rock and Fort Smith that spring: The "Car-

rie Jacobs," "Annie Jacobs," "Ad Hines," "Des Moines City," "General Grant," "Chippewa," "J. H. Done," "Almo," and "Sunny South," and by the latter part of June had brought up supplies sufficient for an army of twelve thousand men for ten months, making it unnecessary for the army to depend on wagon trains to bring down supplies from Fort Scott via Fort Gibson, as it was obliged to do in the winter.

The Carrie Jacobs, a rather large boat, brought up three hundred tons of supplies on one trip, which was equal to a train of two hundred to two hundred and fifty wagons loaded with supplies and transported by mule power two hundred miles.

The boats usually made the trip from Fort Smith down to Little Rock in two days; but coming up from Little Rock heavily loaded with supplies, they generally required three or four days. It was a genuine satisfaction to most of the soldiers to know of the pouring in of large quantities of supplies, for there had been some grumbling among them during the prolonged period of short rations. Many of them were obliged to spend a good part of their wages as soldiers to purchase edibles from the sutlers and citizens to satisfy the demands of hunger, a feature of the service few had been called upon to meet.

The matter of purchasing a part of the ration pressed harder on the soldiers of the infantry regiments, who received only thirteen dollars per month from the Government, than upon the cavalry soldiers, who received that amount and each twelve dollars per month additional for the use and risk of his horse. The hardship pressed not only upon the soldiers, but upon the families of many of the soldiers who had been receiving from them nearly all their wages after each pay day

Up to the war Fort Smith was considered a beautiful little city of about two thousand population. It had much

wealth and refinement of the kind considered worth while in the South; but after the Federal occupation of the place, there was a steady drifting into the city of refugee families, mostly Union families, from the western part of the State south of the Arkansas River, until the conditions were becoming anything but ideal.

Most of these families had a hard and troubled existence up to the time of the Federal occupation of the country, and after that nearly all the male members of families came into Fort Smith to enlist in the Union army, or for safety. Many of their families were robbed of their movable property by the Southern partisan bands, or considered it unsafe to remain at their homes, and made their way into the Federal lines and outposts, and finally into Fort Smith.

They were unable to bring food with them, and very little clothing, and the Government was obliged to feed and provide for them to prevent them from starving. The soldiers were on half rations until well along in the spring, and the additional demand of these refugee families for food supplies increased the hardships for all. While some Southern families had moved south on the Federal occupation of the place, very few vacant houses could be found to house the refugee Union families during the winter and early part of the spring. In some instances there were as many as twenty-five to thirty women and children in a single house that was intended to accommodate not more than half a dozen persons. Where there was crowding of so many persons in a house, with none of the modern conveniences, unsanitary conditions developed with much sickness and some immorality. It had been the rule of the Post Commander, to whom all reports of unsanitary conditions and suffering of refugee families were made, to send many of these families north to Fort Scott with the returning wagon trains which had been bringing down supplies for the troops.

But now that the river was opened to navigation and steamboats were steadily bringing up supplies for the army, and returning to Little Rock without cargoes, or very small cargoes, many of these refugee families were sent to Little Rock and to points as far north as Cairo and St. Louis, which relieved the situation to some extent. There was no effort made, however, to send away the families of the Arkansas Union soldiers who had come into the different posts for protection, for the soldiers were generally able to provide for their families, and had opportunities of seeing them at intervals, and in some instances daily, particularly where the family of the soldier was at the post where he was stationed. It was the policy of the Department Commander to have an Arkansas Union regiment, or at least a battalion of one, stationed at the different posts in the territory occupied by the Federal forces, and if the families of the soldiers could not stay at home, generally came to them at those posts.

After the failure of the Red River campaign, however, and the retirement of General Steele's army from the Camden expedition to Little Rock, it became more difficult for boats to ascend the river to Fort Smith, for General Price, commanding the District of Arkansas, was then able to send heavy forces with artillery to different points on the river between that place and Little Rock to obstruct navigation; but also to the north side of the river to Upper White River, to interrupt Steele's communication with Memphis and the North.

The march of General Thayer's Frontier Division of the Seventh Army Corps from Little Rock to Fort Smith held back the immediate advance of large Confederate forces to the Arkansas below that place, for the reason that General Maxey, who had relinquished command of his division in the operations against General Steele, had returned and resumed command of the District of the Indian Territory, and was concentrating his available forces against Fort Smith in the hope of capturing the Federal

forces there under Colonel Judson before the arrival of Thayer. In the race Thayer arrived a day or so before Maxey's forces under Cooper were ready to make the attack.

Large quantities of supplies had arrived at Fort Smith by steamers before the arrival of Thayer, and as he marched up the river, he strengthened his posts at Dardanelle and at other points and was able to keep the river open to navigation for army supplies, with a few intervals, during the spring and part of the summer. Only a few times were steamers held up at Little Rock on account of low water in the river.

As the Confederate forces were now holding no place of particular importance north of Red River, except perhaps Camden, the Confederate Generals allowed their forces to operate in relatively small detachments over large areas to the north, and many of Price's Missourians filtered through the Federal lines to their homes in Missouri, where they either gave themselves up to Federal post commanders and took the oath of allegiance to the Government, or endeavored to stay in the country by hiding out until the Confederate army should return and occupy the State, which their leaders had promised them it would do. Besides, many of these returning parties claimed to be on recruiting service for the Southern armies, and others were members of Southern partisan bands and marauders. These Confederate detachments and Southern partisan bands, particularly those of Arkansas, kept the Federal forces at posts on the Arkansas very busy in protecting navigation on the river to Fort Smith; but the main efforts of General Maxey were directed to concentrating his forces against that place to drive the Federal forces out and occupy it, which would give him a prestige no other Confederate leader could boast in recent months.

He knew that his success would hearten the Southern Indian forces to renewed activity and enable him to take the offensive north of the Arkansas, capture Fort Gibson and drive the Federal forces back to Southern Kansas, but if he entertained this ambition, it was never realized.

CHAPTER XXII
CONFEDERATES CAPTURE STEAMER WITH SUPPLIES

The battle of Poison Spring had shown General Maxey what desperate resistance a small detachment of Federal troops could make when attacked by overwhelming, vastly superior numbers, even when burdened with the defense of a large train, which separated the different units and prevented them from fighting to the best advantage. He had seen how these troops when the Confederates had formed directly across their line of retreat had cut their way through by well directed volleys from their rifles into the Confederate ranks and had continued their march without the loss of prisoners. On resuming command of his district he knew he would have the same troops to face that he fought at Poison Spring, only more of them, in the campaign he was preparing for the capture of Fort Smith, and the control of the Arkansas River, which admonished him to direct the movements of his forces with much caution.

He seems to have started out in his campaign with the assumption that Generals Smith and Price had captured or destroyed General Steele's army on its retreat from Camden to Little Rock, and captured the latter place, whereas if he had been correctly informed he would have known that the combined Confederate forces from Arkansas and Louisiana, under the immediate command of Generals Smith and Price, after overtaking the rear of General Steele at Saline River, were, after desperate fighting, repulsed with heavy losses in the battle of Jenkins Ferry, and unable to continue the pursuit, allowing the Federal forces to retire leisurely to Little Rock, without the loss of any of their equipment by capture.

In making known to the Confederate authorities his plans of the campaign, he spoke of the capture of Fort Smith and Fort Gibson as if he had only to march upon them and take possession, and was only waiting for in-

formation of the destruction of General Steele's army, and the Confederate occupation of Little Rock and the lower Arkansas, whereas he had no possible chance of capturing Fort Smith or Fort Gibson with the forces he then had under his command unless these forces should put up a better fight than they had to their credit in any past campaign in that section.

During the months of April, May and June the Arkansas was navigable for steamers from Little Rock to Fort Smith most of the time and large quantities of supplies were brought up for the army estimated to be sufficient for a period of four or five months at least, with additional troops drawn in from outposts, which it was thought would give time to determine the success or failure of General Sherman's operations in his advance upon Atlanta from Chattanooga, a movement that had required for its support, the withdrawal of a large number of troops from the West Mississippi region. Indeed he took with him for operations in that campaign, all the troops that could be spared from the Mississippi Valley, and General Grant, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies, did not desire any immediate aggressive operations in the Departments of the Gulf or Arkansas, after the armies of General Banks and General Steele retired to positions that would enable them to prevent interruption of navigation of the Mississippi or the Arkansas River; the line of the Arkansas was to be held by the Federal forces even if they were on the defensive.

General Grant and the War Department were not satisfied with General Banks' Red River campaign. They believed that his defeat and disaster were brought about by scattering his troops too much, instead of using them en masse against the enemy, and while his army was at Alexandria assisting the Gunboat Fleet under Admiral Porter to pass over the Falls of Red River at that place, by direction of the President, General E. R. S. Canby

was assigned to the command of the Military Division of West Mississippi, which included the Departments of the Gulf and Arkansas, with large discretionary powers, specifying, however, that the navigation of the Mississippi must be kept open and the line of Arkansas held, which meant that aggressive operations in Arkansas would be suspended for the present.

In the recent Departmental changes, the Indian Territory was included in the Department of Arkansas, where it naturally belonged, particularly since the Arkansas Valley was controlled by the Federal forces, and all operations in the Indian country would now be conducted from Fort Smith and Fort Gibson, and supplies for the troops brought up the river from Little Rock, while the river was in navigable condition for steamers.

From about the middle of April to the tenth of May, Colonel W. P. Adair, with 325 mounted men of the First and Second Cherokee Regiments of Colonel Watie's Brigade of Southern Indians, managed to cross the Arkansas below Fort Gibson and made a raid up through the Cherokee Nation as far north as Maysville and Cowskin Prairie, causing a good deal of excitement among the loyal Indians and the people of Southern Kansas, Southwest Missouri and Northwest Arkansas, for definite information could not be secured as to what point, if any, he proposed to attack.

General John B. Sanborn, commanding the District of Southwest Missouri, Springfield, had his scouts on the trail of the Southern Indians, which enabled him to report their movements from day to day until they turned back south. The General also sent Major John Cosgrove with a detachment of eighty men of the Eighth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, to follow the trail of Colonel Adair until he came up with and engaged him, to ascertain his strength and intentions; but when the Major arrived at the place where the wily Indian was reported to be en-

camped, he was gone, and could not be overtaken, for he had crossed to the west side of Grand River and was moving rapidly south and crossed the Arkansas River above Fort Gibson and reported to Colonel Watie, nearly all his men having deserted or left him in the Cherokee Nation.

These deserters in parties of thirty to forty in different neighborhoods in the Cherokee Nation gave the loyal Indians a good deal of trouble, for there were frequent clashes between them with many fatal results, which were reported to headquarters at Fort Gibson, Fayetteville and Neosho, and the sending of mounted detachments of soldiers to the disturbed localities for the purpose of punishing the enemy and restoring of tranquillity. In a scout from Neosho, Major Milton Burch, commanding a detachment of the Eighth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, reported that he attacked a party of about thirty of the Southern Indian faction of Colonel Adair's command in the Spavina Hills region, and killed two, wounded seven, and dispersed the others, capturing their supplies and equipments.

The Confederate authorities had not as yet had much experience in looking after the comfort and welfare of the refugee Indian families who had espoused the cause of the South and had left their homes and property to become exiles among tribes with whom they had nothing in common. Those authorities had made many promises that they would not permit the Federal forces to invade the Indian country; that if they should make an invasion, it would be only temporary, for the Confederate forces would return and drive them out and punish the traitor Indians. In spite of these promises the Confederate forces had not been able to occupy the Indian country north of the Arkansas for more than a year, and perhaps most of the families of the Southern Indian soldiers of that region had remained at their homes. It was found the Southern Indian soldiers, like the Southern white soldiers of Mis-

souri who had been taken from their homes and country by army service to some other part of the country where they were strangers, gradually had an intense longing to return to their families and homes, and their officers from the highest to the lowest had similar desires and the homing instinct found expressions in raids on large and small scales over hundreds of miles through hostile territory, or territory occupied by Federal forces, when, as a matter of fact, the commanding officers of such expeditions had little hope of accomplishing anything worth while commensurate with the cost of blood and treasure involved.

Indeed, many officers commanding large forces promised their soldiers who were far away from their homes that they would lead them back to their own country in a great expedition after the completion of a campaign, and where the soldiers and officers were willing to take the desperate chances of facing disaster, the commanding general could not very well veto the promises, even when to grant them was against his judgment, for he saw refusal meant wholesale desertions, and he was obliged to weigh one evil against the other. Such expeditions of southern forces had been made into Missouri in the summer of 1862-3.

In the Federal army a large percentage of the men with families, and others who had become homesick, wounded men and men who were sick in hospitals, were given furloughs nearly every year, for thirty, sixty and ninety days, all of which relieved the pressure of any particular army wishing to return home en masse. Even with the raiding expeditions arranged to satisfy the homing instinct of the Southern soldiers from Missouri, and the Southern Indian soldiers from the Cherokee Nation, thousands of Missouri soldiers and hundreds of Cherokee Indian soldiers of the Confederate army filtered through

the Federal lines and returned to their homes, some as deserters, some having furloughs, and some having recruiting commissions; but nearly all bound together in any neighborhood by ties of comradeship and interest in the Confederate cause.

In the Cherokee Nation where there were no towns to speak of, and where there was little traveling of individuals from place to place, except the members of soldiers' families visiting them at Fort Gibson, these deserters, furloughed soldiers, and recruiting parties might live in isolated localities undisturbed for many weeks by notifying each other when any one of them heard of common danger ahead, as the approach of a Federal scouting detachment or a general movement to round up and clear out all Confederates in the vicinity.

General Maxey's participation with the Choctaw Indian Brigade and the Texas troops of his district in the operations against General Steele, and his success in the battle of Poison Spring, gave him considerable prestige when he returned to his headquarters at Fort Towson and resumed command of the District of the Indian Territory, and he used that prestige for all it was worth in his efforts to rally the demoralized factions of the Creeks and Cherokees. He at once set about to improve his transportation system, which he complained was entirely inadequate and crippled his operations in the field; that the subsistence and quartermaster supplies for his troops had to be brought from Texas, and that he was unable to secure wagon transportation for them, and thought an ox train of thirty to forty wagons would be of great service to him. He lauded the Choctaw Brigade for their achievement at the battle of Poison Spring and the honorable and important part they took in the Camden campaign, which appealed to their soldierly pride, and in a spirit of emulation, increased the war-like ardor of the Creeks and Cherokees, who after many defeats had

become quite timid in facing the Union Indian and white soldiers who had been thrown against them by Blunt and Phillips, the last two years. He exaggerated the disasters of the Union army in the Red River and Camden expeditions, and endeavored to impress upon the troops and officers of his district that the Federal forces were ready to evacuate Fort Smith and Fort Gibson and leave the Arkansas Valley, and that his troops would have little else to do than to march in and occupy those posts and the country and gratify their war-like spirit in chasing the fleeing Federals north to Southern Kansas. Feeling that he had infused a spirit of emulation in his troops who had not participated in the glorious achievements of defeating the Federal forces in the Camden expedition, to join in an enterprise that would bring them a greater and more glorious success than that, he directed General Cooper to move with his division from Boggy Depot to near Northfork, on the Canadian, where he arrived the middle of May, his position being about equally distant from Fort Smith and Fort Gibson.

About this time General Maxey received a dispatch from his Department Commander stating that he had reliable reports announcing that General Thayer's Frontier Division of General Steele's army had left Little Rock and crossed to the north side of the river, except part of his cavalry on the south side, and were on the march to Fort Smith, and that it would be well to ascertain the truth of the report before making any movements that would endanger his command. In a few days he received reports from his own scouts that General Thayer had arrived at Fort Smith with his division, and that the fortifications were nearly completed, which caused him to give up the proposed attack, and his forces retired in the direction of their depots, after sending a heavy scout to the vicinity of Fort Smith.

Colonel Judson, commanding the Federal forces at Fort Smith, concentrated the troops of his district at

that place, on hearing of the preparations of the Confederate commander for making the attack, and strengthened his fortifications, and was ready to receive them, reported to be advancing 8,000 strong; but on the same day of the reported advance of the Confederates the Colonel received a dispatch from General Thayer stating that his troops would commence arriving at Fort Smith the next day by noon, which relieved the tension of preparing to fight a vastly superior force. Having made preparations for the attack and moved up to within an easy day's march of the Federal position and then to retire without a fight, General Maxey felt that an explanation was due his troops and supporters, and gave out to them that Fort Smith had received large re-enforcements, mostly of infantry, which had caused him to change his plans.

His forces were nearly all cavalry. The spring had been favorable for producing good grass in the Indian country, so that the ponies of his Indian soldiers and the Mustangs of his Texas troops were in fairly good condition, and enabled him to assume a threatening attitude towards both Fort Gibson and Fort Smith, and as General Thayer's policy was not by any means aggressive, the Confederates became bolder as the season advanced.

Having his headquarters near Northfork, about fifty miles west of Fort Smith, General Cooper was instructed to keep out mounted scouting detachments in the direction of that post and Fort Gibson to watch the movement of the Federal troops from those places; to have his scouts and spies visit Fort Smith in particular, to interview Southern sympathizers who were familiar with everything taking place there, and secure accurate information from them of the strength, movements and intentions of the Federal forces at that post, and to report the information obtained as early as practicable to Confederate headquarters.

Most of the families of Fort Smith were Southern sympathizers and one or more members of them were in the Southern army, and as many Federal officers and soldiers boarded in many of these families, there was no difficulty in Confederate scouts and spies getting first hand information in regard to troop movements and of the arrival and departure of steamboats bringing up supplies for the army and returning down the river with cargoes of cotton and refugee passengers destined for points in Illinois or Missouri, where they could be provided for by the Government without drawing on the supplies needed by the troops.

While there had been fairly good navigation of the river during the spring, permitting boats to come up to Fort Smith, there had not been a sufficient rise to allow even the lightest draft steamers that had been up to pass over Webber's Falls, thirty-five miles above, to Fort Gibson with supplies for the troops at that post on more than one or two occasions.

About the middle of June there came another rise in the Arkansas River when it was thought there was a sufficient volume of water in the channel to allow a boat with a cargo of supplies to pass over the Falls and reach Fort Gibson. The steam ferry boat, **J. R. Williams,** which was kept at Fort Smith for the purpose of ferrying troops and wagon trains over the river at that place, and for furnishing posts up and down the river with supplies, was loaded with a cargo of commissary and quartermaster supplies and also with some sutler's goods for the troops at Fort Gibson, and placed in charge of Lieutenant G. W. Houston, quartermaster of the Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry, and the captain of the boat, to proceed up the river to her destination.

The escort to the boat consisted of twenty-six men of the Twelfth Kansas Infantry, under Lieutenant H. A. B. Cook. But there was no cavalry force sent out from Fort Smith up the south side of the river to reconnoiter the

country as a precautionary measure to guard against the boat being fired upon by a hostile force at some point where the channel approached near the south bank. It had been known to General Thayer for several weeks prior to the boat leaving Fort Smith, that General Cooper had been operating in the vicinity of Northfork and Upper Poteau Valley, within forty to fifty miles of the Federal position, and that the small guard of 26 men would be almost helpless against an attack made with artillery, supported by a large concealed force on the bank of the river, only a few yards distant. His Chief of Scouts, Captain Tough, reported almost daily the movements of the enemy on his west and southwest fronts, and he had cavalry to send out to make reconnoissances to verify the reports of his scouts; but he knew, and most of his subordinates knew, that he had no outposts south of the Arkansas between Fort Smith and Fort Gibson; that the country was open and the river could be easily approached by an enemy at almost any place for a distance of forty to fifty miles. Since General Maxey had been able to take the offensive, no Federal outposts could, with safety, be kept out more than ten to fifteen miles from Fort Smith south of the Arkansas, or in the direction of Boggy Depot. They would have been in constant danger of capture, or cut off from their commands, and as Colonel Phillips had not yet remounted his command, for which he was given authority by the War Department, he was unable to do much scouting south of the Arkansas; besides the river above and below Fort Gibson had for some time been past fording, making it unsafe for scouting detachments to be caught on the south side.

There was no secrecy in loading and dispatching the boat up the river to Fort Gibson with her cargo of supplies, and whether some of the Southern spies in Fort Smith hastened with information of her departure to Colonel Watie, commanding the Southern Cherokees in the vicinity of Northfork, or not, he was advised of her de-

parture and marched at once with his available force and three pieces of artillery to a point on the river where he knew that the channel approached very near the south bank overlooked by a bluff and posted his men and guns in a concealed position, with scouts several miles below to give him notice the moment the steamer came in sight.

On leaving Fort Smith, Lieutenant Cook cautioned his men to keep a sharp lookout, as they might be fired upon at any moment by guerrillas concealed at any of the favorable points for making an attack along the river. His men realized the necessity for vigilance and cheerfully held themselves in readiness to execute every order given. The boat steamed along up the river about fifty miles until it came to a great bend in the river to the south where the channel approached near the south bank. At this point, which was about five miles below the mouth of the Canadian, the Arkansas River was about 350 yards wide, and the boat could not pass it without passing near the south shore. Having accurate information of the movements of the boat, and having placed his men and guns in concealed positions, Colonel Watie selected this point, known as Pleasant Bluff, for making the attack. He knew it was a good position to command the river by artillery. He had his three pieces masked behind clusters of bushes about one hundred yards apart on the bluff overlooking the river, and when the boat came up opposite the center gun, the three pieces opened a direct and cross-fire upon it, belching forth fire and smoke and shot and shell with a terrific roar. Almost at the same instant, the Southern Indians also discharged a heavy volley of musketry from their concealed positions on shore, not one of whom could be seen by the officers and men on the boat, who were taken completely by surprise. They knew nothing of the presence of the enemy until they heard the roar of the artillery and musketry and saw the thick clouds of smoke arising from the discharge of cannon and small arms. They had no time to

meditate about the situation, for in another moment a cannon ball crashed into the boat, but above the water line and without doing any damage to the machinery, and then Lieutenant Cook ordered his men to take positions behind barrels and boxes and return the fire with as much precision as possible, and while it did not likely do the Confederates much damage, it had the effect of keeping them at long range and from showing themselves in force in the open. After getting the range of the boat, almost every shot fired from the Confederate guns struck her, so that in a short time she was so badly disabled as to be unmanageable. One of the first shots fired by the hostile guns struck the smoke stack about four feet above the cabin floor, and a second shot hit the pilot house, knocking most of it away, and a third shot struck the boiler, or some of the steam pipes, which released the steam with an almost deafening sound. A dense volume of steam instantly enveloped the boat so that those on board for a few moments could see nothing on deck or on shore, with the boat helplessly drifting.

When the Confederates heard the explosion and saw the cloud of steam burst forth enveloping the boat, they at once rent the air with triumphant shouts along their line, but continued the artillery fire with greater energy, thinking that she would soon surrender, or that a lucky shot would disable her.

While the boat was thus enveloped with steam, impenetrable to vision and soon disabled, the soldiers on board could not keep up their fire with advantage, and Lieutenant Cook went to the captain to ascertain the extent of the damage to her machinery, and he replied that he did not know. The Lieutenant then ordered the engineer to examine her machinery, and he did so and returned and reported her disabled; but while the examination and report were being made and before her machinery stopped working, the pilot ran her on a sand bar on the north side of the river within a few yards of the shore

where the water was quite shallow. Finding that the boat could not be moved up or down the river and that she was a target for the Confederate guns and small arms, Lieutenant Cook took his men off her and waded to the north shore, leaving Lieutenant Houston and the captain on board.

Immediately after reaching the shore, the Lieutenant formed his men behind a sand bar, lying down in such position as to command the boat, should any of the enemy attempt to board her to take her to the south side or set her on fire. His plan of keeping the boat and her cargo from falling into the hands of the enemy was, however, defeated, for, to his great astonishment and mortification, he saw, in a few moments after he had disembarked his men, Lieutenant Houston and the Captain of the boat and one of her crew going over to the enemy in a yawl. Their conduct was unaccountable and reprehensible in the judgment of eye-witnesses who related the story of the loss of the boat and her cargo. They thought it was due to cowardice or treachery, for they were not more exposed to the fire of the enemy than Lieutenant Cook and his men; besides they could have come on shore with him. As the Lieutenant could see no prospect of saving the boat and her cargo, with twenty of his men he started for Fort Smith, arriving at that place the next day and reported to the General the abandonment of the boat and all that had taken place up to the time he left. Three or four of his men, however, who became separated from him, went to Mackey's Salt Works in the Cherokee Nation, about ten miles distant, where Colonel John Ritchie was stationed with the Second Union Indian Regiment, and related to him their version in regard to the abandonment of the boat, and as he had heard distinctly the cannonading, he was interested in hearing their full story.

He at once collected about two hundred of his warriors and hastened to the point where the boat was represented to have been left, with the view of holding it

if it had not been taken to the south side before he arrived. It was late in the day, however, when the soldiers arrived at his camp and reported, so he did not reach the point where the boat was abandoned until the next morning, and he then found that it had been taken over to the south side of the river, and that the enemy were unloading it on a sand bar and preparing to take the supplies away. He carefully scanned the scene of the Southern Indians unloading the cargo and apparently jubilant over their prize, and came to the conclusion that the boat and as much of her cargo as had been taken off and piled up on the sand bar were within range of some of his best small arms, and at once ordered his Indian soldiers to open fire upon the enemy along the opposite shore and any who came down on the sand bar to remove the stores that had been taken off and piled up.

Shortly after Colonel Ritchie's Indian soldiers opened fire upon the enemy unloading the boat and removing the supplies and goods piled up on the sand bar, they set fire to it, unfastened it from its mooring, and it drifted off down the river enveloped in flames. The river continued to rise until it covered the sand bar several feet where the boat's cargo had been unloaded, and in a day or so barrels and boxes of commissary supplies were seen floating in the river past Fort Smith, the Southern Indians having been able to secure and carry away only a small part of the cargo. They had no wagons along with the expedition and took only so much of the supplies as they could carry off on their ponies. There were some sutler's goods on the boat, however, which the Southern Indians took and with which they almost loaded themselves down, and immediately started for their homes with their booty, almost breaking up Watie's command, as he stated in his report of the affair.

Lieutenant Cook was blamed for not keeping his men together on shore within range of the boat, for if he had

done so, it was thought he could have prevented the enemy from coming over to her by a careful fire directed upon any one attempting to approach her in the small boat which Lieutenant Houston and the Captain had taken to the south side when they went over.

As soon as information reached Fort Smith of the attack on the boat, General Thayer directed Colonel S. J. Crawford, Second Kansas Colored Infantry, to take part of that regiment and part of the Eleventh U. S. Colored Infantry, in all about seven hundred men, and a section of artillery, and to march as rapidly as practicable to the point where the boat was attacked, and if possible, drive the enemy off before they could get away with the supplies.

When the Colonel arrived in the vicinity where the boat was captured, he found that the enemy had left the river and fallen back a short distance, having been informed of his approach by their scouts who had been out in the direction of Fort Smith to watch for any movement of a Federal force from that place. Having ascertained that the enemy were in force in his immediate front, the Colonel moved forward again and came upon their pickets at San Bois Creek and chased them to Wire Bridge where about 150 of Colonel Watie's men showed themselves as if they intended to contest his further advance. As he did not know the strength of the Confederate force in his front, he moved cautiously, formed his men in line of battle, sent forward his skirmishers and opened fire with his section of artillery upon the enemy, who, after a few rounds of shot and shell, fled, after sustaining a small loss in killed and wounded. As his force was infantry and had marched day and night, with short intervals for rest, since leaving Fort Smith, he deemed further pursuit of the enemy, who were mounted, useless, and returned to his station. On hearing of the near approach of Colonel Crawford's force Colonel Watie burned some of the commissary supplies captured with the boat except a small quantity

that his Indian soldiers had taken away and those piled upon the sand bar. He reported that his men were mostly interested in securing the sutler's goods as their part of the booty, and broke away from his command to take them home. His success in capturing the boat increased his prestige with Generals Maxey and Cooper, who lauded his achievement as the most important that had been scored by the Confederate arms in the Indian country within the last year.

Lieutenant Cook reported that two of the crew and one of the engineers on the boat were killed when he abandoned it, and Colonel Ritchie stated that in the skirmish across the river he had one sergeant and three other enlisted men wounded.

After the capture and burning of that boat, it was considered unsafe to attempt to ship supplies to the troops at Fort Gibson by steamboat, for in a short time the Southern forces of Maxey and Cooper occupied the country south of the Arkansas River in the Indian Territory, pushing their outposts up to within fifteen to twenty miles of Fort Smith.

General Thayer certainly did not display that rational aggressive policy expected of him by many officers and friends of the Government, for by drawing in his troops from two to three unimportant outposts he would have had enough men, in the judgment of well informed military men in that section, to have marched out and attacked Maxey and Cooper with a strong probability of success. His entire administration of affairs at Fort Smith seems to have been characterized by a want of foresight in calculating what the enemy might do to thwart any given enterprise or movement he projected, as in the case of the loss of the boat and her cargo, and the Poison Spring disaster.

His general movements were directed by General Steele, the Department Commander, who was busy looking after General Shelby operating on the Upper White River,

and General Marmaduke, on the Mississippi below the mouth of the Arkansas River, but subordinate commanders, like General Thayer, operating several hundred miles from Department Headquarters were given rather wide discretionary powers, and generally had such instructions as, "Be cautious in your movements and do not attack the enemy unless in your judgment the chances of success are largely in your favor." But caution bordering on timidity is hardly excusable in military operations of a commander.

The efforts of Marmaduke to interrupt navigation of the Mississippi and of Shelby to interrupt navigation of White River, below De Vall's Bluff, having failed, the question that suggested itself to the observer of events in that section was, Would General Price concentrate his forces for an attack on Little Rock or Fort Smith, or plan a campaign for the invasion of Missouri?

When General Blunt came down to Fort Smith in the spring to take command of the District of the Frontier, there was a good deal of talk about him heading an Expedition into Northern Texas to assist the Unionists in throwing off Southern domination, and there was much speculation among Southern leaders, particularly Generals Maxey and Cooper, as to whether he would push directly south along the western line of Arkansas, or whether he would take the Overland Mail Route, which was in a southwest direction from Fort Smith through the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations. Even after the return of Thayer's Frontier Division from the Camden Expedition, the Confederate leaders still seemed inclined to believe that the troops of that division were to be used for an Expedition into Northern Texas, and Maxey moved his forces north from near Red River with great caution until he secured information that convinced him the Federal commanders were not intending immediate aggressive operations.

To ascertain the movements of the enemy in the counties south of Fort Smith and to bring out quite a number of Union families in that section General Thayer

sent out a scout of two hundred and fifty men under Lieutenant-Colonel Charles S. Clark, Ninth Kansas Cavalry, made up of detachments from the Sixth, Ninth and Fourteenth Kansas Regiments, to form a junction in Polk county with a similar scouting party sent out from Little Rock under instructions from General Steele, about the middle of June. In the afternoon of the 18th, Colonel Clark received information when nearing Waldron of two bodies of Confederates, in his front, one at Hahn's farm, southwest of Waldron, Colonel Well's Battalion of Texas Cavalry, reported to be three hundred strong, and the other eight miles south of Waldron, on his line of march to Polk county, reported to be five hundred strong. He did not consider it advisable to leave the force at Hahn's farm undisturbed, for it would be practically in his rear if he passed it on his right to attack the larger force in his front. He therefore determined to turn off the Waldron road and take the Lookout Gap road and first attack and dispose of the Southern force at Hahn's farm, and marched that evening within four miles of their position and went into camp for the night, seeing to it that no information of his presence should be carried to the enemy. He had men with him who were familiar with the position of the enemy, and the next morning on resuming the march, he decided to charge the Confederate camp and arranged his different detachments for the purpose, and when near enough to make the movement effective, gave the order, and his men dashed forward and swept the camp clean in a few minutes, capturing all their camp equipage, subsistence, books, papers, forty horses and saddles, eighty stands of arms, mostly Enfield rifles, and three prisoners.

The Confederates were completely surprised; a few endeavored to make a stand; but it was impossible in the face of the onrush of the Federal Cavalry, firing as they advanced with their carbines and revolvers or using their sabres. After chasing the Texans two or three miles, Colonel Clark recalled his men to the camp to take account

of the captures and disposed of the captured property. He reported five Confederate dead; the arms, saddles and camp equipage he destroyed; the prisoners and some of the captured property he brought back to Fort Smith.

The affair was of very little importance in itself, but it had the effect of reminding General Maxey that the Federal forces at Fort Smith were not to be taken in or driven out as easily as he had boasted, and that they were able to give blow for blow in all the operations which they would likely be called upon to take part, and that they had no thought of retiring from that place or Fort Gibson.

Directly after Colonel Clark's scout, General Maxey had report to him Brigadier-General R. M. Gano, who had been an officer in the command of General John Morgan, the famous Confederate Raider through Indiana and Ohio. General Gano early gave promise of being one of the most active and enterprising Brigade Commanders who had up to that time opposed the Federal forces in that region, and under his leadership the Confederate field forces were soon to assume a more aggressive attitude than during the past spring. He had by his energy and military bearing attracted the attention of his superior officers in the Confederate operations against General Steele in the Camden Expedition, and he was expected to bring those same qualities to bear in the operations against General Thayer in Western Arkansas and in the Indian country, a field of operations in which the Confederate forces had hitherto been unable to achieve any satisfactory results.

He would have to start with, in the campaign then developing, the prestige of success in other quarters, which was more than General Maxey's other subordinate commanders could boast, which made it more easy for him to accomplish something worth while in military operations. He had received a severe wound in the arm while leading his men in a reconnaissance in the operations against General Steele, which increased his reputation as a bold and dashing officer, and an officer in whom his men had confidence as an enterprising commander.

At that time General Thayer did not have a cavalry officer with experience and with the dashing qualities of Gano; nor did he have the mounted force to put under such a commander if one had appeared on the scene. Colonel W. F. Cloud, Second Kansas Cavalry, fulfilled the required conditions; but he was on duty in another field of operation; he was dashing and had large experience in cavalry movements and was well-known to the Southern people and the Southern leaders in that region since early in the war. His name as the leader of a movement was an assurance of success.

CHAPTER XXIII
ATROCIOUS ACTS OF SOUTHERN BANDITS—ACTION AT ROSEVILLE—STONE'S FARM—MASSARD PRAIRIE—CONFEDERATE DEMONSTRATION AGAINST FORT SMITH

In the movement of his troops south from Little Rock and Fort Smith, on the Camden Expedition, General Steele knew that the natural thing for General Price to do would be to concentrate all the available forces of his district, in the Union front, to check if possible the advance of the Federal Commander.

While it was the policy of General Price to concentrate as large a force as practicable to oppose the advance of the Federal columns, it was also his desire to detach as many of his men as could be spared to operate in the Federal rear against stations with small garrisons guarding public property, and parties carrying the mails and repairing the military telegraph lines from Little Rock and Fort Smith. He felt that he could not spare many of his regularly organized troops for this service while the Federal forces were steadily advancing on Camden; but he determined to commission the Southern partisan leaders in Western Arkansas for the work and believed that they would be more effective than his soldiers of the line.

In less than two weeks after General Thayer's departure with the Frontier Division from Fort Smith, the Southern partisan bands commenced displaying unusual activity at points on Wire Road between Fort Smith and Fayetteville, and between Fayetteville and Cassville, by cutting and taking down the wire and obstructing the road with it and making entanglements by winding it around trees on each side of the road, and by firing from concealed positions upon detachments of Federal soldiers carrying the mails and dispatches, and others employed in repairing the telegraph line.

Many of the members of these Southern partisan bands wore the Federal uniform and were able to deceive

and surprise small detachments of Union soldiers now and then when out foraging or employed in any service that took them a few miles from their stations. There were details of ten to fifteen mounted men to carry the mails as often as once a week from Fort Smith to Fayetteville, and thence to Cassville and Springfield, a distance of about 160 miles, and the route was over the Boston Mountains and through a rough wooded section in which there were very few houses on the road, nearly all of which were occupied by families of Southern sympathizers.

A telegraph line had been constructed from Springfield to Fort Smith along the Overland Mail Route, over which detachments of soldiers carrying the mails passed, and it was important to keep the line open for the use of the military authorities in Western Arkansas in connection with army operations.

In order to cripple the movements of the Union forces as much as possible, Southern Partisan Rangers, as they were sometimes called, dashed in from a distance, perhaps of a day's march, and cut the telegraph wire at different places, so that parties had to be sent out to repair it, and if not adequately protected by an escort while at work, they were almost certain to be fired upon and one or more killed or wounded. The detachments carrying the mail, too, although well armed, were fired upon nearly every week by Southern partisans, from concealed positions, and sometimes with fatal results and without exacting an equivalent toll from the enemy.

In view of the long distance, sixty miles, between Fort Smith and Fayetteville, which the detachments had to march without finding any friendly shelter, a station was established at Prairie Grove at the foot of the north side of the mountain, fifteen miles south of Fayetteville, where horses were kept for relay, and where there were a few soldiers to take care of the stock and afford assistance to the detachments passing over the road.

Colonel M. La Rue Harrison, commanding the First

Arkansas Union Cavalry, stationed at Fayetteville, kept part of his regiment constantly scouting through that section, hunting down and punishing the Southern bandits, wherever they could be found.

Most of his men were brought up in that section and were thoroughly familiar with every part of it and knew the political status of the people: but it was difficult to find the bandits by scouting, for they could effectually conceal themselves in the broken and thinly settled parts of the mountainous region for weeks, and then by making part of a night's march, reach a point from which they could attack the Union pickets at Fayetteville, or cut the wire at one or more places on the Wire Road or attack parties carrying the mail on that road. The bandits usually operated in parties of from a dozen to forty to fifty men, each party having a leader to direct their movements.

On the evening of April 7th, a party of twenty-two of the most desperate outlaws of the Boston Mountains, under a leader named Lyon, descended from their hiding places in the mountains, wearing the Federal uniform, and came to the mail station at the foot of the mountain, which was on the battle field of Prairie Grove, representing that they belonged to the Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry As they were clothed in the Federal uniform and pretended to be friends, they were permitted to advance to the gate in front of the house. There were ten men of the First Arkansas Cavalry and one citizen at the station. Nearly all the soldiers were in the house when the desperadoes came up.

Not suspecting the character of the strangers, and after a short conversation by the men in the yard with the bandits, the men in the house came out unarmed, when the outlaws opened fire upon them, killing nine of them and the citizen, only one soldier making his escape. Some of the men thus brutally murdered were shamefully mutilated by the fiends before they left the scene of the bloody

tragedy. The escaping soldier, however, led to their speedy undoing; he immediately conveyed information of the fiendish murder of the men to Colonel Harrison at Fayetteville who, at once dispatched Major Charles Galloway with a detachment of cavalry in pursuit of the outlaws.

The Major soon struck their trail, overtook and killed part of them and captured four and brought them in. They were tried by a military court and found guilty of murdering the men at the station, all of whom were unarmed, and the outlaws were sentenced to be shot to death.

The findings of the military court were approved by the President, and the four outlaws were executed at Fort Smith on the 29th of July, in the southeast part of the city near the convent. They could plead no extenuation for their conduct.

After their trial and conviction by the military court, they were kept in the military prison at Fort Smith for several months, pending the action of the President, and on the day of their execution fifty soldiers were detailed for the purpose and marched out in front of the prison with their arms, and ordered to ground arms, and when their muskets were placed upon the ground the men were marched to the opposite side of the prison and halted at parade rest.

Another detachment of soldiers were furnished with fifty cartridges, half with balls and half blanks for the fifty Springfield Rifles that were grounded, and ordered to take up the guns and load them so that every alternate gun was loaded with a cartridge and ball and the next with a blank cartridge.

The soldiers who were first marched out and grounded their arms were then brought back and directed to take up their arms in the order in which they had grounded them, and when all was in readiness and the procession started, they marched behind the caisson on which were

seated the condemned men beside their coffins, to the large open space where the executions were to take place. A detachment of soldiers marched in front and rear of the condemned men. It was a beautiful day and a thousand or more citizens and soldiers were on the ground to witness the executions. On arrival at the place of execution the four men were taken off the caisson and placed in position for the firing detachment. The Post chaplain who had been with them at different times to minister to their spiritual wants offered up a prayer for the salvation of their souls, and when he had finished, they were blindfolded and the detachment whose guns had been loaded with balls and cartridges and with blank cartridges, at command, marched in front of them, thirty to forty paces distant and at the order, fire, the roar of the volley and the smoke from their guns sealed their fate, they fell over dead, and not a man of the firing detachment knew whether his gun had fired a ball and cartridge or a blank cartridge.

One of the murderers was a redheaded youth who was probably under eighteen, and he was charged with having committed a number of other murders in the section where he was captured, murders of the most brutal nature.

Not only Southern partisan bands wore the Federal uniform when they could get it; but companies operating with the regular organized Confederate forces frequently wore it with the sanction and under the eyes of Generals Price and Marmaduke and other Southern officers commanding troops west of the Mississippi River. In wearing the Federal uniform the outlaws might now and then get ahead in killing Union soldiers and citizens; but it is not likely that in the end they were ahead, for the chances were more than even that men of desperate characters in active service would get killed, wounded or captured in the course of a year or so, and if captured their records were hunted up, and they were certain to be tried as spies or murderers, and if convicted, shot to death.

When it became known to the Southern partisan leaders in Southwest Arkansas that most of the Federal troops had been taken away from Fort Smith and vicinity, for the Camden Expedition, they made desperate efforts to capture or drive off the Federal detachments stationed at points along the Arkansas River for the protection of navigation and the loyal citizens of that section. After they concentrated about five hundred men from different organizations, they proposed to make an attack on Roseville, forty-five miles below Fort Smith on the south side of the Arkansas River. A battalion of Federal soldiers had been stationed at that place during the past winter; but in the recent movement of the troops of the Frontier Division under General Thayer from Fort Smith to join General Steele on his march to Camden, there were left at Roseville only two companies of the Second Kansas Cavalry, Captain John Gardner commanding, and one company of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, under Captain David Goss. Captain Gardner was the senior officer in command of the troops at the station and directed their movements at that place. The mounted troops of this force were employed not only in scouting and hunting down and breaking up and dispersing Southern partisan bands of that section to prevent them from collecting in sufficient force to attack the boats on the river; but with the infantry detachments they were also employed in guarding their supplies and several hundred bales of cotton, which were seized by the Government and were awaiting shipment to Little Rock and Memphis.

Until ready for shipment the cotton bales were used by the soldiers in making breastworks for defensive purposes in the event of attack. There were also several brick buildings in town which had port holes made in them for small arms in the event of hostile attack, which was looked for.

Captains Gardner and Goss knew that the country around Roseville was full of Southern partisan bands, and they now and then heard of the near approach of heavy cavalry scouts from Price's army in the southern part of the State, and were satisfied that an attack was imminent at any time, and were prepared to make a good fight if they were not overwhelmed by superior numbers supplied with artillery.

General Gano detached a part of his Brigade for the expedition against Roseville, and on the morning of April 4th his detachment and the Southern partisan bands of Captains Stone, King and Basham, numbering upwards of five hundred men, drove in the Federal pickets south of town and immediately commenced a vigorous attack on the troops at the station. In a few moments after the alarm was given Captains Gardner and Goss had their men out in line and their skirmishers thrown forward, protected by houses and fences to keep the enemy out of town.

The Federal soldiers used their long range rapid firing Sharp's carbines very effectively in holding the Confederates off from every point on which they made an attack. They also hastily constructed breastworks of cotton bales around a warehouse near the river, which made an effective shelter and protection against the Confederate small arms. The Confederates made several efforts to charge and carry the Federal position, but were driven off every time with severe loss.

They were not permitted to approach nearer than one hundred feet of the breastwork, the fire of the Federal soldiers was so hot and destructive. During the fight most of the Confederate forces dismounted and sought sheltered positions from which they kept up a hot fire for nearly two hours, doing a good deal of damage. They were finally completely repulsed and driven off with the loss of ten men killed and upwards of thirty wounded, leaving their dead and severely wounded on the ground.

On the Federal side the Second Kansas had five men killed and eleven wounded, and the Sixth Kansas had four men killed, number of wounded not reported. At the time of the fight there was no surgeon or assistant surgeon with either of the Federal detachments to attend to the wounded, and Captain Goss despatched sergeant W. A. Kelly with two men of his company up the north side of the river to Fort Smith with a request that a surgeon be sent down at once. The next morning shortly after daylight Assistant Surgeon Stephen A. Fairchild, of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, with an escort of twenty-seven men under Lieutenant Sharp McKibbin of the same regiment, left Fort Smith for Roseville. A woman on horseback passed out of the Federal lines at Fort Smith with Lieutenant McKibbin's detachment and rode with his advance for several miles, when, moving forward at a more rapid gait than he was marching, she disappeared ahead of him. His detachment marched along without interruption until about the middle of the afternoon, when he made a short halt at a farmhouse within ten miles of Roseville. He found the women at this place greatly excited, and they begged him to move on, expressing a fear that he would be attacked by a force of about four hundred Southern partisans who were encamped about three hundred yards from the road on his left front. He sent two or three men off in the direction of the reported camp to make a reconnaissance. They soon returned with the information that the hostile force had just broken up their camp at the place designated and marched in a direction to intercept him on the road on which he was moving some distance in his front. He resumed the march, looking for an attack at any moment. He moved forward a mile or so to Stone's farm, where the bandits were in position on both sides of the road, prepared to attack him. The road on which he was marching bore nearly due east, and at the point where the attack was made crossed a hollow running from a south-

west to a northeast direction, with timber on its sloping sides. A hundred yards or so on his right and left front there were two fields, between which the road passed through a narrow lane.

About two hundred yards on his left was another field, the southeast corner of which joined the northwest corner of the field on the left of the road in his front. Sergeant William H. Ward, company E, Sixth Kansas, who was one of the escort, stated that on nearing the entrance to the lane the bandits, who were mostly on the right of the road, commenced to swing the left of their line across the road in the rear of the detachment and to move forward the right of their line to prevent the Federal soldiers from entering the lane, at the same time making a charge from their center. Lieutenant McKibbin then brought the escort right-wheel into line to meet them; but as they were wearing the Federal uniform, and fearing that they might be Federal soldiers, he demanded to know who they were before firing. Their leader replied, "Stand there a moment and we will show you who we are;" the escort then delivered their fire, and in another moment, seeing the effort to cut them off from the entrance to the lane, made a dash for it and gained it before the outlaws could throw a sufficient force across it to hold it. On firing a volley from their carbines, the Federal soldiers drew their revolvers and fired right and left into the enemy who were endeavoring to cut them off from the lane.

After the escort broke through the bandits at the mouth of the lane, it was then a race for their lives for the next two miles, and in the space of a few moments twelve of the Federal detachment, including Surgeon Fairchild, were killed, or fell wounded and were afterwards murdered and their bodies horribly mutilated with knives and stripped of the outer clothing.

It was reported at that time that the Southern bandits of that section had bound themselves by an oath not to surrender to the Federal authorities and not take any Federal

soldiers prisoners, and the fiendish conduct of the desperadoes in mutilating the Federal dead showed what desperate characters the Confederacy had called into its service. The next day a detail was sent out from Roseville to collect and bring in the Federal dead, and on arrival of the bodies they were interred in the cemetery near town.

The fiendish conduct of the bandits did not lessen the activities of the Union soldiers in that section, for on the return of General Thayer's division to Fort Smith from the Camden Expedition, he had more cavalry to put into the field, and the Southern partisan bands along the Arkansas River who had participated in the Stone's Farm massacre met with swift punishment. Colonel A. H. Ryan, Third Arkansas Union Cavalry, stationed at Lewisburg, reported to General Steele that different detachments of his command in the course of one week had hunted down and killed fourteen of the enemy, wounded sixteen, and captured fifty-five men and three officers, besides a large number of horses and mules and guns, without sustaining any loss.

The operations of Colonel Cloud who was stationed at Clarkville with the Second Kansas Cavalry were scarcely less successful against the Southern bandits of that section. Detachments of Federal cavalry were sent out daily from the different posts to scout the surrounding country, and they rarely returned to camp without chasing and running down and killing several of the enemy. Before starting out the commanding officer of the detachment generally had information of the exact locality where the bandits would be found, and he was frequently able to surprise them so completely that few of them would get away. At almost every post citizen scouts were employed and sent out one or two together by the Federal commander to obtain information in regard to the movements of hostile bodies of men in the vicinity and within a day's march of the station. These scouts in most cases wore long hair, and traveling

through the country visited Southern families and pretended to be Southern men in order to secure the desired information. When encamped in the deep recesses of the mountains and forests the bandits were sometimes vigorously attacked by the Union cavalry and routed with heavy loss on the reports of citizen scouts who had been thus sent out. The Unionists were determined that these desperate contests should not be one sided.

Action at Massard Prairie

While the Confederate partisan bands were displaying unusual activity to interrupt General Thayer's communication with Springfield and the North, the Southern forces of General Maxey under the immediate command of Generals Cooper and Gano were advancing to the vicinity of Fort Smith in his front, reported by scouts to be five or six thousand strong.

After the capture of the steam ferry boat at Pleasant Bluff with supplies for the troops at Fort Gibson, Colonel Watie was promoted to Brigadier General in command of a brigade of Indians in General Cooper's Indian Division, and his success seems to have infused some hope of further achievements worth while among General Maxey's subordinate commanders, so that on the 19th of July General Cooper with a large Confederate force of about three thousand mounted men made a reconnoissance to Scullyville in the Choctaw Nation, advancing to within ten to twelve miles of Fort Smith.

General Thayer was in great need of cavalry to meet these demonstrations of the enemy in his immediate front. He had been ordered to send the Ninth Kansas Cavalry to Little Rock, and the Second Kansas under Colonel Cloud had been at Clarksville for several months, leaving only two battalions of the Sixth Kansas at Fort Smith, many of whom were dismounted. With a small mounted force, General Thayer could not hope to make a successful aggressive movement against the Confederate troops, who were nearly

all mounted. And this lack of aggressiveness of the Federal commander, impressed the Confederate leaders that it was his weakness or timidity that prevented him from marching against them. General Cooper, who had been repeatedly defeated by General Blunt and Colonel Phillips, with the loss of his artillery, was now becoming so bold as to venture to attack General Thayer's outposts near Fort Smith.

For about three weeks in July four companies of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, under Major David Mefford of that regiment, were stationed at Massard Prairie, five miles south of Fort Smith, as an outpost, and to keep out scouting detachments to the front to watch the movements of the enemy and report every day or so.

After his reconnaissance to Scullyville, General Cooper ascertained from his scouts the position of the Federal outpost south of Fort Smith, and directed Brigadier-General R. M. Gano to take a well mounted force of fifteen hundred men from three brigades, move forward, and approach near enough to the Federal detachment on the night of the 26th to make the attack early the next morning. Owing to the scarcity of forage, Major Mefford had been sending out to graze early every morning under proper details all his horses not required for scouting purposes, so that his command of two hundred men thus isolated was very little more effective than so many infantry.

He kept his pickets properly posted and sent out scouting detachments every day on all roads on which the enemy would likely approach; besides citizens scouts were sent out every day by Captain W. S. Tough, Chief of Scouts, District of the Frontier, from Fort Smith, to watch the movements of Cooper's forces, who had for several days been encamped on Buck Creek about twenty-five miles southwest in the Choctaw Nation. General Gano concentrated his force during the night on the Poteau

River about ten miles southwest of the Federal camp, and moving forward before daybreak on the morning of the 27th drove in the Federal pickets at sunrise, his advance arriving at Mefford's camp almost with the pickets, so thoroughly had his plans worked out.

But the firing between the pickets and the Confederate advance, perhaps half a mile off, aroused the camp, and Major Mefford got his men out in line before General Gano formed his troops to charge. When it was known that the enemy were approaching, Major Mefford ordered his herd brought in from the prairie where it had been sent to graze that morning at daylight.

Before the herd could be secured and the men mounted, however, General Gano charged the camp and stampeded the horses, leaving Major Mefford with his command dismounted to make the best fight possible with the overwhelming force of Texans and Indians. Unfortunately the Federal camp was in the edge of the timber on the south side of Massard Prairie, and there was no shelter by which Major Mefford could protect his men in the unequal contest. The Major was an experienced officer, and in making a hasty disposition for the fight, Companies E and H formed his left, and Companies B and D his right, and by skilfully handling them, his men with their Sharp's carbines repulsed three separate charges of the enemy in defending his camp.

In a short time the Confederates commenced to pass around his flanks and to form in his rear, and then he was obliged to retreat across the prairie in the direction of Fort Smith, using part of his force in firing well-directed volleys to break the lines of the enemy in his rear. He kept up this retreating fight for about a mile across the prairie to a house in the edge of the timber, and by his effective volleys repeatedly broke the lines of the enemy and dispersed them when they formed across his line of retreat. But finally the Confederates formed in such

heavy masses between him and Fort Smith that he could not break their line again, and was obliged to surrender, only a few of his men being able to cut their way through the Confederate ranks and get away. He made a gallant fight and held his men intact to the last volley, so that he did not lose a man from demoralization.

The Federal loss in the action at Massard Prairie was 11 men killed, 20 wounded, and 127 men captured, including Major Mefford and Lieutenant J. M. DeFriese. On the Confederate side there were 9 men killed and 26 wounded.

Immediately after Major Mefford surrendered and his men disarmed, General Gano started the prisoners south on the double-quick, for fear that a large force would come out from Fort Smith and endeavor to retake them. Early in the action Major Mefford dispatched a messenger to headquarters for re-enforcements, stating that he was heavily attacked, and General Thayer hastily collected such mounted troops as were at hand and sent them forward; but they did not reach the field until the fight was over, and they were unable to overtake the enemy.

It was a very warm day, and the prisoners being obliged to march double-quick time for about ten miles, they were nearly exhausted and suffered dreadfully from thirst when General Gano went into camp that night south of Backbone Mountain. Sergeant Thomas Sauls of Mefford's company was about sixty years of age, and the first few miles march gave out from fatigue and heat, and was picked up and taken along in an ambulance until the prisoners went into camp that night. With a sufficient escort the prisoners were taken to Tyler, Texas, where the Confederate authorities had an extensive stockade and prison pen for keeping Federal prisoners captured west of the Mississippi River, and where the treatment of prisoners was very little better than at Andersonville, where they were treated with unspeakable cruelty, that can never be extenuated.

Some of the men who were captured at Massard

Prairie endeavored to escape from the Tyler camp, but they were hunted and run down by bloodhounds and their limbs horribly lacerated by the fierce beasts. A few of the men, however, by tunnelling under the stockade, did escape by the scent of their trail being too old to be followed by the bloodhounds, when put upon it.

General Gano's successful movement at Massard Prairie encouraged General Cooper to make a demonstration against Fort Smith with nearly his entire force, to ascertain if possible the strength of the Union forces, and to make a diversion in favor of a force which he had ordered to cross to the north side of the Arkansas River above Fort Smith to attack some Federal detachments putting up hay for army use on Blackburn's Prairie.

On the morning of July 31st the Confederate advance attacked and drove in the Federal pickets stationed on the Texas road four miles south of Fort Smith under Lieutenant L. F. Stewart, Sixth Kansas Cavalry, and came up to within two miles of the outer line of fortifications, with skirmishers thrown forward to cover their main line of battle. When the near approach of the enemy was reported to him, General Thayer ordered Colonel Judson, Sixth Kansas, commanding Third Brigade, to march out and check the enemy advance. He moved out with two regiments of infantry, the available men of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, and four guns of the Second Indiana Battery under Captain Espey, and taking up a position on the high ground about a mile south of town, sent forward his skirmishers to engage the enemy.

In the disposition of the Confederate troops, Brigadier-General Gano commanded General Cooper's right wing and Brigadier-General Watie his left wing, but they showed no inclination to engage in close fighting.

The troops and guns assigned to the fortifications took up their positions for an emergency, and during the day General Thayer was on the field directing the move-

ments of his forces, but he made no effort to bring the enemy to a general engagement, for want of cavalry to operate on his flanks. There was some spirited skirmishing, but the opposing forces confronted each other on ridges that separted them by a half to three-quarters of a mile nearly all day without either party making a movement to join in close conflict. After some cautious maneuvering and skirmishing at long range, General Cooper ordered up a section of Howell's battery, which threw shells at the Federal line for a short time, when it was withdrawn and a section of Humphrey's battery ordered to take its place.

Directly after this last battery went into action the four guns of the Second Indiana battery were ordered out from Fort Smith and opened upon it with shell, and on firing less than half a dozen rounds came near producing a panic among the hostile Indians of Cooper's command. A single shell from one of the Federal guns burst in the midst of the Confederate battery team, killing four horses and taking a leg off of one of the gunners, while another shell took a man's head off, and wounded several gunners. The dead horses were immediately cut loose from the limber, and the disabled gun drawn off by the men, when the entire Confederate force retreated from the field.

General Thayer did not follow up his advantage by pursuit, claiming that he did not have a sufficient mounted force to do it effectively. The casualties on the Federal side in the skirmish were four men killed and six wounded. Colonel Judson was wounded in the leg by a piece of shell. As far as could be ascertained the casualties on the Confederate side were about equal to those sustained by the Federal forces.

This demonstration convinced General Cooper that the fall or evacuation of Fort Smith by the Federal forces was not as near at hand as had been reported to him, and

the next day he fell back about forty miles southwest in the Choctaw Nation near his depots to rest and reorganize his forces, the expiration of service of some of his Choctaws being near. They nearly all, however, re-enlisted for the war. This was the last demonstration he made in force, but he soon afterwards commenced displaying some activity in sending heavy mounted detachments north of the Arkansas River to attack and break up parties cutting and putting up hay for the Government and to destroy the hay already put up.

Most of Watie's command of Cherokees under Colonels Adair and Bell were sent north of the river through the Cherokee Nation on the east side of Grand River, but after some skirmishing were driven south by the loyal Indian soldiers from Fort Gibson.

General Shelby with a brigade of his Southern Missourians from Price's army, having crossed to the north side of the Arkansas River, was making a vigorous campaign on White River and in Northeast Arkansas, and was giving General Steele all he could do to keep his lines of communication open with Memphis, for Shelby was making frequent attacks on the railroad and bridges between Memphis and Little Rock, and on steamers plying White River.

It was also reported from many sources that Shelby's operations north of the Arkansas were to prepare the way for a larger movement by Price's army into Missouri in a month or two; that he had represented to General Smith commanding the Trans-Mississippi Department, that if liberally supported in making an expedition into Missouri, he would be able to capture St. Louis, with the vast amount of Government supplies stored there, of which the Confederacy was greatly in need; besides, if obliged to retire, he would be able to bring out many thousands of recruits for the Southern army. The picture represented was a very promising one and was strongly favored by Missourians in the Confederate army and was much talked of in their camps.

CHAPTER XXIV
CONFEDERATES CAPTURE SUPPLY TRAIN

On the 30th of July General Thayer issued an order relieving Colonel William A. Phillips of the command of the Indian Brigade and of the Post of Fort Gibson with instructions to turn over the command to Colonel S. H. Wattles of the First Indian Regiment and to report in person immediately to District Headquarters at Fort Smith. There was no reason stated for this change of commanders. The Colonel had been in command of the Indian Brigade for about two years, and had made the loyal Indian troops as efficient in holding the Indian country as white troops, and in holding the extreme right of the Federal forces west of the Mississippi River, were a very important factor in army operations in that region. He had the entire confidence of the loyal Indians and guarded their interest with jealous care.

He had by a skillful movement of the Indian Brigade, supported by a battalion of white troops and a four-gun battery, seized Fort Gibson and fortified it and held the Indian country north of the Arkansas, more than six months before the capture of Little Rock and the occupation of the lower Arkansas by the Federal forces. His administration of the affairs of the Indian Country had been so efficient and satisfactory to the loyal Indians and the Government and so free from any scandals connected with army operations and administration, and his popularity among the loyal Indians so great, that the Lane faction of politicians in Kansas it was claimed by many were envious of the reputation he was making for himself, and not only stood in the way of his promotion, but were constantly scheming to get him out of the way of attracting so much popular attention.

The first scheme of his political enemies and some large private interests operating in that section, to get rid of him, was a recommendation of his superior officer for the muster out of service of the Indian Brigade, and

when this scheme failed, the next was to thwart his efforts to remount part of his command, which was becoming less efficient for the operations required, on account of so many of the mounts of his Indian soldiers having become worn out and unserviceable by hard service and inadequate forage. But as he had secured authority from the War Department to remount part of his Indian troops, it was felt that the surest way to get him out of the district, was to bring influences to bear to relieve him of his command.

He had stood firmly for protecting the rights and interests of the loyal Indians, and against allowing any scandals to grow out of contracts for furnishing the army with supplies.

He was commanding an Indian Brigade whose operations extended over the finest grazing and stock raising of cattle and pony horses in the country, and when the Federal army advanced into the Indian country in the spring of 1862, there were not only cattle upon a thousand hills, but the prairies were dotted with the herds, each animal bearing the brand of the owner.

This stock was the principal source of wealth and of living of the Indians, and was a temptation to Army Contractors who accompanied the troops in the field, to appropriate it to private use without inquiring into the political status of the owners, which made little difference, for if it belonged to the disloyal Indians it might be confiscated by the Government, and if to loyal Indians and appropriated by the army, it would be paid for by the Government. While the armies of both sides and the marauders accompanying them had been taking this stock of the Indians for two years, and had greatly depleted the herds, still, in the summer of 1864, there were many valuable ones in the Indian country that prominent men with political and army influence were desirous of securing without paying for them.

On the 10th of July Colonel Phillips reported to General Thayer the arrest of nine men from Kansas,

caught with a herd of stolen cattle sixty miles up the Verdigris River; that there were eleven men in the party, and that the two principal ones while trying to escape were killed; that the witnesses to both the stealing of the stock and offenders were held at Fort Gibson, and that if they were not to be tried there, he would send them down to Fort Smith under an escort. He also stated that he heard of another large herd of eight hundred head of stolen cattle, that were on the way and then probably in Kansas, and that he was sending a detachment of troops after them. Captain H. S. Anderson of the Third Indian Regiment was sent after this stock and on his arrival at the Osage Mission he found 150 head of the stolen cattle in the possession of the Osage Indians, that belonged to the Creek Nation, and when the Osages found that he was after the cattle, they scattered them and it was impossible for him to follow them. Captain C. Johnson of the Fifteenth Kansas Cavalry, stationed at the Osage Mission, had assisted the Osages in driving the cattle out of the nation, but was not inclined to give any information about it. Captain Anderson stated that he could find all over that country cattle with the Cherokee and Creek brands on them, and that there had been a large number driven from the Indian country into Southern Kansas, the last month, and that he could safely say as many as six or seven thousand head. He also reported that he found it very difficult to obtain information from officials in Kansas in regard to bringing this stock out of the Indian country except Colonel C. W Blair, commanding at Fort Scott, who gave him all the information possible and all the assistance in his power. He further reported that the cattle were there in different herds; but that he could do nothing further than ascertain the fact, as he could not take any action without witnesses.

There was very little of the pony horse stock left in the Cherokee or Creek Nations after the latter part of

1862, for the belligerent Indians of both sides had used it freely in keeping themselves mounted; besides their families had used a good deal of it for domestic purposes and in moving from place to place in the disturbed condition of their country. Two years' hard service, with inadequate forage, had worn out the mounts of the soldiers of the loyal Indian Brigade, so that by the latter part of the winter of 1863-4 practically all the pony mounts that had not died or been abandoned on the march had become unservicable or unfit for scouting purposes, and the situation became so acute that the only way Colonel Phillips could make up a scout, which he considered very important, was to borrow ponies from the women of the soldiers of his command, to make out the complement required.

He presented the situation to General Curtis, the Department Commander, and when the General made an inspection of the condition and needs of the Indian Brigade in January, he was convinced that its efficiency was seriously impaired for want of mounts for the Indian soldiers, and he recommended to the War Department that Colonel Phillips be authorized to mount one thousand of his men on ponies, which it was estimated would not cost more than one-fourth of the amount that would be required to purchase the same number of regular cavalry horses, such as were being purchased for the white cavalry regiments of the army at the depots where such purchases were made.

The authority requested was finally approved by General Grant, commanding the armies, as already stated, and returned through regular channels, and when the Colonel was relieved and ordered to turn over the command of the Indian Brigade to Colonel Wattles on the last of July, the matter had not been acted upon by General Steele, the Department Commander. This was only one instance out of several in which Colonel Phillips was ham-

pered by his superiors in his operations by reducing the efficiency of his Indian troops who were constantly facing the enemy, and now that he had been removed from command in the Indian Territory, predictions were freely made that before the end of the year serious disaster was almost certain to come to the Federal forces in that region unless there should be a speedy change of policy of the District Commander at Fort Smith.

In less than a week after Colonel Phillips arrested the cattle thieves and reported to General Thayer that he was holding them at Fort Gibson for further instructions, he was relieved of his command at that place and ordered to report to headquarters at Fort Smith. Major-General Herron, who made an inspection of the military affairs in the Department of Arkansas and the Indian Territory in October and November, 1864, reported from Fort Gibson November 25th that conditions were badly tangled at that place, and were in great need of the guidance of Colonel Phillips, the only efficient and honest commander the Indians ever had. General Herron made the inspection of the administration of affairs in the Indian Territory under instructions from Major-General Canby.

The much-talked of expedition of General Price into Missouri, after General Shelby with his brigade crossed to the north side of the Arkansas, commenced to take definite form on the 4th of August, when General Smith, commanding the Trans-Mississippi Department, gave Price his final instructions. Under these instructions General Price was to take the mounted forces of the District of Arkansas, which consisted of three divisions, the divisions of Generals Fagan, Marmaduke and Shelby, with a complement of artillery. They were also to take along a supply of small arms and artillery ammunition sufficient for the expedition, as estimated by its chief of ordnance. On the 28th of August General Price and staff left Camden for Princeton where he arrived on the 29th and assumed

command of the expedition, and where Generals Fagan and Marmaduke reported to him. The next day he took up the line of march for Missouri, crossed the Arkansas River at Dardanelle, and was joined by Shelby with his division at Pocahontas in Northeast Arkansas, where some reorganizatoon took place. He was, under his instructions, to make St. Louis his objective, and should he be compelled to withdraw from the State, he was directed to make his retreat through Kansas and the Indian Territory and sweep that country of its mules, horses, cattle and military supplies of every kind. This great movement of the Confederate forces quickly became known to the Southern partisan bands of Missouri and Arkansas, and to Generals Maxey and Cooper commanding the Southern forces in the Indian Territory, and all commenced displaying unusual activity.

The Federal commanders in Missouri and Arkansas could not at first determine Price's objective, and were uncertain where to concentrate their forces to meet him. They had accurate information of his command being concentrated at Pocahontas, Arkansas. From that place he could march by way of West Plains and Rolla to Jefferson City, or he could direct his line of march farther to the eastward by way of Ironton and Pilot Knob to St. Louis, and General Rosecrans concentrated the forces of the Military Districts of his Department, to meet either of these movements at the same time covering St. Louis behind fortifications manned by the troops of General A. J. Smith's division of the Sixteenth Army Corps, and some other troops collected for the purpose, and several thousand Missouri Militia ordered out for emergency.

While these operations of General Price were in progress, Generals Maxey and Cooper were preparing an expedition in co-operation with them, an expedition under General Watie with a brigade of Southern Indians to make a raid into Southern Kansas by marching up the Neosho

River, but information received of the movements of Federal troops at Fort Smith and Fort Gibson caused them to change the plan of Watie's movement and to make it depend upon other movements.

On the 8th of August a train of two hundred wagons, which had just come down from Fort Scott with supplies for the troops at Fort Smith, after unloading, started back to Fort Scott, escorted by the Second Kansas Cavalry, Colonel Cloud commanding. He had recently been ordered up from Clarksville, with his regiment, where he had been stationed several months for operations in that section. His entire regiment did not go on through with the train to Fort Scott, but some of the companies were held at Fort Gibson in connection with guarding and putting up hay for the Government in the vicinity of that place. A large number of Union refugees who had come into Fort Smith from different parts of Western Arkansas accompanied the train to Kansas.

These refugee families were nearly all very destitute, and as the Government had been furnishing them with subsistence, it was desirable that they should go north so that they could be taken care of without embarrassing the operations of the army by consuming the supplies which were needed by the troops.

General Cooper, commanding the Confederate forces in the field in the Indian Territory, was kept advised of the movements of the Federal trains arriving and departing from Fort Smith, and of the strength of the Federal detachments at the different stations employed in guarding and putting up hay, and he determined to use his large mounted force to burn the hay, capture or drive off the men at the hay stations, and if possible capture or destroy some of the trains en route to or from Fort Scott to Fort Smith. It was now the season of the year when there was usually a low stage of water in the Arkansas and

Grand Rivers, and the Arkansas was already fordable at several places above and below Fort Gibson, so that there was no great risk in sending a strong force of his troops to the north side to strike some of the Federal hay camps or trains en route to or from Fort Scott.

General Thayer, commanding at Fort Smith, knew of the low stage of water in the river, and knew that it was the purpose of General Cooper, with his large mounted force of Texans and Indians, to attack the Federal supply line between Fort Smith and Fort Scott and the different hay camps at Cabin Creek and in the vicinity of Fort Gibson, and yet he permitted a large part of his infantry to be scattered in detachments of one or two companies at the different hay camps, with no barrier between them and the enemy than the Arkansas River. The latter part of August Captain John R. Graton, with five companies of the First Kansas Colored Infantry, escorted a train from Fort Smith to Fort Gibson en route to Fort Scott for supplies for the army.

From Fort Gibson detachments of the Second, Sixth and Fourteenth Regiments Kansas Cavalry, and some Indian troops, accompanied the train north, while four companies of the Colored Infantry were ordered to the hay camps near Fort Gibson and at Flat Rock, twelve miles above on the west side of Grand River.

At these hay camps the Colored Infantry were employed in cutting and putting up the hay as well as guarding it, and during the day were generally scattered over two or three miles of prairie. Captain E. A. Barker, Second Kansas Cavalry, with detachments of two companies of that regiment, was in command of the camp, and he had only 125 men in his entire force, including the Colored Infantry. His camp was nearly two miles from the Grand River timber, on a prairie branch along which, every hundred yards or so, there were pools or lagoons from a few yards to fifty yards long, and in places per-

haps two feet deep, and connected by narrow threads of water. The low banks of the lagoons were generally precipitous or caving, with overhanging boughs of small willows. In some of them there were numerous water lilies, with large palm-like leaves floating on the surface.

Captain Barker seems to have used proper vigilance for the protection of his camp and men. From his mounted detachment he kept out scouting parties to the southwest, well in the direction of the fords on the Verdigris River. In the afternoon of September 16th, his scouts came in and reported that the enemy had crossed the Verdigris in large force and were advancing on his camp. As soon as he could collect his men together, he formed them on a ravine in the rear of his camp, and taking a small mounted detachment, rode forward in the direction of the Verdigris about two miles to reconnoiter and ascertain the strength and designs of the enemy. On reaching a high ridge in the prairie he saw the entire Confederate force of Generals Gano and Watie before him, advancing with six pieces of artillery. But before this General Gano had ascended a high hill, from which he could plainly see with his field glass the Federal camp, the hay-ricks, the mowing machines, and the men at work upon the vast prairie. On descending to the foot of the hill, where his command had halted, he sent Lieutenant-Colonel Welch, with two Texas regiments, to his right General Watie, with his Indian brigade, to the left, while he brought up his center in his advance on the Federal camp. In falling back to his camp, Captain Barker was closely pursued by the enemy, and by the time he dismounted his detachment and formed the men on those already in line in the ravine, the Confederate Texans and Indians had approached within two hundred yards and commenced an attack from five different points.

After fighting the Confederate forces for half an hour and repulsing three cavalry charges, he determined to

mount all his men who had horses, make a desperate charge, and break through General Gano's line, leaving the Colored Infantry and dismounted cavalry to fight their way to Grand River timber if possible.

He made the charge through General Watie's line, and got through with fifteen men, but the balance of his mounted detachment of about forty men were cut off and captured. The colored soldiers now rallied under Lieutenant Thomas B. Sutherland, First Kansas Colored Infantry, and fought the Confederate forces for nearly two hours, from the ravine, finding some shelter under the low shelving banks of the stream. As the Confederates had not been giving any quarter to colored soldiers, the colored detachment considered it a struggle in which they proposed to sell their lives as dearly as possible, and used their ammunition to the last ball and cartridge. George W. Duval, an intelligent colored soldier of the detachment, stated that the only way he and his comrades could hold the Confederates off was to fire a volley into them when they came up within range, and then reload and be prepared for them when they came up again. The Confederates were held off in this manner until most of the colored soldiers expended their ammunition, and then Lieutenant Sutherland told them that they would have to do the best they could to save themselves. After this it was simply a massacre, for the colored soldiers were pursued and shot down without any demand for their surrender, and about forty were killed, eight captured and ten escaped.

It was near sunset when the fight ended, and to save themselves some of the colored soldiers had remarkably narrow escapes from their relentless foe. After his ammunition gave out, the soldier Duval secreted himself in a drift in the prairie branch, and when the Confederates put out their pickets that night, he crawled out between them, taking his gun with him.

Another colored soldier jumped into a lagoon which

was deep enough to conceal his body, and he managed by lying on his back to expose enough of his nose above the water under the overhanging willows to breathe freely. And another colored soldier jumped into a lagoon deep enough to conceal his body, and, lying on his back, covered his nose, just out of the water enough to enable him to breathe, by the broad leaves of the water lily. These soldiers who thus secreted themselves heard the Confederates all around them, frequently only a few yards distant, pursuing and shooting down their comrades in the most heartless manner.

After completing his work of slaughter and burning the hay and mowing machines at the camp, General Gano encamped that night on the field, and the next morning marched north to meet the Federal supply train, which he was informed was coming down from Fort Scott. A supply train of 205 Government wagons left Fort Scott on the 12th of September, loaded with army supplies for Fort Gibson and Fort Smith, escorted by 260 men of the Second Sixth and Fourteenth Regiments Kansas Cavalry, Major Henry Hopkins, Second Kansas Cavalry, commanding. There were also ninety wagons loaded with sutler's supplies and four or five ambulances in the train. At Baxter Springs, Major Hopkins received a re-enforcement of one hundred Indians, under Lieutenant A. J. Waterhouse, from Fort Gibson. He also received a dispatch from Colonel Blair, commanding the post of Fort Scott, that information had come to him that General Price at the head of his army for the invasion of Missouri had crossed the Arkansas River at Dardanelle, and was moving north. This dispatch was immediately sent to Colonel Wattles, commanding the post of Fort Gibson, with the urgent request that he send up all the troops that could be spared from that post to strengthen the escort to the train, as an attack from a large force of the enemy was anticipated.

In the meantime Colonel Wattles had heard of General Cooper's preparations for a hostile movement north of the Arkansas River, and sent forward two detachments of Cherokees, amounting to 310 men, under Lieutenants Whitlow and Palmer, to re-enforce the escort to the train. On receiving further information of the movements of the enemy, he sent a dispatch to Major Hopkins, stating that the Confederates, twelve to fifteen hundred strong, had crossed the Arkansas River and were moving north in the direction of Cabin Creek, and directing him to move with the train to that station, where there was a stockade, and where he would be joined by the detachments which were to re-enforce him. The Major moved forward with the train and escort on the military road from the Neosho River, arriving at Cabin Creek at noon on the 18th of September, where he was joined by the Cherokees, making his entire force 670 men of white and Indian troops. He was further informed that he would receive at Cabin Creek another re-enforcement of six companies of Indians and two howitzers under Major Foreman from Fort Gibson.

Having rested his men during the night, on the scene of the action at Flat Rock, the next morning General Gano marched north to Wolf Creek and encamped for the night, without having obtained any definite information in regard to the movements of the Federal supply train. Leaving General Watie in charge of his camp, he took four hundred men and two pieces of artillery and moved north on the morning of the 18th, until he came in sight of the train at Cabin Creek. He then secreted his command in the timber and sent a courier back to General Watie to bring up the balance of his troops and the other four guns of his battery.

Directly after arriving at Cabin Creek that day, Major Hopkins took twenty-five men of the Second Kansas Cavalry and moved forward three miles south of the sta-

tion for the purpose of ascertaining if possible the position and strength of the enemy in his front, and came upon the force under General Gano, occupying a ravine in the prairie. He returned at once to the train; had it parked in close order in the rear of the stockade, strengthened his pickets and formed his men in line for an attack.

It was nearly twelve o'clock that night when the balance of General Gano's force under General Watie came up; but the moon was shining bright, and he moved forward at once over the prairie to attack the Federal position in the edge of the timber on the south side of Cabin Creek. When within half a mile of the Federal camp, he deployed his troops in line of battle, his own brigade of Texans forming his right, and General Watie's Indian Brigade his left, with Howell's battery in position near his right center, supported by three companies of Texans. He then advanced at two o'clock on the morning of the 19th up to within three hundred yards of the Federal line, when the troops under Major Hopkins opened fire upon the enemy.

Almost instantly General Gano's forces replied with small arms, and the six guns of his battery commenced playing upon the Federal position with shot and shell with demoralizing effects upon the teams of the large train, crowded as they were in as small space as possible.

Up to the opening of the fight, Major Hopkins was led to believe, from the information obtained, that the Confederate force in his front did not exceed eight hundred men, and was without artillery. When he found that they were supported by a battery, and saw their long double lines and was able to form something like a correct estimate of their numbers, he was satisfied he could not hold his position very long after daylight.

The firing was kept up at intervals on both sides until after daylight, when Gano moved a section of his battery to a position on his left, which enabled him to cross-fire

the Federal camp at a range of less than two hundred yards. In the early part of the action, when the shot and bursting shells from the Confederate battery came crashing through train and timber, a good many teamsters and wagon-masters became frightened, and cutting one or more mules loose from the teams, mounted them and rode away, believing that the train was hopelessly lost. Finding that his position was becoming untenable, Major Hopkins endeavored to rally the teamsters and wagon-masters, to remove the train to the north side of the creek on the road to Fort Scott; but before his efforts were successful, General Gano ordered two Indian regiments around the Federal right and rear to take possession of the road and prevent any of the teams or Federal troops from escaping on the road to Fort Scott. After daylight an incessant storm of shot and bursting shells swept through the camp and train, killing and wounding many of the mules, stampeding the teams, and causing inextricable entanglements in the absence of the teamsters.

The bluff that rose almost abruptly from the creek in the rear of the camp, the stockade, and a narrow ravine on the Federal right afforded much protection to the Federal soldiers during the terrible artillery fire. Where their line was much exposed to this fire they were obliged to lie down prone upon the ground behind logs and felled trees, in depressions or behind elevations of the ground for protection. Having gained a position on the Federal right and rear, General Gano commenced driving in the Federal skirmishers from that quarter, when they came to a sudden stand, that halted the Confederates.

Then General Gano ordered up Colonel Gurley's Texas Regiment, and led it in person in a charge to break the Federal line which was formed with the ravine in its front, filled with Federal soldiers lying down. When the charging column approached within twenty-five yards of the ravine, these soldiers who were lying down unseen

by the enemy rose from the ground and poured a terrific volley into the ranks of the Confederates, throwing them into confusion and causing them to retire. At the opening of the fight the Federal line faced nearly south; but now that the right was driven back it faced nearly west, and could not be easily broken by direct assault. On being repulsed in front of the ravine, General Gano ordered parts of three Texas regiments still further to the Federal right, flanking this new position, and forcing Major Hopkins to evacuate the camp and retire through the timber along the creek east in the direction of Grand River. He encouraged his men to hold out as long as possible, hoping that the re-enforcement of six companies of Indians and two howitzers from Fort Gibson would come up and attack the enemy in the rear.

Even after evacuating his camp, he hoped to meet this re-enforcement and to return and make an effort to recapture at least a part of the train. He marched at once to Fort Gibson, fifty miles distant, without hearing from the re-enforcement, which was marching on a road east of his line of march.

The entire train fell into the hands of the Confederates, but they were able to get away with only 130 wagons, owing to the fact that the teamsters and dismounted soldiers had cut so many mules out of the teams to ride away on when it became evident that the train could not be saved. A large number of the mules, too, were killed by the artillery fire; others were killed and injured in stampeding and running over the bluff.

This was the most serious disaster the Federal forces met with in the Indian Territory during the war. All the captured wagons and supplies that General Gano could not take away he destroyed as far as practicable. He also burned two or three thousand tons of hay put up in large ricks.

After fitting up as many captured teams as possible to take off the supplies, he started south and recrossed the

Arkansas River about fifteen miles above Fort Gibson. The evening after the fight he met near Prior's Creek Colonel J. M. Williams, with a brigade consisting of parts of the First and Second Kansas Colored and the Eleventh United States Colored Infantry and a battery of parrott guns, coming up from Fort Smith, and marching to the relief of the train. The Colonel fell back a short distance to a strong position convenient to water, and as soon as the enemy came up in range, opened upon them with his parrott guns and drove them back. General Gano brought up his guns and replied, and then the batteries of both sides kept up their fire at long range for an hour or so until nearly dark, when most of the Confederate troops were formed in a long line on a high ridge in the prairie, making an immense display of force, to cover the captured train while it was being hurried forward to southwest in the direction of the Verdigris. Colonel Williams had marched upwards of eighty miles in less than two days, and his men were so worn out that he was unable to commence immediate pursuit. That night the Confederates built fires along the ridge on which they formed, to keep up the appearance of their presence; but when morning came they were gone.

This was the last and only successful expedition the Confederates made north of the Arkansas River in the Indian Territory after that section was occupied by the Federal forces in the spring of 1862.

General Gano reported the casualties of the Texas brigade at Cabin Creek, seven men killed and thirty-eight wounded, including four officers, one of whom was mortally wounded.

General Watie reported one officer killed and four wounded in his brigade, but does not state how many enlisted men he had killed and wounded. As far as could be ascertained, Major Hopkins' casualties were seven men killed, six wounded, and twenty-four missing. The number of citizen teamsters killed and wounded does not appear to have been reported by the wagon-masters.

In the excitement of the closing scenes of the action the forces of Major Hopkins became scattered, most of those on the north side of Cabin Creek going to Baxter Springs and places in Southern Kansas, and some to Neosho, Missouri, but generally kept together in small parties. The Confederates were too busy in securing as much of the train as possible to attempt pursuit of Major Hopkins' disintegrated forces; besides they could not have pursued them to advantage, for the Federal soldiers and teamsters who did not accompany Major Hopkins to Fort Gibson kept to the timber and brush until they felt that they were out of danger.

The report of this disaster and the advance of Price's Army into Southeast Missouri, moving north rapidly in the direction of St. Louis, created intense excitement in Missouri and Kansas, which did not subside until the first of November, when the Federal pursuit of the Confederate forces ended at Pleasant Bluff on the Arkansas River above Fort Smith in the Indian Territory, General Price having lost all his trains and artillery except two pieces, and his army, such as he had been able to keep together after entering Arkansas and the Indian Territory, in a starving condition, being obliged to live on horse and mule meat and any corn they could secure in the country.

CHAPTER XXV

GENERAL PRICE'S MISSOURI EXPEDITION

A brief reference to General Price's Missouri Expedition must be made, for under his instructions from General E. Kirby Smith, commanding the Trans-Mississippi Department, he was to make St. Louis his objective, and should he be compelled to withdraw from the State, he was instructed to retreat via Kansas City through Kansas and the Indian Territory, sweeping the country through which he passed of the cattle, horses, mules, and of all kinds of military supplies.

The Confederate commander had a triumphant march after he crossed the Arkansas River at Dardanelle with his ten thousand mounted veterans, with a complement of artillery, through Northeast Arkansas, where he was reenforced by General Shelby with about eight thousand men, and then continued his march through Southeast Missouri until he arrived before Pilot Knob, where he received a check by the Federal forces under General Ewing, and in his assault on Fort Davidson lost heavily in killed and wounded, without compensating advantage, for General Ewing blew up his magazines and spiked his heavy guns and withdrew his command to Rolla. The movements and objective of General Price were now disclosed to the Federal Commander Department of the Missouri, to be St. Louis, and there was a rapid concentration of the Federal forces of the State to operate on the front, flanks, and rear of the Confederate army, and when it arrived near the outer fortifications of St. Louis, the militia and other forces were called out to man them. General A. J. Smith's Veteran Division, Sixteenth Army Corps, was passing Cairo on transports on the way to join General Sherman's Army in Georgia, and when Price's movements had developed sufficiently to show that his objective was St. Louis, General Rosecrans telegraphed General Halleck, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, requesting that

General Smith's division be ordered to St. Louis for the defense of the city and to operate against Price. The request was granted and General Smith brought his troops up the Mississippi River to St. Louis on transports and they participated in all the operations against Price until he passed west of Harrisonville on his retreat south down the Missouri-Kansas State line.

The Confederate Commander was now having no gay and grand parade, feasting and carousing as his army was in marching through Southeast Missouri, sweeping aside the detachments of the State Militia gathered in his front to oppose his march. The Federal forces had been concentrated against him and he had been fighting almost continuously after he was forced to turn west at St. Louis, and in Western Missouri the Federal commanders of the Departments of Missouri and Kansas concentrated their forces against him, and at the battle of Westport forced him to turn south, losing part of his artillery in the action at Independence, where he was overtaken by General Pleasanton's forces of the Department of Missouri.

After the battle of Westport, a suburb of Kansas City, he was pushed so closely by the forces of Generals Rosecrans and Curtis on his flanks and rear that he did not have time to go more than two or three miles into Kansas, and at Mine Creek in Linn County, Kansas, he was overtaken by the Missouri forces, and compelled to make a stand, and in the engagement that followed lost all his artillery but two pieces, and upwards of one thousand prisoners, including Generals Marmaduke and Cabell and five colonels and much of his transportation and loot.

He had it on his programme to take the important post of Fort Scott, with its vast amount of army supplies, but the Federal forces pushed him so vigorously, that from Mine Creek his movements were a demoralized rout, and at the crossing of the Marmaton River six or seven miles east of Fort Scott he was compelled to blow up

his ammunition train and destroy nearly all his transportation with the loot his troops had gathered up on his march. From the Marmaton River to Newtonia, a distance of about sixty miles, his army was still in a demoralized rout and stampede, not taking the time to make a halt and unable to bring their train along with them. At Newtonia he endeavored to rest a little and secure food and forage for his men and animals, but was pursued and overtaken by the Federal forces of Generals Blunt and Sanborn, and after a sharp engagement, routed again and pursued in the direction of Pineville and Maysville.

At Maysville the Confederate army passed into the Cherokee Nation and marched south to the Illinois River near the State line, and thence southwest until it struck the Sallisaw River and marched down that stream some distance and then turned south and crossed the Arkansas River at Pleasant Bluff, after which Price with most of his Missouri troops marched southwest through the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, passing through Northfork, Perryville and Boggy Depot and other places on the Overland Mail Route and crossed Red River and passed into Texas north of Bonham. From that place his march was more leisurely down through the counties bordering on Red River to Laynesport, where he arrived December 2d, which ended the expedition, and which, according to his Itinerary, embraced a march of 1,434 miles, after leaving Princeton.

Before crossing Red River, however, his command had been greatly reduced by killed, wounded, prisoners, desertions, and also by companies, regiments and brigades leaving him with his permission at different places on the march to return to the sections where they were organized.

His march until he was turned south at Westport had been one of feasting and living off the best the country afforded, and sweeping the Federal forces from his front; but after that fight all was changed, for being attacked in front, flanks and rear, with the loss of killed, wounded, prisoners, generals and artillery, his army commenced to

disintegrate, and when it arrived at Newtonia, was in a deplorable condition, which increased in its sufferings and hardships as he retreated south.

He had been able to penetrate only a few miles into Kansas and was pushed so closely that his detachments were not given sufficient time to collect horses, mules, cattle or food supplies, and after entering the Indian country such supplies were too scanty to give much relief to his starving and shivering horde for his troops were beginning to encounter the first touches of winter weather.

He claimed to have taken out with him several thousand recruits; but they were mostly members of Southern partisan bands and desperate characters whom the loyal, law-abiding people of Missouri and Arkansas were glad to have leave the country; his expedition was certainly a benefit to the loyal people of the country as far as taking out recruits was concerned.

A feeling of envy or jealousy was developed between Generals Rosecrans and Curtis, the commanders of the Departments of Missouri and Kansas, and their subordinates the latter part of the campaign that prevented harmonious co-operation of their forces to the last, which allowed Price to escape with the greater part of his army, and came near permitting him to rest, reorganize, recruit and provision his army in Southwest Missouri and Northwest Arkansas, with food supplies and forage, for the people in Southwest Missouri had been fairly well protected by the loyal Militia of the State and had raised abundant crops of corn, wheat, oats and hay that season, and were beginning to get a start in raising cattle, horses, mules and hogs.

General Rosecrans did not accompany his army south of Warrensburg, and General Pleasanton, his ranking general in the field, left it at Fort Scott and returned to Warrensburg, at the full tide of success of the combined forces of the two departments. As General Rosecrans did

not accompany the army in the pursuit of Price, General Curtis was the ranking officer in the field, and after supplying the troops with rations and ammunition at Fort Scott, ordered them to take up the pursuit again except those who had returned to Warrensburg with General Pleasanton, and overtook Price at Newtonia and routed him again with the assistance of General Sanborn's brigade of the Missouri forces. General Rosecrans having recalled all his forces from the pursuit, General Curtis, who was on the field at Newtonia, did not feel strong enough to continue it with the Kansas forces, the Kansas Militia having been sent home at Fort Scott and he retired twelve miles to Neosho, and reflecting over the situation, telegraphed to General Halleck, Chief of Staff of the Army, who replied that General Grant desired that Price be pursued to the Arkansas River, or at least until he encountered the forces of General Steele or Reynolds in the Department of Arkansas.

On receipt of this dispatch at midnight, General Curtis got up and immediately sent couriers to Generals Sanborn and McNeil of Rosecrans' forces, who were on the march to their stations, to return at once and join him at Cassville, in the further pursuit of Price. The available cavalry of Sanborn's and McNeil's brigades joined General Curtis and he took up the pursuit of Price again, with some loss of time, but arrived at Fayetteville in time to relieve Colonel Harrison who was besieged by General Fagan's division, which had been detached by General Price to take in the Federal command at that place, with such supplies as it had on hand; but on the approach of the Federal forces General Fagan abandoned the siege and rejoined Price near Cane Hill, where he proposed to rest and reorganize his forces. He was not allowed to do this, for General Curtis continued the pursuit of the Confederate army through the Cherokee Nation to the Arkansas River, and came upon the rear guard of the enemy just as they were crossing the

river, and on the arrival of a battery a few rounds of shot and shell were thrown into the timber on the south side of it, and the roar of this artillery firing resounding through the forests carried to the camp of the starving Confederates, the parting farewell of the Federal forces, and a feeling of satisfaction to the gallant old leader, General Curtis, who had not permitted General Price to rest and reorganize his army

The constant marching and fighting of most of the Confederate forces for more than three months, from the time they left Princeton, Arkansas, the last of August, until they arrived at Laynesport, Texas, entailed the severest hardships upon the men and animals of the expedition. Many mounts of the troops and the transportation animals that had become exhausted and worn out from hard service were left on the roads over which the army passed, and many were left with farmers and other persons and forcibly exchanged for serviceable animals. The Union people as far as practicable hid their serviceable horses and mules in inaccessible places, or took them within the Federal lines until the Southern army had passed.

After Price's army crossed the Arkansas River and in its march through the Choctaw Nation it received some food supplies from Generals Cooper and Watie that relieved the pinch of hunger temporarily; but the desperate condition of the troops of the expedition did not have the effect of stimulating the aggressive spirit of the Southern Indian forces. They were greatly disappointed, for they had been receiving wonderful reports of the success of the expedition in sweeping everything before it in its early entrance into Missouri, and until it was turned south at Westport.

The year was closing with the Federal arms triumphant in every part of the country except in the immediate vicinity of Fort Smith and Fort Gibson, where it was common talk that weakness, incompetence and cor-

ruption were undoing much that courage and patriotism had accomplished. Sherman had made his march to the sea, taken Savannah and was preparing for his march through the Carolinas; Thomas had raised the siege of Nashville and destroyed Hood's army and relieved the fear of an invasion of Kentucky and the North, and Grant was tightening his grip on Lee's army around Petersburg and Richmond and pushing it into the last ditch, and everything indicated that the collapse of the Confederacy could not be delayed more than a few months.

But in Western Arkansas and the Indian Territory, too, the new year brought assurance that a saner policy was being inaugurated that would restore the morale of the troops and correct the corrupt practices that had crept into the administration of affairs in that section. Generals Steele and Thayer were removed and superseded by Generals Reynolds and Bussy.

After General Herron made a report to General Canby, commanding the Military Division of West Mississippi, of his inspection of the condition at Fort Gibson, Colonel Phillips was restored to the command of the Indian Brigade, and assumed command on the 29th of December. He found conditions in a frightful state. He at once set to work to correct the abuses that had crept into every department since he relinquished command in July. He found that McDonald & Co., Merchants and Traders at Fort Smith and Fort Gibson, had a hand and controlling interest in nearly everything. He mentioned a case in which the Creek refugees around Fort Gibson were suffering for food and the President had authorized an expenditure of two hundred thousand dollars for their relief, and that Mr. Coffin, the Superintendent of the Southern Superintendency of Indian Affairs, telegraphed the department that McDonald & Co. could furnish corn at seven dollars per bushel and beef at six cents a pound, and that he was authorized to take a temporary supply at those rates.

Mr. Coffin sent his agents through the Indian country and purchased the corn at two dollars and two dollars and a half per bushel and it was paid for in McDonald checks. If a man had one hundred bushels the agent purchased it all and issued to him half of it, and gave his neighbor an order for the other half if he would go and get it and charged it against the two hundred thousand dollars at seven dollars a bushel.

At the post of Fort Gibson the Colonel found a dreadfully demoralized state existing. He was furnished with a report and evidence implicating the post commander, provost marshal, quartermaster and commissary of frightful irregularities and abuses. He found that they were regularly in the habit of arresting and throwing into prison persons and blackmailing them and dividing the money extorted, between themselves. In the commissary department he found wholesale forgeries of vouchers, and in the pendency of contracts for furnishing beef for the troops he found that nearly all the cattle slaughtered, were contraband and charged to the commissary department as purchased.

He also found that the corn purchased by the quartermaster at Fort Scott had been shipped to Fort Gibson by Government transportation and placed in the warehouse of McDonald & Co., to be issued on another contract. He had before he was relieved of the command of the Indian Brigade in July, undertaken to correct the abuses of parties from Kansas, sometimes officers of the army, coming into the Indian country, on one pretext or another, and driving out herds of Indian cattle and selling them and appropriating the money to private use, and after being restored to his old command, took up the fight again with the reasonable hope of being supported by the new department commander.

In February, 1865, in his correspondence with General Canby, commanding the Military Division of West Mississippi, on the subject the Colonel stated that for nearly a

year there had been a systematic and wholesale plundering and driving of stock from the Indian country into Kansas, and that part of the stock was the property of the loyal Indian soldiers in the service at Fort Gibson, part of it of loyal citizens of the Indian country, and part of it of disloyal Indians who were in arms against the Government and those aiding them. He went on to state that the devastations of the war had depopulated the Creek Nation, and that two-thirds of the homes of the Cherokee Nation were abandoned; that the loyal Indians were clustered around Fort Gibson or in colonies some distance away from that post, depending upon the Union Indian soldiers for protection, and that the disloyal Indians were clustered in colonies along the streams tributary to Red River, and that stock of both loyal and disloyal Indians, or what was left of it, was scattered on the range. He further stated that for about two years the Arkansas River had been a boundary between the hostile Indian forces; that after the siege of Fort Gibson by General Cooper in July, 1863, no Southern army had camped on the south bank of the river, nor less than fifty miles south of it; that the Confederate occupancy of the country was of the character of raids or expeditions, and that this situation invited enterprises by which much of the stock had been collected into herds and driven to Kansas. He also stated that he obtained beef for his command and for the many refugees south of the Arkansas from stock subject to be taken by the enemy, and that there was no necessity for Federal troops entering the nation one hundred and fifty miles in his rear, on the pretext of scouting, when the real purpose was for driving off cattle. In some cases some of the men engaged in the wholesale stealing of cattle in the Indian country had permits from the Indian Agent of the Southern Superintendency of Indian Affairs, to enter that country and purchase cattle of the Indians, when he knew or could have known, that the Indians, loyal or disloyal, were not at their homes to make the sales,

and that the pretended bills of sale were simply the forgeries of those engaged in the nefarious work, and who dared not go to Fort Gibson to ascertain and verify the true ownership of the stock they pretended to purchase.

The Colonel gave the names of several officers engaged in the work of collecting and driving herds of stolen cattle from the Indian country into Kansas; but in the most recent transactions he was unable to catch them. His hands were tied; his Indian command had been permitted to become dismounted through the dilatory action of his Department commander in carrying out the authority of General Grant to mount it in the spring of 1864; he did not have a sufficient number of mounted men for scouting duty; he did not hesitate to charge that military authorities in Kansas whose duty it was to protect the Indians were in league with the thieves; but through political influence the offenders were never brought to trial or punished.

In the meantime there had been changes of Department commanders of Missouri, Arkansas and Kansas, and he laid the situation before them so forcibly of the robbing and plundering of the friendly Indians, that General Dodge, the new commander of the Department of Kansas, headquarters at Fort Leavenworth, issued an order dated February 13, 1865, directing all military commanders in his department to arrest and hold in confinement any person guilty of robbing the friendly Indians of their cattle, or in any manner swindling them, and stating further that no permit would be given to any person to pass through the lines of the Department of Kansas for the purpose of trade of any kind, and that all cattle or stock of any kind brought out of the Territory south of the department for sale or speculation would be seized and turned over to the proper department and the stock held until the case could be fully investigated at his headquarters.

In a month or two Colonel Phillips had effectively cleaned house and vindicated decency in the administration of affairs in the Indian country; he had arrested, removed and preferred charges against officers at the post of Fort Gibson, whose records and the testimony of witnesses showed were connected with corrupt practices. He had by his energy, persistence and intelligent presentation of the facts to higher authorities stopped cattle stealing from the Indians within the sphere of his authority; he had seen General Thayer and others who he believed had endeavored to cripple his usefulness and humiliate him removed, and if he could have had only one-half of his Indian soldiers mounted, was convinced that he could have made a good showing in the rehabilitation of former conditions that existed in the Indian country. But he knew that he could not hope for the remounting of his Indian command, for the terms of service of the men would expire in a few months, and the indications were daily increasing that the collapse of the Confederacy was near at hand. With the few available mounted men he had, he employed in scouting well to the front, and as late as the 23d of April, one of his detachments scouting in the direction of Boggy Depot, the headquarters of the Southern Indian forces, met on Snake Creek a Confederate scout endeavoring to push through to Northwest Arkansas, with mail for Southern families and men, and in sharp skirmish killed three of the enemy and captured the mail.

Some of the writers of the letters found in the captured mail spoke of a proposed movement of large Southern forces north into Missouri later in the spring when the grass would be up sufficient for their horses to live by grazing, showing that they had not yet heard of the surrender of Lee's army, and the surrender of Confederate armies in different parts of the South, and that the war was over.

Near the closing scenes of the great struggle, John Ross, the Principal Chief of the Cherokees, and the two Cherokee Delegates in Congress, on March 22, 1865, wrote General Grant, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies, that they were informed an effort was being made to have the Indian Territory attached to the Department of Kansas, and that as representatives of the Cherokee people looking after their interests in Washington, they were entirely satisfied to remain under the command of Major General Reynolds of the Department of Arkansas, and that prior to that time when their country had been attached to the Department of Kansas the cattle and corn of their people had been stolen and their country ravished under the auspices of the authorities sent to protect them, and that they were in fear if they were again connected with that department, their people would be still further impoverished by the same kind of misrule, and that they further requested Major General Blunt be not again placed in command of the Indian country.

During the past winter thousands of refugee Union families had collected and were camping around or occupying such houses as they could secure at the military posts of Fort Smith, Fayetteville, Van Buren and Clarksville, and had to be fed by the Government to prevent them from starving, the food issued them coming mostly from the supplies brought up the river for the use of the soldiers. Most of these people were the families of soldiers who had enlisted in the six or seven Arkansas Union regiments that had been organized in the western part of the State, and would have been largely self-supporting if they could have remained at their homes; but they were robbed and plundered of everything worth taking by the regular and irregular forces of both sides, compelling them to go into the military posts for protection and for food to prevent them from starving. On the 8th of March General Cyrus Busseu, commanding at Fort

Smith, in reporting the situation to the Department Commander, at Little Rock, stated that "many loyal people have been shamefully treated by our army," and further stated that "in most instances everything has been taken and no receipts given, the people turned out to starve and their effects loaded into trains and sent to Kansas."

On the approach of spring these families who had camped about military posts formed colonies in the vicinity of the posts where they could receive protection and proposed to gather up such means as were possible and cultivate the lands and raise crops on the abandoned farms, which would make them in a measure independent of asking assistance of the Government. They could not very well be sent away because many of them were dependent upon their husbands and sons who were soldiers in the Arkansas Union regiments raised in that section. Many of these people were able to purchase from the commissary department the food supplies they needed, and seed corn and seeds they would require for planting their crops. In the Indian country, too, there were many Union Indian families who formed colonies for cultivating abandoned farms along the streams in the vicinity of military posts from which they could look for protection. In Western Arkansas the colonists had fortified positions occupied by companies of forty to two hundred armed men, who scouted the country for information in regard to approach of enemies.

It was to the credit of the state of Kansas and to General Blunt that he and members of the legislature and other state officials made commendable efforts to break up the organizations of lawless men who, it was alleged, were mostly from Kansas and Texas, and engaged in the wholesale stealing of cattle and horses from the Indian country, and while it was charged that General Blunt winked at these illegal operations, it is believed here that he did not sanction or have anything to do with them.

He was a gallant officer and when given a command where there were important operations before him always made good; but he was handicapped by parasites of the army who, through political influence, secured permission from higher authorities, authorities he felt he could not antagonize, to go into the Indian country to purchase stock from the Indians and engage in other enterprises.

He was in a different position from that of Colonel Phillips; he owed his important position to Kansas political influences which he did not like to antagonize, while Colonel Phillips' appointment was from the President without being backed by the Kansas delegation in Congress; he was a delegate from Kansas to the National Republican Convention at Chicago in 1860, and through his influence the vote of the Kansas delegation was delivered to Mr. Seward who was next in strength to Mr. Lincoln, and who was Secretary of State in Mr. Lincoln's cabinet, and was inclined to stand by his friend who had supported him in the National Convention, particularly when his friend was engaged in a struggle waging a war for decency in the administration of affairs in the Indian country.

The morale of the Federal troops at Ft. Smith depreciated to such an extent during General Thayer's administration of affairs in Western Arkansas and the Indian Territory, that the last of December on his recommendation, the Department Commander ordered the evacuation of not only that post, but all the military posts in Western Arkansas, and the withdrawal of all his troops to Little Rock, leaving the Union people of all that section who were unable to leave their homes and accompany the army in midwinter at the mercy of the Southern Partisan bands, who, upon retirement of the troops, would have been ready to pounce upon their Union neighbors.

Ft. Smith was the place from which the loyal Indians

of the Indian Territory could be best protected from incursions of the Southern forces, but it was the headquarters of the Unionists of the western half of the state, which probably furnished fully three-fourths of the loyal element of the state.

Practically all the able-bodied men of this Union element were soldiers in the Union Arkansas regiments and all their families who considered it unsafe to remain at their homes were at the military posts in the western part of the state.

The soldiers and their families naturally did not wish the Federal forces to evacuate the military posts and the country, for they knew that immediately after the retirement of the troops the country would be overrun by Southern Partisan bands, followed by an orgy of murder and robbery of the Unionists.

There were some able men among these people, men able to plead justice for them and to lay the situation before the President who directed General Grant to countermand the order of evacuation of Ft. Smith and other posts, which he did before all the troops had left and just in time to save the destruction of hundreds of thousands worth of Government property for which there was no transportation.

There was no organized force of the enemy within a hundred miles of Ft. Smith except Southern Partisan bands, and with Price's Army drawn from Missouri, Arkansas and Indian Territory into Texas, in completely demoralized condition, with the loss of its artillery, transportation and supplies, its soldiers naked and starving and the collapse of the Confederacy plainly in sight to any man of intellectual vision, it certainly looked strange and as the very climax of weakness in competing that the Federal Commander should have taken such a pessimistic view of the situation as to consider it necessary to evacu-

ate the military posts in the country in the western half of Arkansas and the Indian Territory to the south line of Kansas, all of which had been won by very great costs and sacrifices to the Government, besides the great injustice and suffering such a course would have entailed upon the loyal white people and Indians of the evacuated region.

While the arrangements for evacuation were going forward there was a good stage of water in the Arkansas, and if there was prospect of the army being short of supplies, there was no reason why they should not have been brought up the river on transports from Little Rock, as they were immediately after the order for evacuation had been countermanded.

The proposed evacuation would have taken the loyal Arkansas troops away from the defense of their own part of the state and the loyal Indians from holding the line of the Arkansas River as a defense against the Southern Indian forces overrunning their country north of the river.

THE END.

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Britton's book has sterling qualities; its characteristics are impartiality of judgment and an independence of other men's opinions, in combination with strong Federal sympathies.

The Witness, Montreal, Canada.

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Army and Navy, New York City

Mr. Wiley Britton, of the War Department, has undertaken the task of saving from obscurity the most important of the military operations and events in Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas, and Indian Territory during the years 1861 and 1862.

The Nation, New York City

While we are thankful for what the author has given us in this respect, we cannot help regretting that he has not given us more. Each theater of operations has something peculiar to itself. The "border-ruffian" struggle on the confines of Missouri and Kansas has imprinted peculiar traits upon the people, and modified the conflict when it came under the outer guise of regular warfare.

The Independent, New York City.

Mr. Britton has chosen a field that has not been covered before, and which has been, in some sense, the despair of military writers. It is not too much to say that he has brought the history into intelligible order, and that his book must be the standard one on the subject.

Evening Telegraph, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

He ought, therefore, to be able to produce a valuable book, and this his work appears to be. It is not of the so-called popular kind, that is given to bombastic description of sensational events, nor marred with cheap productions of the alleged war artist, but it is written in a sober, steady vein throughout, being a concise yet complete account of civil and military events during 1861 and 1862, the line of battle after that having been much farther South.

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The Republic, St. Louis, Mo.

His work will probably be criticised sharply by those on the other side, but his book will none the less be read with interest in this section.

Literary World, Boston, Massachusetts.

Mr. Britton's narrative is easy, circumstantial, and impartial, and will take a place of honor in the library of the Civil War.

Commercial Advertiser, New York.

His work is a valuable addition to the literature both of the period and of the region of which it treats. Though his history is technical in character, it is clearly and simply told.

The Tribune, New York.

Mr. Britton has done well to write this volume, even if it might have been fuller and more picturesque, for the Civil War on the border certainly ought to be described in the detail its importance and peculiarities deserve. It was one of the fiercest and most desperate of all the struggles pertaining to the Rebellion; and perhaps, considering all things, it entailed more misery in proportion to the numbers concerned than did the fighting anywhere else

The Herald, New York.

Mr Britton describes some campaigns and engagements in the trans-Mississippi region which have been forgotten except by such soldiers and civilians as have in their natures a trace of the strategic instinct, and know that without the results of some of these actions the Confederates on the eastern side of the Mississippi would have been better reinforced and provisioned.

The Globe, Boston, Massachusetts.

The work has the weight of thorough study and preparation, and is impartial, and it adopts an interesting style. It will be welcomed as a standard history.

Minneapolis Tribune, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

By this means historical inaccuracies are reduced to a minimum and a fairly true record of events transmitted to posterity.

The Journal, Indianapolis, Indiana.

The course of the narrative embraces operations in Kansas, Arkansas and the Indian Territority, and they are described in clear and graphic style.

"The Civil War on the Border" is an admirable contribution to the tory of the epoch to which it refers, and I commend it cordially interested in the subject.

(Signed) John J. Ingalls, U. S. S

I regard the volume entitled "The Civil War on the Border" as esting volume and one that supplies information w ieed supplied in completing a history of the late Civil W